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Displacement and the Somatics of Postcolonial Culture

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Published by The Ohio State University Press

Robinson, Douglas.

Displacement and the Somatics of Postcolonial Culture.

The Ohio State University Press, 2013.

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NOTES

PREFACE

1. For studies of the genealogy of racism, see Jordan, Gossett, Montagu, and West.
2. For this critique, see especially Ahmad, but also JanMohamed, Slemon and Tiffin, and Dirlik “Grinch,” “Aura,” “Response.” For discussion, see Moore-Gilbert 17–22.
3. For discussion of the proprioception of the body politic, see my *Estrangement* 106–12.
4. For discussion of Williams’s “structures of feeling,” see my *Estrangement* 221–23.

FIRST ESSAY

1. For a contrasting view, see Brennan’s *Transmission of Affect*, which rejects mimetic theories of affect transmission in order to argue that affect is transmitted chemically, mainly by smell (pheromones). Ironically enough, Brennan agrees with me that shared affect is the basis of all ethics, all societal regulation of behavior, a claim utterly vitiated by her insistence that affect is transmitted physically rather than imaginatively: if I am considering a course of action that will harm someone not physically present, the only channel of shared affect that can have any significant ethical impact on my decision is not smell but my imaginative reconstruction and imitation of the absent person’s body state. There is also a time problem with her claim: the hormonal transfers she discusses take minutes to transform the target organism; the Carpenter Effect has been measured to transform the imitating organism within several hundred milliseconds. The apparent instantaneity of shared affect could not possibly be created chemically.

2. The direction in which I take somatic theory is heavily influenced by Foucault:

Imbedded in bodies, becoming deeply characteristic of individuals, the oddities of sex relied on a technology of health and pathology. . . . The power which

thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting bodies, caressing them with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatizing troubled moments. . . . There are equal grounds for saying that it [modern society] has, if not created, at least outfitted and made to proliferate and made to circulate elements and a circulating sexuality: a distribution of points of power, hierarchized and placed opposite to one another; ‘pursued’ pleasures, that is, both sought after and searched out; compartmental sexualities that are tolerated or encouraged; proximities that serve as surveillance procedures, and function as mechanisms of intensification; contacts that operate as inductors. . . . [A]ll this made the family, even when brought down to its smallest dimensions, a complicated network, saturated with multiple, fragmentary, and mobile sexualities. (*History of Sexuality* 1:44–46)

Where I deviate from Foucault is in his conception of “power” as a force with agency; my understanding of how normative pressures get circulated through groups is far less centralized, based more on Heidegger’s notion of *das Man*, Wittgenstein’s notion of social practices, and Elias’s and Bourdieu’s notions of *habitus*. Another Nietzschean book that has significantly shaped my conception of ideosomatic regulation is the *Anti-Oedipus* of Deleuze and Guattari; see §1.3.1 for discussion.

3. Both the placebo effect and its opposite, the nocebo effect, in which a patient who does not trust the doctor gets worse, are ideosomatic effects, based on guided response to group norms governing the doctor’s effective authority, the patient’s expected obedience, the contextual significance of the doctor-patient relationship, and the instrumental significance of treatments. Some scholars (see Jospe and Thompson) estimate that as much as 50 percent of the efficacy of modern medicine relies on ideosomatized belief structures: as unconscious collective support for the purely mechanical activities of cutting tissue, setting bones, and intervening chemically in various physiological processes we are trained to expect to get better under a doctor’s care, expect to get better when we like our doctor, expect to get better when we swallow a pill, and *want* to get better to please the doctor—and often do get better when those expectations are met.

4. For an extended discussion of this sort of cultural misunderstanding, and what small recourse we have when confronted with it, in terms of metalocutionary implicature (adapting H. Paul Grice) and reimmédiatization (adapting Charles Saunders Peirce), see chapter 14 of my *Performative Linguistics*.

5. For a problematic excluded-middle argument about groups and territories that is clearly in need of somatic theory, see Warner “Voluntary.” Warner devotes the first pages of his article to an attack on what he calls the “liberal mathematics” that equates the individual with the group with the territory with home with the government with the state with democracy: “Questions of identity are resolved through associations and attachments that can be described by first-degree equalities. Individual/group identity is solved by homogeneous grouping. Home/place identity is solved by attaching the individual/group to a specific place that comes to be called home. Individual/group/homogeneous grouping is inseparable from home/place; the identity of one is equal to the other” (164). “For [William E.] Connolly,” Warner adds, “these associations and alignments, or rather the desire for alignments that are part of the search for a ‘singular hegemony of any set of identities’ (Connolly, *Identity* 1991a:158), are elements of a politics of homesickness and place” (164). This seems reasonable—except, perhaps, to the extent that this characterization seems to carry with it the implicit suggestion that, because a politics of homesickness is typically

dolled up as something else, something nobler, like “liberal political philosophy,” it is itself necessarily cheap and tawdry, something to be ashamed of: I see no need to sneer at people who get homesick.

But Warner is hunting bigger game: he wants, ultimately, to demolish the notion that group identity may be definitively connected with place *at all*. He cites Cuny et al.’s introduction to their edited collection *Repatriation*: “One of the more interesting common denominators found in the case studies is the formation of politically organized, cohesive communities by uprooted peoples. Rounded up by the host government and relocated to refugee camps, refugees are placed in unaccustomed communal situations that may change their way of life and crowd them in among strangers. In these circumstances refugees show an impressive ability to organize and cohere as a new community with its own mores and values” (quoted in Warner, “Voluntary” 165). This empirical observation seems unexceptionable to me: groups may be disrupted by the scattering of members and the destruction of place, but human beings are adaptable. They can regroup. And Warner’s first gloss of this passage, “The relation between individual and group does not have to be physically grounded” (165), suggests that Warner wants to carve out a middle ground between “has to be” and “can’t be,” between “groups are always physically grounded” and “groups are never physically grounded.” But then he draws his binary conclusion: “It is the relations with other people that ground man in his existence, and not the physical grounding of the individual and group with a given space” (165). Based on this principle, he argues his main case that refugees (and generally humans) can never go home in the simple nostalgic sense, because by the time they get there both they and what they have idealized (narrativized) as “home” have changed.

Somatic theory would be most interested there in the middle that Warner so assiduously excludes: the ways in which it is the relations with other people that ground us in our social *and* physical existence, that iterosomatize a random collection of people as “our group,” as a “homogeneous group,” and a specific place as “home,” as “ours,” as the “true” setting of community. For example, Warner summarizes Emanuel Marx’s article “The Social World of Refugees”: “In Marx’s analysis, the social world is based on relationships that are not related to physical space. Social networks are not tied to a particular place since the dynamics of interpersonal relationships are not territorial in nature” (164). Viewed somatically, these absolute negations (“not related,” “not tied,” “not territorial”) are a bit simplistic. It should be quite obvious that it matters enormously to a congregation whether their services are held in their usual church, a high school gym, or a slaughterhouse—the dynamics of a church congregation are in that sense powerfully territorial. That territoriality is not absolute—it can be changed—but it has a felt tenacity that may make it seem, phenomenologically, to many members of the congregation, absolute. A face-to-face university class is not absolutely bound to the classroom—the specific classroom they are assigned to is only gradually, over the first few weeks of the semester, ideosomatized as “their own”—but it does substantially change the intellectual and socioemotional dynamic of the class’s “social network” when the professor gives in to the students’ pleading and they all go out and sit on the lawn, or meet in a coffee house. And while it is almost certainly true that refugees (and the rest of us, having moved away) can never go home again, that is not because social relationships “are not related to physical space”; on the contrary, it is precisely because social groups somatize specific spaces and places as “their own,” as “home,” as “familiar,” even as “sacred,” that the disruption and reconfiguration of social relationships makes homecoming problematic. In order to *feel* as if one were returning home, one would have to return not only to the same place but to the same group that

somatized that place as home and to the same time frame in which that somatization was ongoing.

For a more flexible discussion of the “performance of terrains of belonging,” drawing on Judith Butler’s theories of performative identity, see Fortier; see also Probyn.

6. For a review of the research on refugee children’s assimilation, see Huyck and Fields (who in fact suggest that traumatized children may be even more at risk than their parents and grandparents); for a study of elderly Chinese migrants to New Zealand, see Abbott et al.

7. Significantly, though, Pfister-Ammende gives examples of communists and other “politically oriented unions of those electing to fight” who “proved equally strong” (10), and Zionists, from Vonnegut’s point of view almost certainly to be considered another granfalloon, who were typically also able to maintain stable ideosomatic regulation in refugee camps. Presumably this divergence stems from Vonnegut’s membership in the “karass” (a team of people that “do God’s Will without ever discovering what they are doing” [14]) of what Pfister-Ammende calls *Problematiker*: “They are as little rooted in their social environment as they are dedicated to a clear-cut spiritual idea. Rootless individuals of this type also need the world, but in a different way. Their vitality does not spring from an inner relatedness to the world, since they do not give themselves away to it; instead they take what the world offers them. They are not deeply attached to the world as a whole or to any of its individual manifestations. They are not object-related, nor do they have a binding commitment and unshakable superpersonal hold” (13). Vonnegut’s membership in this karass makes it seem as if many functioning ideosomatic groups are in fact sham groups.

8. Pfister-Ammende writes:

Four situational reactions were found common to persons uprooted from their social milieu and compelled to flee:

1. Fear of the persecutor with subsequent tendency to develop anxiety when the real danger is over, coupled with projection on to neutral persons of the new environment.
2. Hypertrophy of the instinct of self-preservation with deterioration of moral values. The main sphere affected appears to be that of moral behavior based on super-ego control of the drives. The ego-ideal, the “personal ethos” (Binder 1951) tends to remain unaffected.
3. Clinging to values that have remained intact or to the lost homeland amounting in some cases to fixation.
4. Overvaluation of the country of asylum or of persons in authority, a projection of savior phantasies which have remained in a mental vacuum without object-cathexis owing to the frustration inherent in expulsion from their own country. (7)

9. En route to their discussion of the stressors of exile proper [(3)–(4)], for example, Miller et al. deal with preflight (1) and flight (2) stressors among Bosnian refugees—especially the violence brought by the war (345–46). In her study of mental illness among Somali refugees, Carroll similarly quotes stories told by the refugees of the disruption of their happy lives by the outbreak of civil war in 1991 (121–22). For rare studies focused on dysregulation in the preflight context, see Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, and Gorden-

ker; for studies focused on the dynamics of refugee flight, see Kunz and Prins; for a study focused on refugees just arriving at a refugee camp, see Drumm, Pittmann, and Perry. For useful summaries of refugee research, most of which, as I say, is focused on problems of assimilation [(3)–(4)], see Cohon, and Dewind and Kasintz.

10. For a discussion of the virality of literature, see my *Estrangement*: Lev Tolstoy argues in *What Is Art?* that literary texts both emulate and themselves participate in this performative power to “infect” readers with the author’s feelings and sensation, Viktor Shklovsky theorizes the estrangement device, and Bertolt Brecht theorizes the estrangement effect as infection with a defamiliarizing twist, an estrangement designed to infect the reader or the theatergoer with deestrangement.

11. Papa Doc reigned from 1957 to 1971, Baby Doc from 1971 to 1986, having become president for life at age 19 upon his father’s death. The first wave of Haitian “boat people” left the island in 1972; the second wave, consisting of some 40,000 people, occurred in the winter of 1991–92, during the Tonton Macoute coup that overthrew President Jean-Bertrande Aristide and installed General Raoul Cédras in the presidency. Danticat, implicitly setting her story in the context of that second wave, has her girl write: “they’ve closed the schools since the army took over. no one is mentioning the old president’s name. papa burnt all his campaign posters and old buttons. manman buried her buttons in a hole behind the house. she thinks he might come back. she says she will unearth them when he does” (*Krik? Krak!* 4).

Part of Danticat’s anger and frustration in the writing of the story no doubt stems from the decision first of President George H. W. Bush not to grant *any* Haitian boat people asylum in the United States—to instruct the Coast Guard to interdict the boats and return them to Haiti. This move was widely criticized, among others by presidential hopeful Bill Clinton, as a violation of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, of which the United States was a signatory; but upon assuming office in January of 1993, Clinton continued the Bush policy, arguing that he was actually saving Haitian lives by preventing refugees from drowning in the treacherous ocean crossing. On June 21, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided (by a vote of 8–1) in favor of the Clinton administration that the interdiction of Haitian refugee boats did not violate the Geneva Convention on Refugees (*Sale v. Haitian Centers Council*).

12. It is important to note that Danticat does not *frame* these wishful invocations of magic as performatives, direct or indirect; the reader is coached to construct them that way not by anything Danticat does explicitly or even implicitly in writing the story but by the ideosomatized conventionality of *you*-address, a group structuring of emotional response to which the reader has been somatically conditioned by his or her own groups. All Danticat has to do to bring the reader into the transformative somaticity of these indirect performatives is to have her storytellers address their wishes and longings to *you*.

13. For discussion, see also Butler, *Gender Trouble* 141–43, and Bell, “Mimesis” 135–36.

14. For an extended discussion of “doubling,” or what Friedrich Schlegel calls *das Doppeltgehen* “doubled-going”—“daß der wenigstens nicht doppelt geht wie ein Gespenst” (“Ueber” 64), “that he at least does not go doubled like a ghost” (“On” 236)—see the “Magical Doubles” chapter of my *Translation and Taboo*, especially 176–89.

15. In light of Freud’s famous association of sadism with the death drive, it is significant to note that Danticat explicitly invokes doubling and mimetic violence in order to explain the dysregulated/dysregulatory violence channeled through the Tonton Macoutes: “There

were many cases in our history where our ancestors had *doubled*. Following in the *vaudou* tradition, most of our presidents were actually one body split in two: part flesh and part shadow. That was the only way they could murder and rape so many people and still go home to play with their children and make love to their wives” (156). This suggests, in fact, that the dynastic trauma is passed on not only from mothers to daughters but from fathers to sons, perhaps mothers to sons as well—and that the sexual violence unleashed on female bodies in this novel is thus the product of doubling in a double sense, the effect of doubling both on women (causing them to turn their violent impulses both inward, against their own bodies, and outward, against their daughters’ bodies, in “testing”) and on men (causing them to rape, beat, murder, and otherwise brutalize other bodies). Her 2005 novel *The Dew Breaker* is a powerful exploration of a man like this, a former Tonton Macoute now living in the U.S., through his relationships with his wife and daughter.

16. For discussion of the notion that we are all deterritorialized, see Warner, “We Are All Refugees,” which draws on Connolly’s reading of Nietzsche on homesickness in the last chapter of *Political Theory and Modernity* in order to argue that “we all have a certain homesickness that cannot be fulfilled,” that, “no matter where we are, even in our countries of origin, we are all strangers to ourselves,” so that “the protected home that distinguishes us from refugees is only an illusion” (371). Or, as Warner sums up his argument:

To categorize certain people as refugees suggests that we deny the refugeeness inside us all, or deny the “normalcy” that is part of all refugees. Categorizing people as refugees serves an important legal function. It allows millions of people the right to international protection which they may otherwise not enjoy. On the other hand, the categorization delimits one group from another, creating insiders and outsiders. This brief essay has argued that the bridge between the two groups is shorter than one may imagine, and that the solution to the “refugee experience” may be more complex, as, indeed, is the solution to our own existence. (372)

Even at home, in other words, surrounded by familiar people and things, we do not feel at home; we still (always) miss some inchoate idealized “home” or “community” to which we have no access, and in that sense are forever phenomenologically “in flight” from or toward home. Equally indebted to Nietzsche on this point, of course, are Heidegger and Freud in their theorizations of *das Unheimliche*, the uncanny or the unhomely. See Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial theorization of the unhomely in *The Location of Culture* (9–18); on Freud, see Cixous and Kristeva (182–92); on Heidegger, see McNeill; and on both, see Krell. (See also Ziarek on Kristeva’s discussion of strangers, foreigners, and the uncanny.)

I will be returning to Nietzsche’s argument in the *Genealogy* about the “civilizing” transmission of “slave morality” from generation to generation—one of the topics usefully illuminated by Connolly, *Identity/Difference* 151–54—in my theorizations first of colonization as counterregulation in §2.1, and then of intergenerational trauma as paleosomatic regulation in the introductory paragraphs of the Third Essay.

17. See also Kaplan’s *Questions of Travel* (85–91) on Deleuze and Guattari, and especially 91–96 on the spread of Deleuzian romanticizations of the nomad through Euro-American cultural studies in the 1980s and 1990s; and see 96–98 for a reading of Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” as a critique of this development. For a discussion of that essay in this book, see §2.2.2.3.

18. For an extended reading of Nietzsche’s “ecology” of somatic coding in the *Genealogy*, see §4.3 of my “Ecologies of Translation.”

SECOND ESSAY

1. I'm thinking specifically here of Judith Butler's reading of Foucault in *Gender Trouble*:

In a sense, for Foucault, as for Nietzsche, cultural values emerge as the result of an inscription on the body, understood as a medium, indeed, a blank page; in order for this inscription to signify, however, that medium must itself be destroyed—that is, fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain of values. Within the metaphors of this notion of cultural values is the figure of history as a relentless writing instrument, and the body as the medium which must be destroyed and transfigured in order for “culture” to emerge. (166)

2. The entire island of Hispaniola was originally named Santo Domingo by the Spanish and Saint-Domingue by the French. In 1697, the western portion of the island was officially recognized by Spain as a territory of France, whereupon it kept the French name Saint-Domingue and the larger Spanish territory on the eastern part of the island continued to be called Santo Domingo. When Saint-Domingue won its independence from France in 1804, it was renamed Haiti; when Santo Domingo won its independence from Spain in 1844, it was renamed la Republica Dominicana or Dominican Republic. Like many American and British authors of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, James rather confusingly refers to the French colony that became Haiti as “San Domingo.”

3. For a useful overview and critique of scholarly readings of Nietzsche on physiology, see Brown, who notes that *On the Genealogy of Morals* has the most references—33 in all—to physiological phenomena of all Nietzsche's works (64). Emden's piece on Nietzsche's neurophysiological conception of rhetoric in that same collection is less germane, as it does not deal with *On the Genealogy of Morals* and is more concerned with what contemporary research Nietzsche had read before writing his early lectures on classical rhetoric.

4. For Nietzsche's stomach disorders, see Moore 77–78.

5. For a passing postcolonial discussion of Nietzsche on slave morality, see Beverley: “In both Gramsci's and Guha's construction of the subaltern one can detect a residual trace of Nietzsche's characterization of slave morality as founded on resentment of the low for the high. It is true that the characterization is itself turned on its head to constitute now a theory of the epistemological privilege and agency of the subaltern, in the way Marx claimed that he had turned the Hegelian dialectic upside down. But the subaltern would be well within its rights to reply: Fuck you” (38).

The only other study I have found that comes close to addressing the postcolonial implications of Nietzsche's theory of slave morality is an article by Mark Migotti with the promising title of “Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen: A Reading of the First Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*”; but Migotti is not interested in the emergence of a slave morality in a colonial or postcolonial context. The San or Bushmen work in his argument not as the victims of (de)colonization but as an egalitarian “ur-community” that offers a potential counterexample to Nietzsche's empirical claims about slave morality and slave revolts: “By examining and rejecting the idea that the egalitarian culture of the San might pose a knock-down counter-example to the slave revolt hypothesis, we have, it seems to me, been brought to recognize a deeper and more precise sense in which the history of GM I is a history of *western morality*” (778). That Western moralists were still involved in the enslavement of black Africans throughout most of Nietzsche's lifetime—indeed slavery was abolished in Brazil in the exact same year in which he wrote *On the Genealogy of*

Morals, 1888—and that Nietzsche’s pronouncements on slave morality and slave revolts might therefore tell us something about the European colonization of other cultures, never seems to occur to Migotti.

One more: in a 1995 interview, Albert Memmi says, “I love reading Nietzsche, for example, but he always places himself outside circumstances. This is the shortcoming of philosophers” (Wilder, “Irreconcilable” 177). It seems to me that in taking issue with the relative tolerance to pain in “Negroes” and “bluestockings,” not to mention in theorizing the genealogy of “slave morality,” Nietzsche places himself far more radically and controversially inside circumstances than many of his critics.

6. Does Memmi mean that European Americans are decolonized but African Americans are not? Or that no one in the former English colony that became the United States is decolonized, because—what, they aren’t *recently* decolonized?

7. See also Dirlík’s “American,” “Empire?,” “Spectres,” and “Globalization.”

8. See, e.g., the articles by Nietschmann, Ryser, and Connor; for an overview of Fourth World theorizing, see Seton.

9. See, e.g., Caren Kaplan’s strictures against the “theoretical tourism” of Deleuze and Guattari’s minoritarianism:

“Becoming minor” is a strategy that only makes sense to the central, major, or powerful, yet it is presented as an imperative for “us all.” Constructing binaries between major and minor, between developed and undeveloped, or center and periphery, in Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative texts modernity provides borders and zones of alterity to tempt the subversive bourgeois/intellectual. Becoming minor, a utopian process of letting go of privileged identities and practices, requires emulating the ways and modes of modernity’s “others.” (*Questions* 88)

10. Indeed there is a rhetorical excitement to his third chapter that Fanon himself seems hard put to quell:

During the time when I was slowly being jolted alive into puberty, I had the honor of being able to look in wonder on one of my older friends who had just come back from France and who had held a Parisian girl in his arms. I shall try to analyze this problem in a special chapter.

Talking recently with several Antilleans, I found that the dominant concern among those arriving in France was to go to bed with a white woman. As soon as their ships docked in Le Havre, they were off to the houses. Once this ritual of initiation into “authentic” manhood had been fulfilled, they took the train for Paris.

But what is important here is to example Jean Veneuse. (72)

The stories about the Martinican blacks sleeping with white prostitutes in Paris are digressions from his discussion of the René Maran novel, but thrilling ones that he is only with great difficulty able to defer to a later chapter.

11. For further feminist discussions of this moment in Fanon, see Wright 124–33; Fuss; and McClintock 360–63.

12. The classic study of the colonizer–colonized relation in Memmi as “Manichean” is JanMohamed; see also Alschuler for a Jungian “psychopolitical” study of that relation in terms of narcissism, under the rubric of “duo.” Tony Judt situates the tendency to understand the colonizer–colonized relation in Manichean terms in the context of French intel-

lectual thought in the years immediately following the Second World War: “Everything was classified in Manichean terms. Communists/capitalists, Soviet Union/United States, right/wrong, good/evil, them/us. . . . It was once again Sartre who gave this idea its more rarified expression. Hell being other people” (54, quoted in Gibson 210n1). Note that Fanon too writes of a colonized/racialized “Manichean conception of the world . . . white or black, that is the question” (*Black Skin* 44–45)—but attributes it to Mayotte Capécia.

13. For a detailed and useful reading of this chapter in the sociohistorical context of both Césaire on Negritude (and the sociohistorical context that Fanon saw as undermining the effectiveness of Negritude) and Dominic La Capra on intergenerational trauma, see Wilder, “Race.”

14. Cf. the conclusion to *A Dying Colonialism*:

The originality and the impatient richness of the Revolution are now and forever the great victories of the Algerian people. This community in action, renovated and free of any psychological, emotional, or legal subjection, is prepared today to assume modern and democratic responsibilities of exceptional moment.

. . . It is true that independence produces the spiritual and material conditions for the reconversion of man. But it is also the inner mutation, the renewal of the social and family structures that impose with the rigor of a law the emergence of the Nation and the growth of its sovereignty.

We may say firmly that Algerian man and Algerian society have stripped themselves of the mental sedimentation and of the emotional and intellectual handicaps which resulted from 130 years of oppression. . . .

The Revolution in depth, the true one, precisely because it changes man and renews society, has reached an advanced stage. This oxygen which creates and shapes a new humanity—this, too, is the Algerian Revolution. (179–81)

In *The Wretched of the Earth* he is less sanguine: “But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries. . . . For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man” (315–16). He envisions here the same utopian decolonized future, but envisions it now as the product of hard work rather than as a magical transformation brought about in the twinkling of an eye by the revolution.

For discussions of Fanon’s revolutionary thought, see Bulhan (esp. Part III) and Perinbaum.

15. Note that Jentsch’s primary examples of the uncanny effect of psycho-ontological uncertainty are children, “hysterics” (i.e., women), and “primitive man, . . . [whose] ignorance is therefore hidden from him to a great extent by the everyday” (9): “The affective position of the mentally undeveloped, mentally delicate, or mentally damaged individual towards many ordinary incidents of daily life is similar to the affective shading that the perception of the unusual or inexplicable generally produces in the ordinary primitive man” (10). What is required for the experience of the uncanny is significant dysregulation of the group’s ideosomatic construction of reality, and the ideosomatics of reality-construction seem to Jentsch to be on a considerably firmer footing (and therefore the phenomenon of the uncanny far less common) among groups of educated European men than among these “other” groups—suggesting that one of the ways groups of educated European males regulate the ideosomatic construction of reality is by repressing their own uncertainties and

confusions and projecting them onto their childish, womanish, lower-class, “primitive,” and mentally deranged others. Indeed Jentsch’s conception seems to be definitively shaped by the circulatory exosomatization of Western colonialist images of the “primitive” or the “native”:

Conversely, the same emotion occurs when, as has been described, a wild man has his first sight of a locomotive or of a steamboat, for example, perhaps at night. The feeling of trepidation will here be very great, for as a consequence of the enigmatic autonomous movement and the regular noises of the machine, reminding him of human breath, the giant apparatus can easily impress the completely ignorant person as a living mass. There is something quite related to this, by the way, when striking or remarkable noises are ascribed by fearful or childish souls—as can be observed quite often—to the vocal performance of a mysterious being. The episode in *Robinson Crusoe* where Friday, not yet familiar with the boiling of water, reaches into simmering water in order to pull out the animal that seems to be in it, is also based on an inspiration of the writer that is psychologically very apposite. (11)

Women and children, for Jentsch, are the “primitives” or “fearful or childish souls” in “our” (male European) midst; when “we” white educated males have our rare experiences of the uncanny, it is like the surfacing of something long since outgrown in us, or what Freud will call the return of the repressed.

16. Note that Fanon is not really interested in this postcolonial assault on the Hegelian dialectic; in Chapter 5 of *Black Skin, White Masks* he just happens to experience Sartre’s invocation of the dialectic as paralyzing. Cf. his discussion in *A Dying Colonialism* of the decolonizing transformation of the colonized’s use of the colonizer’s language: “What is involved here is not the emergence of an ambivalence, but rather a mutation, a radical change of valence, not a back-and-forth movement but a dialectical progression” (90n8).

17. For a useful discussion of Fanon in terms of the impact on French intellectual circles of Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel’s master–slave dialectic in the late 1930s (among those in attendance were Lacan, who is cited in *Black Skin* [152n15], and Merleau-Ponty, whose lectures Fanon attended in Paris, and whose concept of embodied “lived experience” is implicitly interwoven with Fanon’s analysis throughout), see Gibson, chapter 1 (on Sartre and Merleau-Ponty esp. 24–27).

18. Dirlik does deal with Bhabha and Spivak and generally postcolonial theory and criticism in “Past,” “Response,” and “How the Grinch.”

19. For critiques of Bhabha, see Parry “Signs,” Lazarus, Ahmad, Cedric Robinson, Loomba, Tiffin, the articles in Slemmon and Tiffin, and Moore-Gilbert (chapter 4, esp. 132–40).

20. “However, the ‘signs’ that construct such histories and identities—gender, race, homophobia, postwar diaspora, refugees, the international division of labour, and so on—not only differ in content but often produce incompatible systems of signification and engage distinct forms of social subjectivity. To provide a social imaginary that is based on the articulation of differential, even disjunctive, moments of history and culture, contemporary critics resort to the peculiar temporality of the language metaphor” (Bhabha, “Post-colonial” 176). His examples are taken from Cornel West, Stuart Hall, Hortense Spillers, Deborah McDowell, Houston A. Baker, Jr., and Henry Louis Gates, Jr.

21. Bhabha apparently quotes this passage from memory: he adds “a text of” in front of

“pulsional incidents” and renders “the articulation of the body, of the tongue, not that of meaning, of language” as “the articulation of the tongue, not the meaning of language.”

22. See, e.g., Moore-Gilbert:

While it is surprising that Bhabha makes no comment on Barthes's exoticism, more problematic is the fact that he is in fact at times seduced by Barthes's rigid ontological distinction between the “sentence,” and what is “outside the sentence”; consequently, despite himself, he reinscribes rather than displaces a whole series of binary oppositions between (neo)colonial and postcolonial culture. The West, for Barthes and Bhabha alike, is associated with writing, the symbol, pedagogy (all of which denote monological, fixed and authoritarian qualities), abstract forms of thought and a conception of culture as an epistemological object of the kind associated with the museum, in other words divorced from everyday experience. Meanwhile, the postcolonial is associated with the “text,” the voice, the sign, performance (all of which denote dialogical, democratic and mobile properties), sensual modes of apprehension, and a conception of culture as active, present and enunciatory. The oppositions which Bhabha sets up between Casablanca (which he uses to figure the West, by virtue of the film of that name) and Tangiers are in fact schematic to the point of caricature, with the effect that the West itself then takes on all the qualities of fixity and repetition associated with the “eternal East” of Orientalist discourse. This is nothing other than the “reverse ethnocentrism” of which he (like Spivak) so often complains. (128–29)

23. In Elizabeth Jane Bellamy's reading of this moment in Bhabha's essay, “these disjunctive and only partial modes of opposition militate against a truly collective action. Thus the Muslim peasants are less the site of ‘individuation’ (in the bourgeois, Western sense of the word) than the site of ‘ambivalence’ as ‘an intersubjective affect’ induced by the incommensurability between the religious and the militant” (347). But what manner of unified truth would “a truly collective action” be, and why should we conceive of conflicting ideosomatic regimes as “militating” against it? To be “truly collective,” must an action be instigated and regulated by the intersubjective affect of a single group? If one or more members of the group engage in the action for “the wrong reasons,” does it thereby become a *false* collectivity? And why must “individuation” and “ambivalence” be binarized? Is individuation ever anything less than ambivalent? Bhabha himself does not binarize them; he writes of “ambivalence at the point of ‘individuation’ as an intersubjective affect” (187), suggesting that for him scare-quoted “individuation” is the intersubjective affect whose “point” or transformative verge is characterized by ambivalence. I would revise that formulation only by calling individuation the attributive *product* of the somatic exchange, which will always be characterized by “ambivalence” in the sense of being shot through with conflicting ideosomatic and idiosomatic pressures, but in the counterregulatory contexts of colonization and decolonization will in fact be not just “ambivalent” but actively polynormative.

24. I would also suggest, however, that Moore-Gilbert is wrong to conflate this passage from “Articulating the Archaic” with the passage from “The Other Question” that JanMohamed critiques: “What is denied the colonial subject, both as colonizer and colonized, is that form of negation which gives access to the recognition of difference” (Bhabha, “Articulating” 75). For one thing, I think that both Moore-Gilbert and JanMohamed take Bhabha out of context, reading him to be saying that there is no “form of negation which

gives access to the recognition of difference” between colonizer and colonized, that for Bhabha colonization mutually transforms both the colonizer and the colonized until there is no difference between them, until they become a single unified subject. (JanMohamed writes that “Bhabha asserts, without providing any explanation, the unity of the ‘colonial subject (both colonizer and colonized)’” [59]; Moore-Gilbert seconds him in arguing that Bhabha’s remark tends “to produce an unwarranted unification of colonizer and colonized as a (single) ‘colonial subject’ which discounts the deep objective differences in the political power and material conditions of these ‘secret sharers’” [147].) What Bhabha is saying there specifically is that *both types* of colonial subject are denied that form of negation. He’s not unifying them; he’s comparing them on a single point of similarity. The other thing is that the passages from “Articulating the Archaic” and “Sly Civility” do differentiate clearly between colonizer and colonized, by assigning the former an enslaved/paranoid subjectivity and reducing the latter to the blank negativity of refusing mastery.

25. For a representative logical critique of Spivak’s essay, see Moore-Gilbert 98–109: Spivak presents the subaltern as “wholly Other,” a purely discursive/differential category, and “as a ‘real’ and concrete historical category, more particularly as a material effect of the export overseas of Western capitalism” (103); “this politically comforting reconstruction of motive . . . makes Bhaduri ‘signify’ (if not literally speak), in apparently blatant contradiction of the assertion that the subaltern ‘as female cannot be heard or read’” (105); “Spivak at times seems to present [the subaltern] as a forever passive and helpless victim of forces beyond his/her control. This makes it rather difficult to understand, let alone accept, her complaint about the West’s historic ‘refusal to acknowledge the colonial peoples, post-colonial peoples, as agents’” (107).

One strategy for logical critique that I haven’t seen, but that I adumbrate myself in §2.2.2.3 in connection with Kant, is fuzzy logic—for clearly the aporetic series of subaltern not-yet-subjectivities en route to the subject-as-such is a sorites series: is the subaltern a subject yet? Not yet. Fuzzy logic would make the differentiability that is subalternity aporetic and therefore “unreadable” in a perhaps less strict sense than the one Spivak charts out:

Imagine that “we” (a member of the Western or Indian English-speaking intellectual elite) are standing at one end of a long corridor, with an Indian tribal woman (TW1) and Spivak (GCS) standing together in the center and another Indian tribal woman (TW2) at the far end. GCS takes one step toward us, away from TW1 in the center, and TW2 takes one step toward TW1: is TW1 still subaltern, and is she still silenced by power? Almost certainly yes. Because TW1 is still in the company of a member of the elite, *not yet* among her own, she is still subaltern and cannot speak. GCS and TW2 take another step, both in the same direction, GCS away from TW1, TW2 toward her. Is TW1 still subaltern, and is she still silenced by power? Probably still yes. They take another step, and another, and another. At some point GCS will be standing with us, chatting easily in English, and TW1 and TW2 will be alone in the center of the corridor, and we will want to say that TW1 is no longer subaltern and now can speak. But at what point in the sorites series did the politico-ontological transformation from subaltern to not-subaltern occur?

It is, of course, demeaning to use logical puzzles to talk about the poorest and most disenfranchised people on the planet; but my point is not simply to use logic against logic, to cancel the effects of Spivak’s binary logic with a slightly more complex logic. It is also to show that the “not yet” that Spivak would deny Kant, grounded as it is not merely in fuzzy logic but in *affective* fuzzy logic, in the liberal-progressivist evaluative affect of colonialist thought, is, in the end, less demeaning than Spivak’s desomatized binary logic, which would make the subaltern’s politico-ontological status depend on the on-off gates in the Western

observer's head. And in fact I would guess that Spivak herself knows this, and feels uneasy about it; after all, she begins her famous essay, in its 1985, 1988, and 1999 forms, with a deconstruction of that binary logic in Ranajit Guha's formulation of subalternity in his introduction to the first volume of *Subaltern Studies*:

In subaltern studies, because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical textual practice of differences. The object of the group's investigation, in this case not even of the people as such but of the floating buffer zone of the regional elite—is a *deviation* from an *ideal*—the people or subaltern—which is itself defined as a difference from the elite. It is toward this structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather different from the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual. What taxonomy can fix such a space? (*Critique* 271–72)

Her insistence, despite this diagnosis, on retaining the Gramscian definition of subalternity as a “space of difference” suggests that she finds “the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription” so inexorable that the radical intellectual can do nothing *but* continue to understand the project of subaltern studies essentializingly—or rather, perhaps, anti-essentializingly, but in Spivak's own Derridean purview, of course, that binary opposition remains complicit in the same essentializing stance.

26. I quote here from the original version of the article in *Cultural Critique*, because in this one case Spivak's editing for the reprinted version in *Outside* seems to me to have introduced unnecessary syntactic confusion: Mahasweta, she writes there, “lingers in post-coloniality and even there in the space of difference *on decolonized terrain* in the space of difference” (77). The remainder of the quotations from this essay are taken from *Outside*, and page citations reflect that pagination.

27. It may be that the most problematic term in Spivak's borrowings from Deleuze and Guattari is “code,” a term they take from Saussurean linguistics to indicate the discursivity of laws and rules, the social organizations or codifications of experience and behavior. To the extent that she intends “affective value-coding” to mean the discursive organization of affective value, she is binarizing discourse and affect in ways that would appear to recuperate Cartesian mind-body or subject-object dualisms—or, for that matter, Western power discourse and the silenced body of the subaltern woman. A more interesting reading of “affective value-coding,” however, would be that value is “coded” in and by and through affect—that Spivak is troping affect as the “discourse” by which value is “coded.” This latter (protosomatic) construction of affective value-coding would have to depend heavily on the metaphoricity of affect = discourse and affective approval/disapproval=code, of course, but I think that is a useful metaphorical orientation—that is, until Spivak begins making distinctions like “economically rather than affectively coded,” “represented *within* rather than prior to an accepted code,” and “the figuration of the woman's body before the affective coding of sexuality” (93). Then the spatial (economic vs. affective) and temporal (prior to vs. within) binaries of coding render the metaphor problematic in ways that Spivak does not address, because she does not theorize her terms. In a protosomatic metaphorization of the normativizing circulation of approval/disapproval body language and body states as “affective value-coding,” evaluative affective states would certainly saturate and normatively condition economic coding as well; indeed it's hard to imagine what economic coding would look or feel or act like without affective coding. Those evaluative affective states would also saturate and normatively condition representation and figuration, of course;

somatically speaking “representation,” “figuration,” and “code” are not so much cuts the group makes in the affective flows, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, as they are bodily-becoming-mental mappings of affective channels of social organization and circulation—homeostatic attempts to understand and regulate those flows whose relation to the flows is iterative rather than scissive.

If on the other hand the “code” of affective value-coding is thematized as a clearly bounded discursive structure, with spatial boundaries that separate it from economic value-coding and temporal boundaries that separate it from pre-affective/pre-coding regimes (or perhaps pre-regimes?) of representation or figuration, then affect = discourse is not a trope at all but a simple post-linguistic ontology.

For a reading of Nietzsche on the “somatic codes” developed for the comparative corporeal-becoming-affective calculations of guilt and debt, see my *Ecologies of Translation* (§4.3).

28. See also Shetty’s passing remarks on Spivak’s reading of “Douloti the Bountiful” (71) as a counterpoint to her discussion of motherhood as an “allegorical seme” in Mahasweta’s “Stanadayini” 67–73, and Judith Butler’s reading of Spivak on Devi in *Undoing Gender* 229–30. That book concludes with an essay whose title seems to promise a philosophical rethinking of Spivak’s essay—“Can the ‘Other’ of Philosophy Speak?”—but it is an autobiographical reflection on Butler’s own theoretical speaking from outside philosophy, and does not even mention Spivak.

THIRD ESSAY

1. And, strikingly, Cathy Caruth is as unable to theorize the intergenerational transmission of trauma as Freud is, despite the fact that *Moses and Monotheism* is the central text in *Unclaimed Experience*, a text to which she devotes fully two of her chapters, chapters 1 and 3. She does not seem to be aware of Freud’s roots in this area (as in so many others) in Nietzsche. See also notes 21, 26, and especially 28.

2. For discussions of Nietzsche’s protosomatic theory, see §4.3 in my *Ecologies of Translation* and §2.1 in the current volume; for Schore’s protosomatic reading of Kohut, see my *Estrangement* 46.

3. Judith A. Antell seems to be arguing for some such ceremonial transformation in the novel, but her description remains vague:

Like the writings of Momaday, Welch’s novel is best understood in the context of the dream/vision ritual structure of plains tribal life. Welch, like Momaday, uses correct ritual sequencing of events rather than the chronological lines of organizational life. It is this structure of Welch’s novel which holds the major clue to its function as a tribal document (Allen, 1986:9386). *The Death of Jim Loney* is ritualistic in approach, structure, theme, symbol, and significance, and in order for Jim to confront and resolve the bicultural and colonial problems to which he is exposed, he must participate in the ritual tradition—a tradition that affirms the power of the female. For Jim Loney, as for Abel and Tayo, the solution to male alienation is personal integration through insight and action, and the ritual for Jim, as for Abel, leads him to the decision to arrange his own death. (219)

What “personal integration”? What “insight”? The power of what female? Antell isn’t say-

ing. But perhaps she means something like “in order for Jim to confront and resolve the bicultural and colonial problems to which he is exposed, he *would have* to participate in the ritual tradition—a tradition that affirms the power of the female—but *he can't*”? Perhaps she's setting up this ritual tradition grounded in the power of the female as the impossible goal that Loney finds himself unable to reach? Not really: “So, while on the surface the novels of Momaday, Welch, and Silko appear to be stories of alienated Indian men, they are really much more the stories of female power as acknowledged through ritual and ceremony” (219–20). In the case of *The Death of Jim Loney*, at least, this strikes me as wishful thinking.

4. Lemberg here quotes from the *Critical Inquiry* article version of LaCapra's chapter in *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, “Trauma, Absence, Loss” 716. We will be returning to LaCapra's trauma theory in §3.2.4.

5. Stromberg, it seems to me, seriously overstates his case. He argues, for example, that the reading offered by Sands, Allen, and Purdy, to the effect that Loney dies a warrior's death of his own choosing, “reveals a critical paradox: Loney, who declares he does not feel Indian and who spends much of the novel seeking a state of authenticity, is read as the novel's representation of authentic Indian identity” (38). But of course they only argue that he *becomes* something like a “representation of authentic Indian identity” at the end—that that is the *goal* of his quest, and he reaches it—not that he represents “authentic Indian-ness” all the way through. He also insists on reading Loney's wish to belong to *some* community, white or Indian (Welch 14), as an “imperative of purity that is part of a process of ‘othering’ which has no room for overlap or admixture. Loney's desire to be wholly Indian or wholly white is not a natural response to a genetic condition but is an internalization of a powerful cultural logic” (39)—and in order to make this case utterly ignores Welch's recontextualization of this moment later in the novel when the narrator remarks that Rhea “had said he was lucky to have two sets of ancestors. In truth he had none” (102).

6. For example:

He was restless. He had been thinking of his life for a month. He had tried to think of all the little things that added up to a man sitting at a table drinking wine. But he couldn't connect the different parts of his life, or the various people who had entered and left it. Sometimes he felt like an amnesiac searching for the one event, the one person or moment, that would bring everything back and he would see the order in his life. But without the amnesiac's clean slate, all the people and events were as hopelessly tangled as a bird's nest in his mind, and so for almost a month he had been sitting at his table, drinking wine, and saying to himself, “Okay, from this very moment I will start back—I will think of yesterday, last week, last year, until all my years are accounted for. Then I will look ahead and know where I'm going.” But the days piled up faster than the years receded and he grew restless and despondent. But he would not concede that his life had added up to nothing more than the simple reality of a man sitting and drinking in a small house in the world (20–21).

He thought of his earlier attempts to create a past, a background, an ancestry—something that would tell him who he was. Now he wondered if he had really tried. (88)

7. A very short list of Morrison's critics who have addressed these issues would include Boudreau, Caesar, Cooley, Coykendall, Davis, Ferguson, Finney, Fitzgerald, Fritz, Handley,

Henderson, Horvitz, House, Jablon, Kelly, Krumholz, Lawrence, Mathieson, Mohanty, Osagie, Phelan, Powell, Rody, Rushdy, Schapiro, Vickroy, and Wyatt.

8. “If PTSD must be understood as a pathological symptom,” Caruth writes in her introduction to *Trauma*, “then it is not so much a symptom of the unconscious, as it is a symptom of history. The traumatized, we might say, carry an impossible history within them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess” (5). Without somatic theory, of course, Caruth is unable to bridge the binary between “the unconscious” and “history,” but she is on the right track: if “history” is the ideosomatization of experience, the organization of collective experience via the circulation of shared affect through the group, then traumatic history does indeed endosomatize individuals as its symptoms. In *Unclaimed Experience*, the 1996 book-length study that incorporates her 1991 essay by that title as its first chapter (on Freud, her central theoretical interest, especially his theorization of individual trauma in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and historical trauma in *Moses and Monotheism*), her concern is primarily with history as the painful verbal repetitions of traumatic experience that was not understood when it was first encountered: “In trauma, that is, the outside has gone inside without any mediation” (59). This becomes a model not only for historiography but for the history of psychoanalysis as well:

Freud suggests that psychoanalysis, if it lives on, will live on not as the straightforward life of a known and understood theory, but as the endless survival of what has not been fully understood. If psychoanalysis is to be continued in its tradition, it is paradoxically in what has not yet been fully grasped in its survival that its truest relation to its insight must be found. I would suggest that trauma theory is one of the areas today in which this survival is precisely taking place, not only in the assuredness of its transformation and appropriation by psychiatry but in the creative uncertainties of this theory that remain, for psychiatry *and* psychoanalysis, in the enigma of trauma as both destruction *and* survival, an enigma that lies at the very heart of the Freudian insight itself. (72)

In her theorization of “historical trauma” (67–72), based on a close reading of *Moses and Monotheism*, Caruth does not problematize the question of the *intergenerational transmission* of trauma; she writes about historical trauma as if the survival of a traumatized/traumatizing paleoregulatory regime from generation to generation in the life of a culture were no more mysterious (but also no less) than the survival of PTSD symptomatology in the life of a traumatized individual: “The history of chosenness, as the history of survival, thus takes the form of an unending confrontation with the returning violence of the past” (69). Implicit in that rather sketchy formulation is the notion that “the history of chosenness” is an overt (verbalized) paleoregulatory regime that both expresses and carries (endosomatizes) the covert (nonverbalized, repressed, unconscious) “unending confrontation with the returning violence of the past.”

9. LaCapra also mentions in passing that fiction seems to be much better suited to the study of historical trauma than history, because it can generate “a plausible ‘feel’ for experience and emotion which may be difficult to arrive at through restricted documentary methods. One might, for example, make such a case for Toni Morrison’s *Beloved* with respect to the aftermath of slavery and the role of transgenerational, phantomlike forces that haunt later generations” (13–14). He does not notice the excluded middle that *Beloved* seems to insert into his acting-out/working-through binary.