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Introduction 1. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Attitudes and Action: Public Opinion and the Occurrence of International Terrorism,” Science, September 18, 2009, pp. 1534–36. 2. Ibid., p. 1536. 3. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,” United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, May 17, 2007, especially pp. 2, 4, 41 (www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp1.pdf). 4. Mark Tessler and Michael D. H. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 305. 5. Audrey Cronin, “How al-Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 27. 6. De Mesquita, “Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,” p. 3. 7. Daniel L. Byman, “The War on Terror Requires Subtler Weapons,” Brookings Institution, May 27, 2003 (www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/0527terrorism_by man.aspx). 8. David Petraeus. “Petraeus on Afghanistan, Taliban” interview by John Hockenberry , Public Radio International, February 1, 2010 (www.pri.org/world/middleeast /petraeus-on-taliban-reintegration-in-afghanistan1857.html). 9. Stanley A. McChrystal, “News Transcript: Press Roundtable with Gen. McChrystal in Istanbul, Turkey,” NATO International Security Assistance Force, February 4, 2010 (www.isaf.nato.int/en/article/transcripts/news-transcript-press-round table-with-gen.-mcchrystal-in-istanbul-turkey.html). 239 Notes 10-0559-8 BMrev:0305-1 3/3/11 4:16 PM Page 239 10. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005). Chapter One 1. Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Terrorism,” After September 11 Archive, Social Science Research Council (http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mccauley.htm). Chapter Two 1. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981), pp. 159–60. 2. Osama bin Laden, interview, January 4, 2004, in Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements, 1994–January 2004, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 2004, p. 273 (www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf). 3. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September 1990. 4. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 5. For a fuller development of the idea that Islamism represents a resistance to Western culture, see Alastair Crooke, Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution (New York: Pluto Press, 2009). 6. Sayyid Qutb, “The America I Have Seen,” in American in an Arab Mirror, edited by Kamal Abdel-Malek (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 7. In the 2006 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA survey, the average among countries polled around the world was 56 percent saying that common ground is possible and 28 percent saying that violent conflict is inevitable. This included 64 percent of Americans saying common ground is possible as well as large majorities in most European countries . However, in 2010 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that the number saying common ground is possible had dropped to 51 percent. 8. Survey nations in Asia and Africa were the most favorable toward globalization when asked in this formulation, while responses in the United States and Europe were more lukewarm. Among majority-Muslim nations, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey were comparable to European nations. Mexicans joined the Palestinians and Indonesians as the only publics with majorities or pluralities considering globalization “mostly bad.” 9. Majorities in forty-three of the forty-six countries surveyed agreed that they see themselves as a citizen of the world. African countries were more likely to agree than majority-Muslim countries, while eastern European countries and Germany tended to agree less. 10. Among all nations surveyed, only Kenya, Nigeria, and the United States had majorities who believed that the United States sets a good example by abiding by international law. Non-Muslim nations that were very critical of the United States included China, France, Russia, and South Korea. 240 Notes to Pages 5–36 10-0559-8 BMrev:0305-1 3/3/11 4:16 PM Page 240 11. Many countries, especially in Europe, both prior to and under the Obama administration, have agreed with the assessment that the United States does not take their interests into account. Indonesia’s more favorable attitude—that the United States does take their interests into account either “a great deal” or a “fair amount”—however , was similar to other Asian powers, including India (83 percent) and China (76 percent ) as well as Kenya (75 percent), Nigeria (66...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9780815705604
MARC Record
OCLC
712783428
Pages
275
Launched on MUSE
2015-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
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