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
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Introduction

The Post-conflict Environment

A Genealogy

DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND JACOB MUNDY

In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building *as the construction of a new environment* should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy.

—BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, *An Agenda for Peace*, emphasis added

IN 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali authored a groundbreaking policy document in which he presented the vision of “a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the [UN] Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.’”¹ Entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, this document, requested by an unprecedented UN Security Council summit meeting featuring the heads of all the current governments on the Council, assessed the United Nations’ capacity for peacekeeping and introduced the rationale for a decade of preventive diplomacy that followed its publication.²

No less significantly, the report also contributed immensely to the intellectual foundations of what would eventually come to be known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) paradigm. In R2P, the international community negotiated the competing demands of state sovereignty and international human rights, conditionally favoring the latter in cases when states were either the agents of, or indifferent to, what the International Commission on State Sovereignty called the “avoidable catastrophes” of the late twentieth century: “mass murder, rape, and starvation.”³ The R2P Doctrine, as the UN 2005 World Summit’s Outcome Documents make clear, implies

Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.⁴

The forms of intervention conceived of and acted upon in the period between the publication of these two documents—and to some extent, since—has presupposed something more than action strictly delimited to forestall or mitigate what Samantha Power described as emergent “problem[s] from hell”: ethnic cleansing, genocide, and forced migration.⁵ Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report already anticipated a necessary corollary to the new preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping regimes: a sphere of action he referred to as “post-conflict peace-building.” Indeed, in the period between the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* and the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the R2P principles, an entire technocracy for managing the post-conflict phase of international humanitarian intervention would come into existence. Moreover, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 also accelerated the creation of an emergent field of expertise in post-conflict action, with subsidiary proficiencies in “post-conflict assessment,” “post-conflict management,” “post-conflict recovery,” and “post-conflict development.”⁶ In the process, the forms of action required to establish and nurture institutions and infrastructure under post-conflict conditions came to be seen as something distinct from, and independent of, the political circumstances that occasioned the need for them to begin with. So complete has been the professionalization of post-conflict management as a kind of expertise that, without any hint of irony, the RAND Corporation published a *Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* in 2007.⁷

The principal argument advanced in this collection, however, is that the post-conflict environment that is acted upon by this new international technocracy of peacebuilding is in fact an extension of the politics from which that technocracy seeks to distinguish itself. Indeed, as we outline in the specific case studies collected here, the very idea of a post-conflict environment unselfconsciously *advances* the forms of structural violence that are, in many instances, underlying causes of armed conflict to begin with. Repeatedly, we find that pragmatic assessments of the “post-conflict environment” are at the same time continuations of the same logic whereby the international

community has identified certain of its members as “fragile” or “failed” states, and in the process ratified a contemporary history of intervention. Indeed, we understand the post-conflict environment to be the necessary *corollary* to the “failed state,” in a very precise sense. Leading theorists of late warfare like Mary Kaldor and Paul Collier have described the last two decades of mass armed violence as “wars of state unmaking” and “development in reverse.”⁸ The international, and increasing transnational, response has been the multiplication of knowledges and techniques of state- and nation-building.⁹ If the conflict environment is said to be one of “weak,” “fragile,” or “failed” nation-states—so the thinking goes—then the emergence of the late post-conflict environment is one where the *remaking* of identities, bodies, polities, economies, and governments within Neoliberal constraints is regularly treated as paramount. Our aim, in this collection, is to render that reasoning reflexive: we trace how the post-conflict environment of the new technocracy’s imagination is “imagineered” a priori as the site of a new *mission civilisatrice*.¹⁰

THE ORIGINS OF THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

A grim history attends the rise of this new post-conflict technocracy. On one hand, the end of a bipolar geopolitical order marked by the fall of the Soviet Union influenced the cessation of a number of long-standing conflicts. On the other hand, the end of global bipolarity has led to the efflorescence of violent struggles, and these have challenged both the perceptions of, and responses to, old and seemingly new repertoires of peace and violence. With respect to the so-called new wars, it is important to note that the 1990s witnessed the outbreak of a significant number of conflicts. Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chechnya, East Timor—to name just a few horrors—loom large in histories of post-conflict peacebuilding.¹¹ Not only because a number of these conflicts presented the international community with a persistent “intervention dilemma” during the hostilities, but because their cessation posed even larger challenges to established conventions of peacekeeping.

The new landscapes of UN action since the end of the Cold War correlate with the rise of new techniques of peace examined in this volume. If one were to place former Yugoslavia in a special category all its own, it is notable that the UN mission to help resolve international disputes seemingly be-

came an endangered species in the 1990s: Iraq-Kuwait, Rwanda-Uganda, Chad-Libya, and Eritrea-Ethiopia being the only cases. Similarly, UN decolonization missions were few and met with varied outcomes: a smooth and successful referendum delivering independence to Namibia, a still-stalemated referendum process in the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and East Timor's bloody rejection of autonomy under Indonesian rule in 1999. With internal conflicts becoming the dominant mode of warfare since the Second World War, most UN missions were tasked with the management of civil wars and inter-communal conflicts that either ended with the Cold War, began because it ended, or radically mutated with the loss of super-power inputs: Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Georgia (Abkhazia), Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, and, of course, the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo). More recently, the United Nations has launched peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Darfur conflict (Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic), while reinforcing efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, and Haiti. Haiti, indeed, has become the subject of a half-dozen UN missions since 1993.

At the same time, it is important to note that the United Nations' monopoly over these practices has been tenuous. New players have entered the fields of peace maintenance and rebuilding nation-states. Often in cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union has deployments to the former Yugoslavia, Chad, the DRC, and, at least on paper, the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has increasingly inserted itself into the management of post-conflict conditions too. Starting with its legitimate (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and dubious (Kosovo) interventions into the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, NATO has since assumed roles in stability operations in Afghanistan, protecting shipping near the Gulf of Aden from Somali pirates, and, in 2011, conducting an armed humanitarian intervention in Libya at the behest of the UN Security Council and in coordination with the Arab League.¹²

This, then, is the context in which the international community embarked upon an unprecedented range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. No fewer than twenty-five UN missions were put into effect between the arrival of blue helmets in Angola in 1989 and the United States-led occupation of Afghanistan in 2002. Militarized humanitarian interventions

likewise marked the new security terrain of the 1990s with high-profile actions in Somalia, pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.¹³ No less significantly, these are also the conditions under which new post-conflict technocracies of peacebuilding would emerge, gain legitimacy, and eventually eclipse traditional peacekeeping functions.

The monumental scale of the enterprise just described has coincided with a Taylorization of action; in the aggregate of these cases, one witnesses a situation in which the new technocracy of peacebuilding defines the post-conflict environment in terms of constituent “fragments” of civil society so that it can “re-assemble” them according to its own highly specialized division of labor. As a result, the peacebuilders’ post-conflict environment is characterized as the locus where specific protocols of transitional justice, transitional governance, and economic aid, reconstruction, and development are to be implemented. The World Bank’s 2011 *World Development Report* describes the same “core tools” of peacebuilding quite succinctly, as the transformation or provision of “institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs.”¹⁴ So successful is this schematization of the post-conflict environment that investments in these forms of institutionalization are *themselves* often treated as correlates of sustainable peace and checks against recidivism into war.¹⁵

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POST-CONFLICT CONDITION

This identification of peacebuilding with institutionalization—and more specifically, with the introduction of the institutions of the liberal state—has occasioned a measure of critical analysis both within the peacebuilding technocracy and without. These criticisms align with two distinct, though related, understandings of Liberalism. Stakeholders in the peacebuilding paradigm derive epistemic legitimacy for institutionalization—as have “nation builders” like George W. Bush—from what is commonly referred to as the “Democratic Peace” paradigm. Drawing upon a tradition of political research that has claimed (largely on normative or institutionalist grounds) that democracies tend not to wage war on other democracies, liberal peacebuilders have reverse-engineered the same democratic peace into a program of action.¹⁶ Here, the introduction or re-introduction of institutions characteristic to liberal democracies into post-conflict conditions (democratic gov-

ernance, independent judiciaries, and free markets) becomes an action plan for peacebuilders. The problem, as peacebuilders themselves frame it, is that a liberal project is advanced through illiberal means. “The governance of post-conflict territories by the United Nations embodies a central policy dilemma,” Simon Chesterman argues. “[H]ow does one help a population prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy?”¹⁷ With some variations, stakeholders and advocates of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm have, like Chesterman, suggested that the paradox of undemocratic democratization is an irreducible feature of peace transitions. It is, in other words, a necessary evil to be mitigated by introducing forms of “accountability and consultation” into transitional administrations, and by inviting local populations to become stakeholders “in the creation of . . . [political] structures, and in the process by which power is transferred.”¹⁸ Roland Paris has expressed a similar sentiment succinctly, arguing for “Institutionalization before Liberalization (IBL).”¹⁹ The only other alternative, some liberal peacebuilders argue, is to advance the same process in reverse. For example, Jack Snyder has not only argued that the nurturing of civil society must precede democratization, but that institutionalization of democratization prior to the emergence of civil society is actually a cause of ethno-political violence to begin with.²⁰ Each of these approaches amounts to roughly the same thing: they are efforts to acknowledge and at the same time disavow the illiberal dialectic of liberal peacebuilding by treating it as a sequencing problem instead.

Critics outside of the peacebuilding technocracy have tended to dismiss the reverse-engineering of the liberal peace just described and have commonly treated it as the form of imperialism characteristic to the historical present. As M. A. Mohamed Salih has suggested in an analysis of the political economy of the liberal peace, “built in” to the project of peacebuilding is “a discrepancy between political and economic liberalization” that repeatedly sacrifices the former in favor of the latter, and thus substitutes a species of pacification for peace.²¹ Implicitly, this kind of criticism resonates with a vision of Neoliberalism that Naomi Klein has termed “the shock doctrine.”²² According to this understanding of events, post-disaster conditions, whether natural or anthropogenic, emerge as opportunities for advancing a coercive, totalizing economic order in which only markets are “free.”

The most important studies of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, however, have already begun to approach the concerns we raise explicitly here: that the premises of peacebuilding—as well as many criticisms of it—are “af-

firmative,” in the sense that they are complicit with what they would undo. Theodor Adorno once referred to “affirmative” critique as a kind of “groveling criticism.” In mistaking itself for the transcendence it finds absent in its object (in this case, Liberal peacebuilding’s own self-understanding), critique reveals itself to be a *re-affirmation* of the merely existent.²³

John Heathershaw advances a parallel argument when he notes, in reference to the writings of Roland Paris, that “critical works are incorporated by discourse and become the new dogma.”²⁴ Although Heathershaw sublimates the notion of totality implicit in this position to the discursive sphere (calling it “an intertextual process”), he nevertheless works through the otherwise unexamined language of the dominant peacebuilding paradigms to reveal how, in asserting a problematic coincidence of identity and positivity—that is, peacebuilding and its own notion—the “pragmatic” discourse of peacebuilding reveals itself to have been normative all along. For this reason, pragmatic peacebuilding is actually part of the same politics from which it purports to set itself apart. Measured against its own concept, then, “peace building is not essentially liberal.”²⁵

Heathershaw and Lambach are also correct to point out that implicit in current examinations of peacebuilding are a series of problematic assumptions about the post-conflict environment itself.²⁶ Indeed, it would be fair to say that in the “post-conflict” lie the unexamined premises of peacebuilding, both as the geographically typical *site* and the epistemic *ground* of intervention. Relying on the logic of a critical geopolitics, Heathershaw and Lambach challenge those premises; they treat as ideological the “Unitarian” optic of academic researches on the post-conflict condition, which advance an unexamined “territorialization of space.”²⁷ Here, in other words, the normative horizons of undivided sovereignty and bounded territoriality are projected onto the post-conflict environment as part of a problematic “political ontology.” They therefore propose a “re-conceptualization of our (spatial) frames for understanding the post-conflict” that privileges the multiple, the hybrid, and trans-national *socius*.²⁸

THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: AN IMMANENT APPROACH

Accepting the implications while refusing the methodological conclusions of this sophisticated and important research, the present collection treats the post-conflict environment as a reification that is irreducible, and this is

why we distinguish it from Heathershaw's term: *post-conflict condition*. More to the point, the theoretical position guiding the empirical researches presented in this volume is that the negation of the "Unitarian" perspective does not necessarily corroborate the *identification* of post-conflict conditions as its contrary: a space of contested and *de*-territorialized multiplicities that is "interspatial"—in Heathershaw and Lambach's terms—to the degree that it is negotiated between local and global frames. This is not to suggest that the "state in society" approach advanced by Heathershaw fails to resonate with a number of our own conclusions. But our aim here is not to retrieve an authentic post-conflict condition out of its misprision, so much as it is to understand how that misprision is productively constituted by and within the thinking of the peacebuilding technocracies, with real political effects. In this sense, this collection aspires to advance what David Campbell (paraphrasing Foucault) has described as the need for "problematization of problematizations." Here we apply this approach to contemporary fields of expertise concerning the post-conflict environment.²⁹ The problem of the post-conflict environment is at the same time an urgent problem in the history of thought.

A simple and unoriginal observation—one shared by all the contributors to this project—can be interpolated as our common point of departure. It is the acknowledgement that violent conflicts, from brief episodes of mass armed warfare to decades of quiet government repression, are never entirely over. From Clausewitz to Weber to Foucault, social and strategic theorists have long recognized that the line between peace and war is one drawn by politics, not by nature. Commencing from this observation might suggest that our study has a weak purchase on the terrain we wish to explore. But we are in fact interested in how various efforts to claim mastery over the post-conflict environment necessarily confound themselves in their efforts to define the space, time, and constituent objects of intervention. If there is any blurring of the lines between peace and conflict, that obfuscation is an effect of the "war" for the post-conflict environment itself. Those struggles, their antagonists, genres of knowledge, sites of contestation, tacit ideologies, and—most importantly—their traceable repercussions, are this collection's principal concern.³⁰

The other intuition that grounds this study and affiliates our various contributions is a shared rejection of a common definition of the post-conflict environment. We view as hopelessly circular any effort to arrive at an operational definition or a theoretical model of the post-conflict environ-

ment empirically from a set of a priori axioms. We instead work immanently through the image of the post-conflict environment that stakeholders present as they plan to go about reforming it, as well as through the gaps in the “picture” that emerge as a result of stubborn political realities’ refusal to conform with their depiction. We do so, with the precise ambition to show how the “imaginative geography”—to cite Edward Said³¹—of a dominant geopolitical order presents itself to view in the ways that the same order imagines the sites that risk either falling out of, or may successfully be integrated within, its own logic. The paradox, of course, is that the order that would seek to tame the post-conflict environment is the same that produces it, and so our key observations here are once again about the post-conflict environment that emerges as a reification of a Neoliberal present’s ambiguous relation to a kind of violence from which it cannot be entirely separated. Hence the studies here question institutionally disparate yet functionally similar efforts to construct a pragmatic problem-solution dyad—that is, a “problematization.” Our effort to problematize these problematizations begins with the observation that the dyad refuses to recognize the dialectical relation between its two components. Each study in this collection then details how the forced dyadic organization, in an effort to structure the world as such, derails itself. Previous studies of the disciplines and technologies of the post-conflict environment have been content to stop at basic questions of whether or not the problem has been properly diagnosed and so whether or not the prescription fits the disease. We invert this picture and ask how the medicine is likewise symptomatic of the “disease.”

An already noted example of this approach is Campbell’s (1998) study of post-conflict Bosnia, which sought to account for the emergence of a particular solution (territorial division) to the alleged problem tormenting the Bosnian polity (ethnic conflict). He does so not just by denaturalizing the statement of the problem (that is, questioning ethnic framing of the conflict), but more importantly by elucidating the limits of contemporary liberal political thought that produced, spatialized, and legitimated such Solomonic illiberality across the Bosnian landscape (in the form of its partition). Campbell’s study is much more than a critique of the ethnic conflict literature of the 1990s. It is a thoroughgoing interrogation of a genre of thought and action that locates the solution to violent conflict in the “rightsizing” of state and sub-state boundaries. An interrogation whose objective is not to discard territorialized power-sharing as a “core tool”—to borrow, again, from the World Bank—in the effort to imagineer durable post-conflict environ-

ments. It is an interrogation that seeks to expose the tragedy of the core tool's complicity in the production of the initial problem and, more importantly, its complicity in the reproduction of the ideational and practical limits that ironically give it warrant while constraining its ability to achieve its promises.

In this collection, we perform similar evaluations of the core tools that have emerged within and from the post-conflict environments of the past two decades, namely, statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, refugee management, reconstruction, and finance and redevelopment. The cases in each study—respectively, Sierra Leone, Iraqi Kurdistan, Algeria, Palestinians, Kosovo, and Lebanon—have not been selected because they represent particularly telling deployments of the core tools. As with almost any post-conflict environment, one could apply the analysis developed in this collection to elucidate the doxa that operationalize the core tools normatively while at the same time rendering them self-defeating pragmatically. The cases in this collection instead reflect the contributors' deep familiarity with the environments themselves. When coupled with collectively shared hermeneutic suspicions about the co-constitutive relationship between images or the post-conflict environment and the techniques of post-conflict management, this familiarity has constellated a new and immanent critique of an immense field of practice in international security.

IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHIES OF PEACE

We apply this immanent approach to a series of case studies. The cases under examination here were chosen because they elucidate the most dominant regimes of knowledge and practice within the techno-politics of contemporary post-conflict management: statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, resettlement, reconstruction, and redevelopment aid. Our goal is not to offer a global atlas of the post-conflict environment nor is it to provide a total history of Neoliberal peacebuilding through a series of geographically and temporally balanced case studies. The geographic scope of the contributions here—the authors' ethnographic, historiographic, geographic, economic, and politicographic encounters in Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northwest Africa—should not be the terrain on which this volume is read and deliberated. On the one hand, we recognize the eminence of post-conflict zones in Latin America and Central and Southeast Asia, as well as

East and Central Africa. On the other hand, we dismiss the criticism that this collection is missing key cases or essential conflict sites. That the following chapters are intended as case studies of the subject conflicts—Sierra Leone, Iraqi Kurdistan, Algeria, Palestinian refugee camps, Kosovo, and Lebanon—is the first misperception that has to be abandoned. The chapters in this collection are rather case studies of totalizing logics. As each chapter argues, each logic elaborates an imaginative geography of conflict in those spaces, a geography that then warrants the precise ameliorative intervention from the very logic that has rendered that space as problematic. These are not just case studies of how theories of post-conflict management produce realities at the ideational level, they are also studies of how those self-legitimizing realities become operationalized in the techno-political interventions of post-conflict managers.

The larger point being that we are not out to dismantle Neoliberal peacebuilding by repeatedly demonstrating that it operates through the production of self-serving yet self-destructing constructs. Indeed, Neoliberal peacebuilding works quite effectively, but not in the ways in which these paradigms imagine themselves, their work, and the post-conflict worlds they make. The ways in which the constructs actually work and the broader ways in which they are effective cannot be accounted for within the given peacebuilding paradigms' self-understandings. The chapters in this collection are thus attempts to account for the productive and destructive capacities of late Neoliberal peacebuilding without relying upon or reproducing the epistemologies and ontologies of statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, resettlement, reconstruction, and redevelopment aid.

Statebuilding

Following this program, Catherine Goetze interrogates interventionary techniques of statebuilding and transitional governance in post-war Sierra Leone. She identifies the driving problematization of statebuilding as one that premises state failure and dysfunctional polities as the conditions of possibility for violent conflict, which then become the conditions of necessity that require the intervention of late statebuilding theory and practices. Goetze first supplements this initial observation by unearthing similar assumptions embedded within two important strands of thought: one, economic models of an abstract *pre*-conflict environment and, two, empirical findings related to the human terrain of demobilized fighters in Sierra Le-

one's post-conflict environment. Goetze then argues that domestic-level econometric analyses of civil war etiology, by omitting the international a priori, lack any analysis of actual economic structures. In the specific case of Sierra Leone, these pivotal yet nonetheless hypothetical assumptions about the essential nature of insurgents' motives have been translated into a very real set of interventionary practices aimed at controlling the trade of "conflict diamonds" so as to address the alleged sources of violence (i.e., rebel greed). The curiosity, for Goetze, is the extent to which rebel subjectivities are produced and morally shaded by these assumptions while the demonstrably predacious behavior of state actors and codependent foreign business interests (vis-à-vis Sierra Leone's lucrative diamond industry) have been implicitly rewarded and, indeed, are seen as essential to the stability of the post-conflict environment. As most of the studies in this volume admit, only the most naive observer of transitional governance would be shocked to discover illiberal politics lurking behind the mantle of Neoliberal peacebuilding. The point, rather, is that the analytical absence of the state and extra-state actors from contemporary accounts of civil war causation plays a legitimating function in post-conflict statebuilding and transitional governance activities.

Peacebuilding

If the act of distinguishing between state and non-state actors presents itself as a *problematique* of transitional governance, then the act of repairing traumatized minds similarly becomes viewed as a necessary problem for peace- and nation-building practices to address. Given the preferred assumption that war is mainly psychologically produced and reproduced by those who have experienced its pain (rather than through structures that would otherwise implicate a field of stakeholders far beyond the sites of violence), Sarah Keeler explains that the normative consequent is the warrant to reconfigure trauma and suffering into acceptable ideal forms. Commencing from a critical reading of the disjuncture between normative theorizations of the post-conflict environment and the general absence of its conflictual realities at the agent level, Keeler goes on to outline the historical context that has given rise to layers of trauma and suffering while also witnessing the increasing penetration of foreign interests into the Kurdish region following the 1991 Gulf War. A clear consequence of these applications of routinized and gendered models of Selfhood is the denigration and dismissal of the multifarious and contradictory ways in which suffering is actually understood by its

subject persons and communities. Suffering, as viewed by universalist approaches, Keeler stresses, is rarely understood to constitute a means of resistance, whether as political resistance to local tyranny or psychic resistance to foreign medical interventions. Equally, Keeler argues, the regulation of post-conflict minds under the rubric of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) itself constitutes a form of structural violence that cannot be seen as an unintended consequence of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. As with all of the chapters in this volume, Keeler reveals one of the ways in which structural violence must be taken as constitutive of the post-conflict environment. The imperative to discipline the state, the economy, and the society at large is likewise reflected in the need to discipline traumatized minds as well.

Transitional Justice

To build peace in the late post-conflict environment is to build justice institutionally and culturally while, at the same time, delivering reconciliation to war-torn societies. There is no clearer marker of this mandate and bifurcation than the proliferation, on the one hand, of ad hoc transitional mechanisms intended to reinforce the cultural means by which a society bridges the gap between conflict and peace, authoritarianism and democracy, the state of nature and the rule of law. Then, on the other hand, there are the *punitive* means by which transitional justice is increasingly administered within internationalized fora. Taking normative criticisms of Algeria's most recent national reconciliation policies as his point of departure, Jacob Mundy charts the thirty-year distillation of varied and contingent forms of justice and peacemaking into a generic and now requisite framework for post-conflict reconciliation—the truth commission. To counter the paradigm of retributive or victors' justice (which has become increasingly monopolized in the hands of institutions dominated by Western states), the paradigm of restorative or survivors' justice is presented as the alternative that builds state, national, and judicial capacity. The problem in either approach, however, is the assumed identities of conflict that are reproduced and sedimented by truth commissions. These identities are assumed to be the requisite identities for peace: combatants and civilians, victors and victims, perpetrators and survivors. What restorative justice "restores"—or, more accurately, reifies—is a set of identities wholly dependent upon an idealized ontology of war, not the actual, ambiguous, shifting, contradictory, and indeterminate identities that are lived and practiced by those in any real

conflict. In the end, Mundy does not ask us to envision an alternative model of justice but rather to consider how prevailing transitional justice prescriptions fail to deliver on their most basic promises. In so doing, they operationalize blindness to structural violence in the conflict and post-conflict environments.

Resettlement

From putative spaces of justice, we then move to a post-conflict space that is often rendered synonymous with “exceptional” injustice: the refugee camp. In her contribution to this volume, Romola Sanyal interrogates the now routine practice of corralling displaced populations, particularly those that cross international borders in times of armed conflict. Sanyal observes several related tensions between the two major international refugee institutions—UNHCR and UNRWA—that play a predominant role in the very production of refugees and their spaces. Sanyal argues, however, that the Palestinians’ exceptionality has increasingly become the implicit model for long-term international refugee management. The development and spatial application of “transitional settlements” by the UNHCR—an attempt to move away from the camp as ideal form while also attempting to eschew the new reality of refugee urbanism—is taken by Sanyal to reveal a new logic of refugee management with UNRWA as its implicit guide. One of the clear implications being that the camp is still not understood to be a site of imposed structural violence. And with the advent of transitional settlements, the means of imposing the disciplinary regime of the camp on certain displaced populations becomes all the more effective while reducing the visibility of its nature.

Reconstruction

As with refugee camps, ideational and material attempts to build out past violence in the physical spaces of the post-conflict environment are problematic in ways that their own assumptions do not allow them to visualize. Addressing the imperative to build or re-build in the post-conflict environment, Andrew Hersher documents the irresolvable tension between the assertion of destruction as the problem and the problematics of reconstruction. Nesting his analysis within familiar post-conflict claims of exemplarity/exceptionality, Hersher charts various meta-Kosovos. One

important image of Kosovo emerges out of the specific global controversy surrounding the legitimacy of NATO's campaign against Serbia in 1999, quickly followed by the effort to derive and codify an internationally accepted algorithm to legitimize future humanitarian interventions—the R2P project. Among the post-conflict duties R2P has assigned itself is the responsibility to rebuild, where Kosovo has become a crucial test case. Yet this undecided image of exemplarity and exceptionality has been carried into Kosovo's post-conflict environment. Where Kosovar leaders and their foreign backers insist that the territory's pursuit of independent and sovereign statehood is *sui generis*, Hersher notes that the foreign prescriptions for post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo were very much generic models designed for no specific place at all. Rather than take exemplarity and exceptionality as given, Hersher analyzes the historical circumstances that gave rise to these two images. He seeks to understand their dialectical interactions, and to understand how they function as effective yet competing stays that co-constitute temporal liminality and legitimate the interventionary practices themselves. What is at stake here, for Hersher, is not just that architectural reconstruction in Kosovo has played a part in perpetuating two opposing—and possibly self-serving—views of the same space, whether its exceptionality or its exemplarity. By presenting their aims as the “restoration” of pre-conflict conditions, peacebuilders conflated the problem of housing with the problem of repatriation, so that patterns of post-conflict relief inadvertently function to intensify forms of stratification coextensive with conflict conditions. Despite assumptions that Kosovars would return to the restored environment, such wishful imagineering generates new forms of displacement.

Aid and Redevelopment

Building/imaging the post-conflict environment, however, requires funding. Where International financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund once functioned as an arm of the West in the Cold War struggle for control over the peoples and governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these institutions have since had to recast and position their activities as concordant with the new peacebuilding agendas witnessed in the late post-conflict environment. The reconceptualization of armed conflict as “development in reverse,” according to leading World Bank economists, is illustrative of this conflation.³² Yet Na-

jib Hourani's critique of this new reality is not to be confused with established arguments that cite the nefarious history of structural adjustment programs or with newer claims of emergent "disaster capitalism."³³ Instead, Hourani examines the material and ideational construction of a post-conflict environment as the effect of, rather than the assumed precondition for, the establishment or reinstatement of Neoliberal economic reforms. The problematization that Hourani identifies is the prescription of economic liberalization for economies that otherwise enable authoritarianism and war. Where established criticisms of IFIs see nefarious politics or imperial logics lurking behind economic agendas, Hourani detects something quite different amongst the actual struggles for property allotments and retail space in post-conflict Lebanon. In other words, the joke might be on the IFIs. If there is any Trojan horse in this post-conflict situation, Hourani suggests, it is the ability of informal and formal political factions to use the vehicle of Neoliberal economic reform to advance illiberal agendas. Starting with Lebanon's post-conflict economic tribulations, Hourani traces the path that led to the World Bank's sizeable intervention into the Lebanese property sector in the mid-1990s, while at the same time Lebanon was witnessing the ascendancy of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While the economic competition within the post-conflict commercial spaces co-erected by the World Bank has been quite vigorous, so has the informal politics behind the various stakeholders in these new venues. Given that economics and politics cannot be separated in practice, Hourani suggests that they must be separated in theory and rhetoric so as to justify interventions that are always already political. Hourani concludes that the positing of a post-conflict environment aids in this process by licensing that which would not be possible without the environment in the first place.

PERSISTENT THEMES OF POST-CONFLICT CONSTITUTION

Across these studies we find an ensemble of discrete means by which different post-conflict configurations of space and time, agency and structure are variously enabled or disabled. Central to our studies is a transnational class of managers who co-constitute post-conflict environments through their knowledge and practice in and about those spaces. Tracing the circulations of these actors and their acts helps identify the ways in which local, national, regional, and global interactions impinge upon the work of constituting

post-conflict space today. Where Goetze examines the productive absence of an international political-economy in the science and management of “resource conflicts,” whose roots are ostensibly local in nature, Hourani details local manipulations of Neoliberal assumptions about the economics and politics of civil conflict and Neoliberal demands regarding free markets and liberal governmentality. While trauma is permissible at an abstract national level (what national mythology is not rooted in the overcoming of trauma?), Keeler examines efforts to eradicate it at the personal level of actual victims. Truth commissions likewise fetishize personal experience as the etiological locus of violent authoritarianism and conflict. But for Mundy, this global mandate for truth and accountability works by, one, denying it to most victims of war and dictatorship while, two, shaming those polities that refuse to follow the dictates of the global transitional justice technocracy. Spatial interaction acutely manifests in Sanyal’s examination of Palestinian refugee camps and Hersher’s examination of reconstruction in Kosovo. In both cases, the spatiality of Palestinian camp and Kosovar home exist within a context whose purpose is to build peace (in the case of the latter) or to at least make an armistice tolerable (in the case of the former). But these are conflicts intensely affected by geopolitical forces, particularly the interests of the United States. These forces not only affect the built environment in post-conflict space, they respectively work to enable national identities purposefully and haphazardly.

Building upon this last observation, another durable theme that emerges from our studies of the late post-conflict environment is the ambivalent rendering of the spaces themselves—are they exemplary or exceptional?—when refracted through the regimes of knowledge and managerial strategies that produce them as post-conflict. Sierra Leone is the classic case of a resource conflict driven by a criminally motivated rebellion, and so post-conflict statebuilding projects there have aimed to address these issues. Goetz, however, demonstrates that the exemplarity of Sierra Leone is produced by a certain scientific understanding of civil conflicts as self-contained worlds, an understanding that has achieved epistemic hegemony among economic theorists of armed conflict and those that would seek to manage the aftermath of those conflicts. As detailed above, Hersher addresses this tension head-on, examining the productive tension between the international political exceptionality of an independent Kosovo (i.e., efforts to render it as such by its leaders and backers) vs. the established models of post-conflict reconstruction automatically applied there. The making of post-conflict

spaces in Lebanon that are intelligible to international consumers is, for Horani, a sign of the failure of aid and redevelopment schemes to grasp the exceptional forces at work in Lebanon's civil war. Sanyal's intervention examines a different set of built environments. In the recent convergence of UNRWA and UNHCR styles of the spatial management of refugees, the institutional exceptionality of Palestinian refugees has become an exemplary model for a post-conflict technocracy that increasingly relies upon refugee camps as a space of permanent impermanence. The function of which is to satisfy the demands of some stakeholders (e.g., the antagonists behind a stalemated conflict, an international community unwilling to resolve a dispute, the post-conflict technocracy that now sees camps as a logical and inevitable form) at the expense of the refugees themselves. Mundy raises similar concerns about local and global allocations of dignity. Algeria stands as a country that tried to self-allocate dignity in ways that rendered it exceptionally deviant to international human rights and transitional justice communities. Whereas the exemplar, South Africa's TRC, did not represent a revolutionary redistribution of dignity in post-Apartheid South Africa. It worked precisely because it made a spectacle of national contrition that disabled many more victims' voices than it enabled in public displays of guilt and suffering. The power of the TRC, nearly twenty years later, rests in its ability to reproduce itself as an exemplar, not just in the distribution of restorative justice. Raising similar questions about victims' rights to their own suffering, as well as processes of remember and forgetting, Keeler unearths the ways that, through psychological and medical interventions, exceptional personal experiences of victimhood are disabled at the behest of attempts to erect exemplary yet depersonalized narratives of national suffering.

Central to the construction of post-conflict space is a set of varied and reoccurring techniques and technologies. As one might expect, spatial technologies figure prominently in the accounts here, whether the space of the refugee camp, the reconstructed space of a war-torn country, the space where acts of national reconciliation are performed and consumed, as well as the space where post-conflict normalcy is affirmed through conspicuous consumption of Euro-American products and brands. Keeler additionally documents how new and old forms of personalized psycho-pharmacological management ostensibly seek to de-traumatize individuals and so homogenize experiences and identities in ways that are amenable to projects of post-conflict peace- and nation-building. Goetze, on the other hand, traces international techniques and technologies of prohibition aimed at the ostensible

resources driving armed conflicts in the world's poorest countries. For the authors here, these are the other "core tools"—these routine and evolving knowledges, practices, and technologies—that co-constitute the late post-conflict environment. In the analyses collected here, they emerge as the premier mechanisms through which the global peacebuilding technocracy elaborates and operates within post-conflict environments.

CONCLUSION

We accept the proposition that there are elements of the post-conflict environment that are not new. Recent efforts to picture and build the post-conflict environment hold salient parallels with past interventions into zones of war and perceived anocracy. To say, however, that the late post-conflict reconstruction is nothing more than derivations of the Marshall Plan or that state- and nation-building are colonialism in new bottles ignores the primacy of historical context. Indeed, we would argue that historical context does not merely explain differences in statebuilding between post-war Germany and Kosovo. By historical context, we mean the idea that it is the contemporary condition that produces the very past said to prefigure what follows. Rather than an evolutionary approach to understanding the post-conflict environment (e.g., studying its mutations since the end of the Second World War), we adopt a genealogical approach that explores the contingency of the past based on the present. Just as Benedict Anderson counter-intuitively concluded that national history does not produce but is produced by its alleged product, the nation,³⁴ we find that the late post-conflict environment is an essential condition of possibility for the production of its supposed precursors. In the short term, one prominent effect of this productive process is the generation of conflict histories based on the needs of the post-conflict present. Images of the post-conflict present become the window through which the conflictual past is imaginatively constructed. More broadly, it also produces *longue durée* self-images in much the same way that disciplines and institutions often project themselves counter-temporally into modern, classical, and ancient arenas. These historical constructs not only become legitimating genealogies for the interventionary practices behind the late post-conflict environment, they become adopted and projected as the sine qua non historical understanding of the broader problematic they erect.

In what follows, then, we do not attempt to advance a critique that opposes an idealized image of select post-conflict environments with a supposed contradictory or more robust account of those environments' alleged reality. We do not pretend to present superior readings of post-conflict environments in places such as Palestinian refugee camps, Kosovar housing projects, Beirut shopping centers, or alluvial diamond mines in West Africa. While the contributors to this collection are united in the view that post-conflict environments are often represented in problematic ways (starting from the very claim that they are post-conflict), we do not necessarily believe that the only response to this tendency is the assertion of more accurate or incisive counter-representation. To do so would merely invite the same criticism of this collection that its contributors apply to the schema advanced by stakeholders in the production of the "post-conflict environment." Understanding the doxa of stakeholders to be coextensive with what they represent, we deal here only with *their* post-conflict environment, attempting to understand the effects of mobilized reifications. Thus, our concern here is not with a right way to represent the post-conflict environment, but with the ways in which sometimes competing, sometimes harmonious images of post-conflict bodies, spaces, and institutions (1) legitimize the interventionary practices into those lives and environments by creating justificatory narratives while (2) realizing and revealing the broader logic of Neoliberal peacebuilding from which they obtain moral warrant but in which they are always already embedded. This collection is thus able to account for the post-conflict environment in novel ways that its traditional managers are unable to. Because we view the tacit as entirely problematic, we are better positioned to advance an understanding of peacebuilding in the age of Neoliberalism that does not amount to a self-understanding.

That our interventions do not lend themselves to easy scientific appropriation and redeployment back into post-conflict fields and knowledges is intentional. There are, however, other ways in which we believe this collection will break new ground on pressing issues of global peace and conflict. This volume examines how the leading techniques and technologies of peacebuilding can be read as paradoxically disabling effective management of post-conflict spaces while ultimately enabling the reproduction of the global political and economic condition known as Neoliberalism. Our method, which details the imaginative and material elaboration of post-conflict environments by the dominant regimes of techno-political knowledge and practice of peacebuilding, could likewise find purchase in attempts

to understand late war-making. How are conflict environments expected, assembled, and contested by the scientific and technocratic stakeholders who position themselves as the premier stage managers of the theater of war? In the same way that we view post-conflict environments as performatively constituted through acts that are misidentified as the effects of the environment itself, a new war studies would take as its object of analysis the “theater” of war in the same way that we have attempted to understand the contemporary theater of peace. An exciting agenda of research, as the conclusion to this volume suggests, is the investigation of the dramaturgical regimes of war and peace, their mutual imbrication, and so the ways in which conflict and post-conflict environments reciprocally make and unmake each other, synchronically and diachronically. As we approach a world in which war is ostensibly facing extinction,³⁵ a simultaneous inquiry into the dramaturgical staging of war and peace might lead us to a more critical understanding of both, critical in the sense of an ironic yet ethically pressing science. Here we have accounted for the appearance and powers of peace in ways that raise suspicions about its intellectual architecture, its normative warrant, its temporal inauguration, its spatial configuration, its material amplification, and its ideological instrumentalization. The alleged disappearance of war, and the powers this disappearance confers, need to be accounted for likewise.

Notes

1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
2. See UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Forty Sixth Meeting,” UN Document S/PV 3046 (January 31, 1992).
3. The inaugural document of the R2P paradigm is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In it, “The Responsibility to Protect” is introduced as “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.” See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001).
4. <http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>.
5. Samantha Power, *“A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Perennial, 2003).
6. *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

7. James Dobbins and others, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

8. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*. Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: Harper, 2009).

9. One way to appreciate the growth of the abstract and practical knowledges related to the late post-conflict environment is to witness the rise of its associated terms. In the U.S. Library of Congress and the JSTOR archive of academic articles, for example, the overwhelming majority of holdings bearing terms like *state-building*, *stability operations*, *nation building*, *transitional justice*, *refugee*, *humanitarian intervention*, and *complex humanitarian emergencies* have all been published in the last twenty years, most in the past decade.

10. Imagineers, *Walt Disney Imagineering: A Behind the Dreams Look at Making the Magic Real* (New York: Disney Editions, 1996).

11. While the 1990s witnessed the outbreak of a significant number of conflicts, it was not, as is often believed, a time of unprecedented levels of internal violence. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

Coupled with the claim that the old borders of politics, economics, and identity were being eroded, debate has naturally ensued as to whether or not mass organized violence after 1989 has witnessed a revolution in the ontology of war. Others have suggested a more evolutionary perspective: late warfare is the manifestation of new configurations of already existing techniques and technologies of mass violence. Statements of new war theory can be found in *Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars*, ed. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (London and New York: Pinter, 1997). Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed, 2001). *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*, ed. Dietrich Jung (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Oxford: Polity, 2005). Theoretical, empirical, and historical critiques of new war theory are voiced in Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?," *World Politics* 54 (2001): 99–118. Errol A. Henderson and Joel David Singer, "'New Wars' and Rumors of 'New Wars,'" *International Interactions* 28, no. 2 (2002): 165–90. Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004): 173–89. *Rethinking the Nature of War*, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005). Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 3 (2009). An analysis of the debate is performed in Jacob Andrew Mundy, "Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 3 (2011): 279–95.

12. Pierre Hazan, "Reconciliation," in *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 258.

13. Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, "International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s," *SAIS Review* 23, no. 2 (2003): 71–92.

14. World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), overview.

15. Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2009), 169, cites RAND studies on recidivism.

16. On democratic peace, see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–38.

17. Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building; A Project of the International Peace Academy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 127.

18. *Ibid.*, 143.

The literature on the paradoxes of liberal peacebuilding is extensive. For a critical review, see Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

19. Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

20. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).

21. M. A. Mohamed Salih, "A Critique of the Political Economy of the Liberal Peace: Elements of an African Experience," in *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), 134.

22. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Metropolitan, 2007).

23. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 336.

24. John Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2008): 597–621.

25. *Ibid.*, 620.

26. John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach, "Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2, no. 3 (2008): 269–89.

27. Here we are drawing on Agnew's "territorial trap" argument. See J. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.

28. Heathershaw and Lambach, "Introduction," 286.

29. David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), x–xi. Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

30. Here is an instructive analogy to the kind of project we are attempting here: Reflecting on the strange relationship between intellectual production and its ostensible objects of analysis, anthropologist Joseba Zulaika noted that terrorism studies during the Cold War and immediately afterwards had always seemed to outpace actual terrorism until September 11, 2001. The question Zulaika poses is quite provocative: had decades of discursive anticipation of mass terrorism, particularly in the United States, produced the very conditions that made it possible? See Joseba Zulaika, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies of Counterterrorism," *Radical History Review*, no. 85 (2003): 191–99.

In this volume, we are likewise concerned with the relationship between discrete knowledges and their object. Our working hypothesis, however, is more dynamic. We seek to highlight the ways in which key stakeholders in various post-conflict settings *produce* the post-conflict environment and are themselves reciprocally defined by it. In this sense, our model of "problematization" is more dramaturgical than discursive.

31. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

32. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 3–12.

33. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*.

34. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991).

35. See Azar Gat, "Is War Declining—And Why?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 2 (2013): 149–57.