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## Sport Policy in Canada

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## Multi-Level Governance and Sport Policy in Canada

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Jean Harvey, University of Ottawa

A few years ago, I attended a reception at Ottawa's National Arts Centre in honour of recently appointed members of the Order of Canada. The reason for my presence was the nomination of the late Major Jan Eisenhardt, who was appointed for his work as the leader of British Columbia's Pro-Rec program in the 1930s, as well as for his presidency of Canada's National Fitness Council (NFC) between 1943 and 1946. As we were chatting about his past, he shared with me his recollection of the time when he met with the Honourable Maurice Duplessis, Premier of Quebec at the time, to discuss collaboration between the Commission and his province in order to co-establish physical fitness programs for Quebecois. "He greeted me in his office very kindly," Eisenhardt added, "and offered me a cigar, as well as a glass of a very good Scotch." Eisenhardt recalled that after several minutes of conversation on light generalities, Duplessis told him with a growing smile that in a few minutes as we leave the office, we will face the press waiting outside, and I will say loud and clear: "This is an unacceptable intrusion of the Federal government into the jurisdiction of this province which I will not tolerate as its Premier." Eisenhardt then explained how Duplessis "got up from his chair, warmly shook my hand smiling at me, thanked me for the visit, escorted me to the door of his office, opened the door and, with me by his side, did exactly what he had just told me he would do, while the cameras flashes blinded us from the row of journalists in front

of us.” Laughing at the recollection of the scene, Eisenhardt noted that from his perspective, the Premier behaved as a real gentleman. Needless, to say, the province of Quebec, like other provinces for that matter, never accepted any cost-sharing agreement with the short lived National Fitness Council.<sup>1</sup>

With this example of jurisdictional conflict in mind, one might think that, besides ice hockey, fighting over intergovernmental relations is one of the most popular sports in Canadian politics. Indeed, on many policy issues, the federal government and the provincial and territorial governments invariably clash over which one has jurisdiction to act in a variety of policy fields. Other examples of such intergovernmental conflicts over sport include Loto-Canada—put in place by the federal government in the early 1970s to finance the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games—and the funding of the Jeux du Québec. With regard to Loto-Canada, the position of the provinces was and still is that lotteries fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces.<sup>2</sup> Another example was the provisions set by the Province of Quebec in the 1990s to prevent the federal government from directly funding the Jeux du Québec, a creation of the province. However, besides these persistent frictions, there are also numerous instances of collaboration between these two levels of government, as shall be discussed in this chapter. Indeed, following Painter (1991), two forms of intergovernmental relationships have always existed in Canada: competitive federalism, in which each level of government fights to keep its jurisdictional prerogatives, and collaborative federalism, where the different levels of government negotiate their respective roles on a given dossier or a broad policy field. Sport is no different from other policy fields in this regard.

But, these federal-provincial/territorial interactions reflect only one aspect of the general picture of intergovernmental relationships in Canada, since cities and municipalities, although they are creations of the provinces according to section 92(8) of the *Constitution Act of 1867*, do form a *de facto* third order of government of great importance for sport. First, historically municipalities (i.e., local governments) were the first level of government to intervene in that field. At the end of the nineteenth century, long before provinces and the federal government became involved, cities such as Montreal and Toronto and many others started to intervene in sport, either positively by granting subsidies to local sport clubs and organizations like the YMCAs, or negatively, for example by passing by-laws preventing

the practice of specific sports in their parks.<sup>3</sup> Second, currently, municipalities nearly always provide low-cost infrastructures as well as subsidies to local sport organizations, catering to a much greater proportion of Canadians' overall participation in sports in comparison to high performance sports. Consequently, in relation to overall expenditure, as well as in terms of total value of expenditure, collectively Canadian municipalities constitute the level of government that invests the most in sport. Although, to our knowledge, there are no recent figures available, in 1999 Statistics Canada published estimates of sport and recreation expenditures for fiscal year 1997–98 that aptly illustrate the weight of each level of government in terms of sport-related public spending. According to these estimates the federal government spent CA\$ 431.7M, the provinces CA\$ 551.2M and the municipalities CA\$ 3.615B during that year, representing 9.4%, 12%, and 78%, respectively, of all government sport expenditures (Luffman, 1999).

While they play an important role in sport, municipalities are not in a position of power in the game of intergovernmental relations, since, first, they are, as mentioned above, creations of the provinces which define what their prerogatives will be and, second, they are increasingly lacking the finances and other resources to fulfill their obligations (e.g., rising costs associated with sport infrastructures, shrinking tax-based sources of revenues). Central governments in federations like Canada are increasingly driven into intervening at the municipal level either directly or indirectly through the provinces and territories or through mechanisms that allow them to bypass second-tier levels of government (i.e., provinces/territories). It is notably the case in Canada with the federal power of the purse, which allows the federal government to spend money in fields that are not normally under its jurisdiction.

Finally, at each level of government, several social forces are present. Local clubs consistently rely on access to municipal infrastructures and subsidies to run their programs. Local boosters lobby their cities as well as higher levels of government to host numerous forms of sport events. At the provincial/territorial level, provincial/territorial sport organizations (P/TSOs) depend heavily on provincial/territorial government funding for their day-to-day operations. Such is also the case for national sport organizations (NSOs) at the national level, as well as organizations such as the

Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), which represents the IOC's interests on Canadian soil.

Given the above, one may be led to believe that it made sense that one of the four goals of the former *Canadian Sport Policy* (CSP) was "Enhanced Interaction." In the CSP, interaction meant collaboration and co-operation within the sport sector as well as among federal-provincial/territorial governments. As stated in the CSP, the goal was that by 2012, "the components of the sport system [become] more connected and coordinated as a result of committed collaboration and communications among stakeholders" (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 19). In order to reach that goal, according to the CSP, governments were to undertake the following: increase collaboration within and among governments and between sectors, "foster stronger relations between national and provincial/territorial sport organizations," "foster stronger relations between sport organizations and educational institutions," "strengthen relations between governments and their sport communities," and "strengthen international strategies to promote Canadian sport values" (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 19).

In the 2012 CSP, the former "Enhanced Interaction" has been replaced by the notion of a "Collaborative" policy (Sport Canada, 2012). In his book on public engagement as a new approach to policy making, Lenihan (2012) emphasizes the realization by the leaders in charge, right from the beginning of the CSP renewal process, of the complexity of the new policy environment. As a result, adds Lenihan (2012), collaboration among the different stakeholders in the mapping out of the policy space became the only possible way to develop the new policy in such a complex environment. So collaboration (as opposed to negotiations around competitive views) became the keyword right from the outset of the policy renewal process. Actually, as stated in the final version of the policy, the "collaborative" notion first appears within a new vision of "a dynamic and innovative culture" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 5), that is, a policy that calls for "building collaborative partnerships and linkages within the sport system, as well as with other sectors such as education and health, with municipalities, local governments and community organizations, and within schools, recreation providers and the private sector" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 5). Second, 'collaboration' is ranked as one of the seven overall policy core principles and therefore becomes "integrated into all sport-related policies and programs" (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 6). Visually, this policy principle is partially

rendered in the 2012 CSP framework, through a series of arrows radiating from the contexts of sport participation and pointing to a wide range of sectors that might be involved in or influenced by sport participation (see Figure 1.2).

The principle is reiterated again in the section on policy implementation and action plans. First, the document stipulates that the eventual success of the 2012 CSP lies in the multiplication of ‘linkages’ involving stakeholders from within and from outside the sport system, some of them noteworthy: “among NSOs, P/TSOs, municipal clubs and community organizations; between the Sport, Education and Recreation sectors—among NGOs [non-government organizations] and within governments; and between, federal, provincial and territorial governments and their departments” (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 15).

Finally, section eight of the policy on the roles and key stakeholders is central to this chapter. In summary, first, it is stated that the federal government supports high performance athletes, the coaches and the sport system at the national level as well as the hosting of national and international sport events. Second, the federal government also supports sport participation through the funding of sport organizations and collaboration with provincial and territorial governments. Third, provincial/territorial governments’ areas of focus according to the policy are the support for participation and volunteerism, athlete development, training of officials and coach education, and high performance sport up to the provincial and territorial levels. These governments also support the hosting of sport events. Finally, the document stipulates that the mutual roles of governments described above are in agreement with the National Recreation Statement of 1987, which will be discussed later.

In brief, the above excerpts from the 2002 CSP and the 2012 CSP point to the importance of intergovernmental relationships, as well as to the ideas of collaboration and linkages among various stakeholders from governments and civil society. The purpose of this chapter is precisely to focus on the intricacies of the relationships between all levels of government in the field of sport, while also taking into account the role of non-profit organizations active in sport. Rather than focusing solely on federal-provincial/territorial relations as most of the intergovernmental literature does, in this chapter, I also examine municipalities or more precisely, federal, provincial/territorial and municipal relationships, hence the reference to multi-level

governance in this chapter. What are the respective roles of the federal, provincial/territorial and municipal governments in sport? What factors shape these relationships? How are the actions of each level of government in sport being co-ordinated? What are the social forces at play in this field? These are some of the questions addressed in this chapter. In order to answer them, I first examine the factors that shape current intergovernmental relationships in Canada broadly, as well as in the field of sport policy more specifically. I then turn my attention to the intricacies and challenges of multi-level governance of sport in Canada, with an emphasis on the evolution of the official mechanisms that have been put in place, especially for the delivery of policies and programs that involve more than one level of government. Finally, I conclude by identifying a series of challenges that sport public policy makers are now facing and will continue to face in the near future. But before doing so, I shall define the main concept: multi-level governance.

Nowadays, governance is a prominent notion in political science and in the management literature, as well as in other disciplines. Simply put, governance, according to Kooiman (1993), refers to the plurality of governing actors and to the interactions between political society (the sphere of the government and of its institutions) and civil society (the private, for-profit and non-profit sectors) in the contemporary government of public affairs. In other words, governance is a notion used in the context of a less central role played by contemporary governments and where civil society plays a larger role in decision making through a variety of arrangements such as partnerships, networks, private-public commissions, and so on. Accordingly, multi-level governance refers to:

... a system of continuous negotiations among nested governments at several territorial tiers [...] as a result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level. (Marks, 1993, p. 392)

In other words, first, multi-level governance refers to various mechanisms of public policy and decision making between different levels of governments. Second, multi-level governance refers to the interplay between governments and civil society and/or social forces.

## Factors that Shape Multi-Level Governance

In this section, I review the main factors that shape multi-level governance in sport. At the highest level, the *Constitution Act of 1867* provides the earliest set of rules with regard to the respective roles of the different levels of government that are central to the topic. I have already referred above to section 98(2) of the Act, which stipulates that municipalities are creations of the provinces. That provision makes it extremely difficult for the federal government to interact directly with municipalities. In fact, the federal government cannot do so without the express consent of the provinces. On this specific issue, provincial/territorial governments have historically played different roles regarding federal-municipal relations: monitoring, advocacy, mediation, regulation or partnership (Garcea & Pontikes, 2006). For example, as I discuss later, in hosting major sport events, municipalities interact with the federal and provincial/territorial governments. In other instances, provincial/territorial governments may mediate or advocate for municipalities in order to obtain, on their behalf, federal financial assistance for specific sport infrastructure projects, for example. The case of the projected new arena in Quebec City is a good example of this type of provincial role. In providing up-front financing for the arena, the Quebec government became an advocate for the capital city of the province in its quest for federal funding, even though the federal government declined the invitation.

Concretely, these roles played by the provincial/territorial governments are also influenced by non-constitutional issues, such as the population and size of the city or the province/territory in question. On one end of the spectrum, since World War II, the biggest Canadian cities, such as Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, have evolved into major economic and cultural powerhouses, where significant portions of the Canadian population live. Therefore they carry important weight on the Canadian political scene. On the other end of the spectrum, the smallest provinces, both in size and in population, with their limited resources and political weight seldom have the luxury of resisting what could be seen as federal invasions of their jurisdiction.

Other major provisions of the *Constitution Act of 1867* outlining the role of government in sport are those dealing with the respective jurisdictions of the provincial/territorial governments in relation to those of the federal government. Provincial/territorial governments



have exclusive jurisdiction over property and civil rights (S. 92(13)), and education (S. 93), as well as general matters of a local nature (such as, for example, community sport).<sup>4</sup> The Constitution is in fact silent on sport and physical activity for one good reason: At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the fathers of the confederation did not have to care about sport since it was then in its infancy and nowhere on the political map. However, since then, sport has become generally associated with education and/or health, both of which fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial/territorial governments. As for the federal government's jurisdiction, as stated by Barnes (1996), several sections of the Constitution outline its jurisdiction. Its overall role mainly concerns matters of national and international affairs. As a result, the federal government has clear jurisdiction on matters that relate to national level sport as well as to international sport. Therein lies its main role. Section 91 of the *Constitution Act of 1867* touches on aspects that justify larger federal intervention in sport, as it relates to laws regarding peace, order and good government, as well as on commerce, taxes, immigration, citizenship and criminal law, for example (Barnes, 2010). One example of the initiatives that the federal government can take under these provisions is the Children's Fitness Tax Credit,<sup>5</sup> a measure that directly affects citizens, without the mediation of any other level of government. The exclusive federal jurisdiction over the army justified the first intervention of that level of government in what was then called physical fitness. Indeed, for example, in 1909, Lord Strathcona made a donation to the Government of Canada, which in turn created a trust that provided the Canadian army with funds to enter into partnership with provincial governments to finance physical education in schools (Guay, 1980). Finally, as stated above, the federal government may complement or support provincial/territorial governments in their respective jurisdictions, namely through grants or shared funding as a legitimate means of exercising its spending power "provided the intervention does not amount to a regulatory scheme relating to matters under provincial jurisdiction" (Barnes, 2010, p. 25). From this description of some of the provisions of the Constitution, one can conclude that there are as many clear delineations of government's roles as there are grey areas, a notable example being the extent to which the federal government can use its spending power to 'work its way' into community sport and recreation.

The second layer of factors that shape multi-level governance in sport is formed by legislation. At the federal level, three pieces of legislation had an important impact on one of the main points of contention between the federal and the provincial/territorial governments, that is, cost-sharing programs that deal with physical activity and mass sport participation at the local level. The first piece is the *National Physical Fitness Act* of 1943 that created the NFC.<sup>6</sup> As referred to in the introduction to this chapter, its provisions led to tensions between the NFC and several provinces. The second piece is Bill C-131, the *Fitness and Amateur Sport Act* of 1961, which also included cost-sharing provisions that several provincial government leaders resented (Macintosh, Bedecki, & Franks, 1987). Finally, section 7(1) of Bill C-12, the *Act to Promote Physical Activity and Sport* of 2003, the current federal legislation, stipulates that the minister may enter into agreements with the provinces and territories for the payment of contributions to programs to develop physical activity and sport (Parliament of Canada, 2003). I shall return to this provision of the act later on. While we find three main pieces of such legislation at the federal level, as pointed out by Barnes (2010), each province/territory has also enacted different pieces of sport legislations of their own, putting the list of total provisions beyond the scope of this chapter.

Administrative structures put in place to manage these policies by the different levels of government form a third layer of factors affecting multi-level governance of sport in Canada. At the federal level, two examples illustrate this point. With the creation by the federal government of Recreation Canada in 1972, increasing tensions erupted between the two higher orders of government with regard to their respective role in recreation and mass sport participation. The restructuring of Cabinet in 1993 under the Conservative government led by Kim Campbell resulted in the creation of the Department of Canadian Heritage, to which Sport Canada was reassigned, while Fitness Canada remained with the Ministry of Health (now part of the Healthy Living Unit within the Public Health Agency of Canada). Thus, this restructuring created a strong departmental barrier between the two major divisions of the federal government in charge of sport and physical activity.<sup>7</sup> In the case of Sport Canada, with its inclusion within Canadian Heritage, the use of sport as a tool for the promotion of national identity and unity became even more important.

While sport and physical activity fall under two different administrative structures at the federal government level, they normally fall under only one at the provincial and territorial level.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, as each province and territory has exclusive jurisdiction within its territory over significant aspects of sport, from initiation and recreation to high performance sport selection and development, each of them has the power to adopt its own policies and programs as it sees fit, as long as it does not infringe on the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. Table 2.1 shows under which ministerial portfolios sport, physical activity and recreation fell, as of September 2013, within provinces and territories. It varies from one constituency to another. The fact that sport is sometimes affiliated

**Table 2.1 Provincial/Territorial Government Units Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Physical Activity<sup>9</sup>**

<b>Province/Territory</b>	<b>Ministry Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Physical Activity</b>
Alberta	Ministry of Tourism, Parks and Recreation
British Columbia	Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development
Manitoba	Department of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs (Sport Manitoba) Department of Children and Youth Opportunities (Recreation and Regional Services) Department of Healthy Living, Seniors and Consumer Affairs
New Brunswick	Department of Healthy and Inclusive Communities
Newfoundland and Labrador	Department of Tourism, Culture and Recreation
Northwest Territories	Department of Municipal and Community Affairs
Nova Scotia	Department of Health and Wellness
Nunavut	Department of Culture and Heritage
Ontario	Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Sport
Prince Edward Island	Department of Health and Wellness
Quebec	Ministère de l'éducation, du loisir et du sport
Saskatchewan	Ministry of Parks, Culture and Sport
Yukon	Department of Community Services

with education or with health promotion for example is one indication of the emphasis a particular constituency wants to place on sport. Moreover, whether or not the word “sport” appears in the title of a department or ministry is also an indication of the importance of this portfolio for the government in power. Indeed, from one election to another or from one cabinet shuffle to another, the sport portfolio often switches departments altogether, a fact that does nothing to simplify the overall picture. The latter also signals the fluctuating importance of sport as a portfolio from time to time. Sport has never reached the status of a stand-alone portfolio. In this context, provinces and territories face two types of challenges with regard to intergovernmental relationships: vertical ones in terms of their relations with the federal and the local authorities, as well as horizontal ones in terms of the relationships with their fellow provinces and territories. One illustration of the latest type of constraints that may arise is the attempt by the Quebec provincial Minister to intervene in the case of the infamous assault by Québec Remparts goalie Jonathan Roy on a Chicoutimi goalie during an important junior hockey game in 2008. As a result of the incident, Minister Courchesne, then in charge of the sport portfolio, lobbied the Canadian Hockey League (CHL) and her provincial and territorial colleagues to ban fighting in junior hockey in Canada. As her colleagues would not and could not agree on the ban, because, as opposed to Quebec, they do not have the legislative power to intervene, the Province of Quebec was left with the option to push the Ligue de hockey junior majeur du Québec to adopt stronger rules against fighting within its league only.

So far, the factors listed above all refer to government machinery, but the very nature of sport, physical activity and recreation, as well as the presence of a myriad of organizations within civil society active in that field, also has a strong influence on intergovernmental relationships. First, because of the pyramidal structure of competitive sport, from the local club to international sport federations and the International Olympic Committee, sport calls for the attention of all levels of governments, as well as collaboration and co-ordination. Second, because the structure of sport is based mainly on non-profit or for-profit organizations, the members of these organizations try to influence the actions of governments in order to fulfill their own interest. Here the notion of multi-level governance reaches its full meaning.

## Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Sport Policy

In the previous section, I reviewed the main factors that structure multi-level governance in sport. As mentioned before, tensions arise constantly between levels of government owing to the grey areas of our Constitution and our political system. In recent decades, several agreements have been put in place to manage these tensions and co-ordinate the actions of the different levels of government (see Table 2.2). These agreements can be divided in the following categories. The first category comprises general agreements passed in order to help clarify the grey areas of Canada's Constitution for the purpose of facilitating collaborative action towards shared objectives. For the purpose of this chapter, I call attention to the *High Performance Athlete Development in Canada* agreement of 1985 and the *National Recreation Statement* of 1987. A second category includes those agreements that have been put in place to guide the actions of governments in their respective jurisdictions. Two such instances would be the *Canadian Policy Against Doping in Sport* (initially developed in 1991, most recently renewed in 2011) and the *London Declaration on Expectations for Fairness in Sport* (2001). A third category includes all multi-party agreements relative to co-operation on issues that touch on all levels of government. In this category, I briefly discuss the *Clear Lake Resolution* of 1997 relative to the Canada Games, as well as the Multi-Party Agreement that created VANOC, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. Not listed in Table 2.2, in a category of their own, are the formal mechanisms of intergovernmental sport policy development,

**Table 2.2 Federal-Provincial/Territorial Agreements Relating to Sport and Physical Activity<sup>10</sup>**

Year	Agreements
1985	<i>High Performance Athlete Development in Canada</i>
1987	<i>The National Recreation Statement</i>
1991	<i>The Canadian Policy Against Doping in Sport</i> (most recently renewed in 2011)
1995	<i>The Federal-Provincial/Territorial Planning Framework for Sport</i>
1996	<i>Physical Inactivity: A Framework for Action</i>
1997	<i>Governance of the Canada Games: 1997 Clear Lake Resolution</i>
2001	<i>London Declaration on "Expectations for Fairness in Sport"</i>
2002	<i>The Canadian Strategy for Ethical Conduct in Sport: Policy Framework</i>

the bilateral agreements between the federal government and territories with regard to sport participation in general and the new Implementation and Monitoring Group outlined in CSP 2012.

### **Agreements on Divisions of Jurisdiction**

The first extensive agreement passed in order to draw a line between the federal government on the one side and the provincial and territorial governments on the other deals with the respective roles of these governments with regard to high performance sport. The *High Performance Athlete Development in Canada* agreement of 1985 stemmed from a perceived need by governments to “develop a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of action for the development of high performance athletes in Canada” (Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Fitness, 1985, p. 3). In this document, high performance sport “encompasses athletes who achieve, or, who aspire to achieve, or, who have been identified as having the potential to achieve excellence in World Class competition” (Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Recreation and Fitness, 1985, p. 3). In the preamble, governments acknowledged the limits of clarifying roles, recognizing first that any such exercise always involves some degree of overlap and second, that precise clarification is not possible in all instances. Finally, the governments underlined the fact that sport evolves with time and that delineations may eventually need to be revised accordingly. The core of the document was a discussion regarding a long list of areas in which some were identified as exclusive to the provincial and territorial governments, while others were exclusive to the federal government, and still others were shared between the two. Table 2.3 lists some of these areas of responsibility in each of the three categories (i.e., provincial/territorial, shared, and federal). The provincial and territorial mandate with regard to high performance sport consists of development up to the national level. As for the federal role, the agreement lists areas relevant to national and international sport. Despite this division of roles, “the shared responsibilities program areas outnumber those allocated to one level of government” as stated in the CSP (Sport Canada, 2002a, p. 12). Indeed, Table 2.3 clearly shows that, in many areas of high performance sport, responsibility is shared.

The second agreement I wish to discuss here is the *National Recreation Statement* of 1987. The 16-page document was approved at

the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Conference of Ministers of Sport and Recreation in Quebec City in September 1987 (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987). It originated from earlier documents and declarations stating the ‘primacy’ of the provinces in recreation (defined as including sport) as well as recognition by the federal government of such primacy. In claiming this role, provincial and territorial governments were accepting broad responsibilities including the adoption of policies that put the emphasis on “the importance and value of recreation and leisure and the

**Table 2.3 Areas of Responsibility on a Program-by-Program Basis<sup>11</sup>**

Provincial/Territorial	Shared	Federal
Provincial/Territorial Team Program	High Performance Program Planning	National Team Programs
Provincial/Territorial Championships	High Performance Training Centres	Team Centralization
Provincial/Territorial Games	National Championships	National Coaching Programs
Participation Development	Identification of National Team Members	National Coaches
Coaches of Provincial/Territorial Teams	Competitive Opportunities	Major Games—Related to Canadian Teams
Provincial/Territorial Facilities	Athlete Assistance and Support Services	World Championships—Related to Canadian Teams
	International Exchanges	Technical Information
	Supplies and Equipment	International Interface
	Sport Science	Sport Models
	Athlete Testing	
	Sport Medicine	
	Canada Games	
	Education of Coaches	
	Team Managers Development	
	Officials Development	
	Hosting International Events	
	Talent Identification	

importance of recreation and leisure as a social service,” thus committing significant resources to support provincial organizations and municipalities—“the primary public supplier of direct recreation services”—as well as to meet regularly with other governments to co-ordinate public policies (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987, pp. 8–9). The statement also recognized a role for the federal government, but a complementary one, involving itself primarily in activities that are national and international in scope and by providing for the development of recreation programs “in facilities and institutions under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government” (Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council, 1987, p. 12). The federal government was also expected to distribute information to encourage citizens to participate in recreation and physical activity, as well as to develop a central database for information on various forms of recreation and related programs. Interestingly enough for this chapter, the statement also included a complete section on mechanisms of intergovernmental co-operation and on the need thereof. It listed four main reasons why such co-operation is desirable: to enhance the quality of programs through the exchange of ideas, to avoid duplication, to define and maintain a clear delineation of roles, and to facilitate the resolution of issues. These motives are still relevant today.

### **Multi-Party Agreements**

This category includes agreements that set the rules of co-operation as well as the respective roles of all parties involved in multi-level initiatives such as hosting sport events. These agreements are central to Canadian sport policy, since they provide the framework for the federal Hosting Program (see Chapter VIII on hosting). The *Clear Lake Resolution* was adopted in 1997 30 years after the first Canada Games. The Canada Games “represent a unity of purpose to celebrate the sporting character of Canada through a high quality multi-sport event, which includes opportunities for regional exchange and learning, making the Canada Games a national sport development asset” (Canada Games, 2010, paragraph 2). The Resolution also laid out rules reaffirming the Canada Games Council (incorporated in 1991) as the non-profit organization in charge of the Games. The Resolution included five appendices and two schedules. Appendix 1 described the strategic priorities of the ministers for the Games in terms such



as athlete-centred, values-based, access, athletic excellence, and public interest. Appendix 2 provided the financial framework for the Games (i.e., what share of the funding each level of government must provide). For example, with regard to operating costs, the public sector funding is broken down as follows: 52% from the federal government, 16% from the hosting province or territory, and 32% from the hosting society.

With regard to 'base capital contribution,' the federal government, the provincial or territorial government, and the hosting municipality are expected to contribute CA\$ 2M each. Also, Sport Canada is to provide funds to cover the travel costs for athletes, mission staff and officials. Appendix 3 provided a detailed list of the areas in which the Canada Games Council can make final decisions, relating mainly to the day-to-day operations of the Games. Any area that touches on the main provision of the Resolution and is political in nature remains the responsibility of the federal and provincial/territorial governments. Appendix 4 outlined the provincial/territorial rotation for hosting the Games from 1997 to 2009. The Resolution still constitutes the framework for the Canada Games under the current Canada Games component of the Federal Hosting Program. Interestingly enough, originally, although the Resolution involved municipalities, they were not partners in this agreement. In the development of the Resolution, provincial and territorial governments played the roles of mediation and regulation of federal-municipal relations with regard to the Games. However, as of 2009, multi-party hosting agreements have been introduced that include all three levels of government (Personal communication with a public official).

Interesting features of the Canada Games in terms of governance include the interplay between the Canada Games Council and the hosting societies. According to its stated mission, "the Canada Games Council delivers the Canada Games as a unique, premium, nation building, multi-sport event and works continuously to strengthen the Canada Games Movement, in partnership with government, the private sector and the sport community" (Canada Games, 2010, paragraph 5). The Canada Games Council is managed by a board of directors that includes ex-officio members from federal and provincial/territorial governments and national sport organizations as well as observers/members at large (i.e., members of current and future hosting societies). Several representatives of the private sector serve different functions on the Board, namely as chairs. The

board of directors of hosting societies is similar to the Council in its composition. For example, the Board of Directors of the Halifax 2011 Host Society includes a chair originating from the private sector and representatives from both the provincial government and the community. Two additional members are from the Canada Games Council. Therefore, even if these structures are private organizations on paper, their governance structure presents complex inter-organizational linkages (Thibault & Harvey, 1997) wherein the two upper levels of government are ensured a significant presence, both centrally and locally, in decision-making processes related to the Games. They perceive themselves as partners with civil society, while ensuring oversight of these organizations, following a long-standing, neo-corporatist-like form of governance of sport (i.e., a model where the state plays an active role in the organization of interest groups) (Harvey, Thibault, & Rail, 1995).

The Multi-Party Agreement for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games had a similar structure to that of the Canada Games, but its scope with respect to the diversity of stakeholders involved is far greater. Signed on November 14, 2002, the agreement was set in motion before the Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games were to be awarded to Vancouver. The document was designed to accompany the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation and prepare the creation of the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) in the event that the games were awarded to Vancouver. The Agreement was signed by the governments of Canada and British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), the Canadian Paralympic Committee (CPC) and the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation. The Agreement was 23 pages in length (with another 24 pages of appendices) and fulfilled the IOC's requirements with regard to the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games and was consistent with all relevant Government of Canada policies and laws, such as the Hosting Policy and the *Official Languages Act* (see Chapter XII on official languages), among others. The Agreement also established the respective contributions of each level of government (which eventually ended up being higher). It also stipulated membership of 20 for the future OCOG, a non-profit agency. The members were to be appointed as follows: three by the Government of Canada, three by the Government of British Columbia, two by the City of Vancouver, two by the Resort Municipality of Whistler, seven by the COC, one by the CPC, one by the Lil'wat and

Squamish First Nations and one to be chosen by vote of the other members. The innovative feature of this board was undoubtedly the one seat allocated to the above mentioned First Nations' bands. As such, their role and status as hosting nations were recognized. Once again, in this example, there was a significant presence of government representatives on the board, 10 out of 22 when we include the First Nations. While it may be conceived as a way of ensuring seamless relationships between all levels of government and civil society—more precisely here the IOC through its local representatives in the COC—this feature also raised the question of the truly 'private corporation' nature of the OCOG.

Another interesting feature of the Agreement is section 43, which lists the provisions against conflicts of interest and where it is stated that no member of the House of Commons or Senate of Canada, no current or former federal public office holder or servant, no member of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and no member of the Vancouver City Council or Whistler City Council could be admitted to any share of the Agreement or to any benefits or profit that may arise.<sup>12</sup> While these provisions clearly protect the integrity of the OCOG, they do not mean that the representatives of the different levels of government were not actually representing the interest of their employer. Quite the contrary: for some, this kind of government representation in such multi-level agreements puts these representatives in a position of conflict of interest between the organizations of which they are members on the one hand and, on the other hand, the employer to which they report. Such was the opinion expressed by key stakeholders for the purpose of the evaluation of the 2005 FINA championships in Montreal (Parent, 2006).

The counterargument is that governments invested a great deal of financial resources and thus, should ensure that these funds were used appropriately and legislation and policy were complied with and followed. Moreover, the presence of the different stakeholders on the same board may facilitate the necessary flow of information between the stakeholders. The question that then arises relates to the transparency of these structures. They are presented as private but are they? It also raises the question of accountability of elected officials. Let us consider the example of the language scandal that erupted (mostly in Quebec) from the near-total absence of French during the opening ceremonies of the Vancouver Olympic and

Paralympic Winter Games. How could the Canadian Heritage minister not be held at least partially responsible for this oversight that became so divisive for the country, when he was so well represented on VANOC? The answers to these questions notwithstanding, for the purpose of this chapter, the multi-party agreement truly constitutes a mechanism of multi-level governance which, in the end, delivered successful Games. The Agreement also served as a template for the more recent multi-party agreement for the 2015 Toronto Pan Am Games, an agreement that has already resulted in controversy on the same language issue (Bourgault-Côté, 2010).

### **Mechanism for Federal-Provincial/Territorial Collaboration**

Although presented somewhat late in this chapter, the mechanism for federal-provincial/territorial collaboration has been central to the multi-level governance of sport policy in Canada since the 1960s, although it only became an established mechanism in 1986 (see Figure 2.1). In the 1990s, its focus was primarily on initiatives relating to the Canada Games, the National Coaching Certification Program and Aboriginal issues.<sup>13</sup> Since 2000, the level of activity of that mechanism has increased significantly, as the CSP was developed, adopted and implemented. Today, as we shall see, it is active on a number of issues. Indeed, it is through this mechanism that the agreements discussed above have been negotiated and agreed upon; that the provincial and territorial governments have adopted the CSP; that the implementation and monitoring of the CSP have been carried out and common goals have been developed. In short, it is through this mechanism and its complex intricacies that collaboration between the two upper levels of government in sport and physical activity really takes place, or not. The current structure of the mechanism derives from, and follows, the *National Recreation Statement*, but its origin is earlier, as mentioned above. Before describing the mechanism, it is important to note that its structure is nevertheless informal in essence, meaning that it is not mandated through the Constitution, and therefore does not have any constitutional status. It is the result of evolving relationships between the two major levels of government. Reflecting the formal constitutional divide, municipalities are not part of the decision-making process, an exclusion that leaves the provincial and territorial governments free to exercise their prerogative over local governments.




Figure 2.1 Mechanisms for Federal-Provincial/Territorial Government Collaboration<sup>14</sup>

At the top and centre of Figure 2.1 appears the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Ministers' Conference, the decisional body composed of all the provincial and territorial ministers in charge of sport, recreation, and physical activity. The two federal ministers present (i.e., Canadian Heritage (sport) and Health (physical activity)) are also both members and co-chairs of the Conference. As well, they preside over the agenda items that are relevant to their mandate. Finally, there is a third co-chair (who presides on all issues) who is the minister in charge of sport, recreation, and physical activity for the province or territory hosting the next Canada Games. As such, provincial/territorial co-chairing rotates from one province/territory to the next preceding the Canada Games. This represents a concrete illustration of how the separation of sport and physical activity in two distinct federal administrative units is a factor in the governance of federal-provincial/territorial government relationships. Not only does this separation lead to a complicated 'game of musical chairs' between the two federal ministers (in their role as co-chairs) when the time comes to discuss issues relevant to their respective mandates, it also results in a dual committee structure with, on the one hand, committees in charge of sport and, on the other hand, committees in charge of physical activity and recreation, as outlined below.

In the organization of meetings with federal-provincial/territorial ministers, it was agreed that ministers would meet three times over the span of four years, two of those meetings to occur just prior to the Canada Games. The conference is organized by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS), an agency created in 1973 by the first Ministers to manage the logistics of senior-level federal-provincial/territorial conferences in all areas of federal-provincial/territorial government collaboration. During these conferences, ministers make decisions that the deputy ministers have the responsibility of implementing. To achieve this, deputy Ministers created working groups to provide directions to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Sport Committee (FPTSC) with regard to sport issues and to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Physical Activity and Recreation Committee (PARC) with regard to issues related to physical activity and recreation and tasked their respective working groups with the ground work. It is really at the level of the FPTSC and PARC that detailed negotiations and recommendations are developed. These recommendations are then discussed, and issues are identified at a meeting of the Interprovincial Sport and Recreation Council (ISRC)

(on which all provincial and territorial governments have representation) and federal officials (who are members of FPTSC and PARC). That meeting is chaired by the ISRC chair and is co-chaired by FPTSC and PARC chairs as issues of their respective mandates are discussed. The outcomes of these meetings are then reported to the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Deputy Ministers' Committee where decisions are drafted for submission and approbation at the Ministers' Conference. In short, it is through this movement back and forth from the ministers' conferences to the committees and working groups that federal-provincial/territorial collaboration occurs. As of December 2012, the FPTSC active working groups were: Canadian Sport for Life Management Team, Monitoring of CSP Implementation, High Performance Issues, and Sport and Recreation Infrastructure. Each year, working groups are formed or dismantled as a function of the needs emerging from discussions, meetings and conferences at the minister and deputy Minister levels.

The existence of this governance structure is a clear indication of the need for the two upper levels of government to collaborate on issues of sport and physical activity policy, given the nature of these two governing bodies and the intricacies of our Constitution. The collaborative nature of the structure was meant to uphold, among other duties, the intent of the *National Recreation Statement*, and to smooth out the jurisdictional grey areas of our Constitution where there is the potential for friction and divergence of opinion between governments about sport and physical activity policy in this country. While there is always impetus for the federal government to adopt national goals, policies and programs, there is also a constant preoccupation on the part the provincial and territorial governments to protect their jurisdictions while, at the same time, to influence the federal government to adopt those policies and programs that suit their own policy. I shall return to this later on, but at this point, it is important to understand what is being discussed at this level. One of the major functions of the mechanism that emerged from the process of developing and adopting the first version of the CSP (Sport Canada, 2002a) was the negotiation of multi-year federal-provincial/territorial priorities for collaborative action (Sport Canada, 2002b, 2007). These priorities set by both governments addressed each of the four CSP goals. The first priorities covered the years 2002–2005. For this period, in regard to the enhanced participation goal, priorities were to increase participation in sport and to increase the presence

of sport and physical activity in school. For the enhanced excellence goals, enhancing athlete and sport system performance was the only priority identified. For the enhanced capacity goal, priorities were to implement the competence-based program for coaches, to develop a sport event hosting policy, to improve sport and recreation facilities, to implement the Canadian strategy on the ethical conduct in sport and to foster the diversification of resources for sport organizations and Aboriginal sport development. As for the enhanced interaction goal, priorities were to increase awareness of sport within government (i.e., other departments), to ensure regular communication with the sport community, to enhance collaboration between sport organizations and to negotiate bilateral government agreements to advance the CSP. A second set of priorities was developed for the years 2007–2012 and focused on continuing the initiatives established in the previous document and to work on new priorities in order to further implement the CSP. Among the list of 12 new priorities, the alignment of the overall sport system with the Sport for Life (Long-Term Athlete Development) model was the most pervasive theme. Three priorities were also adopted to pave the road for the evaluation of the CSP, in light of its eventual renewal when it expired in 2012.

On June 27, 2012, at the same time that the CSP 2012 was adopted, a new set of Priorities for Collaborative Action 2012 was made public, to be developed further for review and approval at the 2013 Ministers Conference (Federal and Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation, 2012). The 2012 priorities are as follows:

1. Support introduction to sport programming with a focus on traditionally under-represented and/or marginalized populations;
2. Develop a common data collection methodology with which to identify infrastructure priorities for the sport and recreation sectors;
3. Define and clarify the roles and responsibilities of governments and key stakeholder organizations in the high performance and competitive sport system;
4. Review progress and complete implementation of the Strategic Framework for Hosting International Sport Events in Canada;



5. Work with Aboriginal communities to identify priorities and undertake initiatives for Aboriginal sport development, and the use of sport for social and community development purposes;<sup>15</sup>
6. Introduce initiatives to improve safety and anti-harassment in all contexts of sport participation;
7. Promote implementation of Canadian Sport for Life (CS4L), or equivalent programming, in the sport and related sectors;<sup>16</sup>
8. Implement an engagement strategy to maximize the contribution of NGOs, in the sport and related sectors, to the implementation of CSP 2012. (Federal and Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation, 2012, p. 1)

### **Bilateral Agreements**

The last (but not the least) key feature of the multi-level governance of sport under the current CSP is formed by the bipartite agreements between the federal and the provincial/territorial governments. These bilateral agreements are yet another form of cost-sharing between the two upper levels of government. However, they were not only key in the adoption of the CSP by the provincial and territorial governments, but also play an important role for the federal government in that they provide a vehicle for this government to be active in sport participation where its jurisdiction is limited. The bilateral nature of these agreements gives the CSP the flexibility to adjust to the respective priorities of provinces and territories and, as such, is touted by the federal government as a Canadian policy (i.e., reflecting its decentralized nature) as opposed to Canada's policy.

Sport Canada has three types of bilateral agreements with the provincial and territorial governments: generic agreements aimed at increasing sport participation; Aboriginal agreements meant to increase the capacity of provincial/territorial sport organizations in charge of Aboriginal sport and physical activity; and agreements to support team travel for participation in the North American Indigenous Games. From one jurisdiction to another, the bilateral agreements take different forms, for example, some provincial or territorial governments have combined the generic and Aboriginal agreements while others have kept them separate and have targeted different priorities. The federal funding portion of every agreement

is always based on the fact that the provincial and territorial governments will match the federal funds. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide detailed federal commitments for the generic and the Aboriginal bilateral agreements. The tables show a clear increase in the commitments between 2002 and 2011, which signals an increase in federal-provincial/territorial collaboration on issues of participation and Aboriginal sport. When compared with the overall budget of Sport Canada however, the bilateral agreements program remains a modest one.

In terms of the content of the bilateral agreements, as mentioned above, they vary significantly from one province/territory to another. For example, the 2009–2011 *Sport for More* bilateral agreement with Ontario supports the development of local sport programs in First Nations communities; projects designed to increase the sport participation level of underrepresented groups such as ethnic minorities and women; projects to reduce the number of drop-outs in provincial sport organizations; and funding for the Promoting Life-Skills in Aboriginal Groups (P.L.A.Y.) program. In Manitoba, the generic bilateral agreement is related to the community level. For example, the objectives include building community capacity and providing sustainable programming through the development of local partnerships, and developing low or no-cost sport programs for communities where youth are underserved. In Saskatchewan, among other objectives, the bilateral agreement is aimed at supporting the planning and implementation of the LTAD model in provincial sport organizations. All in all, bilateral agreements are becoming an important mechanism of federal-provincial/territorial collaboration in areas where the federal role is far from obvious.

### **An Implementation and Monitoring Group**

Our last example of a mechanism for federal-provincial/territorial collaboration is the Implementation and Monitoring Group put in place in the context of the 2012 CSP. One of the innovative features of the policy is the inclusion of a logic model, which illustrates policy inputs and outputs, corresponding immediate outcomes, CSP 2012 objectives, CSP goals and ultimate outcomes. Actually, at the moment of the adoption of the policy, the complex two-page grid that constitutes the overall logic model was not complete, as the specific input/activities/outputs were still under development. The logic model is a

**Table 2.4 Government of Canada Financial Contributions for Generic Bilateral Agreements (CA\$)  
2002–2011<sup>17</sup>**

P/T	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2006–07	2007–08	2008–09	2009–10	2010–11
AB		200,000	325,000	378,380	378,380	378,380	378,380	378,380	378,380
BC		100,000	434,360	434,360	434,360	434,360	434,360	434,360	434,360
MB		160,000	100,000	367,000	267,000	267,000	267,000	267,000	267,000
NB		180,000	180,000	240,000	240,000	240,000	240,000	240,000	240,000
NL		200,000	213,000	180,000	230,000	243,000	180,000	230,000	230,000
NS	150,000	150,000	254,540	254,540	254,540	254,540	254,540	254,540	254,540
NT	106,000	170,000	222,160	222,160	222,160	222,080	222,080	222,080	202,080
NU	72,000	140,000	191,620	191,620	191,620	178,620	204,620	191,620	201,620
ON			404,719	884,360	884,360	884,360	884,360	884,360	909,360
PE		200,000	200,000	200,000		208,100	208,100	208,100	208,100
QC			634,160	634,160	634,160	634,160	634,160	634,160	634,160
SK		140,000	258,680	258,680	258,680	258,680	258,680	258,680	258,680
YT		140,000	191,800	191,800	191,800	191,800	191,800	191,800	201,800
Total	328,000	1,780,000	3,610,039	4,437,060	4,187,060	4,395,080	4,358,080	4,395,080	4,420,080

classic feature of the new Public Management policy frameworks in which policies are evidence-based and evaluated through measurable outcomes and outputs. Indeed, the Implementation and Monitoring Group is “. . . responsible for collating and sharing the action plans of governments and NGOs, and for monitoring progress. This group will oversee the development of appropriate indicators and metrics and ensure that longer-term pan-Canadian impacts are tracked and evaluated” (Sport Canada, 2012, p. 19). How can this mechanism be seen as a multi-level governance mechanism? It is by virtue of Committee’s make-up, which includes academics, representatives of federal-provincial/territorial governments and representatives of the sport system.

### The Challenges of Multi-Level Governance

The purpose of this chapter was to focus on multi-level governance of sport in Canada. Several factors shaping this governance were described at length as well as current mechanisms of collaboration between different levels of government. Bilateral agreements foster

**Table 2.5 Government of Canada Financial Contributions for Aboriginal Bilateral Agreements (CA\$) 2006–2011<sup>18</sup>**

P/T	2006–07	2007–08	2008–09	2009–10	2010–11
AB	100,000	100,000	100,000	83,000	95,000
BC	100,000	0	85,000	85,000	95,000
MB	40,000	75,000	83,000	98,000	95,000
NB	0	60,000	50,000	55,000	0
NL	57,700	80,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
NS	60,000	60,000	50,000	55,000	50,000
NT	45,000	80,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
NU	60,000	60,000	50,000	55,000	50,000
ON	0	0	0	0	75,000
PE	29,250	0	50,000	50,000	50,000
QC	100,000	100,000	83,000	50,000	95,000
SK	100,000	115,000	83,000	83,000	95,000
YT	60,000	60,000	50,000	55,000	50,000
Total	751,950	790,000	784,000	769,000	850,000

better collaboration between the federal and provincial/territorial governments in areas of sport participation and Aboriginal sport. This does not mean that difficult issues will disappear. Tensions arising from the federal government's motivation to create a seamless sport system, which potentially translates into pan-Canadian plans and initiatives, may end up creating resistance from provincial and territorial governments. One possible example of just such an occasion for disagreement is the Canadian Sport for Life/Long-Term Athlete Development program that is percolating throughout the Canadian sport system as the federal government strives for its integration not only at the national level but also provincially and locally. Not all the provincial and territorial governments are open to change in their sport systems simply for the sake of adopting the federal plan.

One of the objectives of this chapter was to put some emphasis on the interaction of municipalities with the higher levels of government. The examination of existing forms of collaboration leaves us with the impression that multi-level governance only truly occurs with the hosting of games through multi-party agreements. In all other areas, relationships and collaborations occur at the federal-provincial/territorial levels. Where local authorities are concerned, provincial and territorial governments retain their decision-making prerogative over this level of government.

New challenges are foreseeable in the near future as sport for development within Canada is becoming a central preoccupation thanks to organizations like Sport Matters Group, which lobby the federal government to ensure that these challenges are at the forefront in the next iteration of the *Canadian Sport Policy*. In addition, new developments towards the use of sport as a strategy for larger social roles such as the integration of immigrants have the potential to partially redefine the role of Sport Canada. One such example is the Working Together Initiative where different federal government units, provincial/territorial governments as well as several multi-service organizations team up to find innovative forms of horizontal and vertical governance of sport programs.

In summary, this chapter has shown the sheer complexity of intergovernmental relationships in sport in Canada. The main factors structuring these relationships are not going to disappear, which means that mechanisms to manage these inter-relationships are a necessary feature of sport policy in this country. The decentralized

nature of Canada may lead to greater complexity in the forms of multi-level governance of sport, but more centralized countries such as England, for example, do have similar issues of intergovernmental relationships, only at different levels according to the specificities of their political system. Moreover it can be argued that the decentralized nature of governance mechanisms in Canada are indeed a strength in the sense that they are more sensitive to the expression of regional differences in such a vast and diverse country.

## Notes

1. The NFC was active from 1943 until the repeal of the *National Physical Fitness Act* in 1954.
2. As explained in Macintosh et al. (1987), Prime Minister Joe Clark granted responsibility for lotteries to the provinces in 1979.
3. For more on this, see Gruneau (1983), as well as Andrew, Harvey, and Dawson (1994).
4. For more elaborate discussions on constitutional and legislative issues with regard to governments' roles in sport, see Barnes (1996, 2010).
5. The Children's Fitness Tax Credit is also discussed in Chapter VI.
6. This does not mean that this was the first instance of federal-provincial/territorial, municipal cost-sharing in sport. With the Strathcona Trust, during the Depression of the 1930s, governments also entered into such programs, for example, the youth training programs of the National Employment Commission (1936–1938) put in place to increase youth employability. For more information, see Harvey (1988).
7. Studies on the involvement of the Canadian government in sport in Canada often overlook the fact that besides the two usual suspects, other parts of the government intervene in sport. For example, Canadian Forces has a vibrant competitive sport system. Moreover Immigration and Citizenship has programs that use sport as a means to integrate young new immigrants into Canadian society. For the purpose of this book, we limit our analysis to the two usual suspects.
8. With the notable exception of Quebec where physical activity is the mandate of the Kino-Québec program, attached to the Ministère de la Santé et Services sociaux.
9. Source: Provincial and territorial government websites, as of September 2013.
10. Source: Adapted from Sport Canada's website. Retrieved from <http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/sc/pol/pcs-csp/2003/106-eng.cfm>
11. Source: Adapted from Canada (1985).

12. Surprisingly no such provisions were aimed at the representatives of the COC and CPC, which does not mean such benefit or profit may have been derived by them.
13. This section of the chapter draws heavily from Canadian Heritage (2010), as well as from informal interviews with Canadian Heritage policy makers.
14. Source: Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation Committee (SPARC) Handbook (Federal-Provincial/Territorial Government draft document 2012).
15. "Quebec recognizes the positive impact of sport on economic and social development; however it does not subscribe to this goal as part of a Canadian sport policy" (Federal and Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation, 2012, p. 1).
16. Efforts with regard to "related sectors" will be made as judged appropriate by individual provincial/territorial governments. (Federal and Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Sport, Physical Activity and Recreation, 2012, p. 1).
17. 1 Source: Canadian Heritage (2002–2011).
18. 1 Source: Canadian Heritage (2006–2011).

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