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How can people trust the harvest until they see it sown? —Mary Renault, The King Must Die (1958) In chapter 1, I reviewed the literature that put forth the argument that presidents achieve responsiveness to their executive authority through the strategic use of appointment powers and increases in the number of appointments (especially non-Senate confirmed appointments) while simultaneously centralizing policymaking to a cadre of identified loyalists. I also documented how these tactics were aggressively implemented in the G. W. Bush administration. I identified a management technique that extends from this strategy, known commonly in the administrative presidency literature as “jigsaw management” (Ban & Ingraham, 1990; Benda & Levine, 1988; Pfiffner, 1987), which is based on a fundamental distrust of the career bureaucracy. In chapter 2, I reviewed the literature that explores the importance of interpersonal trust in organizations, especially at the executive ranks. I unpacked the idea of trust from cognate literatures, showed its previously unexplored implications for advancing presidential agendas administratively , and offered a model of trust building and its role in advancing those agendas. In this chapter, I test some of the propositions I put forth in the theoretical framework offered in chapter 2. I focus here on a very narrow piece of the heuristic model previously presented as figure 2.1: the “encapsulated interest” account of trust and its connection to explicit knowledge exchange between appointees and career executives. As discussed in chapter 2, mutual trust can be understood as the areas of interaction in which two or more 5 Encapsulated Interest and Explicit Knowledge Exchange A Case Study of Presidential Transition 116 Rethinking the Administrative Presidency actors find continuing value in both the exchange and content of information . I have referred to this conceptualization of mutual trust as the “encapsulated interest,” or “calculative” account of trust. As previously defined, encapsulated interest refers to the idea that the benefit that one receives from any particular exchange in which one is trusted is a function of “the potential benefit from continuing the series of interactions” (Hardin, 2006b, p. 22). Moreover, as I argued in chapter 2, encapsulated interest represents only one dimension of trust. It excludes the character-based (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and emotional (Dunn, 1990) dimensions of the construct , as well as how social norms and obligations may regulate purely calculative exchanges between individuals (i.e., “embeddedness attributes” of an organizational setting) (Williamson, 1993). Therefore, the focus of this chapter provides a narrow, but more parsimonious, conceptualization of trust as “encapsulated interest.” Additionally, the dependent variable in this chapter is just one dimension of intellectual capital: explicit knowledge. Here, I am specifically interested in how the establishment of encapsulated interest between career executives and political appointees is associated with explicit knowledge exchange. I study this question in a policy area that provides a practical focus for analysis because it is one that was simultaneously implemented across agencies , in a largely universal manner, and intended to be carried out according to a centralized presidential mandate from the White House to political appointees. The policy I examine is the Bush administration’s preparations for the presidential transition of 2008–2009. Importantly, the mandate from the White House explicitly directs Bush appointees to work with career executives in formulating implementation plans and carrying out implementation . Studying the implementation of a centrally mandated policy from the White House calling for career involvement to make for a smooth transition allows us to indirectly assess the effects of prior appointee-careerist relations in the Bush years. If we find empirically that a jigsaw puzzle management technique was used to implement a policy requiring careerist involvement more broadly, a curious paradox is identified, one that may indicate why knowledge of transition activities was limited (as discussed in greater detail in the following section). If we do not find it, or we find some modified or more nuanced version of jigsaw puzzle management, we will have some Encapsulated Interest and Explicit Knowledge Exchange 117 evidence that conventional wisdom may have to be rethought and alterative metaphors considered that better fit the data from these surveys. To test the question of how much careerist input and participation was valued by the Bush administration as input to facilitating the transition, this chapter uses a survey of members of the SES administered by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in October 2008. This survey addresses SES members’ involvement in the 2008–2009 transition, as well as their general perceptions of presidential transitions. The respondents ’ general perceptions of...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9781421418506
Related ISBN
9781421418490
MARC Record
OCLC
922889469
Pages
176
Launched on MUSE
2015-10-13
Language
English
Open Access
No
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