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NOTES CHAPTER I 1. Michael Howard, “The Classical Strategists,” in Alastair Buchan, ed., Problems of Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 47; Raymond Aron, “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought,” in ibid., p. 15. 2. Frank N. Trager and Frank Simonie, “An Introduction to the Study of National Security,” in Frank Trager and Phillip S. Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas for the National Security Education Program, 1973), pp. 35–48. 3. Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and Thomas J. Leney, “A Conceptual Framework,” in Daniel J. Kaufman et. al., eds., U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 18–19. 4. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13. 5. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 329. Also see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 217–18. 6. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 118. 7. Trager and Simeone, “Introduction,” p. 36. 8. Kaufman, McKitrick, and Leney, “A Conceptual Framework,” pp. 18–19. 9. Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (summer 1983): 129–53. On page 133 a “threat to national security” is defined as “an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” For much more circumscribed but still overly inclusive uses of the national security concept that cover all aspects of the country ’s physical well-being, see Barry Buzan, International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (spring 1989): 162–77. 10. See the critical review of the claims in Alan S. Milward, “Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?” Diplomatic History 13, no. 2 (spring 1989): 231–53. 11. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1984), pp. 70–71, 86–91, 143–45, 454–56, 517–19, 625–26. 12. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). The declinist thesis is critiqued in chapter 9 below. 13. For the theory confirming power of “crucial” single cases, see Harry Eckstein , “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and NOTES TO CHAPTER I 280 Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138. 14. Internationalist-isolationist opinion data from 1940 to 1988 are brought together in one time series in Thomas W. Graham, “Extended Deterrence and the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” occasional paper no. 4, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1989, p. 24. 15. William Schneider, “The Old Politics and the New World Order,” in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 63. 16. Robert W. Tucker, A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, 1972). 17. Earl C. Ravenal, “The Case for Strategic Disengagement,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 3 (April 1973): 505–21. This article is expanded in Never Again: Learning from America’s Foreign Policy Failures (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). Also see Earl C. Ravenal, “Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection ,” International Security 6, no. 4 (spring 1982): 26–43; “The Case for Adjustment,” Foreign Policy 81 (winter 1990–91): 3–19; as well as the articles cited in the third part of this chapter and the second part of chapter 2. 18. For one example, see Ernst B. Haas, “On Hedging Our Bets: Selective Engagement with the Soviet Union,” in Aaron B. Wildavsky, ed., Beyond Containment : Alternative American Policies toward the Soviet Union (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1983), 93–124. 19. Such a change is found in the time series data set out in Graham, “Extended Deterrence,” p. 24. But see Eugene R. Witkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 26. There it is seen...


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