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NOTES CHAPTER I 1 For an explanation of "traditional" and "conceptual" rhetoric, see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 3-17. 2 See Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, 35-39, and Classical Rhetoric, 9-15. 3 It is not within the scope of this study to consider the role of ethos in the Greek tradition. Wilhelm Suss, Ethos, has attempted, with varying degrees of success, a detailed examination of the concept in Greek rhetoric and oratory. 4 See, e.g., Phaedr. 269d-274a, Leg. 722-'723, Gorg. 500-504; Lysis 210a-d; d. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos," 55-65; Solmsen, '~ristotle and Cicero," 390404 , esp. 402-404. 5 Cf. Phaedr. 261a, 270b, 271a-d. 6 Aristotle's conception of a thing's organic unity, as illustrated, e.g., in Metaph. 6.17.1041bll-13, seems to have been responsible for his decision to analyze a speech, not as being composed of discrete parts, but as being a whole in which proof, style, and disposition play discrete roles. See Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition," 35-50, 169-190; d. idem, "Aristotle and Cicero," 390-404; Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos," 57. 7 Rhet. 1.2.1356al-4. See Grimaldi, "A Note on the niauu;," 188-192; idem, Studies, esp. 53-68, and Commentary, 19-20, 349-356; in these passages Grimaldi distinguishes the various uses of the word pisteis by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, arguing convincingly that the pisteis of the passage in question represent "source material for demonstrative proof, whereas the niarEt, as modes of demonstration are lv(}vp."p.a and naeaoEtyp.a" ("A Note," 190). 8 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 68. 9 Grimaldi, Studies, 62; Commentary, 39-40. He prefers the name to pragma (based on the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus Lysias 19) for the third source of persuasion, which is not to be identified with enthymema; rather, "the three pisteis as sources for rhetorical demonstration are informed or ordered by the demonstrative process, i.e. the inferential process of deductive and inductive reasoning, namely enthymeme and example" ("A Note," 191 ). 10 Cf. Cope, Introduction, 108-113; see also the relevant passages in Cope's Commentary ; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, 91-93. For slightly different conceptions of ethos, d. Suss, Ethos, esp. 1-2, and Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos," esp. 55-56. 172 Notes to Pages 2-6 11 Sattler's diagram of ethos, "Conceptions of Ethos," 58, illustrates the important connection between this source of persuasion and proairesis. 12 Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero," 404, concludes that Aristotle is certainly indebted to Plato "for his new conception of rhetoric in general and ,/!vxaywyia in particular, but that he is independent of Plato in the methods of its execution ." See above, n. 4. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Cf. Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition," 46-50, 178-179; and "Aristotle and Cicero ," 390-402. See, e.g., Rhet. Her. 1.8, 11, 2.5; De Inv. 1.22,26,29; d. Solmsen, '1\ristotelian Tradition," 178. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero," 397-402; d. his "Aristotelian Tradition," 179. Ad Fam. 1.9.23; d. De Or. 2.152, 160. The affectus are treated in 2.185-211; the technical passage is 2.206-211. Cf. Solmsen, '1\ristotle and Cicero," 396-402. Cf. De Or. 2.310, also 2.80-82, 322. "Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum , animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo dicet orator. ConciIiantur autem animi dignitate hominis, rebus gestis, existimatione vitae; quae facilius omari possunt, si modo sunt, quam fingi, si nulla sunt. Sed haec adiuvant in oratore: lenitas vocis, vultus pudor[is significatioj, verborum comitas; si quid persequare acrius, ut invitus et coactus facere videare. Facilitatis , liberalitatis, mansuetudinis, pietatis, grati animi, non appetentis, non avidi signa proferre perutile est; eaque omnia, quae proborum, demissorum, non acrium, non pertinacium, non litigiosorum, non acerborum sunt, valde benevolentiam conciliant abalienantque ab eis, in quibus haec non sunt; itaque eadem sunt in adversarios ex contrario conferenda." Antonius' theorizing about ethos is likely to have been slightly out of step with the way ethos was being used by Roman orators; the tendency of rhetorical theory to lag behind practice, at times by a substantial margin, has often been noted. Cf. Kennedy's comment on the theory and practice of ethos in "Rhetoric of Advocacy ," 436. 20 This usage seems to occur commonly in Latin; d., e...


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