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327 10 Major Reform Proposals This chapter introduces several prominent studies on national security for the twenty-first century. Of particular significance are issues of organizational design. In general, the studies are bipartisan even though some claim to be nonpartisan. They are staffed by senior personnel with lengthy service in the executive or legislative branch. Some have served as political appointees, and many hope for another appointment. Collectively they bring experience and expertise. The same individuals populate many of the studies. They are practitioners of the art of the possible; they often avoid the hotly contested issues to improve the political feasibility of their recommendations. And, too often, the contested issues are the ones that need examination. Edges can be rounded off and important issues glossed over. The chapter begins by introducing three broad approaches to reform and identifies what appears to be the consensus starting point. The introduction is followed by reviews of notable reform efforts. The chapter concludes with a summary of common conclusions and recommendations. Balancing and Orchestrating the Instruments There have been radical swings in post–Cold War strategies, and there is no strategic stability on the horizon. The various agencies of government house the instruments of power that underwrite the chosen strategy. The uniformed military represents but one instrument of power. The military, as currently configured, is strained in the complex environment of the twenty-first century. It is tempting to conclude that the military should be transformed in response. But such a conclusion is premature. 328 National Security Reform The agencies of government, including Defense, cannot be redesigned for each incoming administration and its chosen strategy. Increasing the size of an organization takes several years; substantially changing the shape of an organization takes decades. An optimal solution for one strategy likely will fail catastrophically for another. The mechanisms of power must be designed to support a reasonable range of strategies. Suboptimal solutions are the only prudent choice. Implementation of a nation-building capability remains an open issue. After determining the necessary balance of instruments, there are two questions to answer simultaneously. One question asks how the instruments of power will be distributed across the agencies of government. The other asks how those instruments will be orchestrated to achieve unity of effort toward national objectives. Where Do the Instruments Lie? Transforming the military from a major-wars force to a small-wars force is one alternative requiring a radical transformation of the military away from its deeply engrained selfconception as a conventional war-fighting organization. This alternative simplifies the orchestration problem, as it would be handled in the existing chain of command that governs the use of military force from the president and secretary of defense to the combatant commander in the field. But the risk is that the transformed military will be unprepared for the next major war. A second alternative is to create additional defense agencies to house the instruments of power necessary for nation building abroad. The Defense Department currently houses twenty defense agencies, including, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Information Systems Agency. More defense agencies could be added to complement the uniformed services. The uniformed military would be reconstituted and modernized for conventional combat operations and to provide security forces for the civilian defense agencies. This, too, has the benefit of simplifying the problem of orchestrating the instruments. Defense agencies can be established by executive order rather than legislation. A third alternative is to leave the instruments distributed across the agencies of government, bring their respective capacities into balance, and turn attention to the problem of orchestration. The instruments of Major Reform Proposals 329 power are not neatly divided by agency. The White House and the State Department share the diplomatic instrument, and diplomacy is conducted to some extent by every government representative abroad. The Defense Department has a near-monopoly on the military instrument, but the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) maintains its own paramilitary force, and a robust security force has grown in the private sector. The intelligence instrument is spread across almost all agencies of government including the cia, State, and multiple defense agencies. The economic instrument is shared principally by Defense (military assistance) and the Agency for International Development (foreign aid), both nominally under State’s guidance. The Justice, State, and Defense Departments share the law enforcement instrument. The information instrument is spread across government and is broken. The reform studies share the third view. Leave the departments...


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