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66 Nation-states emerging from conflict are particularly susceptible to corruption. Many of the factors that create corrupt incentives in any society are likely to be present in post-conflict environments. The cumulative effect of these factors may be greater than the independent effect of each one. Although corruption is a potential problem in all post-conflict states, the nature of the conflict and the conditions under which the conflict ended help to determine the types of corruption that emerge. Although there are broad similarities across all corrupt environments, including post-conflict situations , there are also differences, which can be traced to the conflict itself and the way in which the conflict was resolved. To demonstrate these points, this chapter first outlines the nature of corrupt opportunities and their interaction with post-conflict conditions. Next, it provides a taxonomy of post-conflict situations that draws on case studies of Guatemala,Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, and Kosovo. This section shows how the sources of post-conflict corruption differ depending upon the roles of former combatants, the existence of natural resource rents, the presence of organized crime, and the involvement of international actors. The chapter concludes with reform proposals that are consistent with the case studies and are tailored to the particular problems of weak, post-conflict states. Corrupt Opportunities Corrupt opportunities that arise in the wake of domestic national conflict mirror those in other high-corruption environments. The underlying incentives 4 Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict susan rose-ackerman This chapter draws on Susan Rose-Ackerman,“Corruption and Government,” Journal of International Peacekeeping, XV (2008), 328–343; Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building,” Ohio Northern University Law Journal, XXXIV (2008), 405–443. 04 0328-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3:46 PM Page 66 are universal, but particular variants arise from efforts to rebuild the state, the society, and the economy. The nature of conflict and the resulting peace deal provide important pre-conditions for subsequent corruption. Research on corruption identifies several risk factors. First, corrupt incentives are created by weak state institutions operating with unclear and poorly enforced rules to distribute benefits or impose costs. These incentives are enhanced if officials are poorly paid and trained and if the country has a poorly functioning judiciary that lacks independence. Such conditions frequently prevail in post-conflict societies. Further to exploit corrupt opportunities, officials may create or threaten to create delays as a means of extracting bribes. This can be an especially effective strategy in the emergency conditions that prevail in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Second, large, one-of-a-kind infrastructural projects are convenient loci of payoffs for high-level officials. Often, a conflict has destroyed most of the infrastructure; therefore, there is pressure to initiate reconstruction projects quickly, without strong financial controls. In the case of very poor countries, there may have been little infrastructure to destroy, but post-conflict aid may be used to help the country catch up. Third, corruption is a risk when substantial resources are available to the state apart from internal taxation. These may take the form of natural resource rents, but in post-conflict periods they also frequently involve large influxes of emergency and development aid. These resources create incentives for individuals to appropriate them for personnel use. The individuals who skim the rents may be public officials,domestic or international contractors,or outsiders whose responsibilities may include technical expertise and anti-corruption monitoring. Fourth, corrupt enrichment often co-exists with legal opportunities for profit. This makes it possible for some to disguise corrupt gains as legitimate profits. The corrupt cannot easily be distinguished from the honest, successful entrepreneurs; frequently, the same people play both roles. Fifth, organized crime may have become entrenched during the conflict through smuggling, arms dealing, etc. Its membership may grow, and it may consolidate power in the aftermath of the conflict, enlisting former combatants into its ranks and undermining law enforcement efforts through corruption or something close to a merger with state organizations. All five risk factors are found to some degree in any weak state with infrastructural needs, externally provided funds, and prevalent organized crime. However, the conflict itself may have exacerbated the problem if it has bred a culture of secrecy and impunity where self-dealing was easy to conceal. Even if corruption were not pervasive during the conflict, the conflict’s end may lead to a period of disorganization and weak state control. Governments may Corruption in the Wake...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9780815703969
MARC Record
OCLC
489260840
Pages
497
Launched on MUSE
2015-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
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