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## New Multicultural Identities in Europe

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CHAPTER 9

# Competing Forms of Identity and the Concept of Sovereignty in Europe

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*Murat Sevencan*

Though a person may carry more than one group identity within the layers of self-perception, the effect of it upon his/her choices and decisions depends mostly on the salience of belongingness for that person. Moreover this salience is continuously and indefinitely challenged by other possible and present group identities. Along with the putting on and off the membership hat game, the national identity is not excluded either.

Even if in recent years, nationalism has been on the rise in Europe, it may be interpreted as a reaction to the decline in salience of national identity within the community of social belonging. If one takes this interpretation as a basis, then one must ask some closely related questions on the subject, such as: “What is challenging the salience of national identity?” and “Will such challenging of the salience of national identity be evenly successful if the people are concerned by the perception of international issues?” The purpose of this chapter is to search for the five foreseeable answers to these questions in theory and quantitative data. World Values Survey Data will be used for the quantitative reasoning.

## **Introduction**

Being more of a political hat, national identity fastens, or glues, a person to a family which sometimes consists of more than a billion members, which would be presented as imagined. As Anderson puts it, this family “is imagined because

the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6).

Because of the stated imaginedness of this identity category, the effect of belonging, or rather mobilizing the power of it, would be dependable only if this so-called illusion were alive in the mind of a person convinced by it. From the rather recent history of nation building, despite the primordial connectedness assertions, one can assert that national identity bloomed over the mould of old identities, as a sovereignty transfer. This transformation of identity was from one that binds the person as the subject of God, or Godly sent patronage, to one that appoints the person as a citizen in charge of the maintenance and enjoyment of the homeland. Although this joyful duty seems to be accepted as natural, the theoretical model states that a national identity is reproduced through central education as a voice of other family members, and the state power of imposition is presented as a fatherly or as ‘uncle’s’ advice, and sometimes its violence as father’s belt. But although the classical paradigm of International Relations (IR) takes the nation-state as the single actor of the anarchic jungle of states, national citizenship has never been a unique identity in the mind of a person in his/her actions. As long as the modern paradigm continued, not the men’s but the citizen’s aspect of a person is taken in consideration to construct a national identity in state level affairs. However, what about the other layers of self-perception in their relation to the national identity?

## **Identity and transfer of sovereignty**

One can argue that national identity, as a modern concept, is constructed and sustained through tools of the modern world for each new member of society. These are the standardized education of society, which must include national understanding of history on the primordial view of nationhood; social support or priority grant for certain values of the society, with the help of society networks, such as certain branches of sport or the arts; law enforcement regulating certain parts or functions of public life, such as the coordination and supervision of economic and legal processes; and lastly the use of certain rights on behalf of society, such as issuing a common currency, conscription.

These modern tools are not just the tools with which to use the sovereignty of the modern nation state, but also those shaping the national identity of each

new member of society. But these tools forming the newcomer's national identity are challenged by the changes in the Westphalian System by both the delegation of sovereignty and the effect of globalization. In other words, one can state that with the level of democracy and desacralization of the state, especially in the post-WW II era, the non-citizen side of a person became an effective factor, particularly in daily politics. One can also observe that the nonpareil existence of the nation-state has also started to be challenged by old powers of the game, such as imperial, local and religious fronts. The accumulation of sovereignty from local lords, clergy and emperors to the kings of states has been reversed by a new invention of the post-war European *populi*, the European Union.

As we all know, the transfer of sovereignty started with the delegation of the rights regarding the coal and steel industry of the six member states to the ECSC by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. Since the High Authority's power overrode the member states', the organization obtained its unique status of a hybrid case; it was neither an intergovernmental nor an economic cooperation, in which no authority can supersede the states' decisions, nor a federal state-like situation, due to its limitation on coal and steel sectors (Rittberger 2003: 210). Therefore it was called a sector-based federation. Although this phase of sovereignty delegation did not affect the national identities of the citizens of six, the further integration attempts started to bring both psychological and political shifts.

The first type of shift was faced with the foundation of the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The European Court of Justice, as the highest court and the interpreter of the European treaties since 1951, started to affect the perception of social relations among the status groups of societies by reinterpreting the articles of the treaties while giving final decisions on cases. The reinterpretation of Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome, says: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited," as also the prohibition of discrimination of gender, on the basis of equal pay, or discriminating against citizens of non-member countries, who came as guest-workers onto EEC territory. Although these types of interventions may be taken as positive in the legal and social space of a nation, one should bear in mind that these types of extensions of the supra-national share of sovereignty will create increasingly stronger bonds with the supra-national power than the national one.

The second type of shift happens not because of an unapproved extension of sovereignty but is an extension through the limitation of room for manoeuvre for the nation state caused by harmonization. Nevertheless the effect of those

harmonization acts is brought into sharp focus in the newer eastern members of the Union, but it can also be observed incrementally in the historical evolutionary process in the old members as well. It also finds a place in scholars' terminology as the transformative capacity of the Union (Tamás 2001: 6-8; Dyson and Featherstone 1996).

All these limitations on a state's share of sovereignty do not cause a direct shift in the national identity of the citizens, but they narrow the state's space for reaction to the changes in the international and intellectual environment for 'convincing' citizens to abide by the social contract signed between them and the state. Hence this can be called one of the indirect shifts.

The next type of shift springs from the empowerment not of a supra-national actor, but of the sub-national actors. As is declared in Article 5 of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, though it's put onto table with the 1985 European Charter of Local Self-Government, the principle of subsidiarity will be used in certain matters, which means simply leaving matters to the lowest level of government which we call the local authorities, due to their effectiveness and the ease of reaching tangible objectives efficiently. As is stated, or rather secured, in Article 9 of the same Treaty, the Union will continue to respect the state's sovereignty and most of the time that is what happened.

However, the principle of subsidiarity brought the local authorities more power and flexibility to function on behalf of the state. No one can insist on the diminishing power of the state's authority here, but because of project based funding, one can accept that, if not the control, the functions themselves have become more uniform through European patterning.

Lastly, not because of the EU, but the increasing interdependence and uncontrollable means of communication which we call globalization created another psychological and political shift in the national identities of Union citizens. This shift manifests itself as a uniformity of choices, language and terms, use of body language, and, most importantly, value orientations.

In conclusion, one can say that the sovereignty transfer of the EU states not only weakened their national sovereignty, but also the bond between their nationals and their capability to manoeuvre. Further, this weakening does not transfer these powers to a supra-national actor, but to sub-national actors, namely the local authorities. Figure 1 illustrates this by making an analogy with the feudal period.




Figure 1 - Nation, EU and Local Identities on Transition to Post-Modern Era (Source: Sevencan, 2006, p. 284)

Especially with the further accepted subsidiary principle, the member-states are committing their sovereign rights to continental authority, which leases the use of it to local political entities. For example, the Italian Constitution of 1947 has a specific clause on the limitations of national sovereignty, and the Germans, in their constitution of 1949, approved the transfer of powers to international organizations backing the ratification of the EC founding treaties. The Netherlands also changed their constitution with an amendment in 1953 to make it compatible with the transfer of their sovereignty in the coal industry through ECSC membership (Hoffmeister 2007: 62). This reverse flow has also supported another release of sovereignty to other international organizations, such as international courts. Hence, many things changed in the *civitas* so that even an indivisible concept such as sovereignty can be divided, or rather ‘shared,’ with other actors in the international arena, not by force but willingly as a “mutual limitation of sovereignty” (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 296).<sup>1</sup>

One can tell the story metaphorically with national identity as a mandatory single type of hat. When the dress code of public places is relaxed, individuals in the community see the melon hat, for example, as more and more of a choice amongst a spectrum of other hats. As a woman one may be feminist, or ethnic Scotch, or Christian or with a pious identity. But when that person is a Scottish lady who is a Roman Catholic and believes that the hat is not religion but man-made, the female’s preference on political issues will be decided by her perception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in relation to her hat or, in socio-psychological terms, her salient identity.

The purpose of this study is to analyse quantitatively the very existence of this multiple belongingness, that seems to surface politically, and the share of salience within the competing political identities. After the preliminary analysis of the competing identities, these identity types will be profiled by means of a quantitative analysis. During this analysis the World Values Survey (WVS) Databases will be used.

### Competing political identities

At this point, for the purpose of the study one should seek the forms of identity which may compete with the national one. However the purpose of this search is not to find out how many different group identities there are, nor to find out the *propria* of possible identities, but rather how many different forms of identities one can count.

As one looks at the recent literature on European identities, one may find different approaches to the subject. Morozov and Rumelili model the European Identity from a constructivist point and define a continental identity with the help of others, such as Turkey and Russia. While defining this they create an elite, reactive and exclusive identity; they openly emphasize Europe's Christianity and post-industrial values as western ones (2012: 42-43). Burity, in his comparative review article, while commenting on the effect of globalization on identities takes an intuitionist approach and offers a globalization of local connectedness. He praises the local identity over the national and personal identities of both Europe and Latin America (Burity 2012: 82-83).

Subotic, on the other hand, from a purely realist perspective, in her analysis of the 'Europeanization of Serbia and Croatia' takes the national identity as the only identity and approaches the European Identity as another emerging national/imperial identity (Subotic 2011). While defining the identity from the minimal group paradigm of Tajfel's social identity theory, Ongur elaborates the European identity from the social psychology as counting each nation as a unit personality; hence, as with Subotic, the integrative analysis of European Identity again takes a classical realistic approach.

Gunther approached identity in Europe in the analysis of *rapprochement* between French and German identities as *Françallemagne* identity; he puts forward a *mezzo* identity which covers two national identities while not defining itself as a geographical one. On this amalgamation he refers to Ernest Renan's

words on French unification where the same strategic path is used; forgetting the differences and painful memories of the past but blurring the differences between two nations, as occurred among *Burgundian*, *Alan*, *Taifale* and *Visigoth* identities (Gunther 2011: 48).

Guibernau, in her chronological analysis of the European integration process, takes identity from the functional perspective and acknowledges the national identity with respect to ethnic/local and continental identity. She concludes that the process of competing identities is rather incremental due to hardship in the invention of 'common causes and interests, symbols and rituals' (Guibernau 2011: 313). Dinç (2011) in his article approached the question of European Identity from a nomenclature perspective and referred the subject by comparing and contrasting national and religious identities while concentrating on the Europeanization process.

Srimayee Dam's (2011) analysis of national identity makes a distinction in identity construction between a civic/political and an ethnic/cultural one. For the civic/political one she refers to a mezzo-like national identity such as Gunter presents for the Franco-German case, but this resulted as a national identity, whereas the ethnic/cultural one refers to a rather ethnically and/or culturally homogenized national identity. While making this distinction, she refers to the former as part of Western and the latter as part of Eastern European culture (Dam 2011: 340).

On the other hand Kowalska, while she tries to define regional identity in all micro and mezzo senses, approaches the geographical constructors of identity using all national, religious and personal identities as a comparing and contrasting tool (2010: 165-167). But Kowalska is not the only one who stresses region as an identity constructor. Baba insists, statistically supporting her argument, on regional identity as Italians' personal identity constructor, by stating that regional or city identity is more salient in their definition of themselves than the national one (Baba 2010).

Lastly, Spohn, Fokas and Kurth stress religiosity identity as an identity constructor in Europe. Spohn's argument is that religious identity is treated from an ethnic perspective, theorizing it with multiple modernities, whereas Fokas builds up the same issue with a discursive analysis of the philosophic side of it. Although both researchers stress the secular character of European Identity, while the former mentions it politically, the latter emphasizes it as a principle. On the other hand Kurth elaborates a comparative perspective to religious identity in Europe within a historical perspective (Kurth 2007; Spohn 2009; Fokas 2011).



From the analysis of recent literature, one can conclude that there are mainly four different types of identification; firstly, as the main identity of modern politics, the national identity would be counted as a unit identity; the second one would be listed as a micro level identity, which includes a sub-national level of regional identities and ethnic identities; the third one could be observed as macro-level identity as this is mainly the one that transcends national borders both philosophically and physically; and the last one would be called a nano-level identity, since it can only be formulated from Marx's alienation concept, as a personal salient identity.

### **Quantitative basis: variables, sample and tests**

In this analysis the WVS 5<sup>th</sup> wave data for surveyed Council of Europe member states' respondents will be used in researching identity preferences in Europe. WVS is a survey output of an organized network of social scientists coordinated by a central body, the World Values Survey Association. The data cover a wide range of the world's population, with five waves of repeated survey (EVS and WVS, 2006). There are more than 800 variables, sprung from survey questions, that exist in this database, whereas unfortunately, due to different practices inside the international research consortium, not all variables are applicable to all countries and on all waves.

Even though the WVS data give a comparative insight into world population, because of this fact use of the database is confined to only some specific questions. For the purpose of our analysis six questions of the database will be used for salient identity preference of a respondent. Additionally, for the profiling of salient identities in Europe the two dimensions of Ronald Inglehart (1997: 67-107)–later with Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005)– to measure the modernization and post-modernity level of a person will be used, as they are present in the WVS data. The variables that will be used are listed in Table 1. Also, on the questionnaire, the questions that are coded with G are asked in the Likert-Scale of four, the last question is asked in categorical (nominal) level form. The answer codes and labels are listed in Table 2.

Inglehart and Welzel's two-dimensional measure of social evolution, namely Traditional/Secular and Survival/Self-expression values, is extracted with factor analysis from the world values survey data. Inglehart, later with Welzel, modelled

Table 1. List of variables that is used from WVS data.

Variable	Label
G019	I see myself as a world citizen
G020	I see myself as member of my local community
G021	I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation
G022C	I see myself as citizen of the [European Union]
G023	I see myself as an autonomous individual
F034	Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...
tradrat5	TRADITIONAL/SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES
survself	SURVIVAL/SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES

Table 2. List of variables response codes.

Answer Code	Answer Labels	
	For G019, G020, G021, G022C, G023	For F034
1	Strongly agree	A religious person
2	Agree	Not a religious person
3	Disagree	A convinced atheist
4	Strongly disagree	Other answer

a cultural change in a society using two basic parameters, the Traditional/Secular one represents the society's stand on pre-industrial to industrial transformation, while the Survival/Self-expression one represents the society's stand from industrial to post-industrial transformation.

Traditional/Rational (T/R) score: This factor score contains mainly the variables that are related to religion and authority among the values of the social group. If one needs a shortlist of names, the importance of family ties, obedience to authority (including the relative acceptance of military administration), and the acceptance of either challenge or compromise as a tool for avoiding a conflict might be counted as primary factors. Also the degree of nationalism and national pride is measured in this score. One can also state that this score measures how far the group is modernized. Mainly one can take the first score as

“the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not, but it also taps a rich variety of other concerns... Societies at the traditional pole emphasize religion, absolute standards, and

traditional family values; favor large families; reject divorce; and take a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide” (Inglehart, 2000: 83).

**Survival/Self Expression (S/S) score:** This factor score contains mainly the society’s transformation rate from a materialist to a post-materialist one. It also measures the importance of self-expression and the quality of life versus economic and physical security, etc. The second score is a characterization of

“tap[ping] an intergenerational shift from emphasis on economic and physical security toward increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life... [The second score is] linked with the emergence of growing emphasis on environmental protection, the women’s movement, and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life” (Inglehart 2000: 84).

When the European countries are extracted from WVS 5<sup>th</sup> data, there are 20 countries that are found to have been surveyed (Table 3), but when counting the identity questions, we see that only 16 countries were surveyed for all six questions. Turkey is surveyed about all except EU membership. France, the Netherlands and the UK are only surveyed for religiosity. Since it is not the strong identification but the salience over other identities that is our concern in this analysis, those countries are excluded from the set.

Table 3. List of Countries in the WVS 5<sup>th</sup> Data.

1	Andorra	8	Norway	15	Ukraine
2	Bulgaria	9	Poland	16	Serbia
3	Cyprus	10	Romania	17	<i>Turkey</i>
4	Finland	11	Slovenia	18	<i>France</i>
5	Germany	12	Spain	19	<i>Netherlands</i>
6	Italy	13	Sweden	20	<i>Great Britain</i>
7	Moldova	14	Switzerland		

Also for the same reason, salience, only cases of respondents who strongly identify themselves with only one identity are included in the analysis; others –who strongly identify with more than one identity– are excluded. The result is listed in Table 4. This and further calculations are made through SPSS v.19 programme outputs.

Table 4. Dispersion of salience among identities with respect to country.

Country/ Region	Salience						Total
	I see myself as an autonomous individual	I see myself as member of my local community	I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation	I see myself as citizen of the [European Union]	I am a religious person	I see myself as a world citizen	
Andorra	32	5	19	6	267	39	368
Bulgaria	12	6	50	1	155	1	225
Cyprus	21	0	21	1	168	6	217
Finland	44	4	26	2	80	1	157
Germany	140	81	71	4	160	30	486
Italy	6	8	13	3	249	6	285
Moldova	5	5	11	2	247	4	274
Norway	36	13	20	5	20	5	99
Poland	5	0	4	0	263	0	272
Romania	5	2	9	0	476	1	493
Slovenia	13	3	21	2	266	0	305
Spain	10	30	76	7	135	26	284
Sweden	55	10	80	5	111	10	271
Switzerland	56	8	30	3	176	35	308
Ukraine	7	6	15	2	207	0	237
Serbia	5	4	2	3	287	3	304
Total	432	185	468	46	3267	167	4585

It would be statistically wrong if one were to interpret Table 4 as the actual dispersion of identity saliences, since the excluded cases –of multi-affiliations– and their distribution for the comparative measurement of salient identity cannot be foreseen. However it would be in accord with general expectations to say that local identity salience is more present in Spain, Germany and Sweden as expected. Since our objective is not to tally, but to profile the types of salient identities, to use the elaborated data ‘as is’ will not be a scientific problem.

In order to profile the types of salient identities with respect to modernity and post-modernity preferences, the best method would be the use of Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) since we take the categorical variables of identity salience as treatment (input) and the T/R and S/S score as the response (outcome) scores.

“MANOVA uses the set of metric variables as dependent variables and the objective becomes finding groups of respondents that exhibit differences on the set of dependent variables. The groups of respondents are not specified; instead, the researcher uses one or more independent variables (non-metric variables) to form groups” (Hair 2010: 446-447).

In the case of MANOVA, there are three assumptions of the analysis to be checked (Hair 2010: 458-460):

- **Independence;** although it is a crucial assumption for the analysis, this assumption is assured by the WVS Association, in the details of sampling and interviewing methodology.
- **Equality of variance-covariance matrices;** the Box’s M test indicates that there is no significant difference across the groups’ covariance matrices. Table 5 gives the test results from the package programme.
- **Normality;** as the last precondition of the MANOVA analysis, the normality of dependent variables (T/R and S/S) should be tested. When the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality is applied to the variables, unfortunately, the test result indicates that scores deviate significantly from the normal distribution. However, when the extreme values of the scores are analysed, it is observed that there are no outliers in the data, i.e. the scores are within the  $[\bar{X} \pm 4.s]$  margins. From this, one can conclude that the non-normality of the data is due to kurtosis or skewness. And “[w]ith moderate sample sizes, modest violations [of normality assumption] can be accommodated as long as the differences

are due to skewness and not outliers” (Hair 2010: 460). Tables 6 and 7 are the results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the descriptive statistics of the T/R and S/S values.

Table 5. Test result for equivalence of covariance matrices across groups.

<b>Test Results*</b>		
Box's M		19.922
F	Approx.	1.589
	df1	12
	df2	14060.589
	sig.	,087

\*Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices

Table 6. Results for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality.

	<b>Kolmogorov-Smirnov*</b>			<b>Shapiro-Wilk</b>		
	<b>Statistic</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Statistic</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
TRADITIONAL/ SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES	,088	4421	,000	,941	4421	,000
SURVIVAL/ SELF- EXPRESSION VALUES	,053	4421	,000	.973	4421	,000

\*Lilliefors Significance Correction

After ensuring the applicability of the MANOVA, it is time to apply the analysis. As is stated above, the aim of the analysis is to reveal the differences among groups, from the perspective of dependent variables. But as the number of groups increases, the explanatory power of the analysis decreases exponentially, since the number of categories in each variable (treatment) is multiplied for possible inputs, which for our case is  $2^6 = 64$ , and this brings more confusion to the analysis. Also since we are aiming at searching for salient identity, the multiple saliences are not an informative case for our purposes. Hence, instead of using six salience variables, it is more reasonable to use a single variable –salience– which has six categories as input.



A MANOVA analysis that may be applied with salience as a marker, and with T/R and S/S as dependent variables shows:

$H_0$ :  $(\mu^{T/R}, \mu^{S/S})$  ordered pairs for all groups are equal, vs.

$H_1$ : For at least one group,  $(\mu^{T/R}, \mu^{S/S})$  pair is not equal to the other groups' pairs.

When the analysis was applied, the test results rejected the initial hypothesis with an asymptotic significance of 0 for all three of all four tests. Also the tests' power was 1,00 as well, as is shown in Table 8.

Table 9 gives the mean T/R and S/S scores and their standard errors of each salient identity group; also Figure 2 shows the scores graphically by an ellipse with mean values pairs as the centre and standard errors as radii.

Since the test shows only that there is a grouping, but not the discriminating power of each category, we know for sure that at least one group mean pair is different from the other, but cannot be sure that each group differs significantly. A post hoc test needs to be done for further analysis. When Fisher's Least Significant Difference (LSD) test is applied to the dependent variables separately, there are some interesting results. Due to space economy, since SPSS result tables are too big, a summary table of significance values for LSD test is supplied as Table 10.<sup>2</sup> The upper-triangular matrix of the table gives the results for inter-classes T/R comparison, whereas the lower-triangular gives them for S/S comparison. Gray scores statistical failure for group distinction, the non-shaded ones indicates distinction.

## Statistical findings

Although the MANOVA test results indicate that there are statistically significant differences among groups of salient identities, post hoc tests of the T/R and S/S point out that the deeper analysis does not permit us to conclude more:

**Modernity:** The first thing that strikes one about Table 10 is that the test results of S/S scores – lower triangular matrix – show almost a total failure except between the religious and national identities. These results show that among the identity groups there is no preferential distinction, except the pair of national-



Table 8. MANOVA test results.

Effect	Multivariate Tests <sup>d</sup>						
	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power <sup>b</sup>
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	35,948 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	978.000	,000	71.896	1.000
	Wilks' Lambda	35,948 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	978.000	,000	71.896	1.000
	Hotelling's Trace	35,948 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	978.000	,000	71.896	1.000
	Roy's Largest Root	35,948 <sup>a</sup>	2.000	978.000	,000	71.896	1.000
Salience	Pillai's Trace	9.798	10.000	1958.000	,000	97.977	1.000
	Wilks' Lambda	9,992 <sup>a</sup>	10.000	1956.000	,000	99,924	1.000
	Hotelling's Trace	10.187	10.000	1954.000	,000	101.869	1.000
	Roy's Largest Root	19,399 <sup>c</sup>	5.000	979.000	,000	96,993	1.000

a. Exact Statistic

b. Computed using alpha = 0,5

c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level

d. Design: Intercept + Salience

Table 9. Means of T/R and S/S scores for each salient identity.

Salient ID		REPORT	
		TRADITIONAL/ SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES	SURVIVAL/ SELF- EXPRESSION VALUES
I see myself as an autonomous individual	Mean	1.2901675	-.2339475
	Std. Error of Mean	,12968646	,14337045
I see myself as member of my local community	Mean	,8401597	-.2892314
	Std. Error of Mean	,14434354	,10743890
I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation	Mean	,8476374	-.3342017
	Std. Error of Mean	,08939680	,06685211
I see myself as citizen of the [European Union]	Mean	1.2802115	-.3168533
	Std. Error of Mean	,25385730	,09287778
I am a religious person	Mean	,2741134	-.0369347
	Std. Error of Mean	,02679161	,01827918
I see myself as a world citizen	Mean	1.2390412	-.2996248
	Std. Error of Mean	,15630131	,12699168
Total	Mean	,4220875	-.0629826
	Std. Error of Mean	,02582167	,01733503

religious identities, from the S/S scores point of view. Since the S/S score measures the person's desire to be free (for example at level of physical/national security), one can state that this is not the case when it concerns personal freedoms.

**Religious exclusiveness:** As can also obviously be seen from Figure 2, the post hoc test results for the T/R scores indicate that there is a strong group difference (0,000 asymptotic significance) between religious identity and other identities. This deduction indicates that although there are religious, at least religion denomination-based, differences among societies, religious identity differs structurally from other identities.




Figure 2 - Salient identity ellipses with centres of mean values and radii of standard errors of scores on coordinate plane

Table 10. Summary asymptotic significance value tables of two post hoc LSD tests for T/R & S/S.

	Individual ID	Local ID	National ID	European ID	Religious ID	World Citizen	
Individual ID		0.013	0.002	0.969	0.000	0.800	TRADITIONAL/ SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES
Local ID	0.801		0.963	0.101	0.000	0.068	
National ID	0.518	0.810		0.075	0.000	0.035	
European ID	0.851	0.952	0.968		0.000	0.884	
Religious ID	0.153	0.145	0.000	0.507		0.000	
World Citizen	0.745	0.964	0.835	0.969	0.080	0.000	
	SURVIVAL/SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES						

**European Inclusiveness:** The European identity's distinction test fails (at 0,05 significance level) all except for the religious and world identities. On T/R score it indicates that the boundaries of European identity are not strongly defined, and the group members that define themselves as European come from diverse levels of the traditional-rational scale. However, the identity's upper boundary is merely a stronger one. Statistical findings show a difference when it concerns transcending identities and this finding is not consequent with general finding on the Continent. One can be more sceptical indeed if the religious-European distinction is coming from the exclusiveness of the religious identity, which can not be stated.

**One for all = all for one:** Another interesting deduction from post hoc test results is that there is a strong statistical clue to the structural similarity between individual identity and world citizenship. This result would be counted as the clue that, although the ethical and emotional brandings of the identities are different, the practical results of them are observed to be the same. Since it is almost impossible to mobilize humanity, due to human nature, the actual practice of world citizenship is paradoxically nothing but individualism. Hence, the identity spectrum axis would seem to be a horse-shoe shaped one. (Figure 3).

**Reassessment of unit identity:** Last but not least, the failing asymptotic significance (for  $\alpha=0,05$ ) of LSD test between national and local identities suggests that there is a strong structural correlation between the two identities, which suggests a stronger transitivity between them.




Figure 3 - Formation of identities in Europe

## Conclusion

The purpose of this study as stated at the beginning of this chapter was to answer two questions: ‘What is challenging the salience of national identity?’; and ‘Will it be evenly successful if one takes over its place by something else in the decision-making process of *populi* when it concerns the perception of international issues?’ Although there is no certainty in social science, the deductions of a statistical survey can be used as an acceptable bearing for an answer.

As is stated in the statistical findings, although there are six categorizations of identities built from four levels of identification, socially there are three structures of life-views. The first and the most solid life-view is, with its definite boundaries, the modern-pious one. This life-view identifies itself with religious identity, which transcends geographical or political boundaries. While, one can sense a similarity between this and the old pre-modern super-identity of Christendom, one can believe that its ancestor is the Christendom understanding of life; it should be understood that this life-view is not the mere recurrence of the old one, but better accepts others in society. One can also say that this religious identity is a glocal one, and it formulates the identity categories in a post-secular philosophical sense. The higher mean S/S score agrees with this comment. Due to its discreteness from the other life views and its appreciation of the modern dichotomy of church and state, the mobilizing capacity and parameters of religious identity and national identity do not have collinearity. Hence, one can conclude that religious identity is not a challenge for national identity from a sovereignty perspective.

The second life-view can be called the modern-political life-view. This life-view formulates the identity categories, in functional perspective, with respect to political perception. One can associate this structural life-view with both national and local identity. As has been mentioned, since national and local identities are fed from the same structural source, local identity is the nearest alternative to the national one. Therefore, as an answer to our first question, one can assert that the local identity is the more challenging one.

The last life-view is the hardest to put, since it concerns both nano and macro level identities, the individual and the world identity, within its boundaries. Although the meta-narratives of each identity in it differ, the stand due to the meta-narratives includes a socio-political self-choice of inclusion. Hence unlike the other types of identities that are externally defined, this structure of life-view is constructed from internal reasoning; thus it may be called a

modern-intellectual life-view, and for positioning it with respect to the others they can be categorized as secular-glocal identities. Since the last life-view is not a political opinion but a rather philosophical stand, one can comment that the identities that are contained in this view do not constitute a challenge to national identity. Moreover, one can safely say that this secular-glocal identity also has a distance with the post-secular glocal one.

Although one may call the EU identity part of this last structural life-view, and in fact this is a reality from post-WW II on, because of its historical perspective this identity constitutes a hybrid one. Also since the official values that are constructed through reasoning 'do not constitute a *proprium*,' (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 294) it has scattered support from two different structural life-views.

When we come to the attempt to answer the second question, one can comment that although the local identity cannot triumph over the national identity in the contemporary equilibrium, because of tidal waves of globalization and EU, the gluing factors of national unity 'melt in the air,' and the national identity is forced towards its local partitions. Even if the contemporary responses to the forces of partitioning are moving in a more reactive and pro-nationalist direction, the need for coordination against ambitious economic and technological competition will eventually give way more to tame the national identity.

## Notes

- 1 For further discussion of sovereignty transfer see Sevencan M. (2008) Transformation of National Identities in EU and Turkish Identity. In: C. AC (ed) *International conference on Social Sciences*. Izmir: The Social Sciences Research Society, 119-133.
- 2 Actual SPSS test output can be accured by contacting with the author via msevencan@ssu.edu.tr mailing address.

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