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
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CHAPTER 5

Reconstruction

Constructing Reconstruction

Building Kosovo's Post-conflict Environment

ANDREW HERSCHER

ABSTRACT

After the Cold War, “post-conflict reconstruction” emerged as a particular form of humanitarian and development assistance, both extending and transforming the “post-war reconstruction” that was carried out after the Second World War. Rather than analyzing post-conflict reconstruction as a response to the destruction of the post-conflict environment, I explore it as a means of constituting that environment as an object of knowledge and action in the first place. This constitution takes place in what I term “reconstruction space” and “reconstruction time,” each seemingly objective dimensions of the post-conflict environment. “Reconstruction space” is a location where “external” actors make “interventions” in relation to “local” communities or publics; “reconstruction time” is a temporal period of clearly divided “phases” which move from emergency, through transition, to physical reconstruction as such.

While reconstruction space and reconstruction time frame knowledge of and action in the post-conflict environment, they also structure that environment in accordance with the Neoliberal politics and ideologies of the stakeholders invested in reconstructing it. I investigate this structuring through an examination of the reconstruction of housing in Kosovo after 1999. This reconstruction was staged by reconstruction’s stakeholders as rehousing Kosovo’s homeless and displaced population. More precisely, housing reconstruction incorporated post-conflict Kosovo into global systems of

capitalism, governance, and ordering. I discuss four dimensions of this incorporation. First, housing reconstruction projects equated *re-housing* with *repatriation*, an equation that advanced the immigration and asylum policies of stakeholder nations more than it responded to the housing needs of the homeless and displaced. Second, assessments of post-conflict housing conditions measured *lacks* and *needs* rather than *capacities* and *resources*, thereby withholding agency from post-conflict communities and endowing stakeholder institutions with that agency. Third, housing assistance took the form of the distribution of relief supplies and the construction of shelter repairs; the precise measurement of these activities allowed stakeholders to know and manage housing reconstruction, despite the imprecise relation of these activities to the re-housing of the homeless and displaced. Fourth, the very provision of relief and repair allowed stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction to stage themselves as such, an allowance that displaced stakeholder attention from the conflicts that emerged and intensified during post-conflict reconstruction itself.

Post-conflict reconstruction, then, is less a response to a post-conflict environment that exists prior to and separate from itself than it is a discursive, institutional, and practical production of that environment. Consideration of this production foregrounds the importance of stakeholders in fabricating the environments they imagine themselves to simply and merely reconstruct, a foregrounding that augments critical analysis of post-conflict knowledge and action.

INTRODUCTION

The ruin of architecture and infrastructure is one of the post-conflict environment's most obvious and evident dimensions. The typical claim that "the leveling of buildings and cities had always been an inevitable part of conducting hostilities" gestures towards the self-evidence of destruction in conflict.¹ This self-evidence has only intensified with the formulation of post-modern "new wars" fought in terms of identity politics; these politics are understood to yield "conflicts where the erasure of memories, history and identity attached to architecture and place . . . is the goal itself."² Thus, whatever else the contemporary post-conflict environment may or may not be, it is, almost always, an environment that is defined by physical destruction: "as with the aftermath of a traditional war, the identification of recon-

struction needs following new wars starts by assessing the scale of material damage inflicted upon a country's physical infrastructure, housing stock and economic assets."³ Accordingly, the amelioration of that damage typically comprises a primary post-conflict task.⁴ To investigate the post-conflict reconstruction of the built environment, then, is to study one of the fundamental ways in which the post-conflict environment is epistemologically constituted as an empirical reality in the first place.

In the following, I will examine housing reconstruction in Kosovo after 1999 as one of a constellation of ritualized post-conflict practices that, seemingly invoked as responses to the post-conflict environment, more precisely serve to reify that environment as an objective reality in the first place. The reconstruction of the built environment reifies the post-conflict environment in multiple guises: it is imagined and practiced as if the environment it takes place in is characterized by exceptional forms and levels of destruction; as if it is a component of a whole range of other forms of reconstruction, social, economic, political, and cultural alike; and as if it marks or even furthers a shift from a space and time *of* conflict to a space and time *after* conflict.

The case of Kosovo is of particular importance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction because that case has been understood to be both exceptional and exemplary. "Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation."⁵ So it was observed in the preface to Kosovo's 2008 Declaration of Independence. This declaration was intended to end Kosovo's almost eight-year-long administration by the United Nations—an administration that began with a United Nations Security Council resolution guaranteeing Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁶ If the affirmation of exceptionality in the "Kosovo Declaration of Independence" was not scripted by Kosovo's international patrons in European and North American governments, then those patrons took pains to quickly emphasize exactly the same point. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointed out, for example, that "we've been very clear that Kosovo is *sui generis*."⁷ Others argued for Kosovo's exceptionality so strongly as to make the *sui generis* condition itself generic; for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, for example, "each situation needs to be examined based on its unique circumstances."⁸

Yet these arguments for Kosovo's *exceptionality* came after and reversed arguments for Kosovo as an *exemplary* site, a site of an internationally administered post-conflict reconstruction that was conceived on the basis of a wide set of precedents and also formative of still more precedents. These prece-

dents established conditions for the compromise of state sovereignty at moments when a state bore—or was said to bear—responsibility for perpetrating “grave humanitarian situations,” to use the language of UNSC Resolution 1244. Thus, “‘Kosovo’ has been cited as an exemplar for a new broader trend in international relations,” according to Aidan Hehir.⁹ Many “have begun to see the international response to the Kosovo crisis as a new paradigm of international relations, a blue print for a new world order,” Marc Weller similarly affirms.¹⁰

Identified as an *exemplary* post-conflict environment, Kosovo was treated as an object of knowledge and site of action for post-conflict reconstruction—a place, that is, where generic principles of post-conflict reconstruction could be applied, tested, and reformulated. By contrast, as an *exceptional* site (a polity declaring an independent state), Kosovo was posited outside of precedent application and establishment. The seeming dialectic between example and exception, however, actually retained both terms on each of its sides. Thus, while Kosovo could be posed as an exemplary post-conflict environment, that environment itself comprises an exceptional condition, a space where the seemingly normal forms of sovereignty and governance are held in suspension. Similarly, while Kosovo could be posed as the outcome of an exceptional instance of state-making, the state itself comprises an exemplary condition, the typical form of political order. The relationship of example and exception in the case of both the post-conflict environment and the incipient state suggests that exemplarity and exceptionality ought to be regarded less as objective characteristics of Kosovo than as characteristics within a dramaturgical order in which they are to some degree constitutive of the phenomena they seem to merely describe.¹¹

The shift of Kosovo from an exemplary post-conflict environment to an exceptional incipient state from 1999 to 2008 has typically been studied in terms of its planned and contingent dimensions, its beneficiaries and victims, and its precedents and consequences. More salient questions, however, concern the mechanisms by which example and exception become understood as objective features of the post-conflict environment in the first place. That is, rather than asking who or what causes, acts upon, occupies, or is affected by the post-conflict environment, it is possible to ask how that environment appears as such—how it comes to be seen, thought, lived, experienced, and manipulated as a particular sort of political, economic, social, and spatial situation. These questions presume that the post-conflict environment is not simply an empirical reality that solicits the intervention of

stakeholders but is also an object that is constituted by the knowledge and actions of those stakeholders themselves.¹² Following from this presumption, the post-conflict environment can be understood to appear most self-evidently and objectively precisely where the knowledge and action of its stakeholders is least self-conscious and unreflexive. In what follows, I pose the physical reconstruction of the post-conflict environment as organized and manifested by just such unself-conscious and unreflexive knowledge and actions. As such, physical reconstruction offers a useful view of the conceptual and practical reifications through which the post-conflict environment comes into being.¹³

Kosovo's post-conflict reconstruction is both an object of my study and a site of my past work. The institutions I worked with included the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for which I did research in 1999 and 2000; the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, for which I served as a cultural heritage officer and department co-head in 2001; and the Transitional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo, for which I served as a consultant in 2006 and 2007. Though I worked with stakeholder institutions, my position is not that of one or a combination of these stakeholders. At stake for me is critical analysis of post-conflict knowledge and action rather than the advancement of a given position or judgment of an extant opinion; what follows here is intended to further such critical analysis.

RECONSTRUCTION AS EXPERTISE AND ACTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the reconstruction of war-damaged buildings and cities has been posed as a mode of political action, a form of capital expenditure, and an object of professional expertise and academic study. The key event motivating this investment in reconstruction was the massive destruction of European cities carried out via new forms of industrialized warfare in the course of the Second World War.¹⁴ Architecturally and otherwise, the labor underwritten by the US-sponsored Marshall Plan was usually posed simply as "reconstruction"; that this reconstruction occurred after and as a response to war was perhaps so obvious as to require no explicit acknowledgment. Yet this reconstruction did not involve only or even primarily the physical rebuilding of damaged and destroyed architecture and infrastructure; it was focused, rather, on the political, social, and economic

rebuilding of the European nations. This rebuilding was shaped by an intention to ensure national, European, and global political order through the formation of an open international market economy structured according to liberal economic precepts.¹⁵

The perceived success of the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe contributed to the subsequent afterlife of the plan in US responses to other global crises.¹⁶ Throughout the wave of post-Second World War decolonizations in Africa, East Asia, the Middle East, and South America, then, US governments undertook aid and development projects that were similar to the Marshall Plan in their conceptualization of order and stability as products of free-market capitalism.¹⁷ Carried out as "development assistance" or "nation-building" under the guise of the Truman Doctrine, these projects were also shaped by Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, as the Cold War developed, international assistance provided by both the US and international financial organizations (IFOs) focused on aid and development through the foundation of free-market economies achieved via "structural adjustments" in the economies of aid recipients.¹⁸ Some scholars have viewed this form of assistance as a direct legacy of the Marshall Plan, a view that has also prompted the Marshall Plan to be re-conceived as the ur-form of the structural adjustment program.¹⁹ Yet equivocations between the Marshall Plan and structural adjustment programs also reflected a perception that reconstruction could be thought and carried out without a great deal of focus on the particular situation which invoked it; these situations, which ranged from political conflicts, through disasters, to underdevelopment, were all posited as problems that could be ameliorated in some way by the activities of a robust free market.

After the Cold War, political conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia led to a renewed attention to the specificities of reconstruction after conflict, especially in relation to humanitarian aid and development. This attention led to the framing of "post-conflict reconstruction" as a discrete form of humanitarian and development assistance.²⁰ The shift from the implicit "post-war" dimension of Marshall Plan-era reconstruction to the explicit "post-conflict" dimension of post-Cold War reconstruction reflected the perceived salience of "new wars," encompassing intra-state, informal, and partially privatized conflicts, which were understood to have emerged and proliferated in the post-Cold War world.²¹

This salience has played itself out in multiple formats: after the end of the Cold War, post-conflict reconstruction has become the focus of depart-

ments or units in international organizations; national ministries or departments dealing with foreign aid or assistance; and non-governmental organizations dealing with humanitarian issues.²² IFOs, founded in the context of post-war European reconstruction but subsequently refraining from involvement in post-conflict situations, also expanded their mandate to cover these situations in the years after 1989. In 1995, the International Monetary Fund established the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance program, dedicated to providing assistance to countries in “post-conflict situations,” and, two years later, the World Bank created a Post-Conflict Unit to extend its work to the newly formulated “post-conflict environment.”²³ Some scholars have posed the subsequent focus of the World Bank on the rebuilding of physical infrastructure and on the formation of an open, market-based economic system in this environment as a legacy of Marshall Plan policies carried out in post-war Europe, as well as of Neoliberal economic doctrine.²⁴

In addition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have comprised particularly important new actors in post-Cold War post-conflict reconstruction. In the post-Second World War era, NGOs assumed increasing influence by taking on responsibility for humanitarian tasks and situations that Neoliberal states disavowed or refused.²⁵ Thus, while the reconstruction facilitated by the Marshall Plan functioned primarily through state-to-state relationships, reconstruction in the post-Cold War context has been mediated through an increasingly complex network of local and global NGOs that receive funds from donor states and IFOs and that work with aid recipients, from individuals and communities, through private and public institutions, to national governments. Many NGOs originated in response to relief issues, and many in response to development issues; with the emergence of post-conflict reconstruction as a fundamental mode of humanitarian assistance, NGOs of each of these types have become involved in reconstruction, adapting their mandate and expertise in the process. In addition, a new type of NGO specializing in country-specific post-conflict assistance has also emerged in the 1990s, in response to the increasing political, economic, and social significance accorded to post-conflict reconstruction.

A body of conventions, charters, standards, and best practices has emerged to plan, manage, and evaluate this reconstruction, while an interdisciplinary discourse has developed to analyze and critique the results of reconstruction projects.²⁶ The preceding represents not simply a response to the emergence of the post-conflict environment as an objective geopolitical reality, but also, and more profoundly, a conceptual fabrication of the post-

conflict environment as such a reality in the first place. That is, the status of the post-conflict environment as a space with particular and defining characteristics is at least partially an effect of discourses, institutions, and practices dedicated to ameliorating that environment.

The reification of the post-conflict environment can also be understood as part of a more general post-Cold War incorporation of the global periphery into an array of systems of global capitalism, governance, and ordering.²⁷ In this sense, “post-conflict reconstruction” serves as a name for one aspect of this incorporation, an inscription of this incorporation into seemingly apolitical contexts of humanitarianism and development, and a depoliticization of the Neoliberal political economy whose logic drives humanitarian and development projects.²⁸ Thus, as capitalism has been understood to routinize “creative destruction” as part of the process of capital expansion, so too does it routinize violent destruction by encompassing it, via a concept of “post-conflict,” in larger processes of reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction therefore comprises a procedure of Neoliberal capitalist development, as suggested by recently coined terms such as *disaster capitalism*.²⁹

Stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction are stakeholders in the Neoliberal economy, on the level of states attempting to maintain and strengthen global or regional hegemony, multinational corporations attempting to further capital accumulation, IFOs, and national and local elites. Each of these stakeholders is reliant on knowledge of and expertise in post-conflict reconstruction, as the normative literature routinely, albeit uncritically declares. “Knowledge on both sides is a key to successful reconstruction. Familiarity with the country, its laws, traditions, and culture is crucial for the external actors, while an understanding of the dynamics of the international-donor world and its mechanisms is useful to the beneficiaries”: the apparent symmetry in these sort of claims, with each “side” deemed dependent on knowledge of the other, belies the asymmetrical fabrication of the post-conflict environment, and the positions of the stakeholders within it, by only one of those sides.³⁰

RECONSTRUCTION SPACE AND RECONSTRUCTION TIME

Post-conflict reconstruction is typically framed as a process that is at once objective—a particular form of action in the contemporary global context—and generic—a form of action that is the same across that context. The ob-

jective and generic nature of post-conflict reconstruction places a premium on knowledge of that reconstruction that can be “translated” or “transferred” from one post-conflict environment to another.³¹ This knowledge has both spatial and temporal dimensions; study of and discourse on post-conflict reconstruction have thus formulated what may be regarded as normative conceptions of “reconstruction space” and “reconstruction time.”

The space of reconstruction is invoked by and responds to a posited space of destruction. The destruction in reconstruction space is ostensibly of an exceptional scale or intensity; reconstruction is defined and naturalized with reference to the destruction it responds to. The concept of “new war,” which proceeds not between states on formally defined battlefields, but in and against civilians in towns and cities, has provided an often-cited contextual rubric for the physical destruction that the space of reconstruction emerges around.³² A basic assumption is that the space of reconstruction is opposed to and ameliorative of destruction; this assumption shapes perception of the reconstruction space and of what is characteristic and exceptional in that space.

Reconstruction space also tends to be the space of the other insofar as reconstruction tends to occur at a remove from the places where it is conceived, organized, funded, and studied. Discourse on reconstruction is thus organized around “interventions” made by external actors in distant contexts: “The scale of damages, the need for specialized advice, and the weakness of native response mechanisms caused by warfare usually make external support for recovery necessary.”³³ “Distance” and “proximity,” however, are less geographical concepts than ideological ones organized according to concepts of development, governance, and globalization, the unfolding of which serve to render the distant proximate.

One outcome of the distance between the space to be reconstructed and the space to conceive, organize, fund, and study reconstruction is the focus, in normative literature on reconstruction, on relations between “interventions” made by “external” actors and “local” communities or publics. Actors in reconstruction are defined in terms of their proximity to or distance from the site of reconstruction: “local community,” “local authorities,” “local enterprise,” and “national government,” on the one hand, and “external agencies” on the other.³⁴ Much of the normative literature on reconstruction thus focuses on the articulation of relations between “local” and “external” actors. Privileged forms of these relations are “supportive,” “enabling,” “empathetic,” “participatory,” and “collaborative,” with external actors posited

in a position of strength and local ones in a position of weakness: “post-war reconstruction . . . has to be grounded in supporting conflict affected communities to organize themselves and start to regain control over their own environment as soon as possible.”³⁵ What may be regarded as local forms of agency, order, and power—clientist and patrimonial systems of social stability, clan-based social structures, and shadow and informal economies, for example—tend to be consigned, then, to an a priori marginality.

The desired outcome of the external-local relationship is the return of external actors to their “own” space: “Successful reconstruction is characterized by decreasing levels of external manpower and funding over time . . .”³⁶ This dramaturgy of actors in reconstruction space posits “locality” in terms of a fixed relationship to the post-conflict environment and “externality” in terms of a flexible relationship to that environment, a capacity to enter and exit that environment at will. While this dramaturgy brackets both the transnationality of local actors and the localities of putatively “transnational” or “international” actors, it also establishes a seemingly generic feature of the post-conflict environment.

Given that stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction understand reconstruction to be successful when it is no longer necessary to undertake, the time of reconstruction is structured according to a strictly teleological sequence of clearly divided “phases.”³⁷ These “phases” are defined according to the tasks and roles of the external actors who assume responsibility for shaping reconstruction. The sequence of phases typically moves from a time of emergency, through a time of transition, to a time of reconstruction-as-such, when permanent repairs are made to architecture and infrastructure.³⁸ This “relief-to-development” continuum thus posits reconstruction as an advance along a line of developmental criteria. A critique of these criteria has recently emerged in the normative literature on humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction.³⁹ This critique, however, has not taken on the phasing, sequencing, and teleology of reconstruction time as much as the particular identity of its presumed phases and the process by which those phases are moved through.

The duration of reconstruction time, as well as its particular phases, has also been the object of quantitative and qualitative modeling. A typical quantitative model posits the duration of reconstruction as a function of the length of the “emergency phase” and a constant determined by pre-disaster trends, scale of damage suffered, and resources available for recovery.⁴⁰ A typical qualitative model posits the duration of reconstruction in terms of a

“potlatch effect,” when rapidly rising aid enters the post-conflict environment in the first three years after conflict, and a succeeding “late awakening,” when aid levels drop after those first three years.⁴¹ At stake here is the status of reconstruction time as predictable—a time that can be known and shaped before it begins, rather than a time that can be discerned only after it has fully emerged. This temporal predictability provides another putatively generic feature of the post-conflict environment.

“CRISIS” AND “RELIEF”

In its role as an exemplary post-conflict environment, post-1999 Kosovo provides a vivid example of the positing of post-conflict reconstruction as an objectively necessary response to a humanitarian emergency. The 1998–99 conflict between NATO and Serbia over Kosovo formally concluded on June 9 and 10, 1999, with the signing of a cease-fire agreement and then, on the following day, the passage of UNSC Resolution 1244 stipulating the international interim administration of Kosovo, an administration undertaken by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The motivating context of this administration was defined in Resolution 1244 as a “grave humanitarian situation,” a definition that invoked reconstruction space and time as precise and crucial responses.

The United Nations’ administration mission was organized according to a “pillar” structure in which each pillar corresponded to both an organization involved in reconstruction and a phase of the reconstruction process. In Pillar I, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was put in charge of “humanitarian assistance”—the task of emergency relief. The tasks of transition were assigned to Pillar II, under the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), which was given charge of “civil administration,” and Pillar III, under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was given charge of “democratization and institution building.” Finally, in Pillar IV, the European Union (EU) was put in charge of “economic development and reconstruction.” In UNMIK’s pillar structure, then, reconstruction time was divided into phases correlating with the institutional division of reconstruction labor.⁴²

Stakeholders in Kosovo’s reconstruction initially studied reconstruction space via assessments of housing conditions; unless ameliorated through “humanitarian relief,” the apparently massive wartime destruction of hous-

ing was forecast to prevent large numbers of people from obtaining adequate shelter after the onset of winter. The un-housed and underhoused population of Kosovo was conceived in terms of the categories of “refugees” and “internally displaced people” (IDPs). These terms conflated the problem of *homelessness* with the process of *repatriation*. Thus, for UNMIK, “organized return will be to the place of origin constituting the optimal durable solution to the current displacement (and) . . . resources are to be focused on the conditions at the location of origin.”⁴³

With repatriation posed as a solution to the problem of post-conflict homelessness, the position of the national governments that were invested in Kosovo’s reconstruction was reified as a condition of the post-conflict environment itself. For these governments, many of which were located in the destination-nations of Kosovar migrants and refugees, the significance of repatriation to post-conflict Kosovo was tied to a reluctance to admit these migrants and refugees.⁴⁴ This dynamic was typical in Europe in the 1990s, which saw the tendency to exclude migrants extended in various ways to exclude refugees, especially those from the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ The “homelessness” of refugees and IDPs, as well as the very separation of the displaced into these two categories, thus involved fabrications of subject-categories and corresponding subjects, which then became the responsibility of international organizations concerned with refugees and IDPs rather than national institutions concerned with migration and asylum.⁴⁶

At the end of August 1999, two comprehensive assessments of housing in Kosovo had been completed. These assessments, too, were also reifications of the post-conflict environment, assisting in the formation of that environment as an objective reality and object of reconstruction labor, expertise, and capital. First, assessments typically posited *lack*—lack of materials, lack of technical abilities, lack of capacities to meet needs—in the post-conflict environment, over and against that environment’s particular capacities and resources. This positing would serve to reflexively corroborate top-down and professionalized models of relief and reconstruction over the furthering of local competencies and agencies, or what is often termed *self-help* or *community-driven reconstruction* in humanitarian discourse. Second, discrepancies in the seemingly objective results of assessments led to an atmosphere of mistrust between the agencies conducting the assessments and between those agencies and their intended beneficiaries, as if the post-conflict environment would be easily modeled in quantitative formats. Third, the seeming objectivity of assessment classifications bracketed other data from con-

sideration, a bracketing that prevented the physical relief and reconstruction of housing from responding to the social needs of the homeless. And fourth, assessments of the destruction of conflict served to displace attention from the post-conflict destruction that was occurring in the very midst of those assessments.

Humanitarian relief for Kosovo's refugees and IDPs was the responsibility of the UNHCR. In June 1999, weeks after the arrival of the United Nations to Kosovo, the UNHCR's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set up a Humanitarian Community Information Center which, in turn, organized a "Rapid Village Assessment" to determine "humanitarian needs" in such areas as housing damage, sanitation facilities, and access to water, food, and medical care.⁴⁷ The focus of the assessment was to survey immediate needs for shelter and the other basic services that the "humanitarian community" was organizing to meet.

In the "Rapid Village Assessment," damage was documented using a set of criteria developed by the UNHCR in work in Africa and South and Central America. The use of these criteria in Kosovo exemplifies the generic dimensions of the post-conflict environment. With this environment posed as a condition that is common the world over, the technocracy of post-conflict reconstruction processes its particular interventions as universal knowledge and know-how that can be subsequently applied to other particulars. In the UNHCR's damage assessment, housing damage was divided into five categories, ranging from one (undamaged or slightly damaged) to five (totally destroyed). With damage documented via both satellite imagery and on-site surveys, the "Rapid Village Assessment" was completed in July 1999. It described an environment in which 68 percent of the housing stock fit within category four or five. According to the typical interpretation, this could become the environment of a "humanitarian crisis" when refugees and IDPs returned to damaged houses and winter set in. Thus, the assessment motivated a humanitarian relief effort focused on shelter "rehabilitation" and "winterization."

At the same time, however, another humanitarian organization was also determining housing needs, but the metrics and results of its assessment would prove to be significantly different. This assessment was made by the International Management Group (IMG), an intergovernmental organization established by the UNHCR in 1993 to address technical and infrastructural tasks of post-conflict reconstruction. The European Union had responsibility for physical reconstruction in Kosovo, including the reconstruction

of housing, and in June 1999 the European Commission (the executive branch of the European Union) contracted the IMG to document housing and village infrastructure in Kosovo.⁴⁸ Completed in July 1999 on the basis of extensive on-site inspections, the IMG assessment used its own metric, developed in Bosnia, for categorizing damage—a use which also posed the post-conflict environment as a generic condition whose architecture could be evaluated according to a single set of abstract criteria. According to the IMG's criteria, levels of damage were divided into four categories, from one (slightly damaged) to four (very seriously damaged). In Kosovo, the IMG assessment described an environment in which 32 percent of the houses were seriously or very seriously damaged.

The different assessments of the housing crisis in Kosovo itself provoked problems, if not their own crisis. On one level, it was difficult to co-ordinate the findings of each report so as to accurately determine needs for shelter relief. On another level, if the categories of each assessment were coordinated, then each assessment described, at times, very different situations. In the municipality of Klina, for example, the UNHCR "Rapid Village Assessment" found 2,408 damaged houses (categories 2, 3, and 4) and 1,235 destroyed houses (category 5), while the IMG "Emergency Assessment" found 3,362 damaged houses (categories 2 and 3) and 3,579 destroyed houses (category 4). On the part of donors, this discrepancy led to confusion about how much shelter relief was necessary to provide, what sort of relief was necessary, and where this relief should be allocated.⁴⁹ On the part of many UNMIK officials administering the municipalities where housing was evaluated, there was a mistrust of each assessment and a felt need to produce new, "official" assessments through their own offices.⁵⁰ These latter assessments, which simplified the survey metric into the categories of "damaged" and "destroyed," soon arrived at a third set of results.⁵¹

Distinctions in level of damage also mediated other distinctions, particularly those related to socio-economic class, that nevertheless remained unmarked in damage assessments. In Kosovo, middle-class families and families who benefited from foreign remittances often lived in houses constructed after the Second World War with concrete frames and concrete block infill walls. When these houses were burned, the resulting damage was to internal finishes and fixtures but not to structural elements—an intermediate level of damage in the housing assessments. Lower middle-class and impoverished families often lived in houses constructed prior to the Second World War with rubble masonry and wooden floors and ceilings. When these houses

were burned, the wooden floors often collapsed and pulled the surrounding walls down with them—the most severe level of damage in each of the various housing assessments. Because emergency housing relief concentrated on providing relief to as many families as possible, it focused on houses with intermediary levels of damage; this relief strategy thus resulted in assistance going to relatively privileged families in communities, with less privileged families offered alternative temporary accommodation instead of repairs to their severely damaged or destroyed homes.⁵² Here, in the guise of restoring pre-existing conditions, post-conflict relief inadvertently functioned to intensify socio-economic stratifications.

Shelter relief efforts in the fall and winter of 1999 were primarily undertaken by some 30 international NGOs, from the approximately 300 that were active in Kosovo by the fall of 1999, along with USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance and the European Community Humanitarian Office.⁵³ The architecture of interest here was primarily "shelter": an elemental protection against the elements. The vast scale at which such protection had to be instituted for returning refugees and IDPs led international actors to standardize and professionalize shelter relief efforts. The post-conflict environment was qualified as *domestic*, a site of residence; *elemental*, a site for the accommodation of basic human needs; and *pacified*, a site where violence had been eliminated.⁵⁴ In this environment, the capacities of local actors to participate in relief and reconstruction efforts were neglected, as was the emergence of post-conflict violence against Kosovar Serbs, which manifested in part against architectural targets.

Displaced Kosovar Albanians quickly began to return to Kosovo after June 1999.⁵⁵ Based on its assessments of shelter needs, on the one hand, and the capacities of NGOs and IGOs, on the other, the UNHCR allocated to NGOs and IGOs a certain number of homes to reconstruct or winterize in specified villages or towns. A premise, shared by all institutions and organizations involved in housing relief and reconstruction, was that the return of Kosovar refugees and IDPs implied a return "to their homes" or "to their place of origin."⁵⁶ The asserted equivalence between the "return" of displaced populations and their "homecoming" at a particular architectural point of origin served to focus great effort and major resources on the architectural reconstruction of homes; it also, however, denied the transformed meaning, value, and status of those homes, and of dwelling more generally, wrought both by conflict and by post-conflict reconstruction itself. Conflict, that is, often converted a home from a site of family life, patrimonial inheri-

tance, or sanctuary into one of dispossession, displacement, or violence. With the rendering of the Kosovo conflict in ethnic terms, moreover, neighbors of other ethnicities became dangerous enemies, and village and towns of mixed ethnicities became contact zones between communities at war. The post-conflict program to return Kosovar refugees and IDPs to their pre-conflict homes, however, ignored these dynamics. Homes were thus sometimes reconstructed in places and situations where their occupants could no longer be at home, a factor that contributed to the often low occupancy rate of reconstructed homes.

The post-conflict environment was also reified through the provision of shelter relief; the provision of this relief was, at once, measurable and knowable to stakeholders and indeterminately related to the re-housing Kosovo's of homeless and displaced population. The instruments of shelter relief consisted of the distribution of relief supplies or the construction of shelter repairs. Relief supplies consisted of winter tents with stoves for heating and cooking; "dry room kits" or "emergency shelter kits" with plastic sheets for roof cover, windows, doors, carpet, and stove; "warm room kits" with stove and carpet; "roof kits" with concrete ring-beam base, timber roofing members and plastic cover; and "emergency kits" containing plastic sheeting, winter clothes, and cooking supplies. Shelter repairs were focused on the wooden roofs of mud-brick or concrete frame houses that were destroyed by fire; these roofs were rebuilt and covered either temporarily, with plastic sheeting, or permanently, with roof tiles.⁵⁷

Supplies were distributed and repairs made according to efforts to maximize the "relief" they provided; this relief was calculated in terms of, on the one hand, the amount of supplies distributed and the number of repairs made and, on the other hand, the number of houses "winterized," "rebuilt," or "reconstructed." The relationship between "supplies distributed" and houses "rebuilt" or "reconstructed" was imprecise, with different agencies using different standards to measure the effect of their work. In March 2000, around six months after shelter relief assistance was under way, UNMIK introduced guidelines for housing reconstruction.⁵⁸ These guidelines stipulated the level of repair that was to constitute "reconstruction," as well as criteria for the selection of houses to be reconstructed; by this time, however, the implementation of housing reconstruction projects was already under way, with the organizations involved using their own, self-defined standards.⁵⁹

An imprecise relationship also obtained between the number of houses

winterized or reconstructed and the number and type of people provided shelter. While relief assistance was premised on refugees and IDPs returning to their pre-conflict places of residence, in fact there were significant shifts in settlement in the post-conflict period, especially from rural areas to urban areas, and to Prishtina/Priština, Kosovo's capital city. Shelter relief, however, was consistently described in terms of spaces that were winterized or reconstructed and supplies that were distributed. Thus, many NGOs simply did not monitor the *occupancy* of houses that they reconstructed.⁶⁰ Further, some post-assistance surveys that did monitor the work of NGOs involved in shelter relief and reconstruction found that as little as 40 percent of winterized spaces were actually occupied in the winter of 1999–2000.⁶¹

While emergency housing relief was distinguished, temporally and institutionally, from the permanent housing reconstruction that was to succeed it, the border between housing relief and housing reconstruction was never clearly defined in post-conflict Kosovo. At the very inception of emergency housing relief, aid agencies faced the question of whether to provide temporary shelter relief, in the form of warm room kits, warm roof kits, plastic roofs, or permanent shelter reconstruction, in the form of tiled roofs on timber frames; donors made all the preceding available so that some agencies had to choose whether to assist in “relief” or “reconstruction.”⁶² In Kosovo, temporary plastic roofs could be erected at half the cost of permanent tiled ones, and agencies that provided plastic roofs were able to assist around twice as many aid recipients as those that provided tiled roofs.⁶³ Thus, because the distinction between “temporary relief” and “permanent reconstruction” was infrequently marked in assessments, the former was often privileged over the latter. The provision of emergency relief, especially as it occurred during a moment of focused humanitarian attention and assistance, also often displaced subsequent, more complicated and more expensive housing reconstruction projects. “As a result,” Sultan Barakat has noted, “short-term housing measures often mutate into permanent, poor-quality settlements lived in by the poor.”⁶⁴

Yet destruction was not only encountered via its wartime remains in the two-month-old post-conflict environment; it was also inflicted in and on that environment, against new targets and in the name of new constituencies. If international agencies responded to the wartime destruction of Serb forces by *assessing* it, then local groups of Kosovar Albanians, often including former members of the Kosovar Liberation Army, responded to that destruction by *avenging* it, inflicting a counter-destruction against sites associated

with Serbs and Serbia: Serbian-owned or Serbian-occupied houses and Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries, and graveyards.⁶⁵ What was reified as a “post-conflict environment” by Kosovo’s international sponsors, patrons, and administrators was actually a conflictual environment to many who inhabited that environment. Beginning with the departure of Serb forces from Kosovo in June 1999, buildings owned, inhabited, or associated with Serbs became highly vulnerable to the counter-violence waged against them.⁶⁶ The NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR), responsible for security and order in the territory, took months to be able to even partially respond to this counter-violence by deploying troops to defend Kosovar Serb residences and monuments.

Meanwhile, by August 1999, almost all Kosovar Serbs had fled Kosovo’s towns and cities, either to the predominantly Serbian north of Kosovo, to enclaves protected by KFOR within Kosovo, or to Serbia itself.⁶⁷ By the same time, hundreds of Serb-owned houses had been damaged or destroyed, along with almost 100 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries—a re-destruction occurring at the very initiation of Kosovo’s post-conflict reconstruction.⁶⁸

The ongoing assessments of wartime destruction, however, served to displace attention from the destruction that was occurring in the very midst of those assessments. Perhaps nowhere was this displacement so fraught as in those assessments authored by Kosovar Albanian communities and institutions. Often assigning collective responsibility for wartime destruction to “the Serbs,” these assessments did not simply displace attention from post-conflict destruction but rather legitimized that destruction as acceptable or even necessary revenge. In so doing, those assessments contributed to the formation of a post-conflict environment in which Kosovar Serbs could inhabit few places without fear of conflict.⁶⁹

“DEVELOPMENT” AND “RECONSTRUCTION”

Two years into its unfolding, Kosovo’s post-conflict environment continued to be an amalgam of construction and reconstruction, with building activity inextricably involving each process. The reconstruction that was desired, sponsored, planned, and executed by the international community typically involved the rationalization, modernization, and globalization of extant social and economic structures. In their own terms, these were processes that provided relief from conflict and facilitated development out of con-

flict. In both their success and failure, however, these processes also involved the production of new conflicts, albeit ones invisible in the dominant frames of reconstruction thought and practice.

As housing reconstruction proceeded, the indistinct boundary between temporary “relief” and permanent “reconstruction” that was present from the very inception of relief assistance became ever more prominent. In February 2000, with the intended phasing-out of post-conflict relief in Kosovo, the EU established the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) to manage post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, as well as in Serbia and Montenegro. In Kosovo, the EAR focused physical reconstruction on the repair of damaged or inadequate energy, water, and transport infrastructure and the reconstruction of damaged housing.⁷⁰ As overseen by the EAR, sponsored by individual states, and carried out by IGOs and NGOs, reconstruction was conducted as a fully globalized activity, and, precisely as such, it involved the conflicts between local and global structures typical of any globalizing enterprise.⁷¹

These conflicts emerged on many levels. The building material with which houses were reconstructed was largely imported into Kosovo, so that the local building material industry, which produced bricks, doors, windows, and other products used in construction, had limited access to post-conflict reconstruction activity as a result.⁷² This reconstruction thereby served to weaken Kosovo’s building industry, along with many other local industries.⁷³ These effects were not aberrant features of Kosovo’s reconstruction; they were, rather, typical and desirable outcomes of a process that posed recovery, stability, and development as products of Neoliberal economic policies and programs. These policies and programs promoted the reach and efficacy of global corporate capitalism over and against the interests of local economies, public authorities, and state institutions; the “order” that they advanced was that of the free market. In this sense, post-Cold War reconstruction has continued and intensified a dynamic that marked reconstruction efforts since the Marshall Plan, a dynamic in which post-conflict reconstruction serves as an opportunity to advance Neoliberal conceptions of peace and prosperity.⁷⁴

Architectural reconstruction in Kosovo comprised a form of compulsory modernization, as well as of forced globalization. The building construction system that was preferred for reconstruction utilized a reinforced concrete frame with brick infill. This system was at once simple to fabricate and utilized a standardized set of components; at the same time, its implementation, especially in rural areas, yielded the rebuilding of damaged houses con-

structed from mud-brick or stone with concrete and brick. While this modernizing housing assistance was intended by the UNHCR and UNMIK to be given to the families most in need of it, in fact the recipients of this assistance emerged out of complex negotiations between local groups and aid agencies. Some villages, for example, privileged families who were understood to have contributed to the insurgency against Serbia as recipients of assistance, so that this assistance intensified the formation of a new post-conflict social hierarchy. Because reconstruction assistance was targeted not only to recipients most in need but also to recipients who were present in Kosovo, the vast preponderance of this assistance was given, from 1999 to 2001, to Kosovar Albanians. The concurrent exclusion of Kosovar Serbs, half of whom left or were expelled from Kosovo after June 1991, from the reconstruction process thus served to concretize Kosovo's post-conflict geography of ethnic separation, this despite the explicit commitment of reconstruction agencies to build a "multi-ethnic" and "multi-cultural" post-conflict Kosovo.

The entire process of reconstruction also introduced new models of community development and new social structures to the post-conflict environment, with inherited family- or clan-based structures of decision-making, land and revenue distribution, and welfare responsibility replaced by more "egalitarian" structures fabricated by post-conflict municipalities under UNMIK guidance.⁷⁵ The assumption was that this was a form of democratization. In the words of one United States Agency for International Development (USAID) initiative to develop civil society in Kosovo, this society was traditionally based on "top-down, hierarchical decision making"; in the words of one EAR report, "the involvement of the Municipal Housing Committees in the selection and approval of beneficiaries has helped to facilitate the emergence of democratic decision-making bodies at municipal level."⁷⁶

Yet civil society in Kosovo was structured in highly effective forms, both before and during the Kosovo conflict. Through the era of socialist Yugoslavia, that society was organized around an inherited clan-based system of social order that regulated the production and distribution of property and various forms of revenue. Moreover, during the socialist era, robust informal economies ("black" or "barter" markets) offered alternatives to highly regulated sanctioned systems of exchange. Finally, after 1989, when Albanians withdrew from Serbian government institutions, an elaborate "parallel society" was founded for the provision of educational, medical, and social services to Kosovar Albanians.⁷⁷ The capacities, functionalities, and legacies of these structures, however, was less an object of post-conflict assessment and

evaluation than of neglect and thus abandonment. Most important of all, the parameters by means of which reconstruction was organized usually did not register any of the above dynamics; they tended to appear, if anywhere, in “lessons learned” sections of post-project assessments. Typically, reconstruction was assessed in terms of “housing units” repaired and “beneficiaries” assisted. By the end of 2001, the EAR was able to report that more than half of the houses damaged or destroyed in 1998 and 1999 were “repaired” or “reconstructed”; the manifold effects of that labor, however, were by and large left unregistered.⁷⁸

The EAR only reported on officially sanctioned reconstruction. In post-conflict Kosovo, however, an enormous portion of construction occurred outside of governmental purview—so-called illegal building. The population of Prishtina, for example, doubled from 250,000 to an estimated 500,000 between 1999 and 2002. Most new building to house that population was done “illegally,” without permits, inspection, or regulation; one estimate suggested that up to 5,000 buildings in Prishtina were constructed “illegally” in 2001, the year of the height of construction in post-war Kosovo, alone.⁷⁹ Part of what rendered this construction activity “illegal,” however, was the assumption that Kosovo’s post-conflict environment would be inhabited in the same way as its pre-conflict environment was. This assumption yielded a neglect of such dynamics as the rural-to-urban population shift, as well as shifts from multi-generational houses to single-family homes and apartments, all characteristic forms of post-conflict residential modernization.⁸⁰

CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION

To the extent that both reconstruction problems and reconstruction solutions in the post-conflict environment are constituted by stakeholder knowledge of that environment, attempts to grasp the “objectively real” conditions of that environment are irrelevant. Rather, the “objective reality” that requires apprehension is that of stakeholder knowledge itself, as it is this knowledge which has decisive political effects and consequences.

These effects and consequences persist even when they are framed as products of a practice that constructs, in texts and spaces, the object that it imagines itself to merely ameliorate. Post-conflict reconstruction comprises just such a practice; part of its unfolding includes the framing of its environ-

ment as a space that requires the concepts and techniques it formulates and the actions it carries out. Stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction are consistently adjusting these concepts, techniques, and actions, attempting to bring their effects increasingly in line with reconstruction's desired outcomes. These adjustments, in the form of "lessons learned," are typically framed as responses to empirical data on reconstruction, data that document the degree to which reconstruction actually yields the outcomes its stakeholders seek: democratization, good governance, social stability, economic development, reconciliation between conflicting polities, rebuilding of damaged infrastructure, and so forth.⁸¹ The insistent imagination and assessment of architectural reconstruction on the part of its authors in terms of such indices as the number of buildings reconstructed, the number of square meters made habitable, the number of families housed, and so on is absolutely typical of this style of documentation. On its own terms, then, stakeholder knowledge of reconstruction advances as its real-world effects are registered and analyzed.

Yet this advancement of knowledge reproduces that knowledge's fundamental conceit—that it is knowledge of an object, the post-conflict environment, that exists prior to and outside of that knowledge's own formation and unfolding. Formulations of "best practices" in post-conflict reconstruction consistently urge stakeholders to maximize their familiarity with the "cultures," "customs," "communities," and "laws" of the environments in which they intervene. A reflexive apprehension of reconstruction would turn this project of familiarization back towards its very authors and insist on the importance of foregrounding their own role in constructing the environments they imagine themselves to simply and merely reconstruct.

Notes

1. Robert Bevan, *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War* (London: Reaktion, 2006), 7.

2. *Ibid.*, 8. On "new war," see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006).

3. Vesna Bojčić-Djelilović, "World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-War Reconstruction," in *Recovering From Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace, and Development*, ed. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 84.

4. Alcira Kreimer and others, *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), 9.

5. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, *Kosovo Declaration of Independence*

(Prishtina: Republic of Kosovo, February 17, 2008), <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> (accessed March 2011).

6. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 (June 10, 1999) (accessed March 2011).

7. Jacquelyn S. Porth, "Rice Addresses Afghanistan, Kosovo, Middle East in Norway," *USINFO* (Washington, DC: Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, April 26, 2007), <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/April/20070426170149sjhtrop0.31448.html> (accessed March 2011).

8. "Resolution 1244 Remains in Effect, Ban," *Tanjug* (March 11, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Bilteni/Engleski/b110308_e.html#N14 (accessed March 2011). As Thomas Pepper notes, "admonitions towards the specific differences of each text, and against the banality of generalization, are themselves generalities, and fall into well-worn tracks." See Thomas Adam Pepper, *Singularities: Extremes of Theory in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.

9. Aidan Hehir, "Kosovo and the International Community," in *Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and the Transition to Independence*, ed. Aidan Hehir (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.

10. Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989–1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities* (Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publishers, 1999), 259.

11. This point has also been made by Mariella Pandolfini, who, exploring contemporary states of emergency, has argued that "exemplarity paradoxically resides in particularity"; see Mariella Pandolfini, "From Paradox to Paradigm: The Permanent State of Emergency in the Balkans," in *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfini (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 153.

12. This constitution, or reification, is the apprehension of a human creation as an objective reality that comes into being and exists without human agency; on reification, see *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, ed. Tom B. Bottomore (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 463–65, and Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 36.

13. This perspective can be situated within an emerging critique of humanitarianism, and specifically humanitarian work in conflict and post-conflict situations; see, for example, *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi (New York: Zone Books, 2010); Dider Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and *Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics*, ed. Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 2011).

14. See *Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities*, ed. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), and David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (New York: Longman, 1992).

15. See Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Barry J. Eichengreen, *Europe's Post-War Recovery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

16. See, for example, James Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003) and *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor*, ed. John A. Agnew and J. Nicholas Entrikin (New York: Routledge, 2004).

17. See, for example, *The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System 1945–2025*, ed. Terence K. Hopkins (London: Zed, 1996).

18. See, for example, *Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Daniel M. Schydlosky (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995).

19. J. Bradford DeLong and Barry Eichengreen, "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," *SSRN eLibrary* (November 1991), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=226738>.

20. On post-conflict reconstruction, see, for example, *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa*, ed. Anthony Lake (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990). Peter Burnham, *The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). World Bank, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998). *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Sultan Barakat (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005). *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

21. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

22. On the relationship between humanitarian initiatives and Neoliberal economics, see Vanessa Pupovac, "Human Security and the Rise of Global Therapeutic Governance," *Conflict, Security, and Development* 5, no. 2 (2005): 161–81; Mariella Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention: The Humanitarian Governance of the Postcommunist Balkan Territories," in *Postcolonial Disorders*, ed. Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Sandra Teresa Hyde, Sarah Pinto, and Byron J. Good (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 157–87; and M. Duffield, *Development, Security, and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007).

23. International Monetary Fund, *IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts* (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, September 2010), and World Bank, *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects* (World Bank, Washington, DC, August 1998).

24. Bojčić-Djelilović, "World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector," 87.

25. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Sidney G. Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

26. On post-conflict architectural reconstruction, see, for example, Sultan Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction After Conflict and Disaster* (London: Overseas Development Institute; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2003); Tigran Hasić, *Reconstruction Planning in Post-Conflict Zones: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Community* (PhD Thesis, Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology, 2004); *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Sultan Barakat (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005); and Esther Ruth Charlesworth, *Architects Without Frontiers: War, Reconstruction and Design Responsibility* (Burlington, MA: Architectural Press, 2006).

27. Hardt and Negri make a somewhat similar point when they describe humanitarian agencies as the “mendicant orders of Empire”; see Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 36.

28. See David Moore, “Leveling the Playing Fields and Embedding Illusions: ‘Post-Conflict’ Discourse & Neo-Liberal ‘Development’ in War-Torn Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* 27, no. 83 (2000): 11–28. *Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neoliberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction*, ed. Nandini Gunewardena and Mark Schuller (Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2008).

29. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*.

30. Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné, “A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction,” *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (2009): 93–107.

31. Thus, according to a typical claim, post-conflict reconstruction data should be placed “in a standard framework that would allow for translation from one post-war scenario to another”; see John Calme, “Post-war reconstruction: concerns, models and approaches” (Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, 2005).

32. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

33. Calme, “Post-War Reconstruction,” 16.

34. Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster*, 6–7.

35. *Ibid.*, 11.

36. Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

37. See, for example, Barry M. Blechman and others, “Effective transitions from peace operations to sustainable peace: final report” (DFI International, Washington, DC, September 1997). Center for Strategic and International Studies and United States Army, “Post-conflict reconstruction task framework” (United States Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, May 2002). United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives, “An Introduction to OTI Strategic Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation” (United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives, Washington, DC, 2003). *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003). Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) group, “An operational note on transitional result matrices: Using results-based frame-

works in fragile states” (United Nations Development Group and World Bank, New York and Washington, DC, January 2005). Craig Cohen, “Measuring progress in stabilization and reconstruction” (United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, March 2006).

38. Frederick C. Cuny, *Disasters and Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

39. For a review of this critique, see Philip White and Lionel Cliffe, “Matching Response to Context in Complex Political Emergencies: ‘Relief,’ ‘Development,’ ‘Peace-Building’ or Something In-Between?,” *Disasters* 24, no. 4 (2000): 314–42.

40. Robert W. Kates and Martyn J. Bowden, “From Rubble to Monument: The Pace of Reconstruction,” in *Reconstruction Following Disaster*, ed. J. Eugene Haas, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977).

41. Galtung and Tisné, “A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction,” 95–96.

42. This reification has been subsequently generalized as a principle for post-conflict reconstruction, as in the “Four Pillars of Reconstruction” formulated by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; see Center for Strategic and International Studies and United States Army.

43. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, *The right to sustainable return* (Prishtina: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, May 17, 2002), [http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/ReturnsConcept.htm](http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports>ReturnsConcept.htm).

44. James C. Hathaway, “New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 8, no. 3 (1995): 288–94.

45. A. Herscher, “Urban Formations of Difference: Borders and Cities in Post-1989 Europe,” *European Review* 13, no. 2 (2005): 251–60.

46. Roger Zetter thus writes that “there exists the need to establish more precisely the extent to which bureaucratic interests and procedures are themselves crucial determinants in the definition of labels like refugee”; see Roger Zetter, “Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 1 (1991): 39–62.

47. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, July 26, 1999). See also Paul Currión, “Learning From Kosovo: The Humanitarian Community Information Centre (HCIC), Year One,” *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* (March 2001), <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2278> (accessed March 2011).

48. European Commission Damage Assessment Kosovo and International Management Group, “Kosovo: Emergency assessment of damaged housing and local/village infrastructure” (European Commission, Brussels, July 1999). See also UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, “The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements” (United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements Balkans Task Force, Nairobi, 1999).

49. See, for example, Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003" (Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark, Copenhagen, 2004), especially Annex V, "Residential Housing Reconstruction Programmes."

50. This dynamic was described in the five municipalities in the Peć/Peja region in Corrado Minervini, "Housing Reconstruction in Kosovo," *Habitat International* 26, no. 4 (2002): 571–90.

51. For a numeric comparison of the UNHCR, IMG, and UNMIK municipal assessments, see *ibid.*, 575.

52. This dynamic is described in Peter Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds: Phases I and II, April 1999–January 2000. Volume II: Sectoral Sections" (Overseas Development Institute, Valid International and Disasters Emergency Committee, London, August 2000), 36. Data on the damage level of houses repaired and reconstructed between 1999 and 2002 can be found in Marcy L. Daniel, "The January 2003 Construction Sector Assessment Report for Kosovo" (Cooperative Housing Foundation International, Silver Spring, MD, January 2003).

53. Nick Scott-Flynn, "Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the NGO Sector," *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* (November 1999), <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1039> (accessed March 2011) and Fron Nazi, "Preparing for Winter," *Balkan Crisis Report* (London and Washington, DC: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 29, 1999), <http://iwpr.net/report-news/preparing-winter> (accessed March 2011).

54. Approximately seventy schools and medical clinics in rural areas were also "rehabilitated" in 1999 as part of humanitarian relief; see European Commission, *European Commission's Humanitarian Assistance for Kosovo in 1999* (Brussels: European Commission, November 17, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/kosovo/ec/echo_kosovo_1999.htm (accessed March 2011).

55. On this return, see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of Unhcr's Emergency Preparedness and Response," *The Kosovo refugee crisis: an independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response* (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 9, 2000), <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68d19c.html> (accessed March 2011).

56. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, *The Right to Sustainable Return*.

57. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 32–33.

58. United Nations Mission in Kosovo, "UNMIK Guidelines for Housing Reconstruction in Kosovo" (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Prishtina, March 2000).

59. Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003."

60. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 38–39.

61. Nick Cater, Keith Ashton, and Brenda Puech, "How Kosovo Is Teaching Us the New Economics of Shelter," *Humanitarian Affairs Review* (June 15, 2000),

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64D7N3?OpenDocument> (accessed March 2011).

62. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 33.

63. Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003."

64. Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster*, 15.

65. Human Rights Watch, "Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the new Kosovo" (Human Rights Watch, New York, August 1999). and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, "Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told. Volume II" (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, November 5, 1999).

66. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) allowed an "agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel" to "maintain a presence at Serb patrimonial sites"; UNMIK never allowed this personnel to enter Kosovo and establish this presence, despite repeated efforts by Serbia to organize the entrance and stationing of this personnel.

67. Human Rights Watch, "Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the new Kosovo."

68. *Crucified Kosovo: Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches in Kosovo and Metohija, June–October 1999*, ed. Lubiša Folić (Prizren: Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese of Raška and Prizren, 2000).

69. See, for example, *Serb Genocide upon Albanian Culture of Gjakova, 24 March–13 June 1999* (Gjakova, Kosovo: Directorate for Education, Culture and Sport, Gjakova, September 25, 1999). *Monuments of Kosova, 1998–1999* (Prishtina: Institute for the Protection of Kosova Monuments, October 1999). *Serbian Barbarities Against Islamic Monuments in Kosova (February '98–June '99)*, ed. Sabri Bajgora (Prishtina: Dituria Islame, 2000).

70. European Agency for Reconstruction, "European agency for reconstruction annual report 2000 to the European Parliament and the Council" (European Agency for Reconstruction, Brussels, March 2001).

71. On these tensions, see Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

72. Daniel, "Construction Sector Assessment," 24–26.

73. One exception was the finished wood products industry; because of low barriers to entry and utility of traditional craft skills, a number of carpentry workshops emerged after 1999 to supply doors, windows, and kitchen cabinets to reconstructed houses; see *ibid.*, 27.

74. On Neoliberalism and reconstruction, see *Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neoliberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction* and Neil Middleton and Phil O'Keefe, *Disaster and Development* (London: Pluto Press, 1998).

75. On prewar social relations, see Ger Duizings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 2000); on post-conflict "democratization" of social relations, see United Nations Development Programme, "Community Integrated Rehabilitation Programme" (United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2000).

76. European Agency for Reconstruction, "Annual Report 2000," 18.

77. On the “parallel society” of the 1990s, see Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto, 2000).

78. European Agency for Reconstruction, “Annual Report 2000,” 19.

79. Nehat Islami, “Mayor to Lift Lid on Kosovo Corruption,” *Global policy forum* (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 19, 2002), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30197.html> (accessed March 2011).

80. Daniel, “Construction Sector Assessment,” 18.

81. See, for example, Dobbins and others, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, and *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004).