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
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CHAPTER 4

Refugees

The Work of Exile

Protracted Refugee Situations and the New Palestinian Normal

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ABSTRACT

Protracted refugee situations are becoming increasingly important to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other UN and aid agencies. This is because protracted refugee situations not only signal the failure of a universal human rights regime but also compel the UNHCR to become a quasi-state structure providing emergency aid to chronic refugee crises. This chapter looks at Palestinians under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This has been the longest protracted refugee situation in the world and yet by virtue of being outside the mandate of UNHCR has been marginalized in the regimes of knowledge and practice that manage refugees. The chapter argues that while increasing attention is being provided to protracted refugee situations, it may be useful to draw the Palestinian case more centrally into this discussion because UNHCR's involvement in such situations is making it evolve towards an UNRWA model. In other words, UNRWA is becoming the norm not the exception to refugee studies and can offer valuable insights into the politics of protracted refugee situations of today.

INTRODUCTION

In December 1949, the United Nations General Assembly voted to establish the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

for an initial period of three years. Today around 42.5 million people in the world are “persons of concern” to the UNHCR, still the lead international agency that manages refugees, as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, stateless persons, persons in refugee-like conditions, and so forth.¹ Asia and Africa have the largest numbers of refugees and persons in refugee-like conditions that the UNHCR handles; Asia has approximately 18 million while Africa has 10 million persons that are of concern, according to UNHCR statistics. Of these, 7 million refugees are in protracted refugee situations.² According to Gil Loescher and James Milner, “This estimate does not include many of those long-term displaced in urban settings around the world or smaller residual displaced populations who remain in exile after others have returned home. Nor does it include the millions of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East under the mandate of UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Administration.”³

In the beginning, the primary task of UNHCR was to provide protection and solutions to European refugees displaced due to World War II who had still not been resettled. They had been temporarily housed in camps, and these lasted through the 1950s. Liisa Malkki points out that it was at this time that the refugee camp “became emplaced as a standardized, generalizable technology of power in the management of mass displacement,” and it was also in this time that an entire apparatus of administrators, social scientists, journalists, and refugees themselves defined the refugee as a knowable figure and refugee relief as a standardized practice.⁴ It was only after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the appeal by UNHCR to major Western governments to provide funds and resettlement quotas, that this protracted refugee situation was finally resolved by the mid-1960s.⁵

Among UN agencies, the UNHCR is unique in that it is both an individual represented by the High Commissioner as well as a bureaucracy with its specific culture and value system.⁶ The organization has built its legacy and expanded its operations through long political and financial struggles with various states in developing and developed countries.⁷ It has also had to overcome (i.e., through the 1967 Protocol) the early geographical and temporal restrictions of being limited to post-World War II Europe inscribed in its foundational mandate. None of this has been without cause. While European refugees received assistance and protection from UNHCR, refugees from the developing world were excluded from its mandate. However, as a result of de-colonizing processes, UNHCR found itself getting increasingly involved in the developing world, compelling the United Nations to expand

and renew its mandate. It is important to note here what exactly constitutes a refugee in UN terms. The specific definition of refugees covered under the UNHCR mandate are those who are fleeing due to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a social group. In other words, the Convention definition of a refugee favored a person or persons who were being persecuted because of political values. This definition reflected the Cold War rivalries of that period but did not suit the changing realities of the world, particularly in the Global South where large numbers of people fled due to civil wars and other disturbances.⁸

In the 1960s, for example, de-colonization led to large refugee movements in Africa. Unlike the refugee crises in Europe, the African context appeared to be more complex as instabilities appeared in many, often neighboring countries. By the end of the 1960s, two-thirds of UNCHR's budget was focused on operations in Africa, prompting a call for revisions to the organization's mandate and hence the adoption of the 1967 Protocol. In the 1970s, UNHCR refugee operations continued to spread around the globe, catering to, amongst others, refugees from the Vietnam War.⁹ Regional conventions such as the Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention of 1969 and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 have expanded the definition of refugees to incorporate the changing demographics of forced migrants.

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and more recently the post-9/11 landscape prioritize security over human rights. Unsurprisingly, sympathy and protection for refugees has increasingly turned into suspicion, rejection, and an attempt to contain and control refugee crises and populations in countries and regions where they occur rather than allowing refugees to seek asylum in First World countries.¹⁰ This has led to the re-development of protracted refugee situations, which has become a growing concern for scholars and practitioners alike. Protracted refugee situations are among some of the most complex humanitarian situations. These crises have consequences for the human rights of refugees including their right to mobility, to seek paid employment, and so forth. Refugees living in "chronic exile" are often compelled to live in camps or move discreetly to urban areas.

This chapter argues that the protracted refugee crises are evolving towards conditions of Palestinian refugees living under the administration of UNRWA. Palestinian refugees are the oldest protracted refugee situation in the world today, but because they are under the mandate of UNRWA not UNHCR, they are seen as being the exception to the norm of refugee studies.

However, given the changing nature of protection towards refugees today, it might be more useful to think of how UNRWA has become the new normal mode of refugee protection and assistance. This chapter draws upon fieldwork conducted in Palestinian camps in Beirut, Lebanon in 2006–7 and compares their socio-political and spatial conditions with those of other protracted refugee crises to draw insights from and linkages with each other.¹¹

PLANNING FOR PROTRACTION

The focus on protracted refugee crises is quite recent. Milner and Loescher point out that in 2009, the Executive Committee (Excom) of the UNHCR adopted an ExCom Conclusion on protracted refugee crises after a decade of discussion amongst refugee policy, search, and advocacy communities. While the conclusions are not binding they reflect a broad consensus with regard to international protection.¹² Protracted refugee crises affect developing countries disproportionately as they host considerably higher numbers of refugees. In many host countries governments prefer putting refugees in camps for security reasons. Host governments claim it makes aid delivery and protection of refugees easier, but actually putting refugees in camps is meant to control them and separate them from the local population.¹³ In fact, protracted refugee crises can pit refugee populations against host populations as they compete with each other over scarce resources over time. Additionally, the militarization of several refugee populations provides adequate cause for concern amongst host countries attempting to protect their sovereignty.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the response to protracted refugee crises through encampment serves to disenfranchise refugees as they are denied basic rights they are entitled to under UNHCR's guidelines, such as the right to mobility and the right to access paid employment as mentioned earlier.¹⁵ Prolonged incarceration puts a variety of different pressures on refugees that range from human rights violations to struggles over adequate space and shelter, especially as populations grow and change in camp spaces. Years spent in "temporary quarters" give rise to the need for more permanent structures, infrastructure and employment needs, social services, and so forth. Refugee camps that begin as tents evolve into sites filled with semi-permanent or permanent structures often resembling squatter settlements and slums of developing countries.

The development of refugee camps over the years into settlements of thousands of people has raised the question of whether they can be considered “emergency urbanism,” or “exigent cities.”¹⁶ While some scholars have argued that refugee camps can be viewed as *camp-villes* (city camps), a stunted city-to-be but not as full cities, others have argued that eventually refugee camps can present the features of a virtual city.¹⁷ While there are many camps for which such descriptions may be appropriate, refugees and refugee camps are not generalizable. Further, it is unclear as to what city is being used as the “model” against which these camps or “cities-to-be-made” are being compared. Agier’s description of refugee camps as naked “city-to-be-made” rests on the notion that camps are constantly managed and people are forever in a state of quarantine, thus transposing the legal nature of the camp on the physical space itself.¹⁸ Yet, the complexity of camp planning can show that nothing can be further from the truth. Many different kinds of camps exist ranging from self-settled to planned camps in a variety of locations that make “management” of camps a varied experience.¹⁹

Planning by international aid and humanitarian agencies for displaced populations has traditionally attempted to create settlements that provide emergency shelter and limited development. However, the realities of refuge have changed to more prolonged exile. The term *transitional settlement* attempts to capture the complexity of displacement by defining it as “settlement and shelter resulting from conflict and natural disasters, ranging from emergency response to durable solutions.”²⁰ There is thus a growing recognition that perhaps settlements are not so temporary anymore, and in fact steps need to be taken to ensure that they cooperate and coordinate appropriately with local governments and communities. Various handbooks ranging from the United Nations Handbook for Emergencies, the Sphere Project and the *Transitional Settlements, Displaced Populations* book by Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale lay out guidelines for planning different types of camps for displaced people.²¹

Such planning guidelines are largely aimed towards non-urban, planned camps. The logic for this is obvious as urban self-settled refugees are much more difficult for humanitarian organizations to cater to. As Corsellis and Vitale point out, refugees often settle in the urban periphery along with “squatters” and other slum dwellers whose shelter practices are often viewed by the state as illegal and deviant. While refugees are treated as victims of persecution and deserving victims, often slum dwellers and squatters, many of whom are migrants who came to the city for similar reasons, are treated

differently. As Ranabir Samaddar points out, while there are no discernible differences between the two groups, there has been an artificial divide created between them. Perhaps the only distinguishing feature between the two groups is that while migration due to structural violence is endemic, refugee movements can at best be categorized as climactic.²² However, dividing migrants into these categories (refugee: good, migrant: bad) allows states to exert some control over migration and how rights and privileges can be distributed between groups. For aid agencies, addressing the needs of refugees in such settlements thus becomes tricky as “slums” of the developing world experience housing and shelter practices that are far below international standards.²³ Yet, increasingly, refugees are moving to urban centers as they provide better opportunities for jobs.²⁴ Planning for refugees at the interface of urban poverty thus raises challenges for international organizations who expect higher standards for displaced populations yet have to contend with urban practices in which the poor live in far more abysmal conditions.

Planning camps for long-term displacement can help refugees survive, but does so by continuing the marginalization of refugee populations. Ultimately, there is a real danger that camps in protracted refugee situations can turn into spaces of despair with refugees languishing in them for decades with no solution in sight and few meaningful ways for them to engage with the host society.²⁵

The humanitarian administration of camps by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations while critical and laudable can have an uncomfortable technocratic element to it. Scholars have argued that populations are reduced to bare life where they are subject to control, order, and discipline by humanitarian organizations. Their political lives are stripped away, and they are reduced to populations that can be counted, classified, and managed.²⁶ In this unfortunate turn in refugee affairs, humanitarian organizations that should be fighting against the powers that produce such conditions became, by default, their handmaidens. By submitting to a liberal humanitarian regime, they depoliticize the politics of exile and the people suffering through it.²⁷

UNRWA AND THE POLITICS OF REFUGEE

Of all the protracted refugee crises, Palestinians living under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the

Near East (UNRWA) are the oldest. The mandate of UNRWA, although a temporary one at its conception, attempted to provide shelter and protection for the Palestinians until a solution was found for their situation. It has been over sixty years since the Palestinians have been displaced, and their situation has remained the same. UNRWA has found its mandate continuously renewed every three years, and the Palestinian camps under its protection have grown and evolved in different ways.²⁸ The spatial development of Palestinian refugee camps provides a way of understanding the politics and spatial outcomes of protracted refugee crises.

Palestinian refugee camps were born out of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. The conflict began largely with the second wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1904 and 1914. In contrast with earlier Jewish migration, these newer immigrants insisted on Jewish labor on Jewish land, which stemmed from a socialist ideology and was quite unlike their predecessors who hired and got along with the Arab population. Their political ambitions to establish a separate Jewish identity led to hostility among Arabs who also lived on the land.²⁹ Eventually clashes between the two communities began to take place and intensified over time. The UN General Assembly's Resolution 181 of November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine led to armed clashes between Arabs and Jews. The first exodus of Arabs out of Palestine took place between December 1947 and March 1948 from areas earmarked for Jewish statehood and areas adjacent to them. Most of those who fled were from the Arab upper and middle classes. Most of the rural population from what was to later become the heartland of the Jewish state (the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Hadera and smaller evacuations from other rural areas faced with fighting) also left.³⁰

The conflict, which lasted from November 1947 to July 1949, led to the expulsion or flight of some 750,000–900,000 people from Palestine, the vast majority of them Arabs. The General Assembly's subsequent Resolution 194 of December 1948 stating that those "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property," was never implemented. Israel refused to allow the repatriation of Arab refugees, most of whose villages had been destroyed.³¹ Palestinians who had fled the fighting were scattered over a number of different Arab states and territories within what was once the British Mandate of Palestine. Several aid agencies such as the Red Cross and the American Friends Service Committee

amongst others provided emergency provisions and care. This included setting up camps, registering refugees, and providing tents and rations. UNRWA took over these operations once it began its operations and inherited the refugee registration records from the International Red Cross.³² The agency began its operations on May 1, 1950, and has had its mandate renewed every three years until today. As UNRWA was established a few days before the UNHCR Statute took effect and well before the 1951 Geneva Convention, it resulted in Palestinians from UNRWA's areas of operations being excluded from UNHCR's mandate.³³

UNRWA's operations have evolved from 1949, from providing emergency services to Palestinian refugees, to becoming a quasi-welfare state structure that provides education, health, relief, and social services inside and outside the camps. It maintains records and archives of Palestinian refugees within its fields of operations. This it does while frequently struggling to meet budgetary needs and being accused from both the Palestinian and Israeli sides, as not doing enough for the refugees, colluding with the enemy, and being inefficient and supporting terrorism respectively.³⁴ However, the agency continues its operations, and as a resolution between the Palestinians and Israelis appears dim, UNRWA's presence remains important to both sides of the dispute. For Palestinians in particular, its presence is seen as a sign of their political rights.

In Lebanon, the condition of Palestinian refugees is indicative of the complex politics of various stakeholders in the creation and sustenance of a particular post-conflict environment. Here, a variety of different "sovereigns" intervene in the control of Palestinian camps. Palestinians themselves respond to these "sovereigns" in different ways, taking advantage of the slippages that may exist between the different powers to be able to create livable conditions for themselves. The relationship between all of these different factors leads to a particular urbanism within refugee camps that is complex and varied.

Like many host governments, Lebanon preferred to have Palestinians living in refugee camps after their expulsion from Israel/Palestine in 1948. Lebanon is a particularly sensitive nation-state with approximately eighteen different religious confessional groups, and a deeply divided society. A massive influx of thousands of Sunni Muslim Palestinian refugees naturally raised alarm to a precariously constructed political system, and efforts were made to not only sequester much of the population but place them under the oppressive surveillance of the dreaded *Maktab Thani*, Lebanese internal secu-

rity.³⁵ The camps are dispersed throughout the country not only as a reflection of the movement of people from the south to the north in search of economic opportunities, but also possibly because, as Julie Peteet has pointed out, it was meant to prevent “the emergence of a geographically contiguous, cohesive Palestinian sociopolitical entity.”³⁶ As the Palestinian situation evolved into a protracted refugee situation, many refugees attempted to move to the camps in Beirut as employment was more readily available in the capital. Although restrictions had been placed on work Palestinians could do, these were never enforced until after the end of the civil war in 1990. Nevertheless, many Palestinians worked in the informal economy. The lack of protection of their rights and inability to collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions meant that many refugees were reduced to a condition of being lumpenproletariates.³⁷

Initially, Palestinian refugees—those who went into camps—survived in tents and on rations provided by the Red Cross and later UNRWA. In order to encourage Palestinians to resettle into various countries where they had fled including Lebanon, UNRWA tried to provide a “works” aspect. Palestinian refugees and Arab states that hosted them were fully aware of the intentions behind these programs, and both parties were insistent instead to have the refugees repatriated.³⁸ Meanwhile Palestinian refugees struggled with living in camps under often adverse conditions. In Lebanon in particular, there were restrictions on building permanent structures because they signaled a more permanent presence in the country, which the Lebanese were averse to. On the other hand, increasing demographic pressure coupled with the discomfort of living in a tent for prolonged periods of time made life difficult for refugees, and they strove to produce semi-permanent structures covertly and gradually squatted inside camps to expand their spaces. The Lebanese government attempted to curtail this and other potentially political activities among refugees by installing police and *Maktab Thani* officers to monitor the sites and populations. Harassment was thus a common feature in the everyday lives of refugees.³⁹ It is yet another example of how humanitarian spaces, meant to extend the generosity and benevolence of people, can turn into sites of oppression where basic human rights are revoked in the name of security.

In 1970 the Palestine Liberation Organization moved from Jordan to Lebanon, and this arrival had significant repercussions for Palestinians living in camps. The earlier 1969 Cairo Accords between the Lebanese army commander Emile Bustani and the PLO allowed armed Palestinian guerrillas to

exist on Lebanese soil to manage the camps and to engage in guerilla warfare against the state of Israel.⁴⁰ As the PLO gained control of the camps and began military training in them, and the Lebanese state retreated, the camps became states-within-a-state.⁴¹ This speeded up the spatial development of the camps. Houses could now be built out of solid materials, and institutional offices could be created in addition to the development of various organizations such as camp committees and women's organizations.⁴² Essentially, what the PLO managed to do in Lebanon was run a self-government in exile quite successfully for a few years.⁴³ Simultaneously, the city, Beirut, continued to expand and engulfed the camps such as Shatila that were once away from the urban center. The Lebanese civil war began in 1975 and continued until 1990. This fifteen-year war involved Palestinians along with a host of other actors in armed confrontations and had significant impacts on the fabrics of the camps. Camps such as Shatila and Tal al-Zaatar went through a number of different changes. Tal al-Zaatar, which was in East Beirut near the Maronite strongholds, was razed to the ground and its inhabitants displaced to other camps and parts of the country.⁴⁴ Shatila bore the brunt of much damage to its population and infrastructure, through various sieges and through the infamous Sabra-Shatila massacre in 1982.⁴⁵ The camp was rebuilt and damaged repeatedly as a result of battles that raged between militias and Palestinian fighters who sought to protect it and its people from destruction. UNRWA could not at this time do much beyond what was part of its mandate—to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees such as medical help, food, and other emergency supplies. At a time of war, humanitarianism had not only helped nurture an insurgent movement but also provided the means by which refugees, many of whom were innocent, lost their human rights, and in many cases their lives.⁴⁶

The 1989 Taif Agreement brought a tenuous peace to the Lebanese civil war. At the same time, the Palestinians were held responsible for many of the country's problems.⁴⁷ With the PLO removed from the country, various Palestinian political factions vied for dominance in the camps. Regulations in Lebanon restricted Palestinians from owning or inheriting any property in the country. Further, they were banned from practicing in over seventy-two different professions.⁴⁸ They are largely restricted to their refugee camps due to such oppressive Lebanese laws. In essence, Palestinians are stripped of many of their human rights and treated largely as humanitarian subjects able only to access aid. The consequences of this are significant as Lebanon has the largest number of hardship cases in all of UNRWA's areas of opera-

tions.⁴⁹ At the same time, their camps have become more mixed as many other nationalities also live in the camps, taking advantage of the cheap rents.⁵⁰ Palestinian camps have gone through a variety of different stages in Lebanon through their very long and tenuous protracted refugee situation. Throughout it, Lebanon and much of international politics have largely been hostile to the Palestinians' presence. The various stages in camp life in Lebanon have been results of different approaches Palestinians have had to their conditions in exile and the possibilities of political action. As years have passed, Palestinians have found different ways to be politically engaged, and the acts of building, both in the past and today, against the laws of the state can be seen as acts of resistance and the engagement of a political community. This has included cooperating or challenging the host state on security matters, tapping into its infrastructure, and continuing to be patronized by some of its political parties such as the Hizbullah.⁵¹ The status as refugees in fact allows Palestinians to co-opt the oppression of the state and engage in politics on a global scale.⁵²

READING CAMP SPACE

Palestinians have been the longest protracted refugee situation in the world, and indeed the largest. It would be useful as a starting point to in fact bring them squarely into refugee studies literature instead of leaving them out, as clearly their condition that dates back over sixty years is less exceptional today. In other words, the current refugee regime, as it heads towards dealing increasingly with protracted refugee situations could possibly be seeing the Palestinian case as the norm, not the exception to refugee studies. Such a move—to bring Palestinians into the mainstream of refugee studies—is useful because by bringing Palestinians squarely into the discussion of protracted refugee situations, we can understand better how geopolitics, humanitarianism, and development issues collide with each other and how refugees cope through them.

For example, Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp outline why protracted refugee situations lie at the intersection of geopolitics, development issues, and new thinking on humanitarianism. They argue that there have been attempts by UNHCR to provide a development- and solutions-oriented approach to refugee assistance, but this was met with little success. According to them, host governments were eager to retain the visibility of refugee pop-

ulations they hosted and were not keen on having them settle permanently or indeed show any signs of doing so either.⁵³ Such a scenario, prevalent in much of the developing world, is not fundamentally different from that faced by Palestinians in Lebanon for most of their presence there. Lebanon has largely struggled with its Palestinian population and has resisted attempts at resettling them in the country urging instead their return or resettlement in other countries.⁵⁴ Part of the reason why they reject resettlement of refugees in Lebanon is because it would skew the delicate demographic balance in the country in favor of Muslims and disrupt the Lebanese formula.⁵⁵ This has clear repercussions for the refugees, and such a lesson should not be lost on UNHCR and other agencies dealing with other refugee crises. It is difficult to convince host states to take on more responsibility towards protecting and supporting their refugee populations, particularly when they are poor countries or countries where state sovereignty hangs precariously. This is even more problematic if refugee populations living in them have been politically disruptive. Furthermore, in an era when commitments towards refugees and the humanitarian project at large appears to be in flux, there seems to be no reason for host states to honor such requests. Slaughter and Crisp reiterate the call to reorient the role of UNHCR during protracted refugee crises, where the agency makes clear the limits of its humanitarian role. The hope is that by acknowledging its limitations, UNHCR would be able to draw upon other actors within both the UN and the host state to play their parts, political or otherwise, in protecting refugees. Such a move is important because UNHCR cannot become a surrogate state to the world's protracted refugee situations, as is increasingly becoming the case,⁵⁶ but what if host states do not respond favorably to the diminishing role of humanitarian bodies? In UNRWA camps for example, the cuts to funding have meant fewer and more limited services provided to refugees and less support to those who are hardship cases. Ultimately, the populations that suffer the most from such struggles between host states and humanitarian organizations are the refugees themselves.

An important insight to take perhaps from an analysis of Palestinian refugees, and particularly from Palestinians in Lebanon, is that they are not passive recipients of aid. Even though they have, for the most part of their exile in Lebanon, been subject to a hostile environment, a sequestered existence in camps, and few economic, social, and political opportunities (except when the PLO were present), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have found ways to make their lives more bearable. Often these ways have meant

subverting and negotiating the control and hegemony of the host state and society through covert means and sometimes through armed confrontation as discussed above.

The Palestinians are not the only group of refugees in the world who are able to engage in negotiations and exercise agency within a system of control. There are other examples of refugees who have circumvented the oppression of the state and dependency on humanitarian aid and international NGOs.⁵⁷ Forms of resistance amongst refugees contradict much of academic scholarship and theorization on camps that define refugee camps as *camp-villes*, “object spaces.”⁵⁸ Many of these theorizations draw upon the work of Giorgio Agamben who argues that sovereign power is that which has the capacity to reduce political life into bare life or *homo sacre* (one who can be killed but not sacrificed).⁵⁹ Agamben argues that “bare life” (*zoe*) is one who is stripped of political life (*bios*) and rendered “humans as animals.”⁶⁰ This legal abandonment is an active, relational process, in that one is included through exclusion.⁶¹ The refugee camp for Agamben is the quintessential zone of indistinction where refugees can be reduced to “bare life” and be subjected to various forms of violence without legal consequences.⁶² In these spaces and through new forms of control, the sovereign strips refugees of human rights and value and reduces them to bare lives.

Such renditions of camps that are an increasingly common feature of protracted refugee situations are intriguing as they provide seductive explanations for geographies that are so difficult to explain. However, as Ensin Igin and Kim Rygiel point out, Agamben’s theorizations of camps are insufficient in accounting for novelty of spaces that are created. They argue that Agamben’s focus on the logic of the camp is ahistorical and essentializing because he does not investigate the diverse ways in which the camp functions (e.g., materially and experientially).⁶³ Agamben sees camps as being spaces of pure biopolitics where anything is possible because everything is permissible. However, such a reading of camps fails to account for how camps came to acquire such power in the first place. Did people willy-nilly hand over the capacity to reduce life to bare life to the sovereign without any protest? And what part does geography play in the production and existence of camps?⁶⁴ For example, the presence of camps for refugees marks the limits of both humanitarian and sovereign power. Stuart Elden remarks:

What we have in humanitarian spaces of exception is an intervention from beyond, where the international community takes the role of the state away

from it, while preserving the localization. In this way, then, Agamben's description of the logic of the camp as a particular instance of a space of exception is productive in understanding the way humanitarian spaces operate both within the existing state—thus allowing territorial preservation—but as a limit to the sovereign power of the state—thus limiting the extent of its power and its territorial sovereignty.⁶⁵

Thus, refugee camps symbolize exception because they operate both within the host state (and with its permission) and outside it and its laws (by having their own rules, administrative structure, and budgets), thus simultaneously challenging and upholding state sovereignty.⁶⁶

Furthermore, in commenting on the nature of a particular space, Agamben unfortunately empties space of what makes it *spatial*: social relations. As Doreen Massey points out, space and social relations are intimately linked to each other such that the uniqueness of each space is determined by the specificity of the social relations that occur within it.⁶⁷ Spaces of asylum and refuge are similarly produced out of relations between those who are being “protected” and those who “are protecting.” This is not a one-way relationship in which the sovereign merely reduces the refugee/asylum seekers to bare life, but one in which the sovereign has to also adjust its practices according to the resistance it faces. If the sovereign can reduce refugees and asylum seekers to bare life, then the latter can also engage in acts that constitute “bioagency.”⁶⁸ Such acts challenge the sovereign's capacity to reduce a subject to bare life devoid of politics. Thus attempts at trying to change the conditions of camps themselves need to be handled in a way that recognizes that such sites go beyond simply being sites of incarceration for refugees.

Returning to Massey's point, that space and social relations are intimately linked to each other, here the space of the refugee camp and the refugees co-constitute each other. The specificity of the camp defines the refugees geographically, reminds the international community of their exile spatially and materially, while the presence of refugees and their relationships with each other, with UNRWA, the Lebanese state (in this case), and the larger international community makes the refugee camp unique. The politics of producing space and the politics of being refugees (being stateless, being exiled for generations, demanding the right of return, refusing to integrate into the host community) are intimately linked to each other. Refugees could not claim their demands as forcefully as they can with concrete spatial proof of their exile. Refugee camps are thus carefully produced through po-

litical and spatial negotiations which makes the act of “building in camps” a form of insurgency against the larger agenda of possibly reducing refugees to bare life. Camps that are planned technocratically with little or no input from refugees and which, in fact, treat refugees as developmental problems run the risk of undermining the agency and political struggles refugees may be undertaking in such spaces.⁶⁹

While it is important to consider the ways in which refugees play a significant role in *producing* camps through various forms of resistance, it is also important to consider the limits of such actions. While refugees may engage in everyday forms of resistance against various sovereign powers that control their lives, they are ultimately bound by the conditions of statelessness and displacement that mark their lives. A nuanced approach that understands the complexity of resistance on the ground and limits of such actions at a meta-scale is necessary in order to grasp at the possibilities and limitations of refugees living in protracted refugee situations.

As James Milner and Gil Loescher point out, increasing numbers of long-staying refugees and internally displaced persons are located in urban areas. This issue has also been raised by UNHCR itself as a new and growing challenge for effective protection and aid delivery. Looking back at the Palestinian case, such an urban outcome of a protracted refugee situation does not seem unusual. With increasing years spent in displacement and continued dependence on aid with its concomitant sense of desperation, it is not surprising that refugees would attempt to move to urban areas where they can blend into the local environment and more easily access jobs. The urbanization of refuge is a challenge for practitioners and scholars alike because the different legal statuses between refugees and other kinds of migrants render the execution of humanitarian work and the theorization of refugees as a “special case” more difficult. For example, organizations have to struggle with whether they need to create a parallel set of institutions that refugees can draw upon specifically, such as schools and medical care. In urban areas, where the urban poor and refugees live cheek by jowl, this is not a sustainable model. Yet, it is precisely in these kinds of dilemmas and this interface between the urban and the humanitarian space that the work of UNHCR of protecting the rights of refugees becomes even more significant and urgent. Without this protection, refugees can be subject to the kinds of exploitation that Palestinian refugees have faced through much of their history in Lebanon and other countries.

Finally, in drawing all of these points together, the study of Palestinian

refugee camps reveals how the proliferation and prolonged nature of protracted refugee crises are simultaneously products of benevolence and protection of refugees on the one hand, and the manipulations and shifts in contemporary geopolitics that involve a range of actors, from donor and host countries, to UNHCR and other humanitarian NGOs to refugees themselves on the other. Through these negotiations, the essence of the contemporary system of states is not just maintained but fetishized. In the case of Palestinian refugees, not only do they desire the right of return to their homes, but this right is also linked to the right to return to Palestine as a clear, bounded nation-state. As the Arabs of Palestine do not have such a state to turn to, they depend on whatever political rights they can achieve in host countries in order to survive. This includes the struggle to achieve rights to the city such as in Beirut, where they are largely marginalized.⁷⁰ This raises the question of whether camps resulting from protracted refugee situations can in any meaningful way protect the human rights of refugees. The very existence of such protracted refugee situations—conditions where there is a continuous need to provide basic emergency services and help people survive prolonged political impasses—arguably signals the lack of upholding fundamental human rights of stateless people. Refugee camps—the sites that exemplify protracted refugee crises—are used by the protector and protected to struggle for rights to this state system and by doing so, inadvertently uphold the liberal peace that exacerbates this condition today.

CONCLUSION: SYMBOLISM, POLITICS, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS

In concluding, we return to the question of *why camps?* While camps are but one manifestation of protracted refugee situations, they are perhaps its most problematic. Camps are planned to protect and provide for refugees and yet, in the words of the High Commissioner in the 1950s and 1960s Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies are finding themselves “simply administering human misery.”⁷¹ Host states prefer camps to separate refugees from local populations, and humanitarian agencies have argued that in many ways they allow for better and more efficient delivery of emergency aid. Planning for emergencies and for humanitarian crises thus faces many of the same dilemmas as planning for cities in that they both pursue order, control, and discipline. In so doing they expect that their

technocratic management of space and policy will benefit their subjects at large. But while subjects do in fact benefit from such interventions, there are also consequences that exceed and/or elide the imagination of planners and technocrats. For example, it can be argued that while camps are meant to protect the dignity and safety of refugees, they do, by virtue of their existence, precisely the opposite as is evidenced by refugee populations developing their own economies and means of securing livelihoods and often camp security as well. By sequestering populations in camps, particularly in protracted refugee situations, the humanitarian machinery infringes on the human rights of refugees by restricting their ability to move beyond the confines of their spaces and to meaningfully engage with their host societies. Humanitarianism, however benevolent, ultimately is also hegemonic as it also curtails the possibility of politics for refugee populations. By reducing refugees to populations that are meant to be calculated, managed, and warehoused, aid agencies effectively de-politicize people and conditions. It can be argued that in fact for humanitarian intervention to operate effectively, refugees need to be kept in a condition—in camps—where their human rights are not fully realized. Thus, the production of the refugee regime is a self-perpetuating condition where the invention of chronic refugees and the intervention of humanitarian aid allows protracted refugee crises to proliferate and continue. This in turn, allows for a particular Neoliberal peace to manifest itself—one that attempts to bring about peace through technocratic means but is unable to reconcile the contradictions that this approach in fact produces.

Finally, the very agencies involved in the protection and welfare of refugees are complicit in the continuity of their exile. Scholars have argued that the increasing securitization of Western nation-states and restrictions on immigration and asylum have played a key role in perpetuating an impossible situation for refugees today as they seek safe asylum away from conflict zones. The development of safe third countries, the shift from emphasizing human rights to providing humanitarian aid, are ways in which First World countries not only keep the “problem of refugees” away from their shores but allow it to fester for prolonged periods of time. Providing aid to keep people alive while avoiding the responsibility of attending to their basic human rights essentially allows states to show their benevolence on the one hand and extricate themselves from the messiness of post-conflict peacebuilding. Aid agencies on the other hand find their mandates evolving to increasingly becoming middlemen between states and refugees, donors, and

recipients. As the editors of this volume point out in their introductory comments, “the post-conflict environment that is acted upon by this new international technocracy of peacebuilding is in fact an extension of the politics from which that technocracy seeks to distinguish itself.”⁷² Indeed, UNHCR, UNRWA, and aid agencies that work alongside them enable protracted refugee situations to linger by virtue of acting as surrogate states. The very powers they seek to challenge through their expertise and their intervention become entrenched more deeply. Protracted refugee situations thus cannot be understood without a deeper engagement with global politics and, as scholars, practitioners, and others working on refugee conditions today argue, is an issue that needs greater attention than it is currently given.

Notes

1. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Facts and Figures About Refugees,” <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-figures.html>, accessed October 27, 2012.

2. Protracted refugee situations are defined as situations where refugees have been in exile “for 5 years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.” Protracted refugee situations do not always contain static populations as there are often periods of increase and decrease in the numbers of people displaced and changes within the population itself. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee (ExCom), “Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations,” ExCom No. 109 (LXI) 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/4b332bca9.html>, accessed January 2013; James Milner and Gil Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons From a Decade of Discussion*, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6 (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2011).

Note that in 2004, UNHCR had defined a major protracted situation as having over 25,000 refugees who had been in existence for more than five years with no immediate prospect of a durable solution. This definition then was used to describe all protracted refugee situations which was problematic as many protracted situations such as those of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh or Rwandans in Uganda among others would have been excluded. This definition has been refined to eliminate the population amount.

3. Gil Loescher and James Milner, “Understanding the Challenge,” *Forced Migration Review* no. 33 (2009): 9–10.

4. Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 498.

5. Milner and Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations*, 7.

6. Gil Loescher, “UNHCR at Fifty: Refugee Protection and World Politics,” in

Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–18.

7. *Ibid.*

8. James C. Hathaway, "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law," *Harvard International Law Journal* 31, no. 1 (1990): 129–84.

Hathaway argues that while the temporal and geographical restrictions were lifted, the fundamental structure and biases of refugee law remained, i.e., only refugees who had convention-like conditions (persecution on one of five enumerated grounds) could claim asylum in First World countries. This essentially excluded the vast majority of refugees in Third World countries who fled because of natural disasters or civil war and unrest.

9. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "An Introduction to International Protection: Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR. Self Study Module 1" (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, August 1, 2005).

10. Eleanor Acer, "Refuge in An Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States," *Fordham International Law Journal* 28, no. 5 (2004): 1361–96.

11. The fieldwork for this study was conducted between 2006 and 2007 and was part of a larger research project that compared the urbanization of refugee spaces in Lebanon and India. My own positionality is important to consider in this research. I do not claim to be an objective observer. I came first to Beirut as a PhD student studying Arabic over the summer in 2005 while engaging in a scoping exercise for my research project. I subsequently came back to conduct my fieldwork in 2006 and again in 2007. I developed friendships with NGOs and with families and have had to use my judgement in interpreting their histories. I was also acutely aware that Beirut camps, particularly Shatila, are over-researched sites, and my own interviews with residents only adds to the production of the camp as a unique site of research, with all its attendant consequences. However, this was in some ways an unavoidable choice; I was particularly keen to study urban camps as I came from an urban planning/urban history background, and it was the underlying theoretical framework of my research. However, I would argue that it would be particularly important to study rural camps and other sites in Lebanon and other countries to get a more nuanced picture of refugee camp life.

12. Milner and Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations*.

13. Richard Black, "Putting Refugees in Camps," *Forced Migration Review*, no. 2 (1998): 4–7.

14. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

15. See for example some of the guidelines on what rights refugees are supposed to have access to in host states: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," in *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status: Under*

the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1979).

16. Jim Lewis, "Phenomenon: The Exigent City," *New York Times Magazine* (June 8, 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/magazine/08wwln-urbanism-t.html>, accessed March 2011.

17. Agier, *On the Margins of the World*. Marc Antoine Perose de Montclose and Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13, no. 2 (2000): 205–22.

An early example of the argument for planning camps like planning the layout of cities was made by Frederick C. Cuny. See for example Cuny, "Refugee Camps and Camp Planning: The State of the Art," *Disasters* 1, no. 2 (1977): 125–43.

18. Agier, *On the Margins of the World*.

19. Romola Sanyal, "Refugees and the City: An Urban Discussion," *Geography Compass* 6, no. 11 (2012): 633–44.

20. Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale, *Transitional Settlement, Displaced Populations* (Oxford and Cambridge: Oxfam and University of Cambridge Shelterproject, 2005), 7.

21. See the design for a "self-contained community" in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook for Emergencies*, 3rd ed. (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2007), 214.

22. Ranabir Samaddar, *The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration From Bangladesh to West Bengal* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), 65, 66.

23. Corsellis and Vitale, *Transitional Settlement, Displaced Populations*.

24. See for example UNHCR's website and pages on "Urban Refugees" (<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html>, accessed March 2011) and Media Advisory notes on conditions of urban refugees, such as "Media Backgrounder: Responding to a growing challenge—protecting refugees in towns and cities" (December 7, 2009), <http://www.unhcr.org/4b1cbbda9.html>, accessed March 2011.

25. Not all refugees suffer from such severe deprivations. Depending on the relationship with the host state, many, such as the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, are politically active, gaining significant educational and other qualifications. See Jacob Andrew Mundy, "Performing the Nation, Pre-Figuring the State: The Western Saharan Refugees, Thirty Years Later," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 275–97.

26. See Michel Agier, *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2011); Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

27. Jenny Edkins, "Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp," *Alternatives* (2000), 3–25; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency," *Alternatives* (2000): 117–43; Gil Loescher, "UNHCR at Fifty."

28. Are Knudsen, "Widening the Protection Gap: The 'Politics of Citizenship'

for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 1948–2008,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 22, no. 1 (2009): 51–73. Robert Bowker, *Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

29. Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 33–38.

30. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 59.

31. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World’s Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 113.

32. Julie Marie Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

33. Article 1D of the 1951 Geneva Convention and paragraph 7(C) of the UNHCR Statute exclude Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate and refugees who had taken protection and assistance from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, which stopped its operations a long time ago, while UNRWA continues its operations until today. Lex Takkenberg argues that that Article 1D of the Refugee Convention and paragraph 7(C) of the UNHCR statute were written with Palestinians in mind with the intention of excluding them. However, there is a debate that rather than being an “exclusion” clause, Article 1D is more of a “suspension” clause. This leads to not only a marginalization of UNRWA’s role and the place of Palestinians in refugee studies, but also an operations issue in the coordination between UNRWA and UNHCR when protecting refugees seeking asylum. See Randa Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees,” in *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher (New York: Routledge, 2003), 155–74.

34. Benjamin N. Schiff, “Between Occupier and Occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 3 (1989): 60–75.

35. Bowker, *Palestinian Refugees*, 133.

36. Julie Marie Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 24.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees.”

39. Romola Sanyal, “Squatting in Camps: Building and Insurgency in Spaces of Refuge,” *Urban Studies* 48, no. 5 (2011): 877–90.

40. Yazid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192.

41. Rex Brynen, “The Politics of Exile: The Palestinians in Lebanon,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 3, no. 3 (1990): 204–27.

42. Peteet, *Gender in Crisis*; Julie Marie Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

43. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel’s Invasion,” *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 2 (1984): 255–66.

44. Mahmoud Abbas, Hussein Shabaan, Bassem Sirhan, and Ali Hassan, “The

Socio-Economic Condition of Palestinians in Lebanon,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 10, no. 3 (1997): 378–96; Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

45. Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, *Sabra and Shatila: September 1982* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004).

46. In addition to al-Hout, see also Leila Shahid, “Testimonies—the Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (2002): 36–58.

47. Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

48. Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap.”

49. Rebecca Roberts, *Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-Term Displacement* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

50. Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

51. See for example the discussion by Laleh Khalili, “Standing with My Brother’: Hizbullah, Palestinians, and the Limits of Solidarity,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 2 (2007): 276–303.

52. In an interview with an UNRWA field worker in 2007, he discussed in detail that the Lebanese government had started to reverse many of the restrictions they had placed on Palestinian camps, allowing them to upgrade their infrastructure and cooperating with them to improve their living conditions. This was a reversal of the Lebanese position that had previously banned any building material from entering the camps, particularly in the south. Interviews with refugees in camps such as Dbayyeh reconfirmed that these projects were indeed being envisioned as several camp residents agreed that they had been asked to give feedback on issues in the camps that needed resolutions.

53. Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, *A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations*, New Issues in Refugee Research 168 (Geneva: Policy Development and Evaluation Service, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2009).

54. Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Implantation, Transfer or Return?” *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 1 (2001): 94–105.

55. Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap.”

56. Slaughter and Crisp, *A Surrogate State?*

57. In India for example, in the aftermath of the partition violence, refugees came pouring into the country. In Calcutta, refugees used their status as displaced individuals to claim preferential treatment from the government while demanding equal rights as citizens. This was done while displacing local people from their homesteads in the fringes of the city, leading to long-standing tensions between local people and the refugee population.

58. Michel Agier, *On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today*, trans. David Fernbach (Malden, MA: Polity, 2008). Engin Isin and Kim Rygiel, “Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps,” in *The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving*, ed. Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina Masters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

59. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 9.

60. Patricia Owens, "Reclaiming 'Bare Life'? Against Agamben on Refugees," *International Relations* 23, no. 4 (2009): 567–82.

61. Agamben, "Homo Sacre"; Geraldine Pratt, "Abandoned Women and Spaces of Exception," *Antipode* 37 (2005): 1052–37.

62. Owens, "Reclaiming 'Bare Life.'"

63. Isin and Rygiel, "Abject Spaces," 184.

64. Raffaella Puggioni, "Resisting Sovereign Power: Camps In-Between Exception and Dissent," in *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*, ed. Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 71.

65. Stuart Elden, "Spaces of Humanitarian Exception," *Geografiska Annaler B: Human Geography* 88, no. B4 (2006): 483.

66. Hyndman, *Managing Displacement*.

67. Doreen B. Massey, "A Place Called Home?" in *Space, Place and Gender*, ed. Doreen B. Massey (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), 168.

68. Peter Nyers, "Taking Rights, Mediating Wrongs: Disagreements Over the Political Agency of Non-Status Refugees," in *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*, ed. Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 52.

69. Linda Tabar, "The 'Urban Redesign' of Jenin Refugee Camp: Humanitarian Intervention and Rational Violence," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 2 (2012): 44–61.

70. Romola Sanyal, "Urbanizing Refuge: Interrogating Spaces of Displacement," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (2013), doi: 10.1111/1468-2427.12020.

71. Goedhart cited in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees 2006*, 105.

72. See Monk and Mundy, "Introduction," this volume, 2.