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Advocacy in Hard Times

Nonprofit Organizations and the Representation of Marginalized
Groups in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina and 9/11

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What are the effects of national crises on nonprofit advocacy, particularly
when it comes to organizations that represent marginalized and underrepre-
sented groups in national politics? Following the 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the American political landscape has been
influenced by the convergence of a range of "national crises," including the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, continued threats of terrorist violence, the
destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina, and the mortgage and financial
crises.[1] While the convergence of these phenomena has changed American
politics, this terrain continues to be shaped by perennial challenges, among
them enduring racial, gender, and economic inequalities. This chapter ana-
lyzes the intersections between these persistent inequalities on the one hand
and episodic crises on the other, examining their implications for nonprofit
organizations' advocacy on behalf of marginalized groups. Combining orig-
inal quantitative and qualitative data, I argue that crises present advocacy
organizations with a combination of constraints and opportunities when
it comes to addressing the enduring issues affecting their constituents. In
particular, comparing the responses of organizations to 9/11 and Hurricane
Katrina reveals that each of these two calamitous events has had different re-
percussions for liberal and conservative advocacy groups. These differences
can tell us a great deal about the political opportunities and policy windows
for nonprofit advocacy on behalf of groups for whom times are "always hard."

Nonprofit Advocacy in (Pretty) Good Times

Nonprofit organizations, interest groups, and advocacy organizations are cru-
cial conduits for the articulation and representation of the legal, political, and
policy interests of groups such as women, people of color, and low-income

people, who have traditionally been underserved by the two major political parties and underrepresented within the electoral system (Bass et al., 2007; Berry and Arons, 2003; Boris, 1999; Boris and Krehely, 2002; Boris and Mosher-Williams, 1998; Costain, 2005; Dahl, 1967; Frymer, 1999; Heaney, 2004; Minkoff, 1994, 1995; Weldon, 2002, 2011). Organizations advocating on behalf of marginalized groups were once outnumbered, out-resourced, and out-influenced by organizations such as business and professional associations that spoke for more powerful and all-too-often anti-egalitarian interests (Schattschneider [1960] 1975, 35). By 2000, however, there were more than 700 organizations representing women, people of color, and low-income people in national politics, encompassing more than 40 African American organizations, more than 30 Asian Pacific American organizations, and well over 100 women's organizations (Strolovitch, 2007). These organizations continue to make up only a small portion of the broader interest group universe that counts more than 17,000 national organizations representing much wealthier and more powerful interests. Nonetheless, groups like the National Association for Advancement of Colored People, the National Organization for Women, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the National Council of La Raza, and the National Asian Pacific American Law Center have become a significant and visible presence in Washington politics, and many argue that these organizations are among the most important representatives of and advocates for marginalized groups in the United States.

Although the increase in the number of organizations has helped usher in significant legal and policy gains for these and other marginalized groups, the extent to which their promise to equalize the representational playing field has been fulfilled remains the source of much debate. And while scholars continue to echo the long-standing concerns of scholars such as E. E. Schattschneider, who were concerned with biases within the broader pressure group system that favored wealthy and powerful interests, some also express concerns about the development of biases within organizations claiming to represent marginalized populations (Berry, 1999; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1992; Skocpol, 2003; Strolovitch, 2007). Observers allege, for example, that civil rights organizations focus mainly on "middle-class" issues, that feminism is a movement of and for affluent white women, and that economic justice groups marginalize low-income women and people of color (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1992).

My 2007 book *Affirmative Advocacy* took these debates and allegations as its point of departure. In it, I explored how advocacy organizations decide

which battles to prioritize in an era marked by subsiding de jure discrimination but often heightened de facto inequalities, both *between* their marginalized constituencies on the one hand and dominant racial, gender, and income groups on the other, as well as *within* the marginalized populations they claim to represent. Faced with limited resources but encompassing large and internally complex constituencies, how do advocacy organizations decide which groups and subgroups warrant the most attention?

To answer these questions, I explored the issues addressed by organizations that represent marginalized populations in American politics. In particular, I examined to what degree and in what ways organizations claiming to speak for marginalized groups attend to the particular challenges associated with advocating on behalf of disadvantaged subgroups of their own marginalized constituencies—what scholars have come to call "intersectionally disadvantaged" groups (Crenshaw, 1989; see also Collins, 1990; Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, among others). Intersectional frameworks contend that economic and social injustices are not mutually exclusive and that no particular form of domination or social relation—be it race, class, patriarchy, or heteronomativity—is the primary source of oppression (Kurtz, 2002, 38).[2] As I explained in *Affirmative Advocacy*, while recognizing that important inequalities persist *among* racial, gender, or economic groups, intersectional approaches highlight the ways in which social and political forces manipulate the overlapping and intersecting inequalities *within* marginalized groups. These approaches also emphasize the consequent unevenness in the effects of the political, economic, and social gains made by marginalized groups since, and as a result of, the social movements and policy gains of the 1960s and 1970s (McCall, 2013; Strolovitch 2007, 22–28).

Using this intersectional approach, in the summer of 2000, I fielded the Survey of National Economic and Social Justice Organizations, in which respondents were asked a series of questions about the levels and targets of their advocacy activities on four domestic policy issues. The four issues were assigned to different types of organizations based on a four-part policy typology that I created to operationalize key aspects of intersectional theories about power and marginalization and to test them against competing explanations (fig. 6.1): (1) universal issues that affect, at least in theory, the population as a whole regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, class, or any other identity; (2) majority issues that affect an organization's members or constituents relatively equally; (3) disadvantaged subgroup issues that affect an intersectionally marginalized subgroup of an organization's constituents

	Affects Subgroup	Affects Majority of Group
Low Power	Disadvantaged Subgroup Issue	Majority Issue
High Power	Advantaged Subgroup Issue	
	Universal Issue	

Figure 6.1. Policy typology. Source: *Affirmative Advocacy* (Strolovitch, 2007)

(i.e., it is disadvantaged economically, socially, or politically compared to the broader constituency); and (4) advantaged subgroup issues that also affect a subgroup of an organization's constituents, but a relatively advantaged or privileged subgroup compared to the broader constituency (though they are nonetheless disadvantaged compared to the general population).

For example, I asked respondents from women's organizations about their advocacy efforts regarding violence against women (VAW) as a majority issue, as all women are, theoretically, equally likely to be victims of gender-related violence, even if not every women is in fact a victim in her lifetime. I asked them about affirmative action in higher education as an advantaged subgroup issue because this issue primarily affects college-educated women, a relatively privileged subgroup of all women. Finally, I asked these same respondents about welfare reform as a disadvantaged subgroup issue, as it intersects gender and class and affects low-income women, an intersectionally disadvantaged subgroup of women. All organizations in the study were asked about Social Security as a "universal" issue.[3] Based on this typology, respondents from different kinds of organizations were asked a series of questions, including one that asked them to estimate the proportion of their constituency that was affected by each of four designated policy issues, and another that asked how active, on a scale of 1 to 5, their organization had been on each issue between 1990 and 2000.

Table 6.1 shows the percentage of organizations that were active and inactive on each issue type, as well as the mean levels of activity on each one

TABLE 6.1.
Mean Level of Activity and Percent of Organizations Active on Each Issue Category,
by Type of Organization

Organization Type	Majority Issue		Advantaged Subgroup Issue		Disadvantaged Subgroup Issue		Universal Issue	
	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
Asian Pacific American	3.7	76.9	3.0	84.6	2.4	69.2	1.6	30.8
Black/African American	4.1	85.0	4.5	90.0	3.7	90.0	2.1	45.0
Latino/Hispanic	4.6	100.0	4.3	100.0	2.9	62.5	2.1	50.0
Native American/ American Indian	4.0	100.0	3.8	69.2	2.9	69.2	1.7	15.4
Civil rights (other)[a]	3.3	74.4	2.9	64.1	2.7	64.1	1.6	23.1
Labor[b]	3.8	78.6	4.0	78.6	3.5	71.4	2.9	54.8
Economic justice[c]	3.4	69.7	3.4	71.2	1.2	12.1	1.9	30.3
Public interest[d]	3.3	72.7	2.4	45.5	2.1	63.6	1.8	27.4
Women's rights/ feminist[e]	3.6	84.8	3.4	77.3	2.9	65.2	2.1	39.4

Source: Survey of National Economic and Social Justice Organizations; see Strolovitch (2007) for details

Organization officers were asked, "Please tell me, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not active, and 5 is very active, how active has your organization been on each of the following policy issues in the past ten years?" Note that data reflect the percentage of respondents giving answers between 2 and 5.

[a]Includes broadly based civil rights and civil liberties organizations; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights organizations; criminal justice organizations; Arab/Muslim organizations; antiracist organizations; some religious minority groups; and multiculturalism organizations. Also includes immigrants' rights organizations.

[b]Includes unions.

[c]Includes antipoverty, welfare rights, antihomeless, and antihunger organizations.

[d]Includes consumer, environmental, and "good government" organizations that advocate in the areas of racial, gender, or economic justice.

[e]Includes women of color, reproductive rights, and women's health organizations.

(based on the 1–5 scale of activity). The data show that the advocacy organizations in the study were involved in many of the issues about which they were asked, thereby confirming that advocacy groups are a critical source of compensatory representation for marginalized groups. But variations in their patterns of involvement also show that they give short shrift to issues that affect intersectionally disadvantaged subgroups of their constituencies, devoting considerably *less* attention to issues affecting such constituents than to issues affecting more advantaged ones.

In the case of women's groups, for example, approximately 85% of the responding organizations were active on the majority issue, VAW. Slightly fewer, about 77%, were active on affirmative action in higher education, an issue affecting an advantaged subgroup of women. But a significant but far smaller proportion of these organizations—just over 65%—were at all active on welfare reform, an issue affecting a disadvantaged subgroup of women.

Figure 6.2 illustrates the effects of these disparities. Probabilities of activity that simulate the contingent effects of the proportion of affected constituents as they vary by policy type (while holding the values of all variables at their means) show that there is a 23.3% chance that an organization will be very active (4 or 5 on the 1–5 scale of activity) on a majority issue with a low level of impact on an organization's constituents (1 on the 1–5 scale of impact). This probability increases to 78.8% in the case of a majority issue with a high level of impact (5 on the 1–5 scale of impact). In the case of disadvantaged subgroup issues, the chances of a high level of activity increase from 14.6% to 45.6% as we move from low to high levels of impact. The simulation also demonstrates, however, that levels of activity for advantaged subgroup issues are likely to be very high (62.8% chance of a high level of activity), even when impact is at its lowest level. Moreover, the probability of a high level of activity on an advantaged subgroup issue increases much less starkly (to 78%) as we move from low to high levels of impact. In fact, the probability that an organization will be active at a high level is greater in the case of an advantaged subgroup issue with a very low level of impact on its constituents than it is for a disadvantaged subgroup issue that affects "almost all" of its constituents.

Together, the analyses in *Affirmative Advocacy* revealed what I characterize as a double standard on the part of advocacy organizations that represent women, people of color, and low-income people in US politics—a double standard in which issues affecting advantaged subgroups receive more attention than disadvantaged subgroup issues and more attention than even majority issues. Moreover, while activity on both majority and disadvantaged subgroup issues is sensitive to levels of impact, levels of activity on advantaged subgroup issues do *not* increase or decrease as the proportion of constituents affected by an issue increases, suggesting that these issues are almost immune to strategic considerations about breadth of impact. Instead, under some circumstances, the broader the potential impact of an issue, the *less* attention it receives.

Figure 6.2. Predicted probability of activity and inactivity by issue type and level of impact (membership organizations only). Note that organization officers were asked, "Pease tell me, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not active, and 5 is very active, how active has your organization been on each of the following policy issues in the past ten years?" The black columns reflect the probability of giving a rating of 4 or 5 (holding the other variables in the model constant) when they judge the level of impact on their constituency to be low (1). The shaded columns reflect the probability of giving a rating of 4 or 5 (holding the other variables in the model constant) when they judge the level of impact on their constituency to be high (5). Source: Survey of National Social and Economic Justice Organizations

Nonprofit Advocacy in Not-So-Good Times

Such evidence of inequalities in representation even among those organizations most concerned with advocating on behalf of marginalized groups is particularly sobering in light of the fact that it is based on data that tracked policy advocacy between 1990–2000, when times were, by many accounts, relatively good. Though the survey and interview questions asked respondents to reflect upon their organizations' activities and priorities going back to 1990—an era that encompassed, among other things, an economic recession and Operation Desert Storm—the period under examination in *Affirmative Advocacy* was one that has come to be considered a decade of relative

"peace and prosperity." In addition, while Republicans held the presidency until 1993 and all or some of Congress at various points during the same period, 1992–2000 was dominated by a Democratic administration that is typically portrayed as having been relatively sympathetic to marginalized groups, and the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives and Senate for four years (1990–94). While that era was by no means a utopian one for marginalized groups—characterized as it was by widening wealth and income gaps (Bartels, 2008; Hacker and Pierson, 2010), welfare reform legislation, Don't Ask, Don't Tell military policy, immigration reform, the Defense of Marriage Act, and the Omnibus crime bill—it is normally remembered as having been markedly untumultuous (Robin, 2004).

All that would change as I was analyzing and grappling with the results of this research. I fielded the survey of organizations in the summer and fall of 2000, completing it just a few days after the 2000 election. I then conducted face-to-face interviews during the spring and summer of 2001, completing the last one in mid-August, a month before the events of September 11, 2001. Working on *Affirmative Advocacy* in the wake of 9/11 consequently highlighted important questions about the political effects of catastrophic events, and led me to contemplate the implications of crisis for the questions I was trying to address about representation and intersectional marginalization.

Even during the ostensibly peaceful and prosperous 1990s, respondents had claimed that, as organizations and movements speaking on behalf of weak, minority, and marginalized groups, they first needed to secure their place at the political table before they could be expected to pay attention to "narrow" issues affecting their intersectionally marginalized constituents. Framing such issues as narrow and particularistic "special" interests allowed them to justify both their lack of attention to them as well as their extensive attention to issues affecting advantaged subgroups. Others argued that the concerns of intersectionally marginalized subgroups were not central to their organization's mission, and that other groups were therefore better suited to address them. Still others claimed that the crosscutting issues of race, class, gender, or sexuality would be taken care of by whatever the organization in question considered the more "fundamental" issue. Most centrally, when I probed respondents about their organizations' lack of attention to issues affecting intersectionally disadvantaged subgroups of their constituencies, they often gave answers such as that "the time wasn't right" to address such concerns because resources were scarce, that there were "bigger issues" at stake, or that such issues were divisive in ways that

threatened their ability to present a united front to dominant groups (Strolovitch, 2007).

Crises, Marginalization, and Nonprofit Advocacy

That these responses justifying meager representation for intersectionally marginalized groups were articulated during what are more often than not characterized as relatively good times led me to contemplate what we might expect during the "hard times" that followed 9/11, when the pressure to fight for "the common good" that so often leads to the marginalization of disadvantaged groups intensified almost instantly. While 9/11 undoubtedly and unalterably changed the political terrain, the issues at the core of *Affirmative Advocacy* were not unique to the 1990s. Rather, these issues are related to enduring and deeply embedded structural inequalities and consequently serve to underscore, as Gretchen Ritter writes, the coexistence of order and continuity with "political disorder, disequilibrium, punctuation, and transformation" (Ritter, 2007, 388; see also Jacobs and King, 2009; Strach and Sapiro, 2011). Contemplating organizations' responses from this perspective leads to a second question: How would nonprofit organizations that represent groups for whom times are "always hard" respond to and be affected by the nexus of crises in the midst of the persistent and quotidian inequalities that impact their constituents?[4] To paraphrase an often-invoked expression about people of color in the United States, when America catches a cold, do nonprofits that advocate on behalf of marginalized groups get political pneumonia?

At first blush, the answer to this question would seem to be yes. Although rising tides do not lift all boats, tempests and waning tides do seem to ground smaller ones more violently. Almost by definition, for example, lower-income people are likely to suffer more acutely during economic and financial crises, and because of racial and gender disparities in income and wealth, the effects of economic crises also disproportionately disadvantage blacks, Latinos, and women of all races and ethnicities. At the height of the Great Depression, for example, one quarter of American workers were unemployed, but the rate was double—50%—for blacks (Sundstrom, 1992; see also Strolovitch, 2004, 2013). Analogous disparities were evident in the Great Recession of 2007–9. In 2009, rates of black unemployment in the 15 largest metropolitan areas in the United States were on average seven percentage points higher than rates for whites, with differences as high as 13.8% in Minneapolis-St. Paul (where white unemployment was 6.6% and black unemployment 20.4%) and 10.5%

in Memphis, Tennessee (where white unemployment was 5.1% and black unemployment 15.7%; Austin, 2010).

Crises cut in multiple directions, however, and a great deal of research suggests that, although difficult to disentangle, the political effects of crises may not mirror their material impact. In particular, even if a population group suffers during or as a consequence of a recession, natural disaster, or health pandemic, the organizations that advocate on its behalf might "benefit" through increased visibility, media attention, or donations.[5] A comparison of fundraising by nonprofits in 2009 and 2010 by the Nonprofit Research Collaborative (NRC) found that although 37% reported declines in donations during this recessionary period, a similar proportion (36%) reported increases (NRC, 2010, 32).[6] Similarly, while material conditions might worsen, events such as wars and economic crises might also open what John Kingdon (1995) calls "policy windows" or improve conditions within what social movement scholars label the "political opportunity structure" (Eisinger, 1973; Meyer, 1993a, 1993b). Public sympathy for the poor often increases during recessions, for example (Gilens, 1999; McCall, 2013), and while the Great Depression took a greater toll on already disadvantaged groups, welfare state advocates advanced redistributive policies that they had failed to secure in more prosperous times (Goldfield, 1989; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Skocpol, 1992). Scholars such as Mary Dudziak (2000), Mark Graber (1995), Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith (1999), and Daniel Kryder (2001) have shown that equality for African Americans has advanced most dramatically during times of war.[7] While women's suffrage faced setbacks during the Civil War and World War I, President Wilson eventually "announced that women's suffrage was urgently needed as a 'war measure,'" and his support for the Nineteenth Amendment was in part a reward to women for their contributions to the war effort (Mayhew, 2005; see also Flexner and Fitzpatrick, 1996; Ritter, 2006).[8] Crises such as wars can also have indirect benefits for nonprofits by stimulating civic engagement (Skocpol, 2002).[9] Suzanne Mettler (2007) and Christopher Parker (2009) have found that wartime military service cultivated a lasting sense of entitlement to full citizenship rights on the political participation on the part of black men.

In contrast to evidence suggesting that crises can have silver linings for nonprofit advocacy, other research finds that they can also bring political constraints, challenges, and setbacks for nonprofits associated with movements seeking expanded civil rights or broad social and political change. Historian Robert Caro told President Barack Obama that the main lesson

of the Vietnam War and the Johnson administration is that wars kill movements for domestic reform (Sanger, 2009, 448). During the Civil War and World War I, for example, women's suffrage organizations were attacked as selfish and unpatriotic for not focusing on the war effort (Banaszak, 1996). In the days following 9/11, Northwest Airlines (NWA), facing lost income like almost all airlines at the time but also confronting impending negotiations with its unions, invoked wartime powers to override protections against layoffs and announced that it would cut about 10,000 jobs to make up for financial losses it attributed to the terrorist attacks. The proposed cuts prompted talk of a strike by several NWA unions, which the airline rebuffed, alleging that a strike would be unpatriotic (Kennedy and Phelps, 2001).

Data and Methods

The foregoing bodies of scholarship have taught us a great deal about the implications of particular crises for particular groups or for specific policy areas, but they also lead to conflicting expectations about the more general implications of crises for nonprofit organizations that advocate on behalf of marginalized groups. Viewed through some lenses, crises would seem to present these organizations with distinct, albeit constrained, opportunities to advance their legal, political, and policy goals. Thinking about crises as policy windows, for example, leads to potentially sanguine assessments of the possibilities that change can take place during "states of exception" (Agamben, 2005). But other work suggests that crises also redirect resources and produce calls for austerity and national unity, closing policy windows, restricting political opportunities, and making some kinds of advocacy more difficult.

To shed light on the conflicting expectations that arise from extant research, I compare the implications of two starkly different crises—9/11 and Hurricane Katrina—for several aspects of the work done by an array of advocacy organizations. To do so, I use data from "Public Interest Organizations in the New Millennium" (PIONM), a survey of 626 advocacy organizations that I conducted in 2007 (table 6.2).[10] The survey follows Robert J. Pekkanen and Steven Rathgeb Smith's definition of nonprofit advocacy as "the attempt to influence public policy, either directly or indirectly," which is articulated in their introduction to this volume. To make sure that all responding organizations engage in advocacy according to this definition, the survey opens with the screening question, "On a scale of 1 to 5, if 1 is 'not important' and 5

TABLE 6.2.
Distribution of Organizations in Public Interest Organizations in the
New Millennium, 2007

Organization Type	Frequency	%
AIDS/HIV	14	2.2
Arab/Muslim	6	1
Asian American	15	2.4
Black/African American	15	2.4
Civil liberties	15	2.4
Civil rights (general)	35	5.6
Conservative (general)	56	8.9
Criminal justice/anti–death penalty	10	1.6
Disabled	16	2.6
Environment/ecology/animal rights	48	7.7
Farm/migrant workers	11	1.8
Health care	4	0.6
Immigration	10	1.6
Labor organization or union	78	12.5
Latino/Hispanic	14	2.2
LGBT/Queer	14	2.2
Native American/American Indian	21	3.4
Peace/antimilitarism/antinuclear	13	2.1
Poverty and social justice[a]	80	12.8
Progressive social change (general)	13	2.1
Public interest	13	2.1
Right to life/anti-abortion	14	2.2
Senior citizens	7	1.1
Women of color	10	1.6
Women's health/reproductive rights	28	4.5
Women's rights/feminist (general)	66	10.5
Total	626	100.1

[a]Includes welfare rights and homelessness organizations.

is 'very important,' how important is influencing national public policy as a part of your organization's mandate and activities?" PIONM targeted liberal and conservative organizations, and contained general questions about organizations' constituencies, governance, and funding, as well as more specific questions that asked respondents about changes in their organizations' advocacy targets and policy agendas over time and about the effects of the attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina on several dimensions of their organizations' work.[11] To explore these issues in more depth, and to begin to examine the effects of the Great Recession, I also conducted face-to-face interviews with officials at 45 organizations in 2006, 2007, and 2010.

In what follows I use the information from these two studies to investigate the political effects of crises on political opportunity and policy windows

for nonprofit organizations, particularly for organizations that advocate on behalf of marginalized groups. To ascertain whether 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina had differing implications for different kinds of organizations, the responses of liberal organizations are compared with those of conservative groups (based on their self-placement on a 1–10 scale of ideology, where 1 is very conservative and 10 is very liberal). By almost every measure, there are significant differences between the perceived effects of each crisis on liberal groups compared to their conservative counterparts. Taken together, these differences begin to make sense of the conflicting expectations suggested by extant research about the implications of crises for nonprofit advocacy.

Policy Windows and Political Opportunity after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina

In his classic book about agenda setting and public policy, John Kingdon (1995) defines policy windows as "opportunities for action on given initiatives" (166). Although crises do not *guarantee* policy change, they are, in many ways, prototypical focusing events that precipitate the opening of policy windows (Solecki and Michael, 1994; see also Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). David Mayhew (2005) has argued that one kind of crisis—war—is "the ultimate 'policy window,' during which favorable political environment comes together with a perceived public "problem" to make policy change possible" (47). More generally, crises might structure political opportunity by encouraging or discouraging mobilization or membership, rendering the public more or less sympathetic to a group's issues and policy goals, and increasing or decreasing access to elected officials (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). But one organization's policy window opening can be another organization's policy window closing. In this light, the extent to which crises shift political opportunities is likely to vary dramatically among types of organizations.

Extant research also suggests that the resulting variation in policy windows will have significant consequences for policy outcomes. Recessions might open doors for antipoverty advocates, for example, but might also lead to deprioritizing "quality-of-life" issues such as civil rights (Berry, 1999; Inglehart, 1971). Although women's and civil rights organizations fought for and supported the New Deal, for instance, many of its redistributive policies discriminated against black men and women as well as against women of all races. Similarly, a crisis might expand political opportunities in some

venues while simultaneously narrowing them in others. Although opportunities may expand in terms of favorable public opinion, they may nonetheless contract when it comes to government attention.

To explore whether, to what extent, and in what ways 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina altered the political terrain for different kinds of nonprofit advocates, respondents were asked about the impact of each crisis on four elements of the political opportunity structure. The first question draws on the insights of a growing body of research about "threat as a motivator," which shows that membership in advocacy organizations often rises in the context of political climates perceived as adverse by their constituents (Huddy et al., 2007; Miller and Krosnick, 2004). Increases or decreases in membership and donations can have significant implications for organizations' capacities to engage in advocacy activities and to make claims as representatives. To assess what this might mean for nonprofit advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, respondents were asked whether each of these two events led to increases in their membership or donors.

Rises or declines in membership in the wake of a crisis are related to increases and decreases in media sympathy for and public attention to the issues addressed by an organization. I examine these two dimensions of political opportunity using respondents' answers to questions about changes in their perceptions regarding media coverage of and public attention to and support for their issues. I then analyze their answers to questions about the changing level of government attention to their issues. To examine the cumulative effects of these factors on the policy windows available to advocacy groups, respondents were asked whether their policy goals became easier or harder to pursue between 2000 and 2006.

Donors and Members

Responses to the foregoing questions are presented in table 6.3, and together they begin to sketch the contours of the differential effects of each crisis, as these vary along ideological lines. First, the data show that conservative groups are more likely than liberal ones to report that 9/11 led to increased donations and membership growth, while they report that Hurricane Katrina had much less of an effect on this front. Liberal groups reported that the two events had similar effects on their donations and membership, with 12.5% of these organizations saying that 9/11 led to increased members and 14% reporting that Hurricane Katrina did. Although this is an admittedly

TABLE 6.3.
Indicators of Changes in Political Opportunity

	9/11		Hurricane Katrina	
	Conservative (%)	Liberal (%)	Conservative (%)	Liberal (%)
Increased members or donors	18.0	12.5	4.9	14.0
Decreased public attention	17	28.5	21.3	10.9
Increased public attention	48.9	36.7	29.8	54.4
Decreased public support	15.2	28.5	13.1	12.4
Increased public support	32.6	28.4	19.6	45.1
Decreased government attention	17	30.7	17	17
Increased government attention	34	26.8	14.9	32.8
Led organization to change mandate/ shift issues	13.1	20.1	4.9	21.2

Source: Public Interest Organizations in the New Millennium, 2007

incomplete measure of resources, increased membership and donations are key indicators of support for and resources available to an organization, as well as indirect indicators of the salience of the issues with which they are associated among members of the public. As such, the patterns of increases in members and donors are quite telling, suggesting that the two crises raised the salience of different issues that resonated in particular ways with different constituencies. More specifically, that 9/11 led to a much larger uptick in support for conservative groups than for liberal groups suggests that the attacks raised the salience of policy issues such as national security and law and order that are more likely to be on the agendas of conservative groups, while the policy issues associated with Hurricane Katrina failed to resonate to the same degree among the conservative groups. The executive director of a conservative organization told me that 9/11 "kind of gave us an issue that's always been percolating below the surface, but 9/11 really brought it out." Before 9/11, he said, "Americans thought of terrorism as something distant. That's what happens in London, Madrid, Spain." More importantly, these concerns have perhaps, in his opinion, "spilled over into the immigration debate, securing our borders. Because it's not just securing our borders for people who

are getting here legally and who want to work, but people getting into here legally who want to hurt us . . . So I think that goes over well with our donor base."[12]

While 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina each resonated in different ways among conservative groups, respondents from liberal organizations reported that the two catastrophic events had similar effects on membership in and donations to their organizations. Although neither crisis led to as large of an increase for liberal groups as 9/11 did for conservative ones, 9/11 seems to have raised the salience of civil liberties issues among liberals. Hurricane Katrina, on the other hand, raised issues of racialized poverty and government neglect in particularly salient ways for the constituents of liberal organizations. As such, it is understandable that 9/11 was associated with increased members and donors for both liberal and conservative groups while Hurricane Katrina stimulated increases primarily among liberal organizations.

Evidence from the face-to-face interviews I conducted with advocacy group officers suggests that because of the complicated politics associated with civil liberties during times of war, the opportunities presented by 9/11 for growth among liberal organizations were fraught. Even after 9/11, a majority of Americans remained unwilling to give the federal government a blank check when it came to limiting civil liberties to fight terrorism. However, a greater-than-usual proportion of the population was willing to tolerate certain restrictions that had been controversial before the attacks (Berinsky, 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009). Many liberal advocacy organizations found themselves trying to navigate demands from their long-standing members that they take firm stands against any and all threats to civil liberties, while at the same time trying to appeal to potential members who might be newly concerned about possible subversions of freedom, but who also felt threatened by the possibility of further attacks. As one interviewee from a civil liberties group put it, "bring the Patriot Act back in line with the Constitution" is a message that "sells with Middle America." The challenge, however, was that this position was not "strong enough" for the group's "most hard-core supporters," who, he argued, wanted the organization "to say 'repeal, repeal, repeal.'" But taking this position, he said, "gets us nobody. The people already believe us and love it, and we don't grow by a person."[13]

To illustrate his point, the respondent recounted what happened when he was on a panel soon after the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act was passed. After concluding his remarks, a panelist

representing another civil liberties organization said, "I like a lot of what [he] said." The respondent told me that as his co-panelist was saying this, he was thinking, "Here comes the 'but,'" and that he cringed as his co-panelist went on to say, "But I don't know why they're not talking about creeping fascism." "I'm sorry?," said my interlocutor, "Not only did we just lose middle America, we just lost Stockton. We can't even get out of the Bay Area." I explore in further detail below the implications of this and related tightropes that organizations often find themselves walking.

Media Sympathy and Public Attention and Support

Increasing membership is one indicator of changing political fortunes; two other important dimensions of political opportunity concern how attentive and sympathetic the media and the public are to the issues advocacy organizations address. The differences between liberal and conservative organizations' answers to questions about these issues are telling. For example, respondents from liberal organizations were more likely than those from conservative groups to indicate that the media had become more sympathetic to the issues addressed by their organizations. When asked whether the media was more sympathetic to their cause after 9/11, 30.2% of conservative organizations agreed (versus 69.6% that disagreed), and 47.6% of liberal organizations agreed (versus 52.4% that disagreed).

The trend is somewhat different when it comes to the effects of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina on support for and attention to their organization's issues among members of the public, however (note that the PIONM questions about media sympathy do not ask about its relationship to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina). In that case, almost half of the respondents from conservative organizations (49%) reported that 9/11 led to increased public attention and support for their issues, while only 30% of these respondents said the same was the case for Hurricane Katrina. Conversely, a far smaller proportion of respondents from liberal groups (36.7%) said that 9/11 had increased attention among members of the general public to the issues addressed by their organizations, while a far greater proportion of these respondents (54%) believed the same was true of Hurricane Katrina (see table 6.3).

Similar patterns are evident in the perceived effects of the two calamitous events on public support for the issues addressed by organizations, with just under a third of conservative groups saying that 9/11 led to increased public support for their issues and only a fifth reporting the same was true of Hur-

ricane Katrina. While 28% of respondents from liberal groups said that 9/11 led to increased public support for their organizations' issues, 45% gave this response when asked about Hurricane Katrina. The proportions of respondents in organizations of each type who said that each event led to decreases in public support for their issues are just as significant as these perceived increases in support. For example, 15% of conservative groups, but almost 29% of liberal groups, said that 9/11 had led to declines in support. The proportions of liberal and conservative groups giving this answer regarding Hurricane Katrina was roughly even, however, with approximately 12% saying that it led to decreased public support for their issues.

Government Attention and Policy Windows

Membership, media attention, and support from members of the general public are all important factors when it comes to structuring political opportunities for advocacy, but this advocacy requires attention from policymakers if it is to contribute to policy changes. To understand perceptions among advocates about whether and how Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 influenced this attention, respondents were asked to assess whether each event had greatly decreased, somewhat decreased, somewhat increased, greatly increased, or had no effect on government attention to the issues addressed by their organizations.

The patterns in the responses to these questions in table 6.3 are similar to some of those for the measures that I have described thus far, but they also reveal some significant departures that are suggestive about the ways in which political opportunities vary, with some kinds of groups finding openings where others find less receptivity. Although more than half of respondents from liberal groups reported that Hurricane Katrina had increased public attention to their issues, for example, and almost as many said that it had led to increased public support as well, only a third (32.8%) reported that it had led to increased government attention. This finding is nonetheless approximately twice the proportion of respondents from conservative groups (14.9%) who thought that Hurricane Katrina had led to expanded opportunities for their issues. And whereas these latter respondents had reported that 9/11 led to vastly expanded public attention to the their issues, only about a third of respondents from these conservative groups (34%) reported that it had led to increased government attention. Although respondents from liberal groups were only somewhat less likely than their conservative counterparts to report increased government attention as a consequence of 9/11 (34%

for conservative groups, 26.8% for liberal groups), however, they were almost twice as likely to say that it had led to decreased attention from policymakers.

To assess the extent to which these factors come together to open windows of opportunity for advocacy, respondents were asked how each event affected the ability of their organizations to achieve their policy goals during the years 2000 through 2006. Table 6.4 presents the mean responses to these questions disaggregated by organization type. A few results stand out. First, among almost all types of organizations associated with progressive causes, 9/11 is viewed as, on average, having made it harder to achieve their policy goals. But the pattern is less consistent when it comes to the effects of Hurricane Katrina, and respondents from liberal organizations do not necessarily view it as having opened policy windows.

TABLE 6.4.
Perceived Effects of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina on Ability to Achieve
General Policy Goals

	9/11	Hurricane Katrina
AIDS/HIV	−1.00	−0.33
Arab/Muslim	−1.50	0.00
Asian American	−0.45	−0.36
Black/African American	−0.89	0.11
Civil liberties	−0.89	0.11
Civil rights (general)	−0.97	−0.14
Conservative	0.11	−0.03
Criminal justice/anti–death penalty	−1.00	−0.17
Disability	−0.33	0.07
Environmental	−0.66	0.32
Farm/migrant workers	−1.29	−0.14
Health care	0.00	0.75
Immigration	−1.78	−0.56
Labor organization or union	−0.61	0.08
Latino/Hispanic	−0.33	0.11
LGBT/Queer	−0.40	0.00
Native American/American Indian	−1.23	−1.00
Peace/antimilitarism/antinuclear	−1.11	0.12
Poverty and social justice	−0.80	0.41
Progressive social change (general)	−1.18	−0.45
Public interest	−0.75	−0.08
Right to life/anti-abortion	0.00	−0.14
Senior citizens	0.17	0.17
Women of color	−0.80	−0.40
Women's health/reproductive rights	−0.88	−0.59
Women's rights/feminist (general)	−0.55	−0.31

Source: Public Interest Organizations in the New Millennium, 2007
Note that data reflect mean responses on a scale between −2 and +2, in which −2 is "much harder" and +2 is "much easier."

To explore the ways in which such openings and closings of policy windows translate into changes in advocacy, respondents were asked whether 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina had led to changes in their mandate or in the issues addressed by their organizations (see table 6.3). Once again, conservative organizations were more likely to report that 9/11 had such an effect than they were regarding Hurricane Katrina. Even more striking, however, is that approximately equal proportions of respondents from liberal groups—20%—claimed that each event led to changes in their mandates or agendas.

My conversations with officers from a range of advocacy organizations help to make sense of some of the changes in advocacy resulting from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, particularly for understanding the expanding and contracting political opportunities they faced between 2000 and 2006. A respondent from a civil liberties group told me, for example, that the magnitude of the sense of crisis brought about by 9/11 was so overwhelming that progressive groups quickly realized that they "couldn't make any real immediate inroads into it. We couldn't stop the Patriot Act, we couldn't stop a lot of stuff that was going on." "We knew," she said, "we were emailing each other the afternoon of 9/11, and our email was not, 'Oh, goody, this is an opportunity to get attention to this stuff,' but 'Oh, my God, there is gonna be such a huge, horrible bill.'" She continued, "We didn't think we were gonna pass anything good. We were just trying to limit the damage. Nobody in their right mind thought they were gonna do anything—that there was any good legislation gonna come out of that."[14] But while her organization was unable to influence the substance of public policy, the nature of these policies raised the salience of many civil liberties issues that have long been central to their mission, and her organization was consequently able to "mobilize a tremendous people on the right and left." Moreover, she continued, the "ACLU made a trillion and a half dollars, I don't know what the number was, but it was a huge amount of money, and got a lot of supporters."

Finding themselves stymied at the national level, organizations like the one above also pursued opportunities in other venues, engaging in the process that Doug McAdam and his collaborators call "scale shift," through which "contention at one level is transposed" to a higher or a lower level of government. In this case, many civil liberties organizations shifted their focus from trying to change federal policies to trying to support such efforts at the state and local levels (McAdam et al., 2001). For example, this respondent explained that while advocates at many national organizations felt "somewhat powerless" when it came to trying to challenge national policies such as the

Patriot Act, they nonetheless wanted to register their concerns and decided that it was best to do so locally. "So," she said, "you had . . . 500 and some ordinances" passed by states and municipalities saying, "'We want to repeal the Patriot Act, we don't want our city or county or state to enforce what we consider to be overreaching, unconstitutional violations of civil rights,' and whatever else."[15]

While some organizations were able to retool in these ways, others found that 9/11 had mainly a chilling effect on their work. The director of operations at another liberal civil liberties group explained that among her organization's many projects are databases that aggregate information about environmental toxins. The databases are all compiled from publicly available information, but after 9/11 the organization was told by the government to remove them from its website. The idea "that you could [ask anyone to] take down any data set that was public because terrorists might read it," she explained, became "a kind of mantra for a while . . . All of a sudden they created a new classification that it wasn't a 'classified document,' it was 'sensitive but unclassified,' where they could just take things off from anywhere and just say, 'It's a security risk.' You didn't even know what was in the document, but it wasn't classified, so it couldn't be unclassified later on . . . And our work got really more difficult."

The hurdles to advocacy associated with such measures extend beyond their "chilling effects" on organizations to their substantive effects on the nature and scope of organizations' agendas. That is, rather than focusing on the policy issues that are at the core of their agenda—in this case, cleaning up environmental toxins—the organization's energy became focused on battling government efforts to "hide that data from terrorists."[16]

While the foregoing statements illustrate some of the constraints faced by progressive organizations following 9/11, other interviews are suggestive about the kinds of opportunities that a crisis like Hurricane Katrina can present to liberal organizations, particularly to ones that focus on issues of race and poverty. The policy director of a civil rights group told me, for example, "here's this festering problem, the problem of inequality and race and class-based injustice, something that threatens this democracy and has for a long time." Hurricane Katrina, he said, put these issues "on TV in such a dramatic way that no one could resist it" and, he argued, did so in a way that "made clear the Republicans are both uncaring and incompetent in a fundamental way." He continued, "That's a huge opening for Democrats to say, 'OK, we're taking a baby step next month. We'll pass the minimum wage. We're gonna

put it on the table . . . We're gonna make it very hard for [Republicans] to say no on this.' "

Plus Ça Change . . .

Although the survey and interviews provide evidence that both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina affected the political opportunities and policy windows available to advocacy groups, equally significant is the evidence suggesting that for many organizations and issues, the more things change, the more they stayed the same. As the executive director of a criminal justice organization put it, 9/11 "doesn't seem to have affected our work on a day-to-day basis. The problems we face, the issues, are not that much different than they were before."[17] The executive director of a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights group went even further, saying that "nothing linked to 9/11 caused any changes" for her organization.[18] Indeed, although many respondents from liberal groups reported that Hurricane Katrina opened important policy windows, many others told me that, in their view, it was a fleeting opportunity. The executive director of an antipoverty group argued that "people were disgusted by the scene of it all . . . People were just horrified by the magnitude of the disaster, and they wanted people's lives to be better, if you will. But it only lasted for so long, and people go back to what's occupying them."[19] Another interviewee said that Hurricane Katrina provided "an opening . . . to participate in a debate about poverty," to ask "what are we doing for the underclass, the widening gap, and how we fit into the problems?" However, he continued, "press interest in poverty is waning . . . It's more than it was, but it's . . . certainly not what it was many, many years ago."[20] Another respondent put it this way: "Katrina was huge and shameful and brought the attention of the poor inescapably to America's TV sets, but it's disappeared. But I don't think that . . . it plays a continuing role in helping to raise poverty issues."[21]

Policy Issues and Political Opportunity

To get additional purchase on the meaning of the continuities and changes in political opportunity structures for nonprofit policy advocacy that I have discussed thus far, I turn now to evidence from a series of questions in which PIONM respondents were asked to list up to five policy issues that had been most important to their organization in 2000. They were then asked to answer a series of questions about each one, including a question that asked

whether their organizations had experienced changes in the difficulty of pursuing their goals on the issues they mentioned; that is, had these goals become harder, easier, or had there been no change since 2000?

The data in table 6.5 disaggregate the answers to this question by the ideological self-placement of the organizations, and then more finely by organization type. Comparing the responses of liberal organizations to those of conservative groups shows that although respondents may have experienced openings in policy windows or political opportunity at a general level, a plurality of respondents nonetheless felt that it had become more difficult to pursue their goals on most of the issues that were important to their organizations. While this was true of 40% of respondents from conservative groups, however, it was far more common among respondents from liberal groups, a strong majority of which (54.6%) reported that their goals had become more difficult to achieve. Among those from conservative groups, responses were more evenly distributed, with over 60% saying that their goals had become easier or that they had experienced no change.

These differences between liberal and conservative groups generally persist when the responses are disaggregated by organization type. For example, immigration, civil liberties, American Indian, women of color, and HIV/AIDS groups were particularly likely to say that it had become harder to achieve their policy goals, while this response was uncommon among conservative movement organizations and anti-abortion groups. The disaggregated responses also reveal provocative deviations from this pattern, however. In particular, among organizations associated with progressive issues, immigration and LGBT organizations both stand out—immigration organizations because they were most likely to report that their policy goals had become more difficult (71.1%), and LGBT groups because, at 64.5%, they were more likely than any other organization type in the survey to report that their goals on the issues they named had become easier.

Looking at the particular issues mentioned by respondents from these organizations reveals that in most of the cases in which respondents from LGBT groups reported that an issue had become easier, it was an issue related to lifting the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) prohibition on gays and lesbians serving openly in the military. Efforts to repeal DADT gained traction as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan progressed, particularly after the release of a 2006 report from the General Accounting Office, which found that over 300 language experts, including over 50 who speak Arabic, had been discharged under DADT. In 2007, the US Department of Defense issued a statement

TABLE 6.5.
Perceived Change in Difficulty of Achieving Specific Policy Goals Listed by Respondent
by Organization Type, 2000–2006

	Easier (%)	No Change (%)	Harder (%)
Conservative (1–5 on scale)	29.4	31	39.5
Liberal (6–10 on scale)	22.8	22.7	54.6
AIDS/HIV	22.2	16.7	61.1
Arab/Muslim	25.0	25.0	50.0
Asian American	25.8	22.6	51.6
Black/African American	31.4	20.0	48.6
Civil liberties	16.1	12.9	71.0
Civil rights (general)	29.2	19.8	51.0
Conservative (general)	28.0	36.0	36.0
Criminal justice/anti–death penalty	31.6	31.6	36.8
Disability rights	19.0	25.9	55.2
Environment/ecology/animal rights	17.3	25.3	57.4
Farm/migrant workers	27.8	22.2	50.0
Health care	33.3	6.7	60.0
Immigration	7.9	21.1	71.1
Labor organization or union	17.3	25.3	57.4
Latino/Hispanic	36.4	25.0	38.6
LGBT/Queer	64.5	9.7	25.8
Native American/American Indian	14.3	20.4	65.3
Peace/antimilitarism/antinuclear	25.7	14.3	60.0
Poverty and social justice	22.3	27.2	50.5
Progressive social change (general)	25.0	37.5	37.5
Public interest	8.7	30.4	60.9
Right to life/anti-abortion	33.3	45.5	21.2
Senior citizens	13.3	26.7	60.0
Women of color	29.2	12.5	58.3
Women's health/reproductive rights	21.8	29.1	49.1
Women's rights/feminist (general)	22.3	27.7	50.0

Source: Public Interest Organizations in the New Millennium, 2007

making the unprecedented suggestion "that lesbian and gay service person-
nel should continue to use their skills in support of national security efforts,
even after facing dismissal under the law" (PRNewswire, 2007). In late 2010,
Congress passed and President Obama signed the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Re-
peal Act of 2010 and the new policy went into effect in 2011.

That efforts to repeal DADT gained traction and were eventually real-
ized in the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates some of
the ways in which crises can interact with enduring inequalities to produce
variations in the political opportunities and policy windows encountered
by advocates for marginalized groups. In particular, it suggests that orga-
nizations might be best able to exploit the instabilities of crises by framing

their claims as extending rights to a "worthy" group—in this case lesbian and gay military personnel—who need fuller citizenship in order to serve national interests (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Conversely, the experiences of immigrants' rights groups are suggestive about the ways in which crises can intensify the constraints faced by advocates. In particular, the issue that leads to the strongly negative mean for immigration organizations is the increased difficulty associated with the pursuit of issues related to undocumented immigrants. That is, it is partly related to the increased complexity of trying to frame undocumented immigrants as a morally worthy group and of regularizing their status as being in the national interest.

Although the case of undocumented immigrants is a telling example of the constraints faced by advocates for marginalized groups during a time of crisis, considering military and immigration issues together also illustrates the kinds of struggles over the *constructions* of marginalized groups that can take place in such a context, particularly during a time of war. Specifically, while political opportunities to address issues related to undocumented immigrants seemed to contract after 9/11, in July 2002, President George W. Bush announced that "the thousands of non-citizens serving in the US armed forces would immediately be eligible for naturalization." Proclaiming military service "the highest form of citizenship" (Krebs, 2006), President Bush essentially said that these immigrants were "worthy," and that they should be rewarded with citizenship rights for serving the national interest (see also Novkov, 2010).

In fact, as has been the case before, the wars that followed 9/11 seemed to allow many veterans' issues to gain traction (Dudziak, 2000; Graber, 1995; Klinkner and Smith, 1999; Kryder, 2001; Mettler, 2007; Parker, 2009; Ritter, 2006). Table 6.6 makes clear that, across all types of organizations in the study, respondents typically reported that issues related to rights and resources for members of the military—including the repeal of DADT as well as issues such as women in combat and benefits for wounded veterans—became easier. As the data in table 6.6 demonstrate, however, organizations of all types reported immigration issues typically became more difficult. These two clusters of issues are essentially mirror images, with 75% of those mentioning military-related issues reporting that they had become easier while 76.5% of those mentioning immigration-related issues reporting that it had become more difficult to achieve their goals. As the legislative director for a veterans' organization told me during an interview, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan "put a lot of focus on us and our issues. It's terrible to say, but in a way, it's helped us get our issues enacted into law. There's just that type of

TABLE 6.6.
Perceived Change in Difficulty of Achieving Policy Goals for Selected Issues,
2000–2006

	Easier (%)	No Change (%)	Harder (%)
Immigration-related issues	11.8	11.8	76.5
Military-related issues (e.g., wounded veterans, women in combat, DADT repeal)	75.0	4.0	20.1

Source: Public Interest Organizations in the New Millennium, 2007

sentiment right now, following 9/11." For over a decade and a half, he said, his organization was "fighting for reform of the VA healthcare budget process. Last year, we finally got it enacted into law."[22]

It may not be surprising that, as has been the case before, the need for bodies to fight wars can present political opportunities to members of marginalized groups who can be framed as worthy and constructed as patriots (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). But while rights and policy gains such as the repeal of DADT, benefits for disabled veterans, or the conferral of citizenship to immigrants who serve in the military might be things that, as Gayatri Spivak argues, "we cannot not want," they also replicate and reinforce narrow and normative racial, gender, class, and nationalist ideals and claims to citizenship (Spivak, 1993, 45–46). Policy changes are often tied to these constructions, of course, but such connections are tightened by links among "worthiness," "citizenship," and the "national interest" that are so often heightened during wars, depressions, pandemics, and disasters.

Conclusions

Organizations that advocate on behalf of marginalized groups often represent unpopular or underresourced constituencies, and the issues that they address are frequently divisive and controversial. As a consequence, such organizations typically face significant constraints and often give short shrift to issues affecting intersectionally disadvantaged subgroups of their constituencies, even during relatively untumultuous times. Given the difficulties they face when times are good, it is important to examine how they fare during hard times, such as the period that followed 9/11 or post Hurricane Katrina.

The evidence that I have presented suggests that the crises brought about by events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina do not necessarily mirror their material impact on members of marginalized groups. Rather, they present

advocacy organizations with a combination of constraints and opportunities when it comes to addressing the ongoing social, economic, and political issues that affect their marginalized constituents. Comparing the responses of organizations to 9/11 on the one hand and to Hurricane Katrina on the other also reveals that each crisis has had different implications for liberal and conservative advocacy groups. Moreover, while these crises affected the political opportunities and policy windows faced by advocacy groups, my research also suggests that for many organizations, particularly ones that advocate on behalf groups for whom times are "always hard," the more things change, the more they stay the same. Taken together, the evidence holds several implications for our understandings of advocacy strategies, about the types of issues in which nonprofit groups engage, and about the effects of crises on the political opportunities they present to nonprofit organizations vis-à-vis their members, the policy process, and their roles as advocates for marginalized groups.

First, this study confirms that a sense of urgency can be helpful to an advocacy group, particularly in terms of resource development, member recruitment, and public attention. In particular, since crises can increase the sense of urgency around some kinds of issues, they can present organizations with important opportunities for fundraising, public education, and media outreach. They can also present organizations with opportunities to reinvigorate their relationships with their constituents, as well as to recruit new members. While nonprofit advocacy organizations should certainly be attentive to the potential opportunities presented by crises, they should also be aware of their potential tradeoffs. If outreach or appeals to new members or donors entails watering down agendas, for example, advocacy efforts stimulated by crises can risk alienating long-standing ones.

Second, crises not only open up opportunities to increase membership and resources, they can also lead to shifts in the locations of political opportunity. As the example of the Patriot Act suggests, crises can open policy windows at the state and local levels even as they close them at the national or international levels. Conversely, Hurricane Katrina allowed advocates to leverage a crisis that affected a few states as a way to draw national attention to issues of race and poverty, if only briefly. Organizations should prepare for and be attentive to the possibilities of such scale shifts by maintaining strong ties to state, local, and perhaps even international and transnational organizations along the lines of those that I advocated in my 2007 book.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, organizations that advocate on be-

half of disadvantaged groups must not lose sight of or neglect the longer-term, quotidian, and structural problems that affect their constituents, even as they may exploit the political opportunities associated with episodic crisis. This "moving picture" approach is important for several reasons (Pierson, 2004). First, it is helpful and important for developing a sustainable business model and strategic plan. Taking a long-term view can also help to mitigate the likely "media cycles" that accompany attention-getting crises by reminding advocates that they need to continue to work on issues even—and perhaps especially—after the media or Congress loses interest in them. In addition, maintaining a long-term view can help organizations to combat the chilling effects that can accompany crises associated with wars or security crises. Finally, such an approach can help them to maintain proactive agendas and what I have called "utopian visions," and to do what they can to make sure that the most vulnerable and intersectionally marginalized members of their communities do not bear a disproportionate share of the retrenchments of rights and resources that so often accompany national crises (Strolovitch, 2007).

NOTES

1. That events such as wars, terrorist attacks, depressions, health pandemics, and natural disasters are "national crises" often seems self-evident, but I acknowledge that their status as crises is also the product of political contestation, interventions, and the exercise of power. In other work, I explore the processes through which a subset of problems become figured as "urgent crises" that demand urgent policy responses.

2. Examples of intersectionally marginalized groups include women of color, whose disadvantage is constituted by the intersection of racial and gender-based marginalization.

3. Though not everyone is affected in exactly the same way by Social Security, it is relatively "equal opportunity" in its potential impact, both among constituencies of the organizations in the study and among general public.

4. I borrow this formulation from Brown-Dean (2010).

5. Any distinction between material and political effects is, to some degree, plastic and further complicated by the difficulty of disentangling the political effects of crises from the effects of regularized political events such as elections. Can we separate the effects of an exogenous crisis like 9/11, for example, from those of the 2000 election and the political agenda of President George W. Bush? In spite of these and related complexities, extant research suggests that it is worth trying to tease out the ways in which crises might open political opportunities or close policy windows, even in cases in which they do not lead to immediate gains or losses.

6. Disaggregating these data uncovered significant variations by type of organization (NRC, 2010).

7. While several scholars argue that war can open up possibilities for mobilization, others suggest that such openings are quite contingent. For Klinkner and Smith (1999), inclusive wartime rhetoric and an established protest vehicle are necessary as well.

8. David Mayhew (2005) writes that "no doubt this reform, effected by the Nineteenth Amendment, would have succeeded sooner or later, but energetic contributions by women to wartime mobilization seem to have brought the proximate winning argument. Suffrage extension was 'necessary to the successful prosecution of the war,' President Wilson argued; 'We have made partners of the women in this war.' . . . Women won the vote in many other countries during World War I or its near aftermath, evidently through a logic of wartime contribution or various other democratizing impulses associated with war. The instances include Britain (for women over thirty), Canada, Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Women in France, Italy, Hungary, and Japan had to wait until the close of World War II, when a comparable logic seems to have obtained" (478).

9. Skocpol (2002) argues that the extent to which this is true depends upon whether the government calls for or otherwise encourages citizen involvement and whether voluntary associations are available and structured in ways that allow people to "volunteer together" and "to link face-to-face activities in local communities to state and national projects" (539). For example, the government relied heavily on voluntary associations during the Civil War, World War I, and even during World War II, even though it did not need them to the same degree. She argues, however, with the rise of professionally managed associations, the focus after 9/11 was on "managerial coordination and professional expertise" rather than on mobilization and engagement (538).

10. The University of Chicago Survey Lab administered the PIONM. The sample is composed of 626 respondents out of an original list of 1,249 organizations, for a response rate of 50.1%. Respondents could complete the survey by phone, on the Internet, or on paper. The sample of organizations was generated by assembling a database of national progressive and conservative advocacy organizations using information from published directories of organizations, websites, and movement publications.

11. In order to distinguish between these events and changing political conditions, respondents were also asked about the effects of the 2000 presidential election and the 2006 midterm elections, with the expectation that the 2000 election would provide a baseline and that 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina would show variations. Although these expectations are borne out, the results are beyond the scope of this chapter, and I focus my discussion here on the effects of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.

12. Interview with organization officer, July 2007.

13. Interview with organization officer, May 2010.

14. Interview with organization officer, June 2010.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Interview with organization officer, December 2006.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview with organization officer, May 2010.

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