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Displacement and the Somatics of Postcolonial Culture

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Displacement of Cultures/ (De)Colonization/ Ideosomatic Counterregulation

TO THE EXTENT that postcolonial studies may be said to have a “center” or “core,” this is it: the study of colonization and decolonization. By comparison, refugee studies is marginal, centrifugal, ancillary, supplementary, shunted out of the realm of the paradigmatic colonial encounter into the borderlands or hinterlands of postcoloniality, and therefore far more attractive to poststructuralist migrancy theorists: refugees, as I noted in the preface, can be driven out of their homes and homelands not only by colonial and postcolonial forces like wars of liberation and ethnic cleansing but also by natural disasters, which may only occasionally and only by a stretch of the imagination be blamed on the colonial encounter. And intergenerational trauma studies is more marginal still, which is why I defer it till the Third Essay. The center of the field, and the center of this book, is the cultural displacement—or what I call the ideosomatic counterregulation—of the native by the colonizer, followed by the dream, or the myth, conditioned by the original colonial counterregulation, of the cultural displacement of the colonized by the decolonizer.

By the same token, of course, I risk boring you by treading well-worn ground. If discussions of C. L. R. James, Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak are virtually obligatory in a study of postcoloniality, that expectation alone might potentially make this entire essay stale goods, banal, trite. The fact that Bhabha and Spivak broke new ground in the

field by theorizing postcolonial affect obviously makes them important focal points in a somatic study of postcoloniality; but their pioneering efforts along these lines were noticed back in 1998 by Elizabeth Jane Bellamy. And if those efforts have largely been forgotten and ignored in the decade and a half since, is that perhaps a sign that no one really wants to be bothered with such matters anymore?

My pressing concerns throughout this Second Essay, and thus the grounds for my insistence that these iconic thinkers are worth another look, lie somewhere in the excluded and vacated middle between postmodern/poststructuralist discursivism and Marxist/(inter)nationalist activism. Not only can a more theoretically complex new look at postcolonial affect turn Bhabha's and Spivak's early (and rather tentative) interventions into a methodological platform for mediations between the opposing camps that still divide the field; I believe that somatic readings of James on violence and Nietzschean slave morality, Memmi on the failures of decolonization, and Fanon on the social construction of race can help us radically rethink some key issues in postcolonial studies.

In §2.1.3 I will be reading Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, which he describes as an empirical study, "a clinical study": "The attitudes that I propose to describe are real. I have encountered them innumerable times" (12). He also, at least at the outset, explicitly situates his empiricism in terms of his own experience: "Since I was born in the Antilles, my observations and my conclusions are valid only for the Antilles—at least concerning the black man *at home*. Another book could be dedicated to explaining the differences that separate the Negro of the Antilles from the Negro of Africa" (14, emphasis in original). Of course he can't help himself; once he gets going he begins generalizing freely about "the Negro," theorizing "the black man," and freely admitting that objections to such generalizations are valid and apply to him as well: "In the beginning I wanted to confine myself to the Antilles. But, regardless of consequences, dialectic took the upper hand and I was compelled to *see* that the Antillean is first of all a Negro" (172–73, emphasis in original). Here in the Second Essay I'm going to try to stretch myself, to mix a metaphor, across the horns of the same dialectic: to treat three exemplary early analyses of (de)colonization both as empirical case studies, limited to specific (post) colonial experiences—James on Haiti, Memmi on the Maghreb, and Fanon on the Antilles—and as exemplary theorizations of (de)colonizing ideosomatic counterregulation that are generally applicable to "postcolonial culture." What I gain from this double vision is economy: it allows me to use James, Memmi, and Fanon to set up a series of sample somatic theorizations of (de)colonization without having to (pretend to) cover the whole field.

I'll also be bringing other, more theoretical perspectives to bear on each exemplary postcolonial critic in the first three sections: Friedrich Nietzsche on James, Arif Dirlik on Memmi, Hélène Cixous and Robert Young on Fanon. In §2.1.3.3 I'll also be reading the 2004 UNICEF-sponsored Spanish short *Binta y la gran idea* as a neocolonizing representation of decolonizing counterregulation; and in §2.2.2.4, after my somatic exfoliations of Bhabha and Spivak on postcolonial affect, I conclude with a look at Spivak's reading of "Douloti the Bountiful" by Mahasweta Devi.

2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES

2.1.1 C. L. R. James

The difficulty was that though one could trap them like animals, transport them in pens, work them alongside an ass or a horse and beat both with the same stick, stable them and starve them, they remained, despite their black skins and curly hair, quite invincibly human beings; with the intelligence and resentments of human beings. To cow them into the necessary docility and acceptance necessitated a régime of calculated brutality and terrorism, and it is this that explains the unusual spectacle of property-owners apparently careless of preserving their property: they had first to ensure their own safety.

These slaves were being used for the opening up of new lands. There was no time to allow for the period of acclimatization, known as the seasoning, and they died like flies. From the earliest days of the colony towards the middle of the eighteenth century, there had been some improvement in the treatment of the slaves, but this enormous number of newcomers who had to be broken and terrorized into labour and submission caused an increase in fear and adversity.

—C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (11, 56)

C. L. R. James was born in 1901 in the British Crown colony of Trinidad, attended the Queen's Royal College in Port of Spain, and upon graduation taught school for six years (one of his students was the young Eric Williams, Trinidad and Tobago's first prime minister and "Father of the Nation"), during which time he also wrote cricket journalism, short stories, and a novel (*Minty Alley*, not published until 1936). He also got involved with the *Beacon* anticolonialist group and began to write books (*The Life of Captain Cipriani: An Account of the British Government in the West Indies*, 1932) and pamphlets (*The Case for West-Indian Self Government*, 1933) against colonialism.

In 1932 he moved to England, where he expanded his involvement in the West Indian independence movement to pan-African agitation, becoming chair of the International African Friends of Abyssinia; along with his childhood friend George Padmore he also became an influential member of the International African Service Bureau, through which he met later Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah, of whom he would later write *Kwame Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution* (1977). During these years in England he also spent time in France researching his history of the 1791 Haitian revolution, *The Black Jacobins* (1938), which remains his best-known book today; the research also inspired a play, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, which was produced in the West End in 1936, starring Paul Robeson.

In England James also joined the Trotskyist movement and published three books of Marxist theory, and when he moved to the United States in 1938, he visited Lev Trotsky in exile in Mexico, went on a speaking tour to promote the movement, and engaged in a series of published dialogues with Trotsky himself. He also became very active in Marxist politics, first in the Socialist Workers' Party, then helping found the Workers' Party (WP), where he (cadre name "J. R. Johnson") and Trotsky's former secretary Raya Dunayevskaya (cadre name "Freddie Forrest") formed the Johnson-Forrest (JF) Tendency. Dunayevskaya, the founder of what was then called Marxist Humanism and later became known as the "New Left," was doing the first English translation of Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (one of the foundations of Marxist Humanism), and she and James cotranslated the "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole." In 1939 James followed Dunayevskaya in splitting with Trotsky over the nature of the Soviet Union: where Trotsky saw it as a degenerated workers' state, and the WP saw it as bureaucratic-collectivist, the JF Tendency saw it as state-capitalist and disinclined to support the liberation movements of oppressed minorities. In 1952 James was detained by the U.S. government for overstaying his visa by ten years, and, while waiting on Ellis Island to be deported, wrote a study of Melville entitled *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In*, had it privately published, and sent a copy to every member of the U.S. Senate, hoping (in vain) to convince them to let him stay.

After a few years in England, he returned in 1958 to Trinidad, where his old student Dr. Eric Williams offered him the job of editing *The Nation* for the pro-independence People's National Movement; his advocacy of a West Indies Federation led to a falling-out with Williams and resignation of the editorship, however, and he spent the remaining years of his life in the U.S., where he

taught at Federal City College (1968–80), and England, where he died in 1989. His best-known book from this period is *Beyond a Boundary* (1963), a kind of cricket memoir that is also a study of decolonization.

Most of my remarks, however, will be devoted to a reading of James's early history of the Haitian Revolution, *The Black Jacobins*, from which my epigraphs are taken. In an era of colonial discourse analysis, it is worth remembering that people were physically and culturally displaced in the colonial context not only with discourse, but also with brute physical force. Of course brute physical force too can be troped as discourse, especially, perhaps, coming out of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* by way of Kafka's "In the Penal Colony," as the "inscription on bodies" of discipline and punishment. Since in Kafka's story the actual punitive speech acts of the judges are etched on the skins of the convicts,¹ it is possible to *think* of what James calls the "régime of calculated brutality and terrorism" that the French colonizers of Saint-Domingue (renamed Haiti in 1804²) launched against their slaves in order to "cow them into the necessary docility and acceptance" as essentially a discursive regime. And this is a useful trope: it helps us think about physical pain more complexly than simply as an overwhelming bodily experience that shuts down thought. But it is also important not to naturalize this trope as reality—not to let it iterosomatically shut down thought about the bodily experience that in turn shuts down thought.

It's ironic, in fact, that poststructuralist theorists, whose intellectual tradition was powerfully shaped by Friedrich Nietzsche, should be so eager to iterosomatize physical pain as a discursive formation. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, after all, Foucault's direct model for *Discipline and Punish*, Nietzsche specifically theorized physical pain as the primary "mnemotechnic" channel of "civilizing" discipline:

"How does one create a memory for the human animal? How does one go about to impress anything on that partly dull, partly flighty human intelligence—that incarnation of forgetfulness—so as to make it stick?" As we might well imagine, the means used in solving this age-old problem have been far from delicate: in fact, there is perhaps nothing more terrible in man's earliest history than his mnemotechnics. "A thing is branded on the memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick"—this is one of the oldest and, unfortunately, one of the most enduring psychological axioms. In fact, one might say that wherever on earth one still finds solemnity, gravity, secrecy, somber hues in the life of an individual or a nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must formerly have promised, pledged, vouched. It is the past—the longest, deep-

est, hardest of pasts—that seems to surge up whenever we turn serious. Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, his effort has been attended with torture, blood sacrifice. The ghastliest sacrifices and pledges, including the sacrifice of the first-born; the most repulsive mutilations, such as castration; the cruelest rituals in every religious cult (and all religions are at bottom systems of cruelty)—all these have their origin in that instinct which divined pain to be the strongest aid to mnemonics. (II:3, 192–93)

This is not a discursive theory. Physical pain here is not “inscribed” on the body in signs or symbols—though of course it can be metaphorically retheorized along those lines. What Nietzsche offers us in the Second Essay of the *Genealogy* is a protoneurological³ theory of the counterregulatory effect pain has on the human nervous system. He has just postulated in the human animal a “faculty of oblivion,” “an active screening device, responsible for the fact that what we experience and digest psychologically does not, in the stage of digestion, emerge into consciousness any more than what we ingest physically does” (II:1, 189). This faculty of oblivion, precursor of Freud’s unconscious, has for Nietzsche a specifically homeostatic neurophysiological function: “to shut temporarily the doors and windows of consciousness; to protect us from the noise and agitation with which our lower organs work for or against one another; to introduce a little quiet into our consciousness so as to make room for the nobler functions and functionaries of our organism which do the governing and planning” (II:1, 189). “There can,” Nietzsche insists, “be no happiness, no serenity, no hope, no pride, no *present*, without oblivion. A man in whom this screen is damaged and inoperative is like a dyspeptic (and not merely *like* one): he can’t be done with anything . . .” (II:1, 189). Nietzsche, himself a dyspeptic whose gastrointestinal disorders frequently shut down his ability to think,⁴ positively *longs* for the homeostatic screen that would protect him from the “noise and agitation with which our lower organs work for or against one another.”

And yet, he says, that faculty of oblivion also tends to block our ability to make and keep promises, and thus to retard the civilizing process—and pain, he says, especially brutal punitive pain, has been our regime for remembering, for imposing a memory on a “naturally forgetful” nervous system:

Now this naturally forgetful animal, for whom oblivion represents a power, a form of strong health, has created for himself an opposite power, that of remembering, by whose aid, in certain cases, oblivion may be suspended—specifically in cases where it is a question of promises. By this I do not

mean a purely passive succumbing to past impressions, the indigestion of being unable to be done with a pledge once made, but rather an active not wishing to be done with it, a continuing to will what has once been willed, a veritable “memory of the will”; so that, between the original determination and the actual performance of the thing willed, a whole world of new things, conditions, even volitional acts, can be interposed without snapping the long chain of the will. But how much all this presupposes! A man who wishes to dispose of his future in this manner must first have learned to separate necessary from accidental acts; to think causally; to see distant things as though they were near at hand; to distinguish means from ends. In short, he must have become not only calculating but himself calculable [*berechenbar*], regular even to his own perception, if he is to stand pledge for his own future as a guarantor does. (II:1, 189–90)

This is as good an encapsulation of the European counterregulatory colonizing ideal as we have: to take the “naturally forgetful animal” of Africa or Asia or the Americas and force him or her through physical pain and other disciplinary regimes (education, religion, law) to remember, to “continue to will what has once been willed,” to “become not only calculating but himself calculable.” By creating a “muscle memory” or somatic marker, disciplinary pain goes on hurting after the whipping or the torture has physically ended, and so becomes the internalized agent of the colonizer’s discipline (“only what goes on hurting will stick”), the exosomatized calculus or *Rechenstein* (lit. calculating stone) inside the colonized’s organism that makes him or her calculable. In this sense disciplinary pain is simply an intense channel of social disapproval—or else the body language of disapproval is simply a milder channel of disciplinary pain. Pain is used to establish in the individual the authority of the group; once that authority has been established, the somatomimetic circulation of body language and body states through the somatic exchange will ideally suffice to stabilize social regulation. It may also not suffice, of course, leading to idiosomatic deregulation and either ostracism, if the idiosomatic deregulators are in a small enough minority or, if they become a strong enough power within the group, counterregulatory revolt.

Of course Nietzsche is specifically interested in how “we”—“Westerners” from the ancient Greeks and Hebrews to the Germans—have civilized “ourselves,” but parallel quotations from his Second Essay and the opening pages of *The Black Jacobins* make it clear that colonization entailed the exportation of exosomatized European self-torture to the “primitives” that Europeans found abroad:

It needs only a glance at our ancient penal codes to impress on us what labor it takes to create a nation of thinkers. . . . Germans have resorted to ghastly means in order to triumph over their plebeian instincts and brutal coarseness. We need only recount some of our ancient forms of punishment: stoning (even in earliest legend millstones are dropped on the heads of culprits); breaking on the wheel (Germany's own contribution to the techniques of punishment); piercing with stakes, drawing and quartering, trampling to death with horses, boiling in oil or wine (these were still in use in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the popular flaying alive, cutting out of flesh from the chest, smearing the victim with honey and leaving him in the sun, a prey to flies. By such methods the individual was finally taught to remember five or six "I won'ts" which entitled him to participate in the benefits of society; and indeed, with the aid of this sort of memory, people eventually "came to their senses." What an enormous price man had to pay for reason, seriousness, control over his emotions—those grand human prerogatives and cultural showpieces! How much blood and horror lies behind all "good things"! (Nietzsche II:3, 193–94)

But there was no ingenuity that fear or a depraved imagination could devise which was not employed to break their [the African slaves'] spirit and satisfy the lusts and resentment of their owners and guardians—irons on the hands and feet, blocks of wood that the slaves had to drag behind them wherever they went, the tin-plate mask designed to prevent the slaves eating the sugar-cane, the iron collar. Whipping was interrupted in order to pass a piece of hot wood on the buttocks of the victim; salt, pepper, citron, cinders, aloes, and hot ashes were poured on the bleeding wounds. Mutilations were common, limbs, ears, and sometimes the private parts, to deprive them of the pleasures which they could indulge in without expense. Their masters poured burning wax on their arms and hands and shoulders, emptied the boiling cane sugar over their heads, burned them alive, roasted them on slow fires, filled them with gunpowder and blew them up with a match; buried them up to the neck and smeared their heads with sugar that the flies might devour them; fastened them near to nests of ants or wasps; made them eat their excrement, drink their urine, and lick the saliva of other slaves. One colonist was known in moments of anger to throw himself on his slaves and stick his teeth into their flesh. (James, *Black Jacobins* 12–13)

The only real difference between these "ancient" German tortures, found in Germany as "recently" as the fifteenth century, and the more "modern"

colonialist tortures found in Haiti and other slave-owning colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is that Nietzsche and James—both of them products of such “civilizing” regimes, centuries later—attribute different motivations to them. For Nietzsche, they are intended to teach the individual “to remember five or six ‘I won’ts’ which entitled him to participate in the benefits of society”; for James they are motivated by fear and “a depraved imagination,” by “the lusts and resentment of [the slaves’] owners and guardians.” Also, of course, the German victims of this regime “come to their senses”: the result in the individual is “reason, seriousness, control over his emotions.” James writes that “the majority of the slaves accommodated themselves to this unceasing brutality by a profound fatalism and a wooden stupidity before their masters” (15).

This difference is partly due to the different time scales in Nietzsche and James: Nietzsche is looking back on the millennia of Western civilization leading up to his own time, while James (at this point in his book) is looking at the early weeks and months of enslavement, perhaps at most years, the “seasoning” of slaves. At a deeper level, though, it is also conditioned by the difference that Nietzsche is interested in the Western civilization of other Westerners, the German civilization of other Germans, while James is studying the French “civilization”—the breaking, cowing, and terrorizing—of African slaves, who are not so much fellow humans to be civilized as they are dangerous chattel, animal enough to be chattel and human enough to be dangerous. But then Nietzsche does not entirely ignore the colonial applications of his genealogy:

By way of comfort to the milksops, I would also venture the suggestion that in those days pain did not hurt as much as it does today; at all events, such is the opinion of a doctor who has treated Negroes for complicated internal inflammations which would have driven the most stoical European to distraction—the assumption being that the negro represents an earlier phase of human development. (It appears, in fact, that the curve of human susceptibility to pain drops abruptly the moment we go below the top layer of culture comprising ten thousand or ten million individuals. For my part, I am convinced that, compared with one night’s pain endured by a hysterical bluestocking, all the suffering of all the animals that have been used for scientific experiments is as nothing.) (II:7, 199–200)

Nietzsche’s genealogical argument seems essentializing here—with “animals” and “Negroes” not only culturally but also physiologically early and low and Europeans culturally and physiologically late and high, and with educated liberal European women even later and higher on the genealogical hierar-

chy of civilization than European men, indeed absurdly so—but his apparent essentialism is in fact a mapping of what he is theorizing as the counter-regulatory *transformation* of physiology over the last thousand years or so. It's not just that Europeans today (and especially “hysterical bluestockings”) are more susceptible to pain than Europeans were seven or eight centuries ago, or than dark-skinned people are today; it's that people whose ancestors were brutalized for centuries are more susceptible to pain than people whose ancestry is relatively new to the brutality of the “civilizing” process. Pain has a kind of intergenerationally cumulative effect, Nietzsche is suggesting, so that the more “civilized” we become, the less pain is needed to regulate us: the tiniest twinge or threat of pain and we yield, we conform. “Perhaps,” he writes, “it is even legitimate to allow the possibility that pleasure in cruelty is not really extinct today; only, given our greater delicacy, that pleasure has had to undergo a certain sublimation and subtilization, to be translated into imaginative and psychological terms in order to pass muster before even the tenderest hypocritical conscience” (II:7, 200). Racist and sexist as Nietzsche's genealogical hierarchy here unquestionably is, therefore, it is a constructivist rather than an essentialist form of racism and sexism: what would make “hysterical bluestockings” more susceptible to pain and “Negroes” less would not be any kind of innate physiological difference but the relative duration in the two groups of the intergenerational transmission of punitive pain-based ideosomatic counterregulation.

The two constructions of the motivations behind that counterregulation—Nietzsche's that it was designed, however horrifically, to civilize its targets, and James's that it was a repressive reaction-formation born out of the Haitian colonizers' fear, resentment, lust, and depravity—also represent two radically opposed constructions of the colonizing ideosomatic exchange. At one end, Nietzsche's internalization of mastery, it seems that the group imposes a painful counterregulatory regime on its members in order to discipline them to conformity, to make them iterosomatize punitive pain as introjected master(y), “self-mastery” as submission to group normativity. At the other end, James's description of the “seasoning” of slaves, it seems that the group is defined in terms of the circulation of potentially dysregulatory feelings—that everyone, slave-owner and slave alike, feels at least fear and resentment, that the slaves are afraid of the slave-owners' resentment and the slave-owners are afraid of the slaves' resentment—and that each side harbors and sooner or later expresses violent impulses as an outward *channel* for those feelings. In this latter construction the somatic exchange serves no “civilizing” function at all: it may be designed to terrorize the slaves into docility and submission, but it becomes instead a kind of ideosomatic pressure-cooker for fear, resentment,

and brutal reaction. The “cultural” legacy of that pressure-cooker in Haiti, of course, can still be all too viscerally felt two centuries later in (§1.2) the work of Edwidge Danticat.

From Nietzsche’s point of view, James’s construction of the colonial somatic exchange would have to be seen as still circulating that same fear, that same resentment, and thus as a textbook case of what he calls “slave morality”:

The slave revolt in morals begins by rancor turning creative and giving birth to values—the rancor of beings who, deprived of the direct outlet of action, compensate by an imaginary vengeance. All truly noble morality grows out of triumphant self-affirmation. Slave ethics, on the other hand, begins by saying *no* to an “outside,” an “other,” a non-self, and that *no* is its creative act. This reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invariable looking outward instead of inward, is a fundamental feature of rancor. Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own. Physiologically speaking, it requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction. The opposite is true of aristocratic valuations: such values grow and act spontaneously, seeking out their contraries only in order to affirm themselves even more gratefully and delightedly. . . .

All this stands in utter contrast to what is called happiness among the impotent and oppressed, who are full of bottled-up aggressions. Their happiness is purely passive and takes the form of drugged tranquility, stretching and yawning, peace, “Sabbath,” emotional slackness. Whereas the noble lives before his own conscience with confidence and frankness (*genmaios* “nobly bred” emphasizes the nuance “truth” and perhaps also “ingenuous”), the rancorous person is neither truthful nor ingenuous nor honest and forthright with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves hide-outs, secret paths, and back doors; everything that is hidden seems to him his own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in silence, in long memory, in waiting, in provisional self-depreciation, and in self-humiliation. (I:10, 170–72)

One obvious question to ask Nietzsche here is where his own rancor at “slave morality” comes from—why he seems to be *accusing* slaves and their descendants of compensating by imaginary vengeance, saying *no* to an outside Other, or, “full of bottled-up aggressions,” finding happiness in doing nothing, as if all that were somehow a base and shameful response to enslavement. The obvious answer is that the morality he is most interested in demystifying as slave morality is that of his own now powerful group, that of Western philosophers (Socrates, Mark Migotti argues, is for Nietzsche the first “Thersites of

genius” (758) who shames the nobles with his slave morality), of Christians, of German Lutherans—and he is the son of a Lutheran pastor. His romanticized conception of “noble morality” as “grow[ing] out of triumphant self-affirmation,” then, would be his projection of a utopian ideal into the past and present as a kind of hopeful prefiguration of his own future freedom from his own slave rancor against the old slaves become new masters, the ascetic priests among both the Jews and the Christians.

Despite his aggressive dysphemizing of slaves and euphemizing of their masters, however, Nietzsche’s analysis of slave morality is acute, and anticipates much colonial discourse analysis of the decolonization process⁵—which in fact suggests, as I’ll be arguing in §2.1.2.2, that decolonization is not the reversal but rather the next stage of colonization. The image of “rancor turning creative and giving birth to values” explains not only Christianity but also the politically volatile value systems of many former colonies today, always ready to “compensate by an imaginary vengeance” or, in ethnic cleansing and other forms of seemingly excessive violence, actual vengeance for imaginary (transferential) crimes. His notion that slave morality says “*no* to an ‘outside,’ an ‘other,’ a non-self, and that *no* is its creative act,” that “slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own,” feeds Freud’s conception of negation, which has been extraordinarily influential in the shaping of our understanding of colonial and postcolonial discourse. His suggestion that slave morality or decolonization is grounded at base in the “reversal of direction of the evaluating look” anticipates not only the contemporary understanding that decolonization involves the reversal of the energies of colonization but also the somatic notion that body language, or rather the transformative circulation of body states through somatic mimeses of body language, is the primary channel of social regulation. Nietzsche’s notion that slave morality survives as body-becoming-mind (susceptibility to pain creatively mapped as a value system) in cultures that have not been enslaved for centuries also introduces, under the rubric of “genealogy,” the concept of the intergenerational somatic transmission of trauma, to which we will be returning in the Third Essay. And the last lines in that quotation clearly adumbrate early analyses of the impact of colonization on the colonized by Albert Memmi in *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (§2.1.2) and Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (§2.1.3): “the rancorous person is neither truthful nor ingenuous nor honest and forthright with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves hide-outs, secret paths, and back doors; everything that is hidden seems to him his own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in silence, in long memory, in waiting, in provisional self-depreciation, and in self-humiliation.”

Again, in *The Black Jacobins* James describes only the initial stages of this reversal:

The slaves destroyed tirelessly. Like the peasants in the Jacquerie or the Luddite wreckers, they were seeking their salvation in the most obvious way, the destruction of what they knew was the cause of their sufferings; and if they destroyed much it was because they had suffered much. They knew that as long as these plantations stood their lot would be to labour on them until they dropped. The only thing was to destroy them. From their masters they had known rape, torture, degradation, and, at the slightest provocation, death. They returned in kind. For two centuries the higher civilization [what Nietzsche would call “noble morality”] had shown them that power was used for wreaking your will on those whom you controlled. Now that they held power they did as they had been taught. In the frenzy of the first encounters they killed all, yet they spared the priests whom they feared and the surgeons who had been kind to them. They, whose women had undergone countless violations, violated all the women who fell into their hands, often on the bodies of their still bleeding husbands, fathers and brothers. “Vengeance! Vengeance!” was their war-cry, and one of them carried a white child on a pike as a standard. (88)

For James, clearly, this is “compensation,” but not quite as “imaginary vengeance”: they were returning violation for violation, torture for torture, death for death. In a sense, though, there was an imaginary component to their vengeance as well: no white woman they raped had ever raped a black woman, rendering vengeance-rapes the infliction of compensatory violence on symbolic or imaginary targets. Of course the white wives and daughters of plantation owners had enjoyed the fruits of their husbands’ and fathers’ exploitations of slaves, and were therefore complicit in the colonial system for the degradation of human beings; but this too is a symbolic or imaginary complicity.

In his next paragraph, however, James does begin to convert his justified rancor into a value system, into what Nietzsche calls slave morality:

And yet they were surprisingly moderate [he adds in a footnote: “This statement has been criticized. I stand by it”], then and afterwards, far more humane than their masters had been or would ever be to them. They did not maintain this revengeful spirit for long. The cruelties of property and privilege are always more ferocious than the revenges of poverty and oppression. For the one aims at perpetuating resented injustice, the other is merely a momentary passion soon appeased. As the revolution gained

territory they spared many of the men, women, and children whom they surprised on plantations. To prisoners of war alone they remained merciless. They tore out their flesh with red-hot pincers, they roasted them on slow fires, they sawed a carpenter between two of his boards. Yet in all the records of that time there is no single instance of such fiendish tortures as burying white men up to the neck and smearing the holes in their faces to attract insects, or blowing them up with gun-powder, or any of the thousand and one bestialities to which they had been subjected. Compared with what their masters had done to them in cold blood, what they did was negligible, and they were spurred on by the ferocity with which the whites in Le Cap treated all slave prisoners who fell into their hands. (88–89)

The rebelling slaves were more “humane” than their “bestial” masters: this is the reversal of the evaluating look of which Nietzsche wrote, the transvaluation of value that seizes the moral high ground out of the ashes of the master’s one-time vaunted superiority, now “revealed” (reconstructed) as criminal and subhuman. “The cruelties of property and privilege are always more ferocious than the revenges of poverty and oppression. For the one aims at perpetuating resented injustice, the other is merely a momentary passion soon appeased.” This, it should be clear, is not simply journalistic reportage; it is a new morality, a decolonizing morality that justifies the excessive violence of rebelling slaves as “a momentary passion”—an understandable lapse from their true inner moral superiority—and condemns the excessive violence of the masters as systemic injustice.

Of course, this is not to join Nietzsche in condemning slave morality; it is rather to apply his analysis of slave morality without the condemnation. Indeed the classic analyses of the social psychology of the formerly colonized are quintessentially attempts to understand the dysregulatory impulses in decolonizing cultures in the specific explanatory context of the colonizations that conditioned those dysregulations, and thus in a very real sense to extend and consolidate Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of slave morality, to explain the persistence of slave morality in a decolonizing context genealogically, as something *produced*—and intergenerationally reproduced—rather than innate.

As a Marxist, in fact, James does not indulge much in this sort of psychoanalytical or other slave-moralizing of decolonization. His later discussions of decolonization, *Modern Politics* and *Party Politics in the West Indies*, as well as “Black Sansculottes,” his 1964 updating of his history of postcolonial Haiti to Papa Doc Duvalier and the Tonton Macoutes, by and large focus on the political ramifications of economic issues like land reform and the nationalization

of industry. He comes closer to an analysis of what Nietzsche calls slave morality in his 1963 memoir of cricket (and generally the culture of decolonization), *Beyond a Boundary*, or in his 1964 review of Orlando Patterson's Jamaican Rastafari novel *The Children of Sisyphus*:

The Rastafari are one example of the contemporary rejection of the life to which we are all submitted. The Mau-Mau of Kenya do the same. The Black Muslims of the United States are of the same brand. . . .

But Rastafari and Mr Patterson are West Indian. They are both new. Their world is just beginning. They do not suffer from any form of angst. They have no deep-seated consciousness of failure, no fear of defeat. That is not in their history. Mr Patterson does not, cannot, convince the reader that the life he is describing is absurd. Horrible, horrible, most horrible it is. But it is not absurd. The prostitute who tries to lift herself out of the squalor, the filth of the Jungle is consciously impelled by "ambition." The other prostitute whose pathetic destiny equals the horrors of her existence is impelled by her passionate wish to give her daughter a secondary education. The colossal stupidities, the insanities of the Rastafari are consciously motivated by their acute consciousness of the filth in which they live, their conscious refusal to accept the fictions that pour in upon them from every side. It is the determination to get out of it that leads them to their imaginative fantasies of escape to Africa. These passions and forces are the "classic human virtues." As long as they express themselves, the form may be absurd, but the life itself is not absurd. The fate of Rastafari and Mr Patterson himself are very closely linked. And this book is one proof of their common distress and common destiny. (164)

Here, clearly, the genealogical analysis of Nietzsche (and later of Freud and Foucault) is not very hard at work: "They are both new. Their world is just beginning. They do not suffer from any form of angst. They have no deep-seated consciousness of failure, no fear of defeat. That is not in their history." The Rastafari simply *reject* "the life to which we are all submitted," *refuse* "to accept the fictions that pour in upon them from every side." And, to James's mind, fictions are precisely what they are: not the iterosomatic traces of colonialism that are now circulated by their own group and so feel like realities, like human nature; just patent lies and propaganda pouring in upon them from the outside, and so easy to resist. "The colossal stupidities, the insanities of the Rastafari are consciously motivated by their acute consciousness of the filth in which they live," but that filth has no history, no genealogy, certainly no genealogy of the body-becoming-mind, no history of the evaluative look. I

assume that James's denial of the impact of colonial history on Jamaican poverty is ironic, a kind of satirical double-voicing of Rastafari idealism; but the fact that James does not analyze that history, does not genealogize the emergence of "the colossal stupidities, the insanities of the Rastafari" out of the brutalizing experience of colonization and slavery, renders this too a very sketchy critique of decolonizing slave morality. In what ways is Rastafarian religion a counterregulatory *revision* of the "colossal stupidities" and "insanities" of colonial culture? Presumably for the Marxist James one thing that makes the Rastafari movement stupid and insane is that it is a religion; another, perhaps, that it is more a Judeo-Christian "heresy" than an African syncretic religion like vodou or candomblé. But James does not raise these questions; again, he is more interested in the political and economic issues:

But neither the economic masters nor the political inheritors (the coloured middle classes) want to have in their midst anything or anybody disturbing their precarious peace. The freedom which would enable the Rastafari to build their new Jerusalem in Jamaica's green and pleasant land would enable the Pattersons to steel and temper their weapons upon some dark and satanic mills. Their walls may appear to be very solid. But they are no more than the walls of Jericho. They would tumble at the sound of trumpets. But the trumpets must sound in Kingston, in Port of Spain, in Bridgetown and in Georgetown. From London (and in London) they are horns from an elf-land, blowing only faintly. (165)

2.1.2 Albert Memmi

So goes the drama of the man who is a product and victim of colonization. He almost never succeeds in corresponding with himself.

—Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (140)

The decolonized experiences a form of stationary dismemberment, torn and pulled from every side.

—Albert Memmi, *Decolonization and the Decolonized* (57)

Albert Memmi was born to Arabic-speaking Jewish parents in the French colony of Tunisia in 1921, studied philosophy at the University of Algiers and the Sorbonne, and after university took a teaching job back at his old high school in Tunis. In 1953 he published his first novel, *La statue de sel* (*The Pillar of Salt*), a semiautobiographical tale about a young Jew from the Tunis ghetto

who breaks with his family tradition to become an intellectual and a fiction-writer but is paralyzed throughout, like Lot's wife, by his solitude. He was an ardent supporter of the anticolonial liberation movement, but upon independence in 1956 he found himself ostracized from the new nationalistic Muslim society, and moved permanently to France, where he taught high school and eventually, in 1970, accepted a post at the University of Nanterre. His most famous book, *Portrait du colonisé, précédé du Portrait du colonisateur* (*The Colonizer and the Colonized*), was published in 1957, with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre; its sequel, *Portrait du décolonisé* (*Decolonization and the Decolonized*), appeared nearly fifty years later, in 2004, when Memmi was in his early eighties. His other novels include *Agar* (*Strangers*), *Le Scorpion ou la confession imaginaire* (*The Scorpion*), and *Le Désert ou la vie et les aventures de Jubaiür Ouali el Mammi* (*The Desert*); his other nonfiction works include *L'Homme dominé* (*Dominated Man*), *La Dépendance* (*Dependence*), *Le Racisme* (*Racism*), *Le Nomade immobile* ("The Immobile Nomad," not yet translated), and several works on Judaism, *Portrait d'un juif* (*Portrait of a Jew*), *La libération du Juif* (*Liberation of the Jew*), and *Juifs et Arabes* (*Jews and Arabs*).

What I want to do in §2.1.2.1 is to read *The Colonizer and the Colonized* and *Decolonization and the Decolonized* intertextually, beginning with the latter, which blames the patent failure of decolonization almost entirely on the decolonized themselves, on the greed and corruption and violence of their leaders. This constitutes a radical rethinking of *Colonized*, perhaps even a rueful recantation in the light of subsequent history—but also, I want to argue, a forgetting. In §2.1.2.2, then, I will build on a few passing remarks in *Decolonized* and recent work by Arif Dirlik and others to show that what Memmi takes to be the *failure* of decolonization is in fact the *illusion* of decolonization, the hegemonic myth that decolonization as the counterregulatory "reversal" of colonization is a viable project—an illusion that, Dirlik argues persuasively, is actually a phantom projection of colonialism in its ongoing evolution from military and economic occupation into neocolonialist globalization, or what I propose to call the colonialist metanarrative of development. In §2.1.2.3, finally, I will take a look back at Memmi's discussion of "the colonizer who refuses" from *Colonized* as an autocritical perspective on my own project here.

2.1.2.1 THE FAILURE OF DECOLONIZATION

There is a certain cognitive slippage between Memmi's two books on colonization and decolonization that I find particularly telling, as it seems to reflect his confusion about the five-decade persistence of what I would call colonial ideo-

somatic regulation: because he lacks a model that would adequately explain that persistence, it seems to him as if there must be none, as if the belief that decolonization continues to be regulated by (slightly displaced) colonial ideosomatics must be sheer illusion, a flimsy excuse apologists invent to let the young nations off the hook.

For example, he describes the poor blacks' hostility toward the Italian and Korean business owners in their neighborhood in Spike Lee's *Do the Right Thing*, and comments:

My friends asked me why they didn't do what the Asians or Italians did. My pained response was that these immigrant groups obviously help one another. As soon as they arrive in the country, they are taken in by their extended family, assisted by various civic associations. Why don't the blacks have their own associations? The explanation given is that this is contrary to their "mentality," that they dislike associations, and so on. When the questioner insists, the real reason is given: "Because they were slaves!" "But," he responds in astonishment, "that was a long time ago!"

Black Americans are not a decolonized people [why not?⁶], although they have certain traits in common with them, just as they have certain traits in common with the colonized. But their evasive responses are the same. It is the fault of history, it is always the fault of the whites. Dolorism is a natural tendency to exaggerate one's pains and attribute them to another. Like the decolonized, as long as blacks have not freed themselves of dolorism, they will be unable to correctly analyze their condition and act accordingly. (*Decolonized* 18–19)

This is a complaint that he recurs to over and over in the book: "If the decolonized are still not free citizens in a free country, it is because they remain the powerless playthings of some ancient fate. If the economy fails, it's always the fault of the ex-colonizer, not the systematic bloodletting of the economy by the new masters, not the viscosity of their culture, which fails to address its present and the future" (20), and "Apologists go out of their way to learnedly explain that what can be criticized today in Islam are merely the remnants of an anti-Islamic period, overlooking the fact that we might have done away with such remnants since then" (33). Yes, we might have, but that isn't exactly a fact that might be overlooked; it's a potential that hasn't been realized. The interesting question that Memmi wants to address, and can't, is *why* it hasn't been realized. His only hesitant explanation is the greed and the corruption of the leaders of the new nations, but he himself recognizes that these are just more symptoms of the problem, not its cause.

Or again:

Why such continued desperate violence? The embarrassed historians among the formerly colonized have not failed to look for explanations. They claim this is simply a bad habit inherited from the colonial period, an additional wound. They note that there was considerably less of an emotional outpouring when the colonized suffered at the hands of the colonizers. So be it. We try to relieve our sense of guilt any way we can. But now the violence occurs among the formerly colonized, against their own people. In spite of the passage of time, the situation has not only endured, it has gotten worse. (52–53)

It's easy enough to point out that he himself predicted something very like this enduring recourse to violence in his earlier book, a half century before:

Uncertain of himself, he [the ex-colonized] gives in to the intoxication of fury and violence. In fact, he asserts himself vigorously. Uncertain of being able to convince others, he provokes them. Simultaneously provocative and sensitive, he now makes a display of his contrasts, refuses to let himself be forgotten as such, and becomes indignant when they are mentioned. Automatically distrustful, he assumes hostile intentions in those with whom he converses and reacts accordingly. He demands endless approval from his best friends, of even that which he doubts and himself condemns. (*Colonized* 135–36)

It's harder to recognize that Memmi has in both books the conceptual or at least imagistic tools with which to work through this problem to an explanation, but doesn't quite know what to do with them: "Obviously," he sighs in *Decolonized*, "nothing comes of nothing; the actual face of the world's young nations bears the imprint of their colonial past along with their own history" (21). After all his complaining about ex-colonized historians using the colonial legacy as a lame excuse for their country's lack of decolonizing progress, Memmi here (briefly) adopts the same position—but what I'm most interested in there is the facial trope for that lingering legacy. What kind of imprint is left by the colonizer on the colonized's face? If this were James's history of Haitian slavery, it might be a scar left by a whip; but Memmi's own argumentative history suggests that what he means here is the imprint left by somatic mimicry, the assimilative effect empathetic mimicry has on body language, and through body language both outward appearance ("the actual face of the

world's young nations") and inward body states. In *Colonized*, for example, he wrote extensively of the colonized's imperfect but powerfully transformative attempts to assimilate his or her behavior, posture, gestures, accent, and tone of voice to that of the colonizer: "At the height of his revolt, the colonized still bears the traces and lessons of prolonged cohabitation (just as the smile or movements of a wife, even during divorce proceedings, remind one strangely of those of her husband)" (129). Those traces of prolonged cohabitation are not just kinesic but somatic, which is to say, not just outwardly mimetic but inwardly evaluative and thus collectively regulatory, and not just a passing physiological tropism but persistent over time ("still bears the traces"), which is to say, stored as somatic markers.

By the time he comes to write *Decolonized*, however, Memmi has forgotten his earlier protosomatic insistence on this *lasting* mimetic transformation of the colonized: "Like buffalo that follow their leader," he writes, "even when he leads them into a ravine, human animals display a kind of gregarious mimicry" (19); "The presidents of the new republics generally mimic what is most arbitrary about the colonial power" (60). Mimicry is not purposeful, not transformed by or transformative of the (post)colonial encounter; it is "gregarious" and "arbitrary," sheer superficial mammalian behavior (which is not to suggest that mammalian behavior is actually this superficial). In the earlier book the accusation that "the colonized is an ape" is attributed to the colonizer: "The shrewder the ape, the better he imitates, and the more the colonizer becomes irritated" (124). Now, after long somatic training in colonial mimesis and even longer exile in France, Memmi has himself assimilated to the colonizer's irritation, and no longer remembers what he knew in *Colonized*, that somatic mimesis is assimilative, counterregulatory, and that the assimilation is extremely difficult to reverse.

His analysis of the colonial counterregulation in *Colonized* is, in fact, one of the most powerfully insightful sections of the book. I mean the "Mythical portrait of the colonized" and "Situations of the colonized" chapters of Part Two. He begins there by defining the colonizer's "mythical portrait of the colonized" as a "series of negations," a definition that seems to anticipate poststructuralist readings of postcolonial identities as the emptying-out of the plenitude of idealized colonizer identities: "The point is," he writes, "that the colonized means little to the colonizer. Far from wanting to understand him as he really is, the colonizer is preoccupied with making him undergo this urgent change. The mechanism of this remolding of the colonized is revealing in itself. It consists, in the first place, of a series of negations. The colonized is not this, is not that. He is never considered in a positive light; or if he is, the

quality which is conceded is the result of a psychological or ethical failing” (83–84). He seems even more like a protopoststructuralist colonial discourse analyst a couple of pages later: “What is left of the colonized at the end of this stubborn effort to dehumanize him? He is surely no longer an alter ego of the colonizer. He is hardly a human being. He tends rapidly toward becoming an object. As an end, in the colonizer’s supreme ambition, he should exist only as a function of the needs of the colonizer, i.e., be transformed into a pure colonized” (86).

But the abstract differentiability (subalternity) of this image-analysis, the sense in which the dehumanized object-ideal of the “pure colonized” is at once the infinitely deferred cancellation of subjectivity and the iterative negation of the colonizer’s alter ego-ideal, is everywhere in these chapters resaturated with evaluative affect. Even in that first apparently protopoststructuralist formulation above, for example, Memmi tendentiously somatizes his abstract equations with pathos: “means little” and “far from wanting to understand him as he really is” both surge with the hurt anger of the child led to expect love from his or her neglectful parents. Memmi’s depiction of the colonizer’s objectification of the colonized is not so much an analytical proposition as it is a fully embodied speech act, less abstract or discursive than *inflammatory*, intended to incite rebellion against it: the colonizer’s counterregulatory ideal resomatized as the colonized’s revolutionary anti-ideal.

And indeed on the very next page he gives us a powerful account of what I call the somatic exchange, troping it this time not with sight (mimicry) but with hearing (echo), once again suggesting that colonial counterregulation works by being *circulated as evaluative affect* through the colonized:

More surprising, more harmful perhaps, is the echo that it excites in the colonized himself. Constantly confronted with this image of himself, set forth and imposed on all institutions and in every human contact, how could the colonized help reacting to his portrait? It cannot leave him indifferent and remain a veneer which, like an insult, blows with the wind. He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested nickname which has become a familiar description. The accusation disturbs him and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser. “Is he not partially right?” he mutters. “Are we not all a little guilty after all? Lazy, because we have so many idlers? Timid, because we let ourselves be oppressed.” Willfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and degrading portrait ends up by being accepted and lived with to a certain extent by the colonized. It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the true portrait of the colonized. (*Colonized* 87–88)

This is an almost letter-perfect description of the iteronormative effects of ideosomatic regulation: the colonizer circulates a negative or accusatory image of the colonized through “all institutions and in every human contact,” till it “excites” a harmful “echo” in the colonized’s own somatization of the world. This is no mere superficial mimicry, no ephemeral echo, no “vener which, like an insult, blows with the wind”: it sticks. “The accusation disturbs him and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser”: the ideosomatic hierarchy in the colonial encounter circulates not just “mythical and degrading portraits” but the evaluative affects that accompany and confirm those portraits, admiration and fear for the colonizer, worry and disturbing self-loathing for the colonized. And so, gradually, the colonial ideosomatic counterregulates the colonized’s group construction of reality and identity: “It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the true portrait of the colonized.” This counterregulated reality/identity, Memmi notes, anticipating Foucault, is institutionalized (note here again the image of facial mimesis):

This conduct, which is common to colonizers as a group, thus becomes what can be called a social institution. In other words, it defines and establishes concrete situations which close in on the colonized, weigh on him until they bend his conduct and leave their marks on his face. Generally speaking, these are situations of inadequacy. The ideological aggression which tends to dehumanize and then deceive the colonized finally corresponds to concrete situations which lead to the same result. To be deceived to some extent already, to endorse the myth and then adapt to it, is to be acted upon by it. That myth is furthermore supported by a very solid organization; a government and a judicial system fed and renewed by the colonizer’s historic, economic and cultural needs. Even if he were insensitive to calumny and scorn, even if he shrugged his shoulders at insults and jostling, how could the colonized escape the low wages, the agony of his culture, the law which rules him from birth until death? (91)

What begins as an apparently discursive formulation, the “series of negations,” is expanded first to the intersubjectivity of the social economy of value, and then to economic, cultural, and legal institutions that govern every aspect of the colonized’s life—and each stage of the expansion is saturated with affect: the indignation at neglect in the “series of negations”; the detestation, disturbance, worry, admiration, and fear in the “echo that it excites in the colonized himself”; the calumny and the scorn and the agony that run like a bass note through the low wages and other legal depredations.

The final stage in this process is the breaking point, at which revolution becomes possible:

Now, into what kind of life and social dynamic do we emerge? The colony's life is frozen; its structure is both corseted and hardened. No new role is open to the young man, no invention is possible. The colonizer admits this with a new classical euphemism: He respects, he proclaims, the ways and customs of the colonized. And, to be sure, he cannot help respecting them, be it by force. Since any change would have to be made against colonization, the colonizer is led to favor the least progressive features. He is not solely responsible for this mummification of the colonized society; he demonstrates relatively good faith when he maintains that it is independent by its own will. It derives largely, however, from the colonial situation. Not being master of its destiny, not being its own legislator, not controlling its organization, colonized society can no longer adapt its institutions to its grievous needs. But it is those needs which practically shape the organizational face of every normal society. . . . However, if the discord becomes too sharp, and harmony becomes impossible to attain under existing legal forms, the result is either to revolt or to be calcified. (98)

Or, more commonly, both: to be calcified and then to revolt, and to carry the calcification over into the revolution and the decolonization. "Colonized society," Memmi writes, "is a diseased society in which internal dynamics no longer succeed in creating new structures. Its century-hardened face has become nothing more than a mask under which it slowly smothers and dies. Such a society cannot dissolve the conflicts of generations, for it is unable to be transformed" (98–99).

And then, nearly half a century later, we find him shaking his head at the fulfillment of his own predictions, *accusing* the former colonies of not dissolving those untransformable conflicts: "For lack of anything better, governments promote folklore, arts and crafts, and tourism. As for tourism, it's better to be a servant than to go hungry. Even in Tunisia, which is often cited as an example for its recent success against poverty, at least a third of its revenue comes from the tourist industry. But these are dead ends. For they perpetuate the artificial character of the economy of these nations and maintain their dependence on the developed world, whose obsequious or rebellious clients they have become, instead of moving toward relative independence, which demands the courage of breaking with established structures and moving resolutely toward the future" (*Decolonized* 11–12).

And we find him accusing the Arab-Muslim nations of the Maghreb of not pluralizing the (post)colonial somatic exchange: “To restore some sense of balance Arab-Muslim intellectuals would have to make use of a tradition other than the submission to dogma and power, of siding with opinion. However, there no longer exists, if there ever did in the Arab-Muslim world, that great public tribunal characteristic of democracy, where everyone can publicly give his opinion without unnecessary risk. True controversies are rare, except possibly for unimportant details, where disagreements occur against a background of underlying unity. As a result, any condemnation of wrongdoing and scandal always comes from the exterior, from those outside the community, leading to suspicions of bias or perversity” (33). “There no longer exists, if there ever did”: what exactly is the charge here? That Muslim Arabs have *banished* democracy, or that they never had it? “[I]sn’t it astonishing,” he complains, “that there are no discordant voices, even if they are wrong?” (33). How could this possibly be astonishing to the man who at 36 so brilliantly theorized the ways in which the colonized were locked into that somatic exchange of aggressive insecurity, the institutionalized circulation of calcified/inflamed self-loathing? Is this the fifty-years-after hangover of revolutionary idealism, the rueful aftermath of the impossibly hopeful belief back then that the revolution would once and for all toss the colonizer’s mythical portrait on the bonfire?

2.1.2.2 THE CAPITALIST METANARRATIVE OF DEVELOPMENT

Decolonization and the Decolonized may not be a particularly cogently argued book, but it is full of trenchant observations. Here is one: “The situation is not one in which, as has been repeated so complacently, several civilizations clash. There is now a single, global, civilization that affects everyone, including fundamentalists, who seem to have no qualms about using cell phones, the Internet, the banking system, automobiles, and planes, and may one day just as easily embrace rockets and sophisticated weapons—technologies they did not invent. It is far from clear that they are entirely sincere in claiming to defend values that have become increasingly unsustainable” (44). There is, in other words, no clash between Christian and Islamic civilizations, or between Western democracy and Muslim theocracy: there is only one global civilization. On the face of it, this is naïve: of course there is a civilizational clash between the Euro-American and Arab-Muslim worlds! What is naïve about Memmi’s remark, though, is really only its absolutism, his radical binary insistence that

“the situation is *not* one in which . . . several civilizations clash.” Actually, it is *both* one in which several civilizations clash *and* one increasingly dominated by a single global civilization—which is to say that the clash between the Christians and the Muslims, or between democracy and theocracy, or between the “First World” and the “Third World,” or whatever names we want to put on the two camps, is itself at least partly conditioned and regulated by the emerging global civilization. But what is globalization but the latest economic and cultural guise assumed by colonialism—or, more broadly, the latest colonialist guise assumed by capitalism? And if Memmi is right both that the Arab-Muslim world was conditioned by colonialism to its current jihadist fervor and that this new global phase of capitalist/colonialist culture (still) dominates it, then the lack of progress toward true independence that he laments in the “decolonization” of the Maghreb is in fact not a *failed counterregulation* of colonial ideosomatics but a displaced function of continuing (neo)colonial *regulation*.

In a 2002 article entitled “Rethinking Colonialism,” Arif Dirlik argues persuasively that postcolonial criticism orients itself to the study of the legacies of the colonial past through “assumptions that derive their plausibility from its context in globalization,” and that, viewed from this new context, “colonialism no longer appears as ‘the highest stage of capitalism,’ as Lenin wrote of imperialism (1969), but a stage on the way to globalization—the most recent phase in the spatialization of the world by a capitalism that has yet to live out its history” (429–30). The main burden of Dirlik’s argument, following Partha Chatterjee in *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* and Ania Loomba in *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (215–31) on the replication of colonial discourses and practices in decolonization, is that *both* colonization and decolonization were products of that earlier stage, which all three scholars associate with nation-building:

For all the retroactive readings of the nation back into the past, nations in the colonial world were products of colonialism, if inadvertently. While colonial policy and its effects varied widely, it is arguable nevertheless that, in contrast to nation building in Europe, European colonizers had little interest in the political integration of colonial territories into national entities, or the homogenization of their cultures into national cultures—which for obvious reasons were contrary to their interests. We may recall here the violence with which movements for national liberation and sovereignty were met with across the colonial world and the ideological efforts to discredit national liberation movements by identifying them with a global Communist conspiracy. Nevertheless, to realize their own interests in the

colonies European colonizers had little choice but to establish administrative boundaries in accordance with their needs and abilities, to seek to impose uniform rules on the colonies that took account, in varying degrees in different places, of local practices, and to create functionaries recruited from the local population to facilitate colonial rule. (Dirlik 436)

They also, of course, replicated in the colonies what Dirlik describes in earlier European nation-building as “the erasure (at least in intention) of local cultures and the promotion of a homogeneous national culture that would endow the nation with cultural identity” (436), as when the Spaniards chose the Tagalogs as the principal ethnic group in the Philippines and made *la lengua tagala* the indigenous *lingua franca* for the islands—a status it continues to enjoy in an independent Filipino nation today—or when the Belgians organized the cultural identity of colonial Ruanda-Urundi around the Tutsi, “promoting the Tutsi within the colonial administration and economy” while “legal and bureaucratic barriers preventing Hutu upward mobility were cemented” (Johnson 160), leading to ongoing tension and violence between the two groups, most horrifically of course the Hutu genocide of 800,000 Tutsi in the spring of 1994. “Anticolonial nationalism,” Dirlik notes, “would emerge in the end out of the ranks of the native functionaries of colonial rule, who were both of the new structure of power and shut out from its rewards, and who were keenly aware by virtue of their colonial education of the fundamental differences that distinguished colonial rule from national politics in Europe” (436).

What I want to pick out of Dirlik’s article for particular emphasis, however, is his discussion of the Three Worlds model, which he identifies as the primary casualty of postcolonial theory’s rejection of metanarratives in favor of “borderlands’ conditions, where the domination of one by the other yields before boundary crossings, hybridities, mutual appropriations, and, especially, the everyday resistance of the colonized to the colonizer” (433):

The “Third World,” the location for neo- and postcolonialisms, was a product of a systemic understanding of the world in terms of capitalism and socialism—the “First” and the “Second” Worlds understood in developmental terms—which showed the Third World alternative paths to its future. Politically, the idea of the Third World pointed to the necessity of a common politics that derived from a common positioning in the system (rather than some homogeneous essentialized common quality, as is erroneously assumed these days in much postcolonial criticism). As colonialism had preceded the emergence of a Second World, the world of socialism, the Third World had historical priority to the Second, which

points also to the priority of capitalism in the systematic shaping of the world, to which socialism was a response (which also made socialism into an attractive goal in the liberation from colonialism). (433)

In an era of globalization, Dirlik argues, this model, focused as it was on the developmental trajectories of nations, is no longer relevant:

Nevertheless, the present world is a world that is radically different from the world of decolonization in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Capitalism has reinvented itself and opened up to the formerly colonized, who are now participants in its global operations. Former colonials are in the process of colonizing the “mother” countries, bringing the earlier “contact zones” of the colonies into the heart of formerly colonialist societies. These motions of people force a redefinition both of nations and national cultures. Postcolonial intellectuals, having arrived in the First World, call into question cherished ideals of Eurocentric notions of progress and knowledge, for which they are rewarded by widespread acknowledgment of the vanguard role they play in the production of knowledge. New entrants into the ranks of capitalism revive cultural legacies erased by Eurocentrism to claim alternative paths to the future. As the former three worlds are configured so that it is possible to find Third Worlds in the First and First Worlds in the Second, so are class relations globally, so that it is now possible to find in the global ruling class representatives from all the former three worlds. (439)⁷

But if that’s the case—or rather, since clearly it’s at least partly the case, if that’s the *whole* case—what are we to make of chestnuts like this, taken from an earlier (1994) Dirlik essay but virtually ubiquitous as a nonce problem in postcolonial studies: “Taking the term literally as *postcolonial*, some practitioners of postcolonial criticism describe former settler colonies—such as the United States and Australia—as postcolonial, regardless of their status as First World societies and colonizers themselves of their indigenous populations. (Though to be fair, the latter could also be said of many Third World societies)” (“Postcolonial Aura” 336)? Is this slippage further evidence of the hybridization of the Three Worlds in a globalized economy and culture? Or is it evidence that the old Three Worlds metanarrative continues to circulate ideosomatically in the midst of widespread hybridization? I suggest it’s the latter, in fact: if some former colonies become Second World colonizers (the People’s Republic of China colonizing Tibet) and others become First World neocolonizers of vast tracts of the Third World (the United States, which is also

still involved in the old colonial project, in Afghanistan and Iraq), isn't that a prime example of the First and Second Worlds showing "the Third World alternative paths to its future"? I would argue, in fact, that Dirlik's "fairness" should be extended to a recognition that, in turning successful decolonization into supremely exploitative neocolonizing First World status, the United States is not at all an anomaly in the capitalist/colonialist Three Worlds model, but rather an exemplary case of it.

Still very much at work in our mythological thinking about development, in other words, even in the midst of the global hybridization celebrated by postcolonial theorists, is an idealized nation-centered movement "up" the Three Worlds, from the Third to the Second to the First, or even—the ideal case is again of course the United States—from the Third directly to the First. That's where all postcolonial nations are ideologically supposed to want to go. Some, barred from the First, take great oppositional pride in their rise to the Second: Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, arguably even Iran, if we're willing to shift our definition of the Second World from socialist anticapitalism to *any* anticapitalist or anti-First World opposition. This vision of the Second World is Frantz Fanon's clarion call in *The Wretched of the Earth*: "Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the sickness, and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions. Comrades, have we not other work to do than to create a third Europe?" (313). At least one Second World superpower, the People's Republic of China, is arguably positioning itself either to dominate the First World or to become a new First World of its own: Third to Second to First. The reports of the Second World's death, in fact, are greatly exaggerated.

I would go further. Since the late 1970s or early 1980s, some historians have been speaking of a Fourth World,⁸ comprising the indigenous populations colonized by (among others) Third World former colonies: the Karen by Burma and Thailand; the Meo, Akha, Lahn, and others by Thailand; the Naga by India; the East Timorese by Indonesia; the Tamils by Sri Lanka; the Tibetans by the People's Republic of China; the Ainu by Japan; the Kurds by Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; the Maori by New Zealand; the Pitjantjatjara, Yirrkala, Gurindji, and Warlpiri by Australia; the Quinault, Hopi, Navajo, Lakota, Iroquois, Inuit Athapaskans, and Aleuts by the United States; the Maymara and Quechua-speaking peoples by Peru; the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama by Nicaragua; the Baruca, Cabecares, and Bribris by Costa Rica; the Zapotec, Mixe, and Mayans by Mexico; the Shaba, Luba, and Kasai by Zaire; and many others. This "fourth-worldization" of indigenous populations by Worlds One through Three is generally considered a tragic irony; I am sug-

gesting it is endemic to the capitalist/colonialist metanarrative of development, which directs development up the worlds, *Fourth* to Third to Second to First, the counterregulatory displacement of groups (language groups, ethnic groups, settler groups, refugee groups), first as Fourth World colonies or other dominated entities, then through wars of national liberation as “decolonized” Third World nations, and finally as Second and First World powers ready to dominate and exploit others in a colonial and eventually globalizing neocolonial mode.

But Fourth World activists and theorists would dispute that last formulation: for them the indigenous peoples, tribes, language groups, and ethnic groups of the Fourth World are nations too, “imaginary communities,” certainly, in Benedict Anderson’s term, but in that no different from the nations of Worlds One through Three. What distinguishes First, Second, and Third World nations from Fourth World nations for them is simply international recognition:

With but very few exceptions, authorities have shied away from describing the nation as a kinship group and have usually explicitly denied that the notion of shared blood is a factor. Such denials are supported by data illustrating that most groups claiming nationhood do in fact incorporate several genetic strains. But such an approach ignores the wisdom of the old saw that when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately matters is not *what is* but *what people believe is*. And a subconscious belief in the group’s separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology. . . . Since the nation is a self-defined rather than an other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction concerning the group’s singular origin need not and seldom will accord with factual data. (Connor 380)

Fourth World nations for these scholars are self-defined nations whose national status is (as yet) systematically denied by the self- *and* other-defined nations of Worlds One through Three. This suggests that in a (post)colonial context the nation is not just an imaginary community, but an imaginary community first ideosomatized as a directionality, as an impetus toward geopolitical upward mobility. The nation was the invention of the “First World” before it was called that, Europe during the era of the trizygotic birth of capitalism, the nation state, and the colonial project; it is the convergence of the latter two under the aegis of the first that iterosomatizes nation-thinking with the aspiration to improved collective status. The anticolonial wars of national

liberation beginning with the United States in the 1770s and Haiti in the 1790s and continuing through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to today have been essentially wars designed to “upgrade” colonized peoples to the status of nations, which is to say—anachronistically in some cases, since the Three Worlds model was not invented until the mid-twentieth century—to “raise” them on the capitalist or colonialist metanarrative of development from the Fourth to the Third World. For a Fourth World group to *call* itself a nation is thus to organize itself for the next step up, to iterosomatize images of its future as a nation-state. A newly liberated people is internationally recognized as a nation, which is to say that the group that circulates ideosomatized images of this people’s nationhood grows exponentially; once it has thus “become” internationally what it has long felt it is locally, a nation, a Third World entity, it begins positioning itself for either the colonizing Second World or the neo-colonizing/globalizing First World. In this sense the significant difference between neocolonizing former colonies like the United States and traditionally colonizing former colonies like Ethiopia (which colonized Eritrea from 1961 to 1991) is that the neocolonizers are more “successful”—which is to say that they have advanced further along the capitalist/colonialist metanarrative of development.

But of course it’s also important to remember that decolonization has not been the only historical path to the Third World:

But, then, there have been other countries—such as Turkey which has *not* been colonised, or Iran and Egypt, whose occupation had not led to colonization of the kind that India suffered—where the onset of capitalist modernity and their incorporation in the world capitalist system brought about state apparatuses as well as social and cultural configurations that were, nevertheless, remarkably similar to the ones in India, which *was* fully colonized. In this context, we should speak not so much of colonialism or postcolonialism but of capitalist modernity, which takes the colonial form in particular places and at particular times. After all, the United States was also once a colony, or a cluster of colonies; so was Latin America to the south of the US, Canada in the north, not to speak of the Caribbean islands. But later history has taken in each case a very different turn. When applied too widely, powerful terms of this kind simply lose their analytic power, becoming mere jargon. (Ahmad, “Politics” 7)

Another nation with state apparatuses and social and cultural configurations that are remarkably similar to those in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and India is

the Russian Federation, which as the Soviet Union was until the last day of 1991 the definitive Second World anticapitalist empire. Never colonized, it has undergone considerable economic turmoil throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium that would not count as decolonization either, though its cronyist fire-sale privatization of national industries in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the initial near-collapse of its political infrastructure, combined with continued high rates of poverty and unemployment two decades into the new regime, make post-Soviet Russia strikingly resemble Third World countries emerging from the oppression of Fourth World colonization; its weak struggles against the old Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist counterregulation also resemble the inertia of decolonization as Memmi describes it, and its gradual return to autocracy under Vladimir Putin signals the tenacity of the old ideosomatic regulation even in the midst of rapid capitalization and globalization; and the greatest cultural and ideological division in the country today is between the nationalistic Russophiles who envision a restoration of Russia's imperial might as the leader of the Second World and the global-minded Westernizers who envision the assimilation of the Russian Federation into the Euro-American First World. At the same time, having granted independence to many of its former colonies, both internal (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and external (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania), Russia continues to dominate 29 colonized "autonomous" (their autonomy has been severely reduced under Putin) republics, oblasts, and okrugs, each consisting of one or more Fourth World "titular nationalities" and several other Fourth World "indigenous nationalities" as well; and since 1999 it has been fighting a "separatist movement"—a war of national liberation—in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya.

With the complexity of this history in mind, then, I have titled this subsection the *capitalist* (rather than colonialist) metanarrative of development—and take the various colonial and postcolonial histories organized by that metanarrative to be only one channel that capitalist modernity has taken. (By "metanarrative," of course, I mean not what actually happens, but a homeostatic mapping of group responses to cultural displacement, a story that is iterosomatized as the true meaning or pattern governing displacement. "Meta" in metanarrative signifies the additive quality of bodily-becoming-mental mapping, the building of an explanatory regime out of allostatic somatic response to displacement.) It would not be difficult, either, to trace the anticapitalist trajectories of the Second World as partial deregulations or counterregulations of capitalism—but that's another story.

2.1.2.3 THE COLONIZER WHO REFUSES

If decolonization is ideosomatically normativized (affectively narrativized) not as a deidealized reversal of the colonial ideosomatic counterregulation, then, but rather as an idealized displacement of that regulatory regime, the most successful forms of decolonization will involve the pursuit of radically transformed colonial ends. These days, of course, those ends entail globalization not only as transnational economic interests and free trade but also as the creation of prestigious university chairs and departments for the theorization of transnational postcoloniality. This book too would thus stand revealed as a decolonized and anticolonial but still neocolonizing study of the global “free trade” of shared evaluative affect—the work, to put it in Memmi’s terms from *Colonized*, of a “colonizer who refuses,” an anticolonial member of a group that continues to benefit from colonialism: “He may openly protest, or sign a petition, or join a group which is not automatically hostile to the colonized. This already suffices for him to recognize that he has simply changed difficulties and discomfort. It is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships. From now on, he lives his life under the sign of a contradiction which looms at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility” (20). Memmi is writing here in the mid-1950s, of course, of an anticolonial colonizer living in a colony—a proliberation Frenchman living in colonial Tunisia, say—hence his insistence on the “difficulties and discomfort” of this hypothetical person’s situation, the living of his life “under the sign of a contradiction which looms at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility.” The situation is rather different for an anticolonial American intellectual, descendant of white settlers, living two centuries after independence—but in fact not radically different. The difference rather involves what Nietzsche would call the *sublimation and subtilization* of “difficulties and discomfort”: as an anticolonial intellectual I am aware that the relative material comfort in which I live is in large part generated by my country’s neocolonial exploitation of the Third World; my greatest source of discomfort is my uneasy awareness of just how easy it is not to be discomforted by this fact. In order to feel the leftist colonizer’s discomfort of which Memmi writes, I have to produce it not only intellectually but also idiosomatically, “rebelliously,” refusing and in part deregulating the ideosomatics of United-Statesian triumphalism (“America is the greatest/richest/most powerful country on earth”) through the collective exosomatization of images of Third World sweatshops, child labor, poverty, widespread unemployment, local economies run by remote control from the boardrooms of multinational corporations, and so on. Memmi writes that

“The intellectual or the progressive bourgeois might want the barriers between himself and the colonized to fade; those are class characteristics which he would gladly renounce. But no one seriously aspires toward changing language, customs, religious affiliation, etc., even to ease his conscience, nor even for his material security” (37)—and while I would disagree with him superficially, at a deeper level he is still quite right. People do “seriously aspire toward changing language, customs, religious affiliation”: I did it myself when I was 16, moving to Finland; women marrying into foreign cultures have done it for millennia; translators, interpreters, and other intercultural subjects are typically the products of such serious aspirations; and, of course, Memmi neglects to mention here what is implicit in his argument, that it is fairly rare for people to want to assimilate to a culture *lower* on the developmental four-world metanarrative but quite common for people to aspire seriously to assimilate to a higher-status culture.⁹ (What he means but does not spell out here is that the French do not seriously aspire to become Arabs. But that happens too.) The deeper question, though, is this: would I give up my middle-class income and lifestyle, my intellectual work, to show solidarity with the Third World on whose exploitation I indirectly live? “Thus,” Memmi writes, “while refusing the sinister, the benevolent colonizer can never attain the good, for his only choice is not between good and evil, but between evil and uneasiness” (42–43).

His final conclusion on the colonizer who refuses is also mostly true: “He will slowly realize that the only thing for him to do is to remain silent. Is it necessary to say that this silence is probably not such a terrible anguish to him? That he was rather forcing himself to fight in the name of theoretical justice for interests which are not his own; often even incompatible with his own?” (43). Probably most antineocolonial Western intellectuals do feel more comfortable remaining silent about their own indirect complicity in the neocolonial exploitation of the Third World. And even those of us who do talk and write about that complicity find ways of silencing our own uneasy voices of self-accusation, typically by *raising* those voices just slightly, intensifying the unease into a careful public self-condemnation designed to impress others with our sincerity—as I’ve been doing in this subsection.

2.1.3 Frantz Fanon

The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of aberrations of affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated.

The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself.

In other words, the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, *turn white or disappear*; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. In still other words, if society makes difficulties for him because of his color, if in his dreams I [as his psychoanalyst] establish the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be that of dissuading him from it by advising him to “keep his place”; on the contrary, my objective, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to put him in a position to *choose* action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict—that is, toward the social structure.

—Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (8, 100)

Frantz Fanon was born in 1925 on the island of Martinique, then a French colony; his hatred for colonialism was sharpened early by the Vichy French naval troops who were blockaded on Martinique in 1940 and who vented their racism openly on the Martinican people. He joined the French Free Forces and fought the Germans in France, was wounded and received the Croix de Guerre. In 1945 he returned briefly to Martinique, long enough to work on the parliamentary campaign of his friend and former teacher Aimé Césaire (running on the communist ticket) and complete his bachelor's degree; he then went to France to study medicine and psychiatry as well as literature, drama, and philosophy (he sat in on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's lectures). Qualifying as a psychiatrist in 1951, he did a residency with François de Tosquelles, who insisted on the shaping power of culture in psychopathology, practiced psychiatry in France for a year and a half, and wrote *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952, translated into English as *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1967). In 1953 he accepted the *chef de service* post at the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria, where he introduced the radical methods of sociotherapy; after the outbreak of the Algerian revolution in 1954, he joined the Front de Libération Nationale and began to study Algerian culture closely, later applying his experiences to the writing of both ecstatic revolutionary books like *L'an cinq de la révolution algérienne* (1959, translated into English as *A Dying Colonialism*, 1965) and *Les damnés de la terre* (1961, translated into English as *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1965), and psychology-of-culture studies like “The Marabout of Si Slimane” (the manuscript of which was lost). In 1956 he publicly resigned his post at the hospital, in his letter of resignation forswearing his French assimilationist background; expelled from Algeria, he returned to France and secretly traveled to Tunis, where he wrote for *El Moudjahid*, his

writings for which were collected posthumously in *Pour la révolution africaine* (1964, translated into English as *Toward the African Revolution*, 1967). Diagnosed with leukemia, he refused to rest, dictating *The Wretched of the Earth* in ten months; he received treatment in both the Soviet Union and, later, with the help of the CIA, the United States, where he died in 1961.

As the two sentences/paragraphs of the first epigraph above suggest, Fanon's decolonizing project was at least in part protosomatic: "the result of a series of aberrations of affect" would be the result of an iterosomatic counterregulation, so that "the liberation of the man of color from himself" that he proposes would actually be not from the "self" but from that colonial iterosomatization of self that *seems* real, seems like a true self, but is in fact only "aberrant." Of course, "aberration" there implies a universalized or transcendently stabilized normativity that is alien to somatic theory, which would rather posit in the colonized population's becoming-counterregulated a *polynormativity* generated by the clash of two or more regulatory groups; but something like this relativized conception of normativity is at least implicit in the functional identity Fanon posits between "universe" and "himself," his two tropes for the ideosomatic prison from which the "black man" must be extricated/liberated. If his self is *a* universe in which he has been *rooted* and must (and can) be *uprooted*, if there are many selves and many universes in which it is possible to root or radicate a black body, then there is no transcendental norm that might be used to thematize a single (colonial) radication as "aberrant." It is therefore only possible to label a colonizing radication or ideosomatic regulation as a "series of aberrations of affect" from a tendentious stance of decolonizing eradication, a postcolonial attempt to counterregulate the colonial "self" or "universe"—once again, as in Memmi, an inflammatory speech act.

There is, in fact, a radical sociogenic fuzzy logic to Fanon's psychoanalytical take on postcolonial identities, a sense that for him subjectivities are always in a state of becoming, becoming-white, becoming-black, becoming-rooted, becoming-unrooted—and that these becomings are the minute fractal byproducts of massive somatotectonic shifts, the affective grinding together of hugely complex social, political, economic, cultural, and ideological affect-circulatory regimes. There is also the sense, only passingly adumbrated in *Black Skin, White Masks* and fully developed in *A Dying Colonialism* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, that these grinding pressures are ultimately too much for "the black man," and issue finally into revolutionary violence: "The Negro is a toy in the white man's hands; so, in order to shatter the hellish cycle, he explodes" (*Black* 140).

My remarks in this section will focus mostly on *Black Skin, White Masks*, in terms first of the exosomatic imagination of becoming black or white, and

then of the paralyzing power of the Hegelian dialectic as applied to black dis-alienation by Jean-Paul Sartre.

2.1.3.1 COLONIZATION AS BECOMING-WHITE/BECOMING-BLACK

As Fanon's title *Black Skin, White Masks* suggests, his analysis of colonization in the book is almost exclusively devoted to race, to counterregulatory somatizations of skin color. He does occasionally digress from his main theme, however, into more general postcolonial reflections on colonial counterregulations:

To understand something new requires that we make ourselves ready for it, that we prepare ourselves for it; it entails the shaping of a new form. It is utopian to expect the Negro or the Arab to exert the effort of embedding abstract values into his outlook on the world when he has barely enough food to keep alive. To ask a Negro of the Upper Niger to wear shoes, to say of him that he will never be a Schubert, is no less ridiculous than to be surprised that a worker in the Berliet truck factory does not spend his evenings studying lyricism in Hindu literature or to say that he will never be an Einstein.

Actually, in the absolute sense, nothing stands in the way of such things. Nothing—except that the people in question lack the opportunities. (95–96)

Of course it's not just that the people *lack* the opportunities; nor is it just that they are denied the opportunities. It is that they are constructed in *terms* of the lack of opportunities. They are regulatorily somatized to that lack. Their lack of opportunities is circulated iterosomatically through the groups that determine their realities and their identities. The "new form" that the colonized are expected first and foremost to shape is the counterregulatory form of colonialism, European "civilization" not as Schubert or Einstein but as submission to the colonizer's authority, submission to labor with little or no remuneration, submission to a racialized hierarchy of human worth, and submission to a prescribed lack of opportunities. Implicit in Fanon's polemic here, however, is also an answer to those who imagine the colonized as *incapable* of becoming a Schubert or an Einstein, of "embedding abstract values into his outlook on the world," and therefore as *in need* of the colonial regime that keeps them down, keeps them effectively enslaved to the life of the body by providing them "barely enough food to keep alive." If by "[the] embedding [of] abstract

values” we take Fanon to be referring to the body-becoming-mind, that mental mapping of body states by which an organism or group of organisms homeostatically regulates its internal and external environment, then clearly the core problem is not just that the colonized don’t have enough to eat but that they don’t have (are constructed as lacking) the power to regulate their own internal *or* external environments—what happens to them, and even how they feel about what happens to them. Obviously, it is an extremely sophisticated form of colonial counterregulation that can extend its regulatory reach into the colonized’s ability to feel, say, anger at oppression, or even a wistful disappointment at not being able to do what s/he wants—a sophistication that is specifically made possible by the somatic exchange, by the circulation of normative/evaluative affect through the bodies of a population. “When the Negro makes contact with the white world,” Fanon writes, “a certain sensitizing action takes place. If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a collapse of the ego. The black man stops behaving as an *actional* person. The goal of his behavior will be The Other (in the guise of the white man), for The Other alone can give him worth. That is on the ethical level: self-esteem” (154). Here, clearly, “the Negro” and “the black man” are Antillean code for “the colonized” of any color and any gender, “the white man” for “the colonizer”: despite his racialized terms, Fanon is not really addressing race here. The “sensitizing action” he describes is the conformation of the colonized’s somatic response to the colonizer’s counterregulatory regime, which is “The Other” in both the external (other person) and the (Hegelian/Lacanian) internal sense, the colonizer-introject that takes over the colonized’s affective economy and manages its circulatory flows. “If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a collapse of the ego” is sheer Freudian individualism, focused on the individual’s “psychic structure” and “ego” as autonomous fortresses that may be destroyed by the white invaders; the rest of that formulation, however, is more amenable to somatic paraphrase. The Other, after all, is the counterregulatory voice of the (colonizing) group inside the (colonized) individual’s head, the actional orientation of the group in the individual’s behavior, and, most tellingly, the constitutive force of external group approval reconstituted as self-esteem, the (white colonizing) ethnos reconfigured as the (black colonized) ethos.

By far the most interesting focus of Fanon’s analysis of colonization, however, has to do with the iterosomatics of race, becoming-white and becoming-black: “Then I will quite simply try to make myself white: that is, I will compel the white man to acknowledge that I am human” (98). If the white colonizer defines “to be human” in terms of his or her own whiteness, then to be human the black colonized must *become* white. Or:

The black schoolboy in the Antilles, who in his lessons is forever talking about “our ancestors, the Gauls,” identifies himself with the explorer, the bringer of civilization, the white man who carries truth to savages—an all-white truth. There is identification—that is, the young Negro subjectively adopts a white man’s attitude. He invests the hero, who is white, with all his own aggression. . . . Little by little, one can observe in the young Antillean the formation and crystallization of an attitude and a way of thinking and seeing that are essentially white. When in school he has to read stories of savages told by white men, he always thinks of the Senegalese. . . . Subjectively, intellectually, the Antillean conducts himself like a white man. But he is a Negro. That he will learn once he goes to Europe; and when he hears Negroes mentioned he will recognize that the word includes himself as well as the Senegalese. (147–48)

The black schoolboy becomes white, “conducts himself like a white man,” until he goes to Europe and becomes black. The mutability of skin color in this formulation suggests that “racial” skin pigmentation is not so much a physiological as it is an exosomatic phenomenon—that not just the white mask but the black skin “itself” as well are exosomata, ideosomatized images of skin that are circulated through the somatic exchange as naturalized realities. The “is” in “But he is a Negro” would thus be a descriptor not so much of an ontological fact as of an ontologizing process, the group iterosomatic stabilization of a becoming or a flux:

If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process:
 —primarily, economic;
 —subsequently, the internalization—or, better, the epidermalization—of this inferiority. (11)

The inferiority complex circulated iterosomatically by white colonizers through the black colonized population is simultaneously internalized as feeling and epidermalized as skin color, which is to say exosomatized as constitutive feeling about skin color.

Or, in one of the most telling formulations of this process:

Out of the blackest part of my soul, across the zebra striping of my mind,
 surges this desire to be suddenly *white*.

I wish to be acknowledged not as *black* but as *white*.

Now—and this is a form of recognition that Hegel had not envisaged—

who but a white woman can do this for me? By loving me she proves that I am worthy of white love. I am loved like a white man.

I am a white man. (63)

Here *her* white skin functions as *my* white mask: the desire to simulate somatomimetically, through the body language of her love, the exosoma of her skin color, to “borrow” or “share” her positively somatized pigmentation and overlay it on top of my negatively somatized pigmentation, an exosomatic upgrade, as it were, renormativization upwards of the exosomatic value collectively assigned the color of my skin. Henry Louis Gates Jr. says that race “pretends to be an objective term of classification, when in fact it is a dangerous trope” (5), so that saying “he’s black” is like saying (to use Ngũgĩ’s example) “he’s a wild animal” (133), and Gates is right, of course, except that race-trope is not just a discursive phenomenon: the race-trope is exosomatized as reality, as identity, and therefore *becomes* reality, shapes identity. Exosomatically repigmentizing black skin as white is exactly like taking over the magical power of a fetish object, internalizing its healing force, possessing the exosomatic charge that has been iterosomatized into or onto it by the group—except that the exosoma of a fetish object can be transferred to any given member of the group only by a person vested by the group with the authority to make the transfer, a shaman or a priest. The object’s taboo power is too strong for ordinary people; it would kill them; they would profane it. For the black man, in Fanon’s formulation, the white woman is that shaman, that priest. Only she, by loving him, can transfer the exosomatic fetish power of white skin, indeed its taboo power: “desire for that white flesh that has been forbidden to us Negroes as long as white men have ruled the world” (René Maran, *Un homme pareil aux autres*, quoted in Fanon, *Black Skins* 70). To paraphrase Fanon, the black man wants to reexosomatize his skin color positively, to upgrade the negative exosoma projected onto dark skin, and fantasizes that this would involve the transfer not just of the exosoma attached to light skin but also of the actual skin color.

Interestingly, though, as a black man Fanon seems unable to resist inflecting his verbal critiques of this fantasy with the exosomata of his group: his deconstructions of black men desiring white women in Chapter 3 (“The Man of Color and the White Woman”) are themselves saturated with that desire, with an almost ecstatic longing¹⁰ for what he is seeking to banish from black men’s somatic exchange, while his deconstructions of black women desiring white men in Chapter 2 (“The Woman of Color and the White Man”) are overwhelmingly somatized with disgust, the typical revulsion toward the exosomata of an out-grouper:

For after all we have a right to be perturbed when we read, in [Mayotte Capécia's] *Je suis Martiniquaise*: "I should have liked to be married, but to a white man. But a woman of color is never altogether respectable in a white man's eyes. Even when he loves her. I knew that." This passage, which serves in a way as the conclusion of a vast delusion, prods one's brain. One day a woman named Mayotte Capécia, obeying a motivation whose elements are difficult to detect, sat down to write 202 pages—her life—in which the most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random. (42)

He presents the black man desiring white women in the first person with only implicit quotation marks, not quite identifying with the "I" of those opening lines ("I am a white man") but not entirely repelled by it, either; he presents the black woman desiring white men in the first person with explicit quotation marks, and recoils from identification with that "I" as from vermin ("perturbed," "vast delusion," "most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random"). The black man's fantasy of becoming white through sexual love for a white woman is presented as "a purely subjective conflict" (70); the black woman's fantasy of becoming white through sexual love for a white man is "a vast delusion." The black man's motivations in desiring white women are obvious to him, because they are circulated through his (male) group; the black woman's motivations in writing a book about her desire for white men are an utter mystery to him ("whose elements are difficult to detect"), because they are alien to his group. In his specific verbal formulations, Fanon expresses solidarity with blacks of either gender; in the somatic charge that powers those formulations, he expresses solidarity with black men desiring white women and scorning black women.¹¹

Fanon offers a more nuanced discussion of what it means—what it has been made to mean in the colonial context—to be "black" in the long "Negro and Psychopathology" chapter:

To come back to psychopathology, let us say that the Negro lives an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic. At the age of twenty . . . the Antillean recognizes that he is living an error. Why is that? Quite simply because—and this is very important—the Antillean has recognized himself as a Negro, but, by virtue of an ethical transit, he also feels (collective unconscious) that one is a Negro to the degree to which one is wicked, sloppy, malicious, instinctual. Everything that is the opposite of these Negro modes of behavior is white. This must be recognized as the source of Negrophobia in the Antillean. In the collective unconscious, black = ugliness, sin, darkness, immorality. In other words, he is Negro who is immoral. If I order my

life like that of a moral man, I simply am not a Negro. Whence the Martini-can custom of saying of a worthless white man that he has a “nigger soul.” Color is nothing, I do not even notice it, I know only one thing, which is the purity of my conscience and the whiteness of my soul. “Me white like snow,” the other said. (192–93)

I’m white, because moral, and immoral, because black; color is nothing and color is everything; my soul is white and pure, and “unconsciously I distrust what is black in me, that is, the whole of my being” (191): all this is the neurosis Fanon describes as sociogenically produced by the colonial “collective unconscious,” which he has just been arguing, contra Jung, “is cultural, which means acquired” (188), “the result of what I shall call the unreflected imposition of a culture,” so that “the Antillean has taken over all the archetypes belonging to the European” (191).

This “unreflected imposition of a culture” is of course Fanon’s term for what I call ideosomatic counterregulation, the circulation through a population of new “corrective” regulatory pressures, designed to displace and replace the existing culture. It is unreflected in the sense that one does not notice it happening, does not reflect on it consciously or analytically; it is indeed a “collective unconscious,” or what Fredric Jameson calls a “political unconscious”—a term that helps mitigate the universalizing connotations of Jung’s archetypal conception, but does little to help us understand the “ethical transit” by which one unreflected culture or political unconscious is imposed on or in place of another. For that we need not just the negativity of the *unconscious* but also the positive action of the somatic exchange.

For the individual born into a colonized condition, of course, like Fanon, the “unreflected imposition of a culture” is simply socialization, ideosomatic regulation, not counterregulation: the counterregulatory regime is already in place when he is born and he simply must be iterosomatized to it. “When I am at home,” he writes, describing his early childhood in the present tense, “my mother sings me French love songs in which there is never a word about Negroes. When I disobey, when I make too much noise, I am told to ‘stop acting like a nigger’” (191). These are the embodied speech acts by which a regulatory ideosomatic is passed from generation to generation: Fanon’s mother has so effectively conformed her thoughts and feelings and behavior to the counterregulatory colonialist regime that she unreflectingly channels that regime to her son through the powerfully somatized vehicles of romantic song and parental anger. “Somewhat later,” he adds, exosomatizing books by white authors as themselves “white,” “I read white books and little by little I take

into myself the prejudices, the myths, the folklore that have come to me from Europe” (191–92). This is, again, an “unreflected” internalization not just of conscious belief structures but of the ideosomatization of those structures, the felt evaluative orientations, the iterosomatic inclination to value “the prejudices, the myths, the folklore that have come to me from Europe” as truths, as realities, as the way things are. These ideosomatic orientations and inclinations cannot be easily identified as coming from any particular person or group, or even easily brought to consciousness; they are diffusely disseminated through the entire population as felt binary valuations, white good, black bad, white strong, black weak, white smart, black dumb, white cultured, black primitive, white moral, black immoral, white spiritual, black sexual, white yes, black no. These simple binaries are stored in each member of the colonized population as somatic markers unconsciously guiding all internal and external decision-making. And, as Fanon writes, “cultural imposition is easily accomplished in Martinique. The ethical transit encounters no obstacle. But the real white man is waiting for me. As soon as possible he will tell me that it is not enough to try to be white, but that a white totality must be achieved. It is only then that I shall recognize the betrayal” (193).

This betrayal places at the “ontological” core of each colonized individual a relational “flaw,” an introject of the “Manichean”¹² colonizer–colonized relation that makes it impossible to describe that individual in purely individual terms:

As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others. There is of course the moment of “being for others” of which Hegel speaks, but every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society. It would seem that this fact has not been given sufficient attention by those who have discussed the question. In the *Weltanschauung* of a colonized people there is an impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation. Someone may object that this is the case with every individual, but such an objection merely conceals a basic problem. Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. (109–10)

I read that first sentence as Fanon’s groping toward a formulation: obviously everyone experiences his or her being through others, as he recognizes imme-

diately in the next sentence (“There is of course the moment of ‘being for others’ of which Hegel speaks”), but there is something *different* about the being-for-others of the colonized, which Fanon wants to thematize in terms of the distorting *presence* of the colonizer, so that the “black man . . . must be black in relation to the white man.” But he recognizes that even among other blacks, “the black man” will have occasion to experience his being through others “in minor internal conflicts”—which is to say that any flare-up of idiosomaticity will make “the black man” *aware* of “his being through others.” “Experience” in that first sentence thus comes to reflect the body-becoming-mind, the movement of social feeling toward a mental mapping, so that even if our being is always shaped by others through the circulation of social feelings, we *experience* that shaping only when ideosomatic regulation is disrupted, either through idiosomatic deregulation (“minor internal conflicts”) or ideosomatic counterregulation (“black in relation to the white man”).

Note that Fanon’s discussion here might be taken as a ground-zero formulation for the postcolonial theory offered by Gayatri Spivak in 1988 that the subaltern cannot speak, to which we’ll be returning in §2.2.2.3. Spivak’s contention that the subaltern cannot speak *as* the subaltern, cannot be heard in the voice of the subaltern, must always assimilate herself to the dominant colonialist discourse in order to be heard and thus to be understood as speaking, is aptly summed up (though with a predictable gender shift) in Fanon’s pithy notion that the black man “must be black in relation to the white man.” What Fanon gives us that Spivak does not, however, is the subaltern’s phenomenology: the experience of that “flaw,” somatic trace of that “betrayal,” the sense of not being able to get around the counterregulatory and in some sense paralyzing introject of the colonizer–colonized relation, which forces the subaltern not only to *be* subaltern in relation to the colonizer (that much is implicit in the differentiality of Gramsci’s definition of subalternity, which forms the core of Spivak’s argument), but also to *feel* subaltern in relation to the colonizer even as s/he begins to “speak” (and be heard), even as s/he masters the colonizer’s language and enters into the xenonormativity of the counterregulatory regime. Not only that; because he approaches subalternity at least partly phenomenologically, Fanon recognizes that the subaltern can speak with other subalterns: “As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others,” which is to say, in Spivak’s terms, to experience her speaking as a being-heard by others. As we’ve seen, Fanon himself realizes that this is not quite true: not only are there those “minor internal conflicts” that open up a gap or rupture in the “pure” experience of equality among

the colonized, but the colonial “flaw” or the colonizer–colonized relational introject through and by which the colonized structures his or her reality and identity circulates colonial power differentials through the community of subaltern “equals” as well. Still, the fact that no perfect or pure equals exist to validate the subaltern’s speaking or being only invalidates Fanon’s insight in the abstract (anti)binary world of poststructuralist thought, where the subaltern is not a person or a group but a “space of difference” (Spivak, “Subaltern Talk” 293).

2.1.3.2 DECOLONIZATION AS FAILED DISALIENATION

In Chapter 5 of *Black Skin, White Masks*, “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon outlines for us a four-step Hegelian dialectic of decolonization as what he calls the “disalienation of the black man”:

1. *Black self-loathing*: “The black man among his own in the twentieth century does not know at what moment his inferiority complex comes into being through the other” (110).
2. *Negritude or black pride*: “So here we have the Negro rehabilitated, ‘standing before the bar,’ ruling the world with his intuition, the Negro recognized, set on his feet again, sought after, taken up, and he is a Negro—no, he is not a Negro but the Negro, exciting the fecund antennae of the world, placed in the foreground of the world, raining his poetic power on the world, ‘open to all the breaths of the world.’ I embrace the world! I am the world!” (127).
3. *Confoundation*: Sartre’s insistence in *Black Orpheus* that white supremacy is the thesis, negritude is the antithesis: “But this negative moment is insufficient by itself, and the Negroes who employ it know this very well; they know that it is intended to prepare the synthesis or realization of the human in a society without races. Thus negritude is the root of its own destruction, it is a transition and not a conclusion, a means and not an ultimate end” (quoted in Fanon, *Black Skin* 133).
4. *Violent revolution*: “The Negro is a toy in the white man’s hands; so, in order to shatter the hellish cycle, he explodes” (140).¹³

The “hellish cycle” of the Hegelian dialectic traps the “black man” in thetic recurrences, repetitions, replications: everything always comes back to the other-generated inferiority complex. “The elements that I used,” Fanon writes

of the construction of his own corporeal schema, “had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,’ but by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” (111)—and this weaving continues even in the romantic mythologies of negritude, certainly in Sartre’s snapping shut of the dialectic on the “black man’s” neck. And while in his later books, *A Dying Colonialism* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon romanticized revolution as a truly liberating purgation of that inferiorizing otherness,¹⁴ the history that Albert Memmi traces in *Decolonization and the Decolonized* would suggest that the white colonizer continues to weave the body of the black (former) colonized even in nationalist revolution, even in decolonization, even in independence.

We have important deconstructions of the Hegelian dialectic as colonialist prison, notably Hélène Cixous’s in *The Newly Born Woman*:

With the dreadful simplicity that orders the movement Hegel erected as a system, society trots along before my eyes reproducing to perfection the mechanism of the death struggle: the reduction of a “person” to a “nobody” to the position of “other”—the inexorable plot of racism. There has to be some “other”—no master without a slave, no economico-political power without exploitation, no dominant class without cattle under the yoke, no “Frenchmen” without wogs, no Nazis without Jews, no property without exclusion—an exclusion that has its limits and is part of the dialectic. (71)

“But why,” Robert Young asks in his commentary on this passage in the introductory chapter of *White Mythologies*, “this emphasis on Hegel?” His answer has to do with “the dominance of Hegelian Marxism from the thirties to the fifties” as “the particular context for the French poststructuralist assault”—the sense French intellectuals had in the 1960s and 1970s that “the dominant force of opposition to capitalism, Marxism, as a body of knowledge remains complicit with, and even extends, the system to which it is opposed. Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which uncannily simulates the project of nineteenth-century imperialism . . .” (3).

But then, to continue Young’s why-questioning, why “simulates”? Why “uncannily”? What is the specific relationship between Hegel’s philosophical articulation and nineteenth-century imperialism that makes it seem to Young a simulation, and what is the relationship between this simulation and our post-structuralist response to it that makes it seem uncanny? In “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906), the study with which Freud begins his 1925 essay

on the uncanny, Ernst Jentsch situates the uncanny in ontological judgments suspended aporetically between the living and the lifeless, or between the real and the artificial: “doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate and, conversely, doubt as to whether an apparently lifeless object may not be in fact be animate” (11). If we take Young to be referring to something like this ontological aporia in our response to Hegel, then “uncannily simulates” would suggest that Hegel’s dialectic is a mimetic iteration of the imperialism and racism of his day whose mimesis is aporetically *constitutive* of “reality” as we understand it, so enmeshed with the group construction of reality that it becomes impossible for us to distinguish between “history” and “Hegel,” or, by extension for Fanon, between “history” and “Sartre,” between one white Frenchman’s opinion and historical inevitability. But note that Jentsch specifically describes the aporetic effect of the uncanny as a group *affective* phenomenon: he wants to study “how the affective excitement of the uncanny arises in psychological terms” (8) and then explores those “psychological terms” along lines that seem predictive of object-relations psychology, where “objects” are not merely inert things but people and things as exosomata that seem to play an active role in the circulation of ideosomatic constructions of the familiar and the strange. Our “mistrust, unease, and even hostility” toward unfamiliar things, Jentsch writes, “can be explained to a great extent by the difficulty of establishing quickly and completely the conceptual connections that the object *strives* to make with the previous ideational sphere of the individual” (8, emphasis added).¹⁵ And so if what makes Hegel’s simulation uncanny is that it *feels* both real and strange—if “society” doesn’t just “*trot along before my eyes* reproducing to perfection the mechanism of the death struggle” but reproduces that mechanism in and through my own felt response to the world, my emotional and behavioral orientation to other people and to the “historical” events I read about in books—then the uncanny simulation is precisely a regulatory somatic exchange among Hegel-reading intellectuals, a circulation of somatic mimeses that blur the lines between Hegel and history because that somatomimetic circulation of Hegel is so thoroughly constitutive of history as we “know” it.¹⁶

This somatic exchange is much closer to the rhetorical surface in Fanon’s map of failed disalienation, which is explicitly grounded in a regulatory somatic exchange not just between Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre but also between black and white intellectuals in Fanon and Sartre’s day and after—between Fanon and Sartre, to put that differently, not just as individuals but as exemplary exosomatizations¹⁷ of the decolonizing stage of the Manichean colonizer-colonized encounter. Actually, Fanon explicitly identifies his reaction to Sartre’s book as part of a larger response among black intellectuals,

specifically the black zealots of *negritude*—“Jean-Paul Sartre, in this work, has destroyed black zeal” (135)—and leaves Sartre’s uncanny simulation or circulation of the ideosomatics of colonial racism in and through white intellectuals implicit. But how else but through such a white-(anti)colonizing-intellectual ideosomatic exchange do we explain the powerful effect that Sartre’s book had on Fanon, or on “black zeal”? Reading Sartre, Fanon feels discouraged, and “black zeal” in the world outside his head is thereby destroyed? “In all truth,” he writes, “in all truth I tell you, my shoulders slipped out of the framework of the world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground. Without a Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible for me to live my Negrohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I was damned. Jean-Paul Sartre had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man. Between the white man and me the connection was irrevocably one of transcendence” (138). What gives Jean-Paul Sartre this power over Fanon’s feeling of “the touch of the ground”? What makes that feeling-loss so viral that it spreads instantly and/or constantly to all “black men,” all former possessors of “black zeal”? Surely it is not a *transcendent* connection, unless by transcendent Fanon means simply transpersonal: it is a *felt* connection, a somatic exchange. Sartre has this power over Fanon because he is the (anti) colonialist, the colonizer who refuses, the French Marxist intellectual who makes a powerful ally and role model because he hates colonialism and racism but who remains nevertheless a colonizer, a regulatory channel of the ideosomatics of colonial inferiorization. But this also means that Fanon can assume, by the virality of somatic mimeticism, that Sartre’s de/recolonizing impact on him is circulated also through other black intellectuals—and, pushing Fanon’s reading to the next level, I can assume that this re/decolonizing somatic exchange is circulated through other white anticolonial intellectuals as well, me at least, perhaps (depending on your background and inclinations) you too. “And so it is not I who make a meaning for myself,” Fanon writes, “but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me” (134): somatic theory suggests that the “meaning that was already there” is the inferiorizing/imprisoning colonial dialectic, and the “there” is the somatic exchange, which constantly circulates that meaning through the group, rendering it always tangibly and pressingly *there*, near, under the skin.

2.1.3.3 CINEMATIC REPRESENTATION: *BINTA AND THE GREAT IDEA*

For a recent cinematic representation of that dialectic, let’s watch the 2004 film about a small rural village in southern Senegal, *Binta and the Great Idea*.

The film opens on a lake scene, with a Senegalese fisherman paddling toward shore in a dugout canoe. Binta (Zeynavou Diallo à Bignona), the six-year-old narrator, introduces him in a voiceover as her father Sabu Diatta (Agnile Sambou à Mampalago). As Sabu's canoe approaches the shore another man, Souleyman (Ismaila Hercule Diédhoiu à Bignona), rides up on his bike and helps him beach his canoe, and asks him how the fishing was. Sabu says (I will cite the English subtitles provided by Amparo Benedicto of La Luna Titra, a Madrid-based film-subtitling firm), "Can't complain, good fishing," but Souleyman looks in the catch basket and sees only seven or eight tiny fish, and makes a little speech: "I don't know if I can handle so much weight. That's a lot of basket for so few fish. In Europe they can catch tons of fish with a lot less effort. In one day a single *tubab* [European] can catch more fish than you could eat in your whole life. God gave them the brains and technique to build great inventions. Those people know what they're doing. We should learn from them." Then his watch alarm goes off, signaling noon, and he starts bragging about it, saying it's Swiss. As they walk back to the village, he tells Sabu about how Europeans fish with cranes, gigantic nets, and fish-finders.

On their way they pass a group of women working in a ricefield; in her voiceover Binta points out her mother Aminata Kamara (Fatua Drámé à Mampalago) and says she works in the ricefields "with the other mothers. Each one has a piece of land but they work together because they like to help each other and they like being together."

Then we cut to the School Teacher (Alphousseyni Gassama à Bignona) teaching the kids tolerance in groups, saying that they have to mix the black with the white, the big with the small, the girls with the boys, because "we respect each other, we accept our differences": "That's how we'll make our school. And when you grow up, that's how you'll make the world of tomorrow."

Next, as a girl rings the recess bell and the kids run outside, Binta introduces us to her cousin Soda (Aminata Sané à Oulampane), who isn't allowed to go to school. Soda walks up to the outside of the school fence with a load of firewood on her head and looks sad. And now the staging becomes complicated: we cut to a woman identified as Soda's mother Fatu (Diariétou Sané à Ziguinchor) and her little brother out on a mat in the yard, the mother sorting through some grains in a basket, the little brother sitting cross-legged reading something; but when Soda arrives, fake-crying, she is now played by a different actress (Annette Tida Sambou à Ziguinchor), and is wearing different clothes. We only gradually realize that some villagers (mostly children) have been organized to stage a key generational conflict in Soda's family for the whole village, Soda begging to go to school, her father refusing to let her; this is a rehearsal, but all through the film we cut back and forth between rehears-

als and the “real thing.” Soda’s mother-in-the-play says to Soda-in-the-play in a loud monotone: “Soda! Soda! Why did you take so long to bring the wood?” Soda throws down the wood and declaims: “Mother! I’m very tired! Very, very tired! Let me go to school like my little brother! I want to learn what is written in books,” and starts fake-crying again. The mother-in-the-play says, in the same loud monotone: “Soda! You know your father will never agree!”

And now the metacinematic intervention is escalated, the irruption of European postmodernity in the “primitive” world of the Senegalese village expanded: saying “All right, all right,” a man identified in the cast credits as “el Profesor del Teatro,” the Theater Teacher (Moustapha Coly à Ziguinchor), comes onscreen and tells them how to play the scene. “Acting means putting yourself in someone else’s skin,” he says, “to understand them better. You are in mother’s skin. You must understand how all mothers . . . how all mothers understand their children. She suffers. You must understand her. When you talk to her, you must speak with love and affection. Love and affection, you understand?” Mother: “Yes.” Theater teacher: “Okay? This works.” He walks off-screen. Mother to Soda: “We’ll wait till he comes.” An adolescent boy (Mohamed Sagna à Diabir) comes on bent over with a walking stick, made up as Soda’s father, saying: “Knock knock knock.” Mother to Soda: “It’s your father.” Father: “Knock knock knock.” Mother: “Yes, come in.” Father: “What’s going on here?” Cut to the Theater Teacher, who is wearing a brown shirt with a Caterpillar corporate logo on it and looking decidedly skeptical.

Cut to Binta’s mother Aminata nursing her baby, sitting next to Binta’s father Sabu on an outdoor bench. Aminata: “That’s not a good idea.” Sabu: “I can’t think of any other.” Aminata: “You’re crazy.” Sabu: “For thinking of the future?” Sabu sees Binta, picks her up, hugs her: “Binta, will you help me with my idea?” Binta’s voiceover: “My mommy says my daddy has birds in his head. I think that’s why he is so nice.” Cut to Sabu dictating to Binta: “Write: Thanks to my friend Souleyman, I heard about the amazing events happening in the world of the *tubabs*. Period. I am referring to, for example, the great geniuses that permit us to extract the maximum that the land has to offer. Period.”

Cut to Soda’s “real” mother (Awa Kéhé à Mampalago) first picking some fruit, then sitting with her basket of fruit by the side of the road. A truck-driver stops and blatantly cheats her, confusing her with simple multiplication and then giving her much less than he promises. Binta’s voiceover: “My aunt never went to school.”

Cut back to the rehearsal scene in the yard that we left earlier. Soda’s mother-in-the-play tells her Soda’s father-in-the-play that she got cheated because she doesn’t know math, begs him to let Soda go to school. Father: “This is Africa. Women must stay at home. When she grows up she will marry.

No school.” Another girl comes in, moving her fist as if knocking, saying hesitantly: “Knock knock knock.” Theater Teacher: “Stop. Stop. Open the door before you enter.” Girl: “There is no door.” Theater Teacher: “It’s true there is no door, but it’s unnecessary. With a little imagination, everything is possible.” Father: “Not everything. Fireworks, for example. Tell us how to make them without rockets.” Theater Teacher: “Of course you can make fireworks without rockets. What matters is having something to celebrate.”

Cut to some children dancing, first Binta, then a little girl with a metal peg for her left leg.

Cut to Sabu sealing the envelope of the letter Binta has been writing for him. Binta’s voiceover: “My daddy also heard from his friend Souleyman that apparently the *tubabs*, thanks to the incredible quantities of fish that they are able to catch, make so much profit that they don’t need to worry about each other.” Sabu gets in a donkey cart and rides away.

Cut to a sick old woman coughing in bed; “real” Soda is sweeping in the room when she sees a woman’s silhouette setting something down just outside the door-curtain; she goes out to find a basket of grain. The implication is that while Europeans don’t care for each other, Africans do.

After a montage of Sabu riding in the donkey cart and arriving at the Lieutenant Governor’s office, we see the Lieutenant Governor (Idrissa Diandy à Niaguls) laughing at the letter, but sending Sabu to the Civil Governor anyway.

Cut to Soda-in-the-play sweeping in the yard; she finds two colorful books, picks them up, looks at them; her mother sees her, asks her whether she’s done sweeping, Soda says she wants to go to school, Fatu says I’ll go tell your father. Cut to Soda’s “real” mother talking to Soda’s “real” father (Fanding Diandy à Niaguis). As they argue, “real” Soda edges up to the door to listen to them, and starts crying.

Cut to Sabu catching a bus. Binta’s voiceover: “There was a third thing that Souleyman told my father about the progress in the world of the *tubabs*.” Cut to Souleyman and Sabu sitting on a bench under a tree. Souleyman: “And all that wealth permits them to have the guns to fight against fear and losing their wealth. Take France, for example. They have the atomic bomb! More progress is impossible.” Sabu: “I think we should do something similar.” Binta says she thinks this was the precise moment when her father got his great idea.

After a montage of the bus driving along with its door open, with Binta’s voiceover telling us that Sabu is taking his letter to the Prefecture of Bignona, the capital of their province, we see the Civil Governor (Abdoulaye Coly à Bignona) reading aloud from his letter: “Therefore, and keeping in mind that if we follow the path shown to us by the First World, we risk that the children of our children will have no fish, no trees, no air . . . that the desire to acquire

wealth will make us lose from [*sic*] our sense of solidarity and our fear of losing our wealth . . .” Sabu finishes: “. . . will lead us to destroy each other.” Binta tells us in a voiceover that the Civil Governor sends Sabu to the Governor in Ziguinchor, the capital of the region.

Cut to the whole village gathered around a makeshift stage, where the girl and boy playing Soda and her father now finally perform the scene they have been rehearsing throughout, where she begs him to let her go to school and he refuses. Three more child actors playing Binta’s family arrive and talk to them. Binta and Soda are in the audience watching. Soda’s “real” parents are also watching, and laughing at the funny moments. As the other actors come up with reason after reason why Soda’s father should let her go to school, Soda’s “real” father in the audience begins to look troubled, and “real” Soda looks resentful.

After a montage of Sabu arriving in Ziguinchor, waiting and waiting to see the governor, we cut back to the makeshift stage and see a boy come out in Western clothes, with a backpack, looking like a university student: “A few years later. Let’s see what has become of the children.” Soda’s little brother is a French teacher; Binta is a doctor. Nobody has seen Soda in ages. We keep cutting to close-ups “real” Soda’s face, which shows more and more anger. Her “real” father cuts his eyes uneasily at her. Then Soda-in-the-play says she was married at 15 and has three children; she cries at this, and “real” Soda in the audience wipes her eyes: her surrogate’s tears on stage are contagious. The actors all line up to face the audience. Binta’s mother-in-the-play says to Soda’s father-in-the-play, look, my daughter’s a doctor, if you get sick she can cure you. Soda’s father-in-the-play comes out with his back to the audience, faces Soda on stage, and mumbles: “I’m very sorry. I didn’t understand.” A boy carrying a backpack steps forward and says: “Dear parents. Let your children go to school.” Soda-in-the-play steps forward and, while the others hum behind her, addresses the audience as “mother and father,” asking them why they didn’t let her go to school. As she goes on, “real” Soda stands angrily, trying to control herself. Finally she walks over in front of her “real” father, covering her teary eyes with her arm: “Father, I want to go to school. I don’t want to be ignorant like you.” Soda’s “real” father by now is very uneasy, almost frantic, but he says and does nothing, only half-shakes his head. “I want to go to school. You have no right to deny me my future. I want to be someone.” She walks away, and the audience explodes: “Let her go to school!” The boy playing Soda’s father walks up to Soda’s “real” father and shouts, pointing angrily: “Let her go to school! Who ever told you that in Africa women have to stay at home? Where is it written? This isn’t the Africa we want for ourselves. Let her go to school!” The whole audience is yelling at him, pointing at him, gesticu-

lating angrily—the movie’s most overwhelmingly obvious instance of ideosomatic counterregulation.

Cut to a secretary (Virginie Manga) coming out of the Governor’s office and asking if she can help Sabu. She lets him in, and the Governor (Yaya Mané à Ziguinchor) reads the letter while Binta’s voiceover reads the letter aloud: “This is why I’d like to request permission to adopt a *tubab* child. Already weaned, if possible, so that here he may develop as a person and acquire the knowledge necessary to be happy in our humble community.” Sabu chimes in, finishing his letter: “That way this boy, when he becomes a man, will be able to contribute to the development of humanity, which is of concern to us all.” The governor agrees, and we cut to a man pretending to throw fireworks up into the sky; the camera pans up the palm trees rapidly, suggesting imagined rockets shooting up into the sky, and as we see their fronds we hear explosions. The kids dance and laugh. Binta’s voiceover: “My daddy says that all the children in the world have the right to educate themselves in the spirit of friendship, tolerance, peace, and fraternity. All the children. Even *tubab* children. My daddy says we must learn from the behavior of birds. Birds are so intelligent that they take the best of the north and the best of the south.”

The credits roll, telling us in Spanish that the film was written and directed by Javier Fesser and produced by Luis Manso, and was “basada en una inquietud personal de Javier Fesser y Luis Manso”—based in a personal inquietude of its Spanish screenwriter/director and Spanish producer. We are also told that the film was made in collaboration with UNICEF Spain and UNICEF Senegal, the Senegalese Ministry of the Interior, and the Senegalese Ministry of Information and Pan-African Cooperation, and that its corporate sponsors include Panasonic, ICO Global Communications, Renfe (Spanish rail), TVE (Televisión Española), Comité Trust (a Madrid-based advertising agency), Madrid Film (the distributor), and others.

So the question is this: who is trying to do what to whom in and with this film? It seems clear that the film is a counterregulatory cluster: the School Teacher trying to infect his charges with a counterregulatory regime that sounds remarkably like Euro-American multiculturalist tolerance for diversity; the Theater Teacher trying to teach his actors a theatrical regime that will incite the village ideosomatically to counterregulate Soda’s father’s “African conservatism,” the rigid paternalism that would keep girls and women at home; Sabu and Souleyman developing between them an ad hoc Euro-African eclecticism that would “take the best of the north and the best of the south.” Unsurprisingly, given the film’s Spanish makers and corporate sponsors, the counterregulatory impulses that drive its message are by and large the best of the north: the multiculturalism, the feminism, the postmodern

metadrama, the veneration of European technology. The best of the south in Fesser's imagination is a romanticized "moral authority of the primitive"—the image of a rural Senegalese village as more communally caring and supportive than the wealthy and technologically advanced Europeans. Even this romanticism is couched in explicitly developmental terms, albeit at once personalized and universalized: Sabu wants the European child he adopts to be "already weaned, if possible, so that here he may develop as a person and acquire the knowledge necessary to be happy in our humble community. . . . That way this boy, when he becomes a man, will be able to contribute to the development of humanity, which is of concern to us all."

But who exactly is the target of this counterregulation? Almost certainly not African villages like Oulampane in southern Senegal, where the film was set and shot; among the "genius" gadgetry the villagers would need to watch it would be a DVD player and a TV set, not to mention electricity. The film stages a counterregulatory intervention in rural village life in Africa, but for whom? The "relevant constituencies" of the Senegalese Ministry of the Interior—i.e., the Senegalese elite? Spaniards, who watched the film on TVE, one of its sponsors? Americans, whose Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences nominated the film for its Best Live-Action Short Film Oscar in 2007? These all seem like far likelier target audiences for the film than "the former colonized," or "the subaltern"—but what do they get out of it?

The only plausible answer, it seems to me, is that they get the satisfaction of a *sham* counterregulation: the illusion of a decolonization that will bring Africans and other former colonized subjects out of postcolonial poverty and into conformity with First World norms—but *idealized* First World norms, romanticized First World norms, which is to say not capitalist rapacity but "the spirit of friendship, tolerance, peace, and fraternity" (that last a telling reminder of a bloody French Revolution). Counterregulated Africans will also have access to European technology, but will not use it to fight bloody civil wars; the technology will somehow have been rendered benign, technology that "will be able to contribute to the development of humanity, which is of concern to us all."

Another way of saying this is that the sham counterregulation staged in the film is intended to reassure its First World audiences, to "show" them that "development" is working, is truly developing the Third World: that the "primitivism" that remains in Africa is an unfortunate legacy of precolonial cultures, not of colonialism, of African tribal patriarchy rather than French Revolutionary *liberté, égalité, fraternité* (which continues to be presented as the counterregulatory solution); that this primitivism is now being successfully rooted out, and the former colonies are moving up the ladder toward the

First World ideal; and that this geopolitical upward mobility is transpiring in an ideally cooperative rather than competitive spirit, so as not to challenge First World economic and cultural hegemony in any way. It is, after all, only an idealized development, one that creates an illusory amelioration, the *impression* of amelioration in the First World viewer's eye. The illusion, we might say, is of a Noble Savage First World: romanticized primitives with Swiss watches on their wrists and contentment in their hearts, celebrating the fulfillment of their developmental dreams with imaginary fireworks. Presumably they then go home and watch this film on imaginary TVs and DVD players, and feel good about the interactive balance between the north and the south.

If we were to generalize from the *Binta and the Great Idea* model to all decolonizing pressures, we would want to say that the counterregulatory impact of colonization on both the colonizer and the colonized has been ideosomatically stabilized in both populations and in their relationships, and continues to generate such ideosomatic stabilizations long after the political end of colonial rule—and that such stabilizations entail both pressures not to change and reassuring exosomatic images of change in which the former colonized seem to become more like the former colonizer's idealized self-image while nothing substantive actually changes. In this light, decolonization might be defined as the ideosomatic manipulation of counterregulatory exosomata as part of a continuing need to stabilize the old colonial regulatory regimes—or, with a French colonial sigh: *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

2.2 THEORETICAL SPINS: POSTCOLONIAL AFFECT IN BHABHA AND SPIVAK

Contemporary postcolonial criticism, whatever its virtues, is also an elite affair, an expression of cultural conflict and contention within a global elite; former colonials who are integrated into the system no longer have any interest in criticism of the system of which they are part, but rather assert their new-found power through varieties of cultural nationalism. On the other hand, there is also an embarrassment or even pain in keeping alive memories of colonialism, or awareness of its legacies, as memories are likely to create cultural and psychological obstacles to assimilation into the system, while forgetting makes for easier assimilation—and acceptance.

—Arif Dirlik, “Rethinking Colonialism” (439–40)

In a note positioned at the end of the first sentence of that epigraph, Dirlik says he is thinking of critics like Leo Ou-fan Lee, whose 1999 book *Shanghai*

Modern to Dirlik's mind embodies the "cultural nationalism" and the "forgetting" he describes. He does not mention in his essay either Homi K. Bhabha or Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the two most famous and influential post-structuralists among the global elite that contend for the production of post-colonial knowledge;¹⁸ and indeed, elitist as both theorists unquestionably are, persistently as both have been attacked as "forgetters" of the painful legacies of colonialism, I want to argue in this final section of the Second Essay that both ultimately escape Dirlik's critique. Bhabha and Spivak may be abstract poststructuralist theorists, but they are also the two postcolonial theorists who are most determined to open up a space within the (anti)binary abstractions of their own poststructuralist thought for a phenomenological economy of affect; as such they are perhaps the most somatic of living postcolonial theorists, and thus the significant ground-breakers for my interventions in this book. To a large extent their tentative passing theorizations of affective economies are influenced by Deleuze and Guattari on the social machine as a body-without-organs, and by the Foucault of *The History of Sexuality* Volume One, both powerfully Nietzschean theoretical orientations that inform somatic theory as well, and that chart a radically different course for postcolonial theory from that abstract poststructuralist differentiability that would, say, thematize the subaltern as a "space of difference" (see §2.2.2.3).

While I will show in this section that the phenomenology of affective "economies" or "value-coding" is almost entirely buried in Bhabha and Spivak, however—almost crushed under the immaterial burden of poststructuralist abstraction—I do want to present my careful reading of their fairly rudimentary stabs at a somatics of postcoloniality as a *contribution* to somatic theory. Under no circumstances should my discussion of their thoughts be read as in any way dismissive.

2.2.1 Homi K. Bhabha

Homi K. Bhabha was born in 1949 to a Parsi family in Mumbai (formerly Bombay), India, and took his B.A. at the University of Mumbai before moving to the United Kingdom to take his M.A., M.Phil., and D.Phil. at Christ Church, Oxford. After working as a lecturer in the English department at Sussex University for ten years, he accepted a fellowship at Princeton and remained in the United States, doing visiting professorships at Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania, then accepting the Chester D. Tripp Professorship in the Humanities at the University of Chicago in 1997 and the Anne F. Rothenberg Professorship of English and American Literature at Harvard in 2001.

Bhabha's two essay collections of the 1990s, *Nation and Narration* (1990) and especially *The Location of Culture* (1994), secured his reputation in the top tier of postcolonial intellectuals worldwide; his densely brilliant poststructuralist rhetoric has helped establish *hybridity* as the critical slippage or leakage across key postcolonial binaries like the colonizer and the colonized, as indeed across any other cultural or linguistic barriers that previous postcolonial critics had tended to stabilize as well. In my discussion of Bhabha's explorations of postcolonial affect below, I'll be looking primarily at two essays from *The Location of Culture*, "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern" and "Sly Civility."

2.2.1.1 AFFECT ON THE MARGINS

In his 1994 essay "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of Agency," Bhabha famously sets up postcolonial cultures, especially what he calls "the transnational dimension of cultural transformation—migration, diaspora, displacement, relocation" (172)—as a hybrid marginal check on universalizing and naturalizing myths of cultural unity. "In this salutary sense," he argues, "a range of contemporary critical theories suggest that it is from those who have suffered the sentence of history—subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement—that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking. . . . The natural(ized), unifying discourse of 'nation,' 'peoples,' or authentic 'folk' tradition, those embedded myths of culture's particularity, cannot be readily referenced. The great, though unsettling, advantage of this position is that it makes you increasingly aware of the construction of culture and the invention of tradition" (172).

This is, of course, the same kind of utopian spin on cultural displacement that we saw Deleuze and Guattari and others placing on nomadism and migrancy in the First Essay (§1.3.1): yes, it's "unsettling" to be torn from home and community, to lose almost every communal and locational prop for identity and reality, to be physically and emotionally brutalized, or, in the colonial context, to suffer occupation and enslavement, marginalization and privation—but there's an upside to all that too, an "advantage." It makes you aware that what seemed so natural was only naturalized, that what seemed universal was only universalized. Bhabha does not elaborate on why and for whom this awareness is an advantage—whether it is only advantageous for the postcolonial intellectual ("It is from this hybrid location of cultural value—the transnational or the translational—that the postcolonial intellectual attempts to elaborate a historical and literary project" [173]) or whether there are also

advantages for the displaced themselves, the refugees, the colonized, the traumatized. A case could be made for the cognitive advantages to be gained by non-intellectuals from the denaturalizing of their loconormativities, advantages stemming from increased versatility or metanormativity in their allostatic responses to cultural displacement; one of the reasons Bhabha's utopian theory has been so heavily criticized is that he doesn't seem to be particularly interested in making that case, and so seems to be reveling in the intellectual advantages to *him* of other people's suffering, in the object lesson to be derived from postcolonial marginality against hegemonic Western constructions of sociopolitical reality.¹⁹

What I am suggesting, however, is that there is more going on in Bhabha's approach to postcolonial marginality than just this elitist theorizing—that nearly hidden in his abstract poststructuralist discourse is an extremely cautious, even *nervous*, move toward something vaguely approximating somatic theory. He hints at this move briefly in the opening lines of “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern,” the passage I quoted as an epigraph to my Preface: “There is even a growing conviction that the affective experience of social marginality—as it emerges in non-canonical cultural forms—transforms our cultural strategies” (172). There is, in other words, a circulatory or economic effect to affect: feelings, felt experience, can be socially, politically, and culturally transformative; what the marginalized feel and experience in being marginalized can be felt transformatively by “us” as well. Bhabha does not theorize any of this in his essay (or elsewhere), and so does not explore just how “the affective experience of social marginality” is transferred to “us,” leaving it entirely possible that the “transfer” is purely intellectual, of the object-lesson sort: we *study* “this hybrid location of cultural value” and draw the analytical implications from it for our “historical and literary project.” It is this “catachrestic” reading-between-the-lines of Bhabha's vague hints at a transfer of affective experience, obviously, that leads to the accusation that he is using other people's suffering as fodder for high-flown poststructuralist theory. The other reading, the somatic reading, that “we” feel “their” affect, that the somaticity of marginalization is not so much *studied* as *circulated*, would obviate the accusation of coldly intellectual opportunism; but it would presumably also leave Bhabha open to another kind of accusation, of imposing a universalizing and consensualizing “liberal vision of togetherness” (190) on the marginalized, of naively assuming that we're somehow “all in this together,” that “we” feel “their” pain because we're all one. That is the accusation I'm courting in this book, obviously—and Bhabha's reluctance to leave himself open to that accusation surely has something to do with his gigantic stature in the field.

Poststructuralist “differential” or “disjunctive” theories are much hipper than potentially liberal somatic ones.

It should be clear by this stage of my argument, however, that actually theorizing (rather than merely hinting at) the somatics of postcolonial culture opens up a counterhegemonic critique of liberal affective universalism; and perhaps I am projecting here, but it seems to me that Bhabha senses the same, at least as an inchoate theoretical directionality. He constructs his argument in “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern” negatively, of course, first theorizing discursive approaches to postcoloniality as a differential/disjunctive negation of unified myths of nation, culture, and identity;²⁰ and then arguing that this “language metaphor” itself “opens up a space where a theoretical disclosure is used to move beyond theory,” used to construct a “liminal form of signification that creates a space for the contingent, indeterminate articulation of social ‘experience’ that is particularly important for envisaging emergent cultural identities” (179). The scare-quoted word “experience” there is a back-reference to the “affective experience” broached in the opening lines of the essay; now that he is contingently and indeterminately attempting to articulate or theorize that experience, Bhabha has air-brushed affect out of the formulation and set articulations of experience up as a double negation of hegemonic unities, discursive theorizations arising on the negative margins of unity myths and liminal articulations of experience arising on the negative margins of poststructuralist discursivity. Because poststructuralist theory has rigged a thousand alarm bells around pre- or post-discursive concepts like “experience,” Bhabha instantly hedges—“But it is a representation of ‘experience’ without the transparent reality of empiricism and outside the intentional mastery of the ‘author’” (179)—and yet insists, finally dropping the scare quotes around “experience,” that “it is a representation of social experience as the contingency of history—the indeterminacy that makes subversion and revision possible—that is profoundly concerned with questions of cultural ‘authorization’” (179).

Bhabha’s examples of this “beyond theory” are taken from protosomatic thinkers like Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin, Barthes writing in *The Pleasure of the Text* of “the pulsional incidents [in a text], the language lined with flesh, a text where we can hear the grain of the throat, the patina of consonants, the voluptuousness of vowels, a whole carnal stereophony: the articulation of the body, of the tongue, not that of meaning, of language” (66–67, quoted in Bhabha, “Postcolonial” 180²¹), Bakhtin noting that “the utterance appears to be furrowed with distant and barely audible echoes of changes of speech subjects and dialogic overtones, greatly weakened utterance bound-

aries that are completely permeable to the author's expression" (quoted in Bhabha, 189). Tellingly, however, Bhabha almost exclusively cordons these hints at shared evaluative affect off into the quotations themselves, takes from Barthes and Bakhtin only the abstract binaries that will feed his post-structuralist habit and ignores the rest—ignores (and indeed tacitly affirms) Barthes's exoticization or orientalizing of the "eternal East,"²² for example, and neglects to mention that for Bakhtin those "barely audible echoes" are barely audible because mostly *felt*, that the "dialogic overtones" are affective (re)tonalizations and (re)attitudinalizations of *voice* that carry complexly collectivized saturations of evaluative accent. What remains of the Barthesian and Bakhtinian somatics of language are the "liminal forms of signification" that point binarily/negatively "beyond theory" and "outside the sentence," with no special inclination to explore that beyond and that outside:

To evoke this "beyond theory," I turn to Roland Barthes's exploration of the cultural space "outside the sentence." In *The Pleasure of the Text* I find a subtle suggestion that beyond theory you do not simply encounter its opposition, theory/practice, but an "outside" that places the articulation of the two—theory and practice, language and politics—in a productive relation similar to Derrida's notion of supplementarity. (179)

Barthes's daydream is supplementary, not alternative, to acting in the real world, Freud reminds us; the structure of fantasy narrates the subject of daydream as the articulation of incommensurable temporalities, disavowed wishes, and discontinuous scenarios. The meaning of fantasy does not emerge in the predicative or propositional value we might attach to being outside the sentence. Rather, the performative structure of the text reveals a temporality of discourse that I believe is significant. It opens up a narrative strategy for the emergence and negotiation of those agencies of the marginal, minority, subaltern, or diasporic that incite us to think through—and beyond—theory. (181)

Because "social experience" or "affective experience" is (figured as) a pleasurable daydream on the supplementary margins of symbolically structured sententiality, it functions in Bhabha's theory as a rupture in hegemonic structuring through which "those agencies of the marginal, minority, subaltern, or diasporic" can be made to seem—retroactively—to emerge. It is not a positivity that might be explored in its own right—that would smack of essentialization, perhaps—but a space of negativity that Bhabha labors to thematize

as a site of liberating retheorization. The “moment of displacement” that for Bhabha effects this emergence is not overtly affective or otherwise corporeal, but discursive, and so abstract:

The individuation of the agent occurs in a moment of displacement. It is a pulsional incident, the split-second movement when the process of the subject’s designation—its fixity—opens up beside it, uncannily *abseits*, a supplementary space of contingency. In this “return” of the subject, thrown back across the distance of the signified, outside the sentence, the agent emerges as a form of retroactivity, *Nachträglichkeit*. It is not agency as itself (transcendent, transparent) or in itself (unitary, organic, autonomous). As a result of its own splitting in the time-lag of signification, the moment of the subject’s individuation emerges as an effect of the intersubjective—as the return of the subject as agent. (185)

Note there that the *pulses* in Barthes’s “pulsional incidents,” which he associated with “language lined with flesh, where we can hear the grain of the throat”—the meaty metabolic pulses of the body, of partially verbalized body language, of blood circulation and respiration, of chewing and swallowing and digesting, “their materiality, their sensuality, the breath, the gutturals, the fleshiness of the lips, a whole presence of the human muzzle” (Barthes 67)—have now become “the split-second movement when the process of the subject’s designation—its fixity—opens up beside it,” “splitting in the time-lag of signification.” The pulsionality of signification is not, obviously, a materiality or a sensuality that can be corporeally felt; it can only be discursively theorized.

In his one attempt to work out the operation of his Lacanian theory of the time-lagged and therefore retroactive emergence of agency in a specific historical situation, however—his discussion of Ranajit Guha’s analysis of Sunil Sen’s remarks on the Tebhaga movement in Dinajpur—Bhabha tips his discursive hand more overtly toward a somatics of postcolonial agency, or what he calls “ambivalence at the point of ‘individuation’ as an intersubjective affect” (187). I take intersubjective affect there to mean shared feeling, but specifically the regulatory regime(s) of the somatomimetic exchange, the circulation of normative pressures and resistant counterpressures through a group; as we’ve been seeing, somatic theory does conceive individual identity and agency as group constructs, collective attributions circulated intersubjectively not only through each individual so constituted but also through the constitutive (initiating/ratifying) somatic economy of the group. And

as we saw in §2.1, in (post)colonial contexts of radical ideosomatic counterregulation we are obviously going to find “ambivalence” and “hybridity” in the collective somatization of identities, agencies, and realities: “In the face of hostile propaganda of the Muslim League and the provocation of the newly-formed Muslim National Guard, the Muslim peasants came to the Kisan Sabha, sometimes inscribing a hammer and a sickle on the Muslim League flag. Young maulavis addressed village meetings. Reciting melodious verse from the Koran they condemned the jotedari system and the practice of charging high interest rates” (Sen 49, quoted by Guha, 39, quoted by Bhabha, “Postcolonial” 187). Jostling here for leverage in the regulation of rebel behavior are several overlapping ideosomatic regimes, including at least traditional Muslim piety (the Koranic chanting), Islamic political activism (the Muslim League and its militant splinter group the Muslim National Guard), and Marxist agit-prop (the hammer and sickle, the economic protests).²³ Ranajit Guha thematizes this confluential competition among ideosomatic regimes as the “contradictions which are indeed the stuff history is made of” and rebel consciousness as therefore “self-alienated” (39), suggesting that overlapping ideosomatic regimes jostle for leverage in his theoretical imagination as well, postcolonial idealizations of indeterminacy not quite counterregulating an older nostalgic idealization of the pre-contradictory (foundational) truth and the pre-alienated (integrated) self. (Why else thematize polynormativity as “contradiction” and “alienation”?) Bhabha reads Guha’s thematization of the scene as very close to his own, indeed as “an emblem of my notion of agency in the apparatus of contingency—its hybrid figuring of space and time” (187), by which he means contingency as both “contiguity, metonymy, the touching of spatial boundaries at a tangent, and, at the same time, [as] the temporality of the indeterminate and the undecidable” (186). Bhabha insists that “representing social contradiction or antagonism in this doubling discourse of contingency . . . cannot be dismissed as the arcane practice of the undecidable or aporetic”—a weak protest against those who accuse him of celebrating the postmodern fractalization of the self and so militating against identity-political activism—because, he says, his model “enables us to conceive of strategic closure and control for the agent” (186). The only problem there is that by “closure and control for the agent” he means no agentic phenomenology, no practical organizational orientation to the world and to self shaped in individuals by groups, but the *philosophical* constitution of the “historically or contextually specific subject” (186), and thus once again a discursive formulation concluded and controlled not by the subject but by the theorist.

2.2.1.2 SLY CIVILITY

Bhabha takes up the topic of “affective ambivalence and discursive disturbance” (97) in an earlier chapter in *The Location of Culture* as well, “Sly Civility,” a 1985 essay devoted to a deconstruction of the rhetoric of liberal universalism in John Stuart Mill and other nineteenth-century British imperialists who preach liberty and democracy for all times and places—except, of course, the colonies, where “a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization” (Mill, quoted in Bhabha, “Sly” 96). The resulting “affective ambivalence and discursive disturbance” is obviously an example of the polynormative somatics of counterregulatory “colonizerization.”

The moment in Bhabha’s essay that I want to focus on, however, appears in his title and late in his argument, the concept of “sly civility,” which Bhabha borrows from an 1818 sermon by Archdeacon Potts: “If you urge them with their gross and unworthy misconceptions of the nature and the will of God, or the monstrous follies of their fabulous theology, they will turn it off with a *sly civility* perhaps, or with a popular and careless proverb” (quoted in Bhabha 99, emphasis in original). Bhabha thematizes this “off-turning” response as “the native refusal to satisfy the colonizer’s narrative demand,” noting that “the natives’ resistance represents a frustration of that nineteenth-century strategy of surveillance, the *confession*, which seems to dominate the ‘calculable’ individual by positing the truth that the subject *has* but does not *know*” (99, emphasis in original). But “sly civility” (or what African-Americans call “tomming”) is patently not just a “refusal to satisfy the colonizer’s narrative demand”: it is a refusal in the outward (kinesic) form of compliance, both “civility” (submission to the colonizer’s kinesic regime) and “slyness” (resistance to the colonizer’s narrative regime). Somatically speaking, Archdeacon Potts attempts to counterregulate the pagan colonized as/into Christians not just by “positing the truth that the subject *has* but does not *know*” but by “*urging* them with their gross and unworthy misconceptions,” etc., putting ideosomatic pressure on them to reject their own religion and convert to Christianity—and the colonized exert a surreptitious counterpressure, kinesically performing their indirect speech act of evasion or passive resistance under the cover of a direct speech act of acquiescence.

Indeed, the passage from Freud’s “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” that Bhabha takes as his epigraph and uses to interrogate native sly civility is equally saturated with somaticity, with obsessive paranoid readings of the somatic exchange:

They [the paranoid], too, cannot regard anything in other people as indifferent, and they, too, take up minute indications with which these other, unknown, people present them, and use them in their “delusions of reference.” The meaning of their delusions of reference is that they expect from all strangers something like love. But these people show them nothing of the kind; they laugh to themselves, flourish their sticks, even spit on the ground as they go by—and one really does not do such things while a person in whom one takes a friendly interest is near. One does them only when one feels quite indifferent to the passer-by, when one can treat him like air; and, considering, too, the fundamental kinship of the concepts of “stranger” and “enemy,” the paranoiac is not so far wrong in regarding this indifference as hate, in contrast to his claim for love. (quoted in Bhabha 93)

Those “minute indications” are, of course, body language—laughter, gestures (flourishing their sticks), spitting—read and felt (correctly, Freud says) as signs of inner body states, as emotional indifference and thus as the opposite of the love the paranoiac needs and expects. Similarly, Bhabha argues, the native “urged” by the “paranoid” colonizing missionary indifferently refuses “to unify the authoritarian, colonialist address within the terms of civil engagement[, which] gives the subject of colonial authority—father *and* oppressor—another turn” (100). As I’ve been suggesting, the native in this encounter both agrees *and* refuses “to unify the authoritarian, colonialist address within the terms of civil engagement,” which gives the subject of colonization—child and victim—yet another turn. Bhabha writes:

The authoritarian demand can now only be justified if it is contained in the language of paranoia. The refusal to return and restore the image of authority to the eye of power has to be reinscribed as implacable aggression, assertively coming from without: *He hates me*. Such justification follows the familiar conjugation of persecutory paranoia. The frustrated wish “I want him to love me,” turns into its opposite “I hate him” and thence through projection and the exclusion of the first person, “He hates me.”

Projection is never a self-fulfilling prophecy; never a simple “scapegoat” fantasy. The other’s aggressivity from without, that justifies the subject of authority, makes that very subject a frontier station of joint occupation, as the psychoanalyst Robert Waelder has written. Projection may compel the native to address the master, but it can never produce those effects of “love” or “truth” that would center the confessional demand. If, through projection, the native is partially aligned or reformed in discourse, the fixed hate

which refuses to circulate or reconjugate, produces the repeated fantasy of the native as in-between legality and illegality, endangering the boundaries of truth itself. (100)

Obviously, yes, in diagnosing what he takes to be the “sly civility” of the natives Archdeacon Potts is reading their body language; and it may well be that Bhabha’s mapping of Freud on paranoia onto the cleric’s construction of that body language is, if not accurate (for how would we ever know?), at least useful. On the surface, all the Archdeacon wants to do is to convert the native to Christianity; how do we then go about constructing what he wants below that surface? We read *his* body language—and because he is physically absent to us, long dead, in fact, that means reconstructing his kinesic body somatomimetically, and reading our reconstruction. We see him urging the natives, pressing them, seeking to overwhelm their resistance with a swarm of partially verbalized somatic aggression; and we see his frustration when they do not respond as he expects, when they respond with incomplete conformity to his counterregulatory pressures. Bhabha wants to push past this level of somatomimetic reconstruction, into the realm marked off by Freud in his remarks on paranoia—wants to feel in the Archdeacon’s initial body state a paranoid desire for love that, thwarted, is converted to hatred and projected outward onto the “refusenik” native. This seems extreme to me—surely what the Archdeacon wants from the natives is more submission than love?—but there’s really no arguing here, as Bhabha and I both base our readings of the Archdeacon’s body states on our own competing somatomimetic reconstructions.

Where I think there is ground for argument, however, is Bhabha’s reading of the “frontier station of joint occupation.” If that frontier station is the somatic exchange, the circulation of somatomimeses, then it is not so much *projection* that compels the native to address the master as it is the circulation of ideosomatic power, sociopolitical power channeled somatically through the Archdeacon’s body language into the native, who feels the power and responds accordingly, civilly: reproduces the Archdeacon’s English Christian civility-pressures in his or her own body and displays them outwardly in the body language of submissive politeness. This is a partial alignment or reformation of the native not only in discourse, but in outward kinesic behavior as well.

What bothers me about Bhabha’s reconstruction of this encounter, however, is that the native doesn’t participate in it, except to refuse. Bhabha’s native is a mere picture of “refusal,” not a subject or an agent at all. Bhabha maps out a similar reading, in fact, in “Articulating the Archaic”: “In these instances of social and discursive alienation there is no recognition of master and slave,

there is only the matter of the enslaved master, the unmastered slave” (131). Here too Bhabha presents the enslavement of the master as a positivity that can be theorized and the slave’s subjectivity as a simple blank negativity: *unmastered*. Ironically enough, what Bhabha is doing in denying the post-colonial applicability of the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is *recuperating* that dialectic for the master, for the master’s need for recognition from the slave, in tacit rejection of Fanon’s insistence in *Black Skin, White Masks* that Hegel was wrong: “I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work” (220n8). And, of course, he is completely ignoring Hegel’s master–slave dialectic for the slave, the topic of Fanon’s seventh chapter.²⁴

It seems to me a relatively uncontroversial assumption that the colonized’s partial kinesic alignment with the colonizer’s ideosomatic pressures displaces him, counterregulates her—that in fact it is *impossible* to remain as blank and somatically unavailable as Bhabha seems to want to make these natives. The frontier station of joint occupation transforms not just the colonizer, as Bhabha seems to want to see it, but what Abdul JanMohamed calls the Manichean *relationship* between the colonizer and the colonized, and thus the identities, agencies, realities of both. And for any kind of discussion of the counterregulatory pressures channeled into decolonization, it would seem indispensable to me to theorize that key word “sly”: the telling deregulatory pressures with which the native idiosomatizes his or her civility, the strategic contamination of submissive civility not just with refusal but with a counter-ideosomatic response aimed at minutely but significantly decolonizing (counterregulating) the frontier station of joint occupation.

As Bhabha reads the encounter, both the “slyness” and the “civility” are the colonizer’s paranoid projections, love-and-hatred fantasies that situate the native “in-between legality and illegality, endangering the boundaries of truth itself.” And while it’s certainly true that we have no direct access to the native’s body states—that any reconstruction of the encounter we undertake will be based on the Archdeacon Potts’s verbal report—so what? We never have direct access to *anyone’s* body states, even our own; all we ever have is somatomimetic reconstructions. Bhabha’s strategy of restricting his analysis to the “paranoia” of the Archdeacon Potts and denying the reconstructed native even a vestige of somatomimetic agency is a *choice*, and in fact a choice that seems punitive to me, motivated less by a desire to open up a utopian decolonizing moment in the encounter than by an unrecognized somatic mimesis of what he takes to be the Archdeacon’s paranoid construction of the native, a projec-

tion of Bhabha's own postcolonial love-thwarted-into-hatred onto this long-dead colonizer. But then, as Freud says, "the paranoiac is not so far wrong in regarding this indifference as hate, in contrast to his claim for love."

2.2.2 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Born Gayatri Chakravorty in 1942 to middle-class parents in Kolkata (Calcutta), capital of West Bengal, India, Spivak took an undergraduate degree at the University of Kolkata in 1959 and then moved to the United States for graduate work, taking an M.A. in English at Cornell and then working on her Ph.D. (writing a dissertation on Yeats, directed by Paul de Man) while teaching at the University of Iowa. Her 1976 English translation of Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology*—and especially her brilliant 100-page introduction to that translation, which taught many English speakers, including me, how to read Derrida—brought her to national and international prominence; but it was her work with the Subaltern Studies group in the 1980s, especially her provocative 1985/1988 essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (see §2.2.2.3), that made her one of the most respected postcolonial intellectuals in the world. Her books include *In Other Worlds* (1987), *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (1993), *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999), *Death of a Discipline* (2005), *Other Asias* (2007), and the compilations *The Post-Colonial Critic* (1990) and *The Spivak Reader* (1995). She has continued to work as a translator in recent years as well, translating the contemporary Bengali writer Mahasweta Devi (*Imaginary Maps* [1994], *Breast Stories* [1997], *Old Women*, [1999], and *Chotti Munda and His Arrow* [2002] and the eighteenth-century Bengali poet-saint Ramproshad or Ramprasad Sen (*Song for Kali* [2000]); one of Mahasweta's novellas will serve as this essay's literary representation in §2.2.2.4.

Spivak describes herself as a Marxist, feminist, and deconstructionist, and in many ways each of those three methodologies corrects and complicates the other two, her Marxism leading her to ground discussions of "woman" and "discursive formations" in economic and class contexts, her feminism problematizing the male-oriented narratives of Marxism and playful antinarratives of deconstruction, and her poststructuralism making her profoundly suspicious of the (strategic) essentializing impulse that drives her identity politics as a Marxist and a feminist. Perhaps as a result, she is also always profoundly self-conscious about her own subject position as an elite postcolonial intellectual, ensconced at a prestigious university (Columbia) in the most powerful and predatory neocolonial country on the planet, and repeatedly undercuts her own positionings by laying bare her own interpretive strategies.

Spivak's interest in postcolonial affect seems to come out of something like this confluence of ideological and methodological orientations as well: out of her poststructuralist/Marxist interest in (but also profound skepticism toward) Deleuze and Guattari's retheorization of Marx on value in terms of desire, on the one hand, and her feminist interest in the female subaltern's body on the other. Like Bhabha, however, Spivak remains deconstructively wary of affect and extradiscursive "experience" in general, and her caution stunts her theoretical forays into affective value-coding, lets them languish in unexamined forms borrowed from liberal-humanist individualism, Cartesian mind-body dualism, and patriarchally hierarchized male-female divisions of psychosocial labor. I'll be looking at her tentative explorations of postcolonial affect in four subsections: her discussions of affective value-coding in several key essays from the 1990s, her discussion of Kant's "raw man" in his theorization of the sublime in *Critique of Judgment* in her own 1999 book *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, the controversial essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?," and her reading of Mahasweta Devi's novella "Douloti the Bountiful" in "Woman in Difference."

2.2.2.1 AFFECTIVE VALUE-CODING

In her 1992 autobiographical piece "Asked to Talk about Myself . . .," Spivak writes:

Experience is a staging of experience. One can only offer scrupulous and plausible accounts of the agencies or mechanics of staging. Chance and randomness are not to be ignored, yet cannot be accounted for. "What is it to stage?" "what is it to be staged?" are questions prior to, so to speak, broader, as it were, than "what is it to perform (being performed?)," "what is it to act (acting out)?" Most thinking about action allows room for some thought of staging. Deconstruction radicalizes it, repeatedly failing to account for it in a place where success is hard to tell from failure.

One of the most tenacious names as well as strongest accounts of the agency or mechanics of staging is 'origin.' I perform my life this way because my origin stages me so: national origin, ethnic origin. And, more pernicious, you act this way because your origin stages you so. The notion of origin is as broad and robust and full of affect as it is imprecise. History lurks in it somewhere. And, even when we have gone around the claim to identity or essence, the question of origin does not disappear, as witness ideas of class origin, where class is clearly seen as a social inscription rather

than a human essence. My remarks here will also suggest that the question of origin is merely displaced when we answer it to ascribe available ways of instantiation for the performance of our sexual staging. To feel one is from an origin is not a pathology. It belongs to the group of groundings, mistakes that enable us to make sense of our lives. But the only way to argue for origins is to look for institutions, inscriptions and then to surmise the mechanics by which such institutions and inscriptions can stage such a particular style of performance. (9)

In the repeated phrase “the agency or mechanics of staging,” I imagine that I understand what Spivak mean by the agency of staging, but wonder about the mechanics. Are we talking wires and pulleys? How do we get to those mechanics from the embodied staging of experience, sexuality, and feelings/affects about origins? Is Spivak suggesting a machine-metaphorics of embodied staging, along the lines of Deleuze and Guattari’s social machine as a body-without-organs? Or is she differentiating between two orders or regimes of staging, one embodied, with agency, the other institutionalized, with mechanics? “The agencies *or* the mechanics of staging”?

In any case her insistence on “staging” here seems to adumbrate something like an ideosomatic perspective on performativity, on action as embodied performativity: when we act, when we perform our sexuality or our feeling that we are “from an origin,” our performance is staged by someone or something else, some extrapersonal force that we do not understand, that may be partly “chance or randomness” but feels organized, directed, feels like a director’s guiding hand, and seems to flow dispositionally out of our past (“origins”) through our present into an organized future. Unlike Bhabha, Spivak approaches these questions phenomenologically, from the point of view of one caught up in these flows, these apparent organizations or stagings of our performances, and from that point of view is unwilling to theorize the “institutions and inscriptions [that] can stage such a particular style of performance”—indeed is eager to categorize our sense that our lives are being staged as grounding “mistakes,” mistakes presumably because she assumes there is no such staging force, but *useful* mistakes that are “not a pathology” because they “enable us to make sense of our lives.” That this sense-making is apparently individualistic, trapped in an isolated perspective from which collective groundings or stagings look like “mistakes,” suggests that Spivak is not inclined to theorize embodiment, performativity, agency, affect, and staging ideosomatically—but clearly, here, she has an intimation of ideosomaticity.

Later in that autobiographical essay, in fact, she restages a pivotal event in her life when, in 1981, a ten-year close friendship with a Roman Catholic

man came to an end and she went to a psychoanalyst to deal with her “deep sense of loss, not the least of which was a sense of myself as a violent person” (13). Spivak and her analyst spent a good deal of time talking about the Hindu goddess Kali, “who punished with a violence that she enjoyed”; the analyst ended by asking her “how can a man brought up with the blessed virgin be able to understand that there can be this model of female violence that is loved and honoured?” (14). At the time, Spivak found this staging of her Hindu origins “helpful,” consoling; later she began to chafe against it, “as if I too were a monotheist who had organized my self image” (15). In her attempts to work through the complexities that begin to emerge for her out of these conflicted stagings of her origins, Spivak repeatedly invokes group constructions, cultural organizations of reality, sidles up to the shaping impact they may or may not have had on her orientations to the world, and then shies away—as in fact she does in presenting the analyst’s invocation of Kali and the Virgin. The apparent double-voicing of “there can be this model of female violence that is loved and honoured” is problematic in several ways, one of which is that by reporting the analyst’s words through free-indirect narration Spivak seems to collectivize the utterance, to make it emerge from what Julia Kristeva calls intersubjectivity or intertextuality and I would call the somatic exchange, but without theorizing (or apparently even noticing) the crucial Bakhtinian blurring of the lines between collective and individual agency. Another is that her polyphony grammatically elides or evades the question of the ontology and disseminatory channel of the model of Kali and the love and the honor attached to that model, in both the depersonalized existential construct “there can be” and the depersonalized passive construct “that is loved and honoured”: there can be *where*? Loved and honored *by whom*? Are the model and the love and the honor in her head and violent body only, or in her parents’ and siblings’ heads and bodies as well, or “in” “the culture” of Calcutta Hinduism? And what does it mean to be both “in” that culture and “in” the heads and embodied performative orientations of Calcutta Hindus? The notion of the somatic exchange offers one explanation of the circulation of ideosomatic approval responses like “love” and “honor” for a punishing goddess image through the group of Calcutta Hindus, including Spivak’s family; Spivak’s “there can be” would appear to reflect an unwillingness to push her theorization in that direction. Her subsequent resistance to the analyst’s formulation, “as if I too were a monotheist who had organized my self image,” seems on the face of it to be an attempt to problematize the “I” and the “my” and the “self” of “I . . . had organized my self image”—an attempt to explore the group organization of self-image—but as it turns out Spivak is really only

interested in the problematics of the “monotheist moment” which “is never far away, it does not supervene” (15).

Spivak returns to the problematic of affect in several essays in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (1993), but, with the exception of a single essay that I want to read more carefully in §2.2.2.4—“Woman in Difference”—she does not really develop it there either. In “Marginality in the Teaching Machine,” for example, she cites the extension of Marx’s argument from value to affect that Deleuze and Guattari made in *Anti-Oedipus*: “they called it ‘desire,’ a word fully as misleading as ‘value’” (62), misleading, as she tells us in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999), “because of its paleonymic burden of an originary phenomenal passion” (105). “Their suggestion was that,” she explains in *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, “since capital decoded and deterritorialized the socius by releasing the abstract as such, capitalism must manage this crisis via many reterritorializations, among which the generalized, *psychoanalytic* mode of production of affective value operates by way of a generalized systemic institution of equivalence spectacular in its complexity and discontinuity” (62). By the *Critique*, the problem has become that Deleuzian desiring-production is too diffuse to be of much analytical use: “By the time one gets to call the effects of all the desiring-machines everywhere *anything*—capital, or nature, or despot—a good deal of inaccessible coding has already taken place. To quote Derrida, this inaccessible is the undecidable through which all decisions must cut. For there is of course a tremendous political difference between the name being capital, or despot, or yet nature” (106). Because desire as “originary phenomenal passion” can be produced and channeled and organized (value-coded) in a wide variety of ways, or rather because desiring-production can be *named* in terms of a wide variety of paraphenomenal effects, ultimately as anything anywhere, its coding is inaccessible to us, undecidable, and nothing else needs to be said about it. But—really? This seems rather hastily dismissive. If desiring-production is value-coded as capital, it produces the capitalist body-without-organs; if it is value-coded as nature, as the environment, it produces the Earth or Gaia as body-without-organs. How is this coding inaccessible or undecidable? Spivak’s deflection of Deleuzian desiring-production into the analytical abyss seems like an avoidance reaction to what I take to be the key question: what *is* affective value? How is it produced and disseminated, deterritorialized and reterritorialized? My own theorization of the somatic exchange is heavily influenced by *Anti-Oedipus*, which I read some time in the early 1980s, a few years before I began to theorize somatic response, so I know how *I* would read the production and dissemination of affective value—the somatomimetic circulation of evaluative

(approval/disapproval) body language and body states within the group for purposes of the normative regulation of social behavior, identity, and reality—but is this how Spivak understands it as well? It is impossible to tell, as she never comments on the term, never even uses it in a context specific enough to enable her reader to guess at how she’s using it. Later in “Marginality” she characterizes patriarchy as “traffic in affective value-coding,” and opposes that to neocolonialism, which unpacks as “traffic in epistemic-cognitive-political-institutional value-coding” (76)—but does this imply that affective value-coding does not circulate through epistemic-cognitive-political-institutional value-coding? Is patriarchy for Spivak all affect and neocolonialism all the cognitive coding of political and institutional epistemes? Does the affective value-coding of patriarchy not also create and alter conditions of economic exploitation? Does a neocolonial power like the United States not attempt to saturate epistemic-cognitive-political-institutional value-coding with positive affective value-coding? And do the opponents of neocolonialism not attempt to recode negatively the affective value of U.S. “interests” and the policies and activities designed to protect those interests? I’m assuming Spivak would agree that the middle ground between the two poles of her casual binary is awash with overflows from each side; but she doesn’t notice that there is a theoretical problem with her binary formulation, so she does not explore it further.

2.2.2.2 THE RAW MAN

The other significant discussion of postcolonial affect in *A Critique of Post-colonial Reason* comes at the other end of her first chapter, “Philosophy,” the beginning, where Spivak walks us through a close reading of specific telling passages in Kant, Hegel, and Marx that invoke the figure of the colonized in passing as an early stage in a strategic teleologization. In Kant the first such passage is this one from the *Critique of Judgment*:

That the mind be attuned to feel the sublime [*Die Stimmung des Gemüts zum Gefühl des Erhabenen*] postulates a susceptibility of the mind for ideas. For in the very inadequacy of nature to these latter, and thus only by presupposing them and by straining the imagination to use nature as a schema for them, is to be found that which is terrible to sensibility and yet is attractive. [It is attractive] because reason exerts a dominion over sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit* “sensuality, carnality, animality”] in order to extend it in conformity with its proper realm (the practical) and to make it look out into

the infinite, which is for it an abyss. In fact, without development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture [*Kultur*], call sublime presents itself to the uneducated man [*dem rohen Menschen*] merely as terrible. In the indications of the dominion of nature in destruction, and in the great scale of its might, in comparison with his own is a vanishing quantity, he will only see the misery, danger, and distress which surround the man who is exposed to it. (§29; *Judgment* 104–5, *Urteilkraft* 111)

Der rohe Mensch is literally “the raw man,” “raw” as in “rude” or “rough” or “uncouth,” “man” in the old patriarchal sense, “man” as a normatively male and in German grammatically masculine “human being.” Spivak’s critique pushes Kant into the realm of subalternity by posing three questions: whether the raw man can ever be female, whether the raw man can ever be educated or cultured or “cooked,” and how the European conception of the raw man is shaped by colonialism. She writes:

Those who are cooked by culture can “denominate” nature sublime [*erhaben nennen*], although necessarily through a metalepsis [“that substitutes respect for the object for respect for humanity (in the subject)”]. To the raw man the abyss comes forth [*erhaben vorkommen*] as merely terrible. The raw man has not yet achieved or does not possess a subject whose *Anlage* or programming includes the structure of feeling for the moral. He is not yet the subject divided and perspectivized among the three critiques. In other words, he is *not yet* or *simply not* the subject as such [emphasis added], the hero of the *Critiques*, the only example of the concept of a natural yet rational being. This gap between the subject as such and the not-yet-subject can be bridged under propitious circumstances by culture. As Freud noted, the transformation of the abyss (of nature’s infinity) from fearful to sublime through the supplementing mediation of reason—a violent shuttling from *Abgrund* to *Grund*—bears more than a resemblance to the Oedipal scene. (*Critique* 14–15)

Spivak notes that the raw man for Kant includes “specifically the child and the poor [and] can accommodate the savage and the primitive” (13), and constitutes in his normative maleness a *not-yet*-subjectivity that “under propitious circumstances” can be brought to full *as-such*-subjectification by culture—an ameliorative (“bring them up to our level”) or counterregulatory regime that is associated historically with liberalism in Europe and paternalism in the colonies. To the extent that the raw man is a woman, however, she is, Spivak says, foreclosed in Kant as “naturally uneducable,” irredeemably *roh* or raw—

uncookable, as it were, or unculturable no matter how much you cook her. The raw man, therefore, is *not yet* the subject as such; the raw woman, and especially the female subaltern, is *simply not* the subject as such. That last, the *female subaltern simply not*, is the *terminus ad quem* of Spivak's argument not just because she is a postcolonial feminist, but because she is a poststructuralist postcolonial feminist—because she needs the binary negation *simply not* in order to open up an aporetic break or rupture within Kant's idealized subject of judgment through the exclusion of the colonial other: “The aporia between the discontinuous texts of the raw man and the subject as such should make Kant's critique of judgment unreadable in the strictest sense. Its readability is bought by ignoring the aporia, passing through it by way of the axiomatics of imperialism” (34). It becomes possible to define (European male) culture as judgment only through the exclusion or abjection of the (non-European and ideally also non-male) subaltern—which, as Spivak suggests out of Derrida's deconstruction of Kant in “Economimesis” (21), is to the body politic of reason and transcendental idealism as vomit is to its body organic. Vomit is never “not yet” the subject as such; it is always “simply not” the subject as such.

The significant thing about Spivak's argument from the standpoint of somatic theory is that the differential “simply not” that she denominates as subalternity is ideally abstracted out of the realm of affect, while Kant's “not yet,” his notion that the raw man may one day be subjectified to judgment by culture, is saturated in affect. Kant insists that we will not be able to *feel* the sublime (“zum *Gefühl* des Erhabenen”) until our minds are “attuned” to it: he writes in German of “die Stimmung des Gemüts,” from *die Stimme* “voice,” in the sense of adjusting a musical instrument till it emits the right “voice” or sound. When he insists that the mind must be attuned to be susceptible or receptive to “ideas,” therefore, he means susceptibility not to *der reine Vernunft* or pure reason but to imagistic mappings or schematizings of those feelings. Nature, he says, is inadequate to these mappings: we only find our way to those specific blendings of pain and pleasure that we call the sublime by “straining the imagination to use nature as a schema for them.” Indeed he tells us in the previous section that sublimity “does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that we are superior to nature within, and therefore also to nature without us (so far as it influences us)” (104). This consciousness of “our” superiority to “nature within” is specifically not the “dominion” that reason exerts over “sensibility”—*die Sinnlichkeit* or sensuous experience, the world of feeling and sensation—but the *feeling* of reason's dominion over feeling, a *felt* superiority, and in that sense, as we saw in connection with Ngũgĩ on racism in the Preface, not

necessarily (all that) conscious. Another way of putting this is that the feeling Kant is theorizing as the productive mental power that generates sublimity is a feeling of mind emerging out of body, a feeling of mental images and ideas struggling to be free of feelings—a movement in the body-becoming-mind to which “we” must be counterregulatorily attuned by “culture” (*Kultur*), which is to say, by the iterosomatizing pressures of the group. The raw man is regulated by his or her own group to experience “the indications of the dominion of nature in destruction, and in the great scale of its might,” as danger, and thus to feel terror; the raw man becomes the cultured man or woman through a process of being iterosomatically “cooked,” gradually counterregulated to experience that terror metanormatively as attractive, as thrilling in her or his imagistic mastery of its somatic power, and therefore as sublime.

What Kant offers us here, in other words, is a protosomatic theory of “reality” as regulated (constructed and maintained) collectively by “culture,” by the ideosomatics of the group. His insistence that the “reality” of the sublime “does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind,” and specifically in the somatic body-becoming-mind, is one founding principle of social-constructivist somatic theory, that reality is an ideosomatically regulated group construct; his insistence that individuals must be “attuned” to this group reality-construct is another, the philosophical basis of the notion that we are not subject(ifi)ed to regulatory group norms instantly but must undergo a long iterative somatization to them. In this context, the raw man is simply an out-grouper, someone who has not yet been iterosomatized as a member of the dominant (“cultured” or “cooked”) group.

2.2.2.3 SPEAKING (OF) SUBALTERNITY

One way of reading Spivak’s recurring insistence on the abstract differential binary as the key to subalternity, in fact, is that she is attempting to protect the subaltern out-grouper *against* affect, against a certain specific patronizing (power-laden) affect, the shared evaluative affect of (neo-/de)colonizing Western ameliorative liberalism, which sets a high affective price for group membership: allow yourself to be ideosomatically counterregulated by us or be invisible and inaudible to us. Certainly Kant’s remark on the raw man is saturated with a regulatory contempt that is redolent of the missionary school or the teacher’s college. Perhaps binary logic, given a poststructuralist spin, will provide a safe haven? If we reduce the argument between “not yet” and “simply not” to an affect/logic binary, so that the “yet” has evaluative/regulatory affect as its entelechy and the “simply” signals logical simplification as the exclusion

of affect, then the “not yet” becomes a form of group directional (counterregulatory) pressure, while the “simply not” marks out a reassuringly stable and indeed almost mathematical absence or lack—though of course (this is the poststructuralist spin) it is also an absence of absence, a lack of lack, an abyssal negation of the very binarizing instance that negates, and therefore ultimately not stable at all. Still, the desomatized subaltern would seem to be ideally protected from the counterregulatory designs of the neocolonizing First World, the colonizing Second World, and the decolonizing Third World.

And indeed Spivak’s most famous essay, the 1983 lecture that was first published in 1985 as “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sacrifice,” reprinted in a longer and more complexly argued form in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg’s *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, and finally revised and reprinted in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, does seem to emerge out of something like this protective gesture: Spivak was tired of postcolonial intellectuals pretending to speak for the subaltern and wanted somehow to situate the subaltern in a space ideally shielded from such appropriations. Such a protected space is of course the “space of difference” (*Critique* 271n118) that defines subalternity as the shifting negated opposite of whatever Western intellectuals want it to be, and specifically as an idealized instance of (post)colonial disenfranchisement that *cannot* be heard by power elites: “if the subaltern can speak,” Spivak writes in “The New Historicism,” “then, thank God, the subaltern is not the subaltern any more” (283); or, as she tells Howard Winant in a 1990 interview, “the subaltern is the name of the place which is so displaced . . . that to have it speak is like Godot arriving on a bus” (“On the Politics” 91). Being heard by the power elite instantly desubalternizes the subaltern—but so presumably does being heard by other members of the erstwhile “subaltern” group, who also cease to be subaltern the instant no member of a power group is around to not-hear them.

To the extent that subaltern differentiality is intended or taken to work as a kind of epistemological guerilla theater, in which Laozi’s “the dao that can be spoken is not the dao” becomes a playful cloaking device or shell game designed to mislead and distract the hegemonic reader, Spivak is arguably engaged in a Derridean or Deleuzean project that privileges intellectual play over (say) the economics of oppression. But this is precisely the project against which Spivak warns us in her article (in its 1988 incarnation):

It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or

critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary—not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a radical discovery [“nomad thought”] that should make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence that separate our “classes” descriptively) as a piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly help in securing “a new balance of hegemonic relations.” (280)

She cannot, therefore, protect subalternity from Western counterregulation simply by *hiding* it discursively, by dislocating it trickily; she has to *locate* it, say something positive about it, essentialize it. But of course that essentialization is in turn precisely the appropriative project against which she reacted in the first place, so that she seems aporetically trapped between two polarized interpretive strategies that are both complicit in the neocolonial/decolonizing counterregulation—and aporetically trapped not in the “good” or “playful” sense valorized by Derrida’s North American followers, either, since that construction of the aporia too would remain complicit with empire in its dislocatory (Deleuzian) mode. All she can do, then, as Walter Montag remarks of the piece, is display “a dazzling array of tactical devices designed to ward off or pre-emptively neutralize the attacks of critics. We might say of Spivak what Althusser said of Lacan—that the legendary difficulty of the essay is less a consequence of the profundity of its subject matter than its tactical objectives: ‘to forestall the blows of critics . . . to feign a response to them before they are delivered’ and, above all, to resort to philosophies apparently foreign to the endeavor ‘as so many intimidating witnesses thrown in the faces of the audience to retain the respect’” (par. 2).

Still, Spivak has clung to her original thesis with remarkable tenacity over the three decades since she first articulated it, revising her arguments substantially but in her revisions and interviews only rarely and equivocably deviating from her central claim that the subaltern cannot speak, which suggests that even in its radical deconstructive negativity it is a positive or essentializing claim, something that she believes is *true* of the heterogeneous class of the poorest and most radically disempowered people on earth.

The problem is, of course, that thematizing the deconstructive negativity of the “space of difference” as an essentializing positivity exposes it to both the affective protests coming out of identity politics and decolonizing social work (Spivak’s claim would paralyze efforts to improve the subaltern’s socioeconomic lot—the central accusation hurled at her in the late 1980s and early 1990s, beginning with Benita Parry’s “Problems”) and the counteraffective response of syllogistic logic.²⁵ Spivak’s response to the former has been to express warm sympathy and political solidarity but not to budge on the default differential speechlessness of the subaltern, and her response to the latter has been to engage in more deconstructive dodging—which is to say that she has done the only thing that she can do in her situation, short of recanting the theory entirely: kept fine-tuning her original arguments in brilliantly evasive and never less problematic ways.

For example, at the end of the *Critique* version of the essay she responds in some detail to two early challenges, “Can the Subaltern Vote?” by Medo-voi, Raman, and Robinson, and Abena Busia’s “Silencing Sycorax,” saying, for example, in response to Busia, that “I am not laying the blame for the muting [of the subaltern] on the *colonial* authorities” (308–9):

As I have been saying all along, I think it is important to acknowledge our complicity in the muting, in order precisely to be more effective in the long run. Our work cannot succeed if we always have a scapegoat. The postcolonial migrant investigator is touched by the colonial social formations. Busia strikes a positive note for further work when she points out that, after all, I am able to read Bhubaneswari’s case, and therefore she *has* spoken in some way. Busia is right, of course. All speaking, even seemingly the most immediate, entails a distanced decipherment by another, which is, at best, an interception. That is what speaking is.

I acknowledge this theoretical point, and also acknowledge the practical importance, for oneself and others, of being upbeat about future work. Yet the moot decipherment by another in an academic institution (willy-nilly a knowledge-production factory) many years later must not be too quickly identified with the “speaking” of the subaltern. It is not a mere tautology to say that the colonial or postcolonial subaltern is defined as the being on the other side of difference, or an epistemic fracture, even from other groupings among the colonized. What is at stake when we insist that the subaltern speaks? (309)

I would submit, however, that Spivak does not in fact “acknowledge this theoretical point,” here—that when it comes right down to it she cannot bring

herself to accept the full implications of the notion that “all speaking . . . entails a distanced decipherment by another.” After all, if that is “what speaking is,” and that “distanced decipherment” that constructs speech as speech cannot construct Bhubaneswari Bhaduri’s posthumous text as speech because as the subaltern she is “on the other side of difference,” then no one can speak. If the subaltern cannot speak, this is Spivak’s true conclusion: when run through the filter of deconstructive discourse analysis, all speech becomes impossible, because as would-be speakers we are all on the other side of difference to someone. It is obviously true that in “even seemingly the most immediate” speaking, with my friends and loved ones, I am always imposing a distanced decipherment on their words, which come to me across the gap of difference, and that decipherment invariably distorts what they are saying, so that all I am left with is my interpretive or “interceptive” construct of what they are saying, so that they can never *speak* as themselves, but must be assigned a mental category of speaking and meaning in my head; if all this is to be thematized as “not being able to speak,” then no one can speak.

Walter Montag makes something like this point as well:

Even more curious than this transcendental turn itself is the argumentation Spivak musters to support her declaration, against all appearances, that the subaltern cannot speak. And she has called forth some very intimidating witnesses on her behalf, the primary one, of course, being Derrida. Who better than the translator of *Of Grammatology* to remind us of the relevance of Derrida’s critique of Western logocentrism and phonocentrism to political life and to show the utter folly, if not the disingenuousness, of Foucault’s call to publish the writings of prisoners as an integral part of the movement against the prisons, or the attempt to set up and archive for the workers’ voices as part of the project of proletarian self-emancipation (a project which Spivak has already criticized in categorical terms)? It appears, however, that no one has thought to ask whether Derrida’s arguments (especially in *Grammatology*, the work in which such questions are most extensively examined) lead to such conclusions. Is there anything in Derrida’s critique of logocentrism that would allow us to say the subaltern cannot speak but must be spoken for, that is, represented both discursively and politically by those who can speak, those who are real subjects of speech? In fact, it would appear that Derrida’s argument leads in precisely the opposite direction. For if we accept Derrida’s arguments against the speaking subject as ideal origin of speech, present to its utterances as a guarantee of their truth and authenticity, that is, that speech is always already a kind of writing, material and irreducible, we are left only with

the fact that there is no pure, original working class or subaltern (or ruling class), possessing a consciousness expressed in its speech or for that matter its acts. There is speech and writing (although these are only modalities of action which are in no way privileged) always and everywhere. It is precisely in and through the struggles that traverse these fields of practice that collectivities are constituted. (par. 8)

In this light, Spivak's repeated insistence that the subaltern cannot speak as him/her/itself to the power elites begins to seem fueled by an objectivist nostalgia for a *true* speaking, a speaking from the heart, a speaking full of the transcendental presence of intentionality, a speaking that is not merely a Kantian construct, not merely someone's "interception." In the context of subalternity, of course, this nostalgia is further charged with the liberal guilt of the postcolonial power elite, the longing for a "true understanding of those poor people," and an uncomfortable recognition that no such "true" understanding is possible—precisely the stance that Spivak first invented the theory to combat, but one that, this analysis would suggest, is recuperated in her theory in negated form.

What Montag calls the "struggles that traverse these fields of practice" and are constitutive of collectivities are in somatic terms the regulatory turbulence of the somatic exchange. In somatic theory speaking is not so much a private act that is "deciphered" or "intercepted" at a "distance" by "another" as it is saturated with group evaluative affect from the start; speech is invented as possible and regulated as meaningful by the somatic exchange, which *circulates* meaning through the group, in the sense of circulating the ideosomatized interpretive orientations that make meaningful communication a pragmatic possibility. It seems to Spivak that the subaltern cannot speak, at the simplest level, because the subaltern is not a member of her group, and therefore does not circulate the same interpretive orientations to speech. By the same token, anyone who does not speak one of her languages will similarly seem not to be able to speak—or, more radically still, anyone who speaks her language but speaks it in disturbingly out-group ways, like a white supremacist or a pathological misogynist, will likewise seem not to be able to speak. We often say about our undergraduate students that they can't talk, can't think, can't read—can't "speak"—because they can't conform their speech to the ideosomatic norms we circulate in our professorial groups. What Spivak was reacting against in writing "Can the Subaltern Speak?" was the liberal (Western modern) project that impels us to try to overcome these in-group/out-group barriers and "truly communicate"—to speak and be heard by others, to hear the speaking of others—with out-groupers that have historically been

excluded from our middle-class groups, especially the socially, politically, and economically disenfranchised, and then—if we admit failure, perhaps even recognize the inevitability of failure—somehow to justify that failure intellectually. Spivak's essay is at the very least a radical insistence on the inevitability of this project's failure; but as many critics have argued, it functions also as an intellectual justification that essentializes subalternity as *restricted* by that failure, that indeed projects the failure of a complex but historically situated in-group/out-group dynamic onto the default "speechlessness" of subalternity as such.

In fact, the one alternative model that Spivak broaches to the cannot-speak negativity of the subaltern space of difference comes very close to this somatic conception. In "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," she reads the subaltern not as a (dis)unified (non-)subject at all but as a heterogeneous group that speaks collectively and anonymously through *rumor*, which she assimilates to Derrida's notion of writing from "Signature Event Context":

If, then, 'rumour is spoken utterance *par excellence*' (EAP 256), it must be seen that its 'functional immediacy' is its non-belonging to any *one* voice-consciousness. This is supposed to be the signal characteristic of writing. Any reader can 'fill' it with her 'consciousness.' Rumour evokes comradeship because it belongs to every 'reader' or 'transmitter.' No one is its origin or source. Thus rumour is not error but primordially (originarily) errant, always in circulation with no assignable source. This illegitimacy makes it accessible to insurgency. (23)

"Supposed to be the signal characteristic of writing" is evasive there, of course: she means supposed by Derrida, and by poststructuralists like herself. But this is an interesting deflective strategy: the theorist who has been arguing that the subaltern cannot speak now admits that there is a kind of subaltern speaking that is actually more like writing, or more like writing as theorized by Jacques Derrida, as if her strongest reservation about the notion that the subaltern could speak had been all along that this claim would implicitly construct the subaltern as self-present and self-expressive subject. The subaltern can "speak," Spivak now seems to be saying, as long as her/his/its "speaking" is an oral form of "writing," "always in circulation with no assignable source." Most important for Spivak in this admission, it seems, is the reader-response constructivism of speaking-as-writing: "Any reader can 'fill' it with her 'consciousness.'" It's not the source of speech in individual intention that lends this speech authority; it's simply the being-heard and the being-circulated: "Let us also remember that the mind-set of the peasants is as much affected by the

phonocentrism of a tradition where *śruti*—that which is heard—has the greatest authority, as is the mind-set of the historian by the phonocentrism of Western linguistics” (23). (Note there too Spivak’s willingness to essentialize “the mind-set of the peasants,” which is to say, to speak for the subaltern. As I’ll be suggesting in a moment, this is inevitable. Speaking for others is a condition of being able to speak at all. But there is a strain of postcolonial guilt that would purify discourse of all such retrograde impulses.)

Interestingly, Margaret Mills has an article taking Spivak to task for refusing to hear the voices of the subaltern—Spivak’s infamous question “seems more indicative of high theory’s hearing problem than of any subaltern Philomena syndrome” (174)—in which she offers something very like this same model for the study of subaltern folklore: “If you buy (as I do) Marta Weigle’s idea that gossip-anecdote can speak (constitute *and* articulate) cosmic order(s) just as much as cosmotactic *myths* do, then our data—anecdotes, gossip, incidents where we were present—are *always already* speaking ‘theory’—somebody’s theory, theory in the everyday—and it’s our job to sort out *whose* theory” (174, emphasis in original). The difference, of course, is that Spivak is only able to entertain the possibility of the subaltern speaking if the speaking is done anonymously, by a heterogeneous group—and Mills’s insistence that we “sort out *whose* theory” vitiates this.

Still, from the standpoint of somatic theory, it seems extreme to binarize the group’s anonymous voice in rumor and gossip and the individual’s named/bodied voice, given that the latter is conditioned by and saturated with the former. Rumor and gossip are precisely the regulatory speaking of the somatic exchange, the verbalized circulation of group evaluative affect—a much more effective hedge against hegemonic appropriations of the subaltern’s voice, to my mind, than the twists and turns of deconstructive negativity—and any attempt anyone makes, from inside or outside the group, to identify the “original source” of a rumor or piece of gossip will continue to be conditioned by group-circulatory attributions of identity and meaning. Indeed it is only possible to spread rumors and gossip if one enters into that circulation, becomes a conduit for identity- and meaning-attributions, and in that capacity helps the group both to “sort out *whose* theory” and to diffuse gossip identities through the group. I can only “start a rumor” if I am willing simultaneously to surrender my personal authorship of the rumor to the group *and* to take the blame for starting the rumor if the group should decide that it is essential to “sort out *whose* theory.” A “rumor” that is not instantly collectivized, instantly disseminated through the somatic exchange as its group-speech (group-opinion, group-speculation), is by definition no rumor at all: it is mere deregulatory grumbling. On a higher level of generality this means that it

only becomes possible to speak at all, to say things that others can hear and understand, insofar as one is willing to channel the group mind, to circulate meanings and identities through the somatic exchange. But this individual surrender to the group mind also entails a surrender to being spoken for, to having someone else explain what you mean, what you're trying to say, what your "mind-set" was in saying what you said, and in fact in some cases a surrender to having someone identify you as the speaker of what was spoken, the originator of a rumor or other verbal epidemic, the performer of the speech act that set the insurgency in motion, the *one* to be lionized in group history or handed over to the cops. In this sense Spivak has it exactly backwards when she insists that the subaltern cannot speak, but can only be spoken for: the capacity to be spoken for is the group condition of all speech. Speaking and being spoken for circulate the same communicative impulse through the somatic exchange. As for the puritanical stricture that the subaltern *should not* be spoken for—well, then no one should, and no one should spread rumors, and no one should belong to groups that regulate their behavior, and no one should ever say anything, etc.

Spivak's thinking throughout the "can the subaltern speak?" debate is hobbled, I suggest, by a certain binarizing orientation that she picks up from Derrida: either the subaltern is a fully self-present subject who speaks as the externalization of personal inward intention, or the subaltern cannot speak; either "speech is the immediate expression of the self" (23), or it is ideally cut adrift from self-expression, and therefore a form of "writing"; the subaltern either speaks or is spoken for by postcolonial elites. The somatic retheorization of speech and writing as ideosomatically conditioned, spoken/written/heard/read, and often individualized (attributed to individual speakers or writers as self-expression) by the group is itself steeped in Derridean thought, especially perhaps "Signature Event Context"; but it brings to the stark (anti)metaphysics of Derridean (anti)binaries the as-if correctives of Kantian, Nietzschean, and Burkean constructivism, according to which it's possible to recognize and analyze the ideosomatic constructedness of a speaking subject while still continuing to respond to the speaking of that subject *as if* it were fully ontologized. *Of course* the subaltern is a group construct. Of course the spoken-for construction of the subaltern by Western postcolonial intellectual groups will be complicit in neocolonialism. Of course I will never know what any given member of a subaltern group "really means." But nor will I ever know what Spivak "really means," or what I myself "really mean." And yet, iterosomatically guided by the various groups I belong to, I continue to live as if I could, continue to circulate (and act on) group attributions of meaning and identity to Spivak, myself, and the subaltern, flawed and incomplete and indeed

propagandistic as they no doubt are. And in fact I respond with a good deal of discomfort to that totalizing fetish of epistemic purity that would require my knowledge to be perfect before I can legitimately allow myself to act on it, because it is only my epistemic uncertainties that allow me to act at all—even though, I suspect, my pragmatic impatience conceals and enables complicity in neocolonialism and other power-ideologies. The rampant contradictions in Spivak’s theorization of the default speechlessness of the subaltern suggest to me that she is impatient also with that fetish—but, at least to date, perhaps because she is more determined than I am *not* to seem complicitous in power-ideologies, she remains as much affected by it as she says Indian peasants are by *śruti*.

2.2.2.4 LITERARY REPRESENTATIONS: “DOULOTI THE BOUNTIFUL”

It may well be that the specific examples Spivak has chosen in order to interrogate the concept of the subaltern have made it especially difficult for her to find her way out of abstract differentialities: the subaltern as *sati* and the subaltern as the Third World female other of Kant’s raw man, both in a sense the other of the colonizer’s other, seem to trap affect as a black hole traps light, so densely desomatized that it seems impossible to discuss them in terms of their affective response to communal pressures. Her one piece where this is not the case is “Woman in Difference,” the 1989/1990 essay originally published in *Cultural Critique* and reprinted in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* that reads Spivak’s own English translation of Mahasweta Devi’s Bengali novella “Douloti the Bountiful.” Because Mahasweta specifically subjectifies Douloti as a tribal girl sold into bonded prostitution, in reading this story Spivak is in a sense beginning at the other end, the self or subject or affect end of “subalternity”; as a result the essay is Spivak’s most extensive analytical mobilization of affect in her work to date, and her most determined attempt to thematize the subaltern woman not just as a binary effect of discourse but as an affective subjectivity.

I say “in a sense,” though, because Spivak does still begin with the space of difference: Mahasweta, she says, “lingers in postcoloniality in the space of difference, *in decolonized terrain*” (105, emphasis in original).²⁶ The space of difference, not surprisingly, is the subaltern:

Especially in a critique of metropolitan culture, the event of political independence can be automatically assumed to stand between colony and decolonization as an unexamined good that operates a reversal. But the

political goals of the new nation are supposedly determined by a regulative logic derived from the old colony, with its interest reversed: secularism, democracy, socialism, national identity, and capitalist development. Whatever the fate of this supposition, it must be admitted that there is always a space in the new nation that cannot share in the energy of this reversal. This space had no established agency of traffic with the culture of imperialism. Paradoxically, this space is also outside of organized labor, below the attempted reversals of capital logic. Conventionally, this space is described as the habitat of the *subproletariat* or the *subaltern*. Mahasweta's fiction focuses on it as the space of the displacement of the colonization-decolonization reversal. This is the space that can become, for her, a representation of decolonization *as such*. (77–78)

The idea here is that the decolonizing reversal should by rights reverse the exclusion of the subaltern into an inclusion, reverse the lack of “established agency of traffic with the culture of imperialism” into an established agency of traffic with the decolonizing culture of organized labor and capital logic, but, paradoxically, it doesn't: the exclusion remains an exclusion, the lack remains a lack, suggesting to Spivak that there is something in that subaltern “space” that by its very differential nature displaces or repels the reversal. This would make subalternity the negative or abyssal image of decolonization as positive ideal, and thus the perfect deconstructive “representation of decolonization *as such*.” Noting that the positive ideal of decolonization reverses “empire” as “nation,” Spivak asks: “(1) How does Mahasweta inscribe this space of displacement, if not with the lineaments of the nation? (2) What does it mean to say ‘socially invested cartography of bonded labor?’ and (3) How does Mahasweta suggest, even within this space, that the woman's body is the last instance, that it is elsewhere?” (78–79).

Her answer to that first question is that Mahasweta *names* subaltern communities, names and so “releases” them, allowing the reader “to grasp that the word ‘India’—signifier of ‘nation’—is sometimes a lid on an immense and equally unacknowledged subaltern heterogeneity” (79). Her answer to the second is that the novella's bond-slaves—all the central characters—are trans-coded in the story into a “broad collectivity” or *shomaj*, the customary Bengali word for “society.” These two answers clear the ground for her sticking point, the third:

There is no avoiding this, even if the story is read by way of the broadest possible grid: in modern “India,” there *is* a “society” of bonded labor, where the only means of repaying a loan at extortionate rates of interest is

hereditary bond-slavery. Family life is still possible here, the affects taking the entire burden of survival. Below this is bonded prostitution, where the girls and women abducted from bonded labor or *kamiya* households [as the eponymous Douloti is] are thrust together as bodies for absolute sexual and economic exploitation. These bodies are connected to bond slavery but are yet apart. . . . Woman's body is thus the last instance in a system whose general regulator is still the loan: usurer's capital, imbricated, level by level, in national industrial and transnational global capital. This, if you like, is the connection. But it is also the last instance on the chain of affective responsibility, and no third world-Gramscian rewriting of class as subaltern-in-culture has taken this into account in any but the most sentimental way: . . . (82)

Here, finally, are affects as the sole carriers of the "burden of survival," in the family life that is still possible in the next-to-last instance of bond-slavery, the life of Douloti's mother and father, the life Douloti too leads until at fourteen she is bought into *kamiya* prostitution. It is interesting that what does the heavy lifting here is "the affects," a fairly nonspecific catch-all category that presumably includes familial love and support; and that on the previous page Spivak describes "the precariously manipulative *function* called 'the nation-state'" as "coded and reterritorialized with the heavy paleonymic (historically stuffed) baggage of reason and affect" (81), an even more nonspecific catch-all category that lumps emotional states in with mental mappings of those states as rationality. There is a metaleptic shift in these two tropes, the rational-affective burden carrying the burden of survival; how should we understand that shift? What makes affect heavy, and what equips it to carry the heavy burden of survival? By the paleonymic baggage of reason and affect Spivak apparently means that reason and affect are historically overcoded or overdetermined ("stuffed"); but what are they stuffed with? The paleonymic baggage of reason and affect is heavy, because it is historically stuffed; survival is another heavy burden, but this time *carried* by affect. And what kind of survival? Does Spivak mean specifically affective survival—that affective survival is made possible by the familial circulation of supportive affect? Or would she include economic and physical survival as well, the *entire* burden of survival being taken by the affects?

In any case, in "the last instance," the extreme case of bond-slavery, *kamiya*-prostitution, the affective value-coding of life as family life is almost completely blocked: not only are daughters taken from parents and wives from husbands, but the children with whom the *kamiya*-prostitutes are impreg-

nated by clients are taken from their mothers and sent into the streets to beg as well. This does not prevent the prostitute-mothers from *feeling* a maternal belonging to their children, but their feeling is not value-coded as “maternal” by the social machine, as the children do not legally belong to them—because they do not belong to themselves. They belong to the “god,” the master, the bond-holder. This affective value-decoding of their own bodies and their own intentionalities is reflected in Douloti’s depersonalization, her desomatizing withdrawal of all affect: “The social system that makes [her father] Crook Nagesia a kamiya is made by men. Therefore do Douloti, Somni, Reoti [the bond-prostitutes] have to quench the hunger of male flesh. Otherwise Paramananda [the bond-holder] does not get money. Why should Douloti be afraid? She has understood now that this is natural. Now she has no fear, no sorrow, no desire” (61).

But it is here, I suggest, in her discussion of the affective value-(de)coding of mothering, that Spivak’s vagueness about affect begins to hurt her:

The affective coding of mothering extends from sociobiology all the way to reproductive rights. Before the mobilization of the reproductive rights debate began in the West, demanding the full coding of the woman’s body in constitutional abstractions, Simone de Beauvoir had suggested that, in the continuum of gestation, birthing, and child-rearing, the woman passes through and crosses over her inscription as an example of her species-body to the task of producing an intending subject. . . .

Among the women of this fiction [“Douloti the Bountiful”], pregnancy as the result of copulation with clients allows the working out of the inscription of the female body in gestation to be economically rather than affectively coded. (89)

What she means by “economically rather than affectively coded” is reasonably clear in the terms given us by Mahasweta: what happens to the prostitute-mother’s newborn infant is determined not by social ideals of maternity but by the bond-holder’s economic interests. Caring for an infant would take the mother away from servicing twenty to thirty clients a day and so cut into his profits; the infant must go, must be sent away.

Somni put her hand to her cheek and said, “See what a strange thing. I was married in childhood, and I stayed with my man for so long. I had only one son. And Latia made me the mother of three sons in a row.”

—Those sons?

—They lie around the marketplace. They beg. They don't let you live with your child, and clients come up to one month before birth. Then I can't for three months.

—Then?

—The god lends money.

—Doesn't he let you keep them?

—No no, would he? When I am burnt up, I go see them. Reoti's son too is Latia's son. And it was Latia's *truck* that hit him and crippled him. As a cripple he gets more begging. He got a shirt too. (63)

Paramananda hasn't given food and upkeep, Latia has impregnated her time after time. Still was it correct of Somni to let her body get so chewed up? (67)

Douloti shook her head. Said, "Uncle Bono, if a kamiya woman becomes a whore the boss makes a lot of profit. No clothing, no cosmetics, no medicine. You have to borrow for everything and the boss adds all the loans to the first loan. No whore can repay that debt in her lifetime." (73)

So, okay: economics, not affect. But what conditions the economics? What makes not just the beneficiaries of this economic system but its victims as well cling tight to it, even desperately to it, like dying men to a float? The answer that Mahasweta has her characters give is tradition, religion:

It's best to go by set rules [Munabar, Douloti's father's Rajput bond-holder, says to his son]. Rule breaking is not good. (43)

Paramananda [the brahman master or "god" who is trying to convince Crook to let him "marry" Douloti in return for paying off his bond to Munabar] gripped Crook hard. Crook filled the sky with his screams. "Truth is being destroyed, the Law is being destroyed! This brahman, this god, is holding me [Crook is an untouchable], please! He must be plumb crazy." (46)

What word, what he should listen to, he didn't think at all. He said "yes" to whatever he heard. Because if the Master says something the machine in Crook's head stops working out of fear. He hears the Master's bellows, but grasps nothing. To say "Yes Sir" to the proprietor is a very long-standing habit. (49)

Rampiyari said, “How will it end? Paramanandaji told me that it is written in the great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata that ending bonded labor is against religion.” (81)

—The boss can do what he likes with the person who becomes a bondslave [Paramananda’s son Bajinath says to the nationalist radicals who want to end bond-slavery, upon taking over the whorehouse after his father’s sudden death]. Yes or no?

—The government will end bondslavery.

—The big government *officers* in Palamu keep kamiyas and seokias.

Who will stop bondslavery?

—I’ll tell you, the big government. Delhi government.

—It can’t be. Bondslavery is an ancient law. That is written in religious books.

—What book?

—I’ve heard. (84)

Is this pure economic value-coding? At the very least, even if we take Rampiyari and Bajinath to be using religion cynically to justify their manipulation of the bond-labor system to enhance their profits, by invoking religious books to defend a traditional injustice they value-code economics as divine law—something far greater and more powerful than sheer numbers. And Mahasweta gives us no indication that they are speaking cynically: they do seem to believe that the ancient religious books not only tolerate but *demand* bond-slavery. (Mahasweta tells us in the interview with Spivak that introduces the volume that “the bonded labor system was introduced by the British. They created a new class, which took away tribal land and converted the tribals into debt-bonded slaves. The present government of India had to introduce, in 1976, the Bonded Labor Abolition Act” [xii]. But the bond-holders in the novella don’t know this. For them the system is traditional, therefore affectively crucial.) Munabar value-codes bond-labor economics as the rule of law, the law of rules, regulation as a guarantor of stability, protection against the insecurities of social change, which he tropes as the West Wind: is this simple cynical greed? Hasn’t Munabar been *conditioned* to believe in bond-slavery, conditioned to believe that it is the natural way of the world, conditioned further to believe that bad things would happen not just to him but to everyone, to life itself, if it were abolished? In other words, isn’t there an affective/evaluative (ideosomatic) conditioning that disposes these power-holders to hold onto their power? The fear that grips Crook Nagesia when the Master bellows

or Paramananda grips him is obviously an affective/evaluative body state that tells him how to behave, what to believe and what to say and what to do in the presence of his social superiors; the Rajput and Brahmin bond-holders defend their economic system with considerably more poise and self-possession—the calm somatics of authority—but they too are clearly “organized” by tradition and religion through affective channels.

Of course it’s true that the Master’s ability to overlay his own nervous or anxious affect with the outward somatic display of authoritative “reason” would support Spivak’s claim that what is at work here is economic *rather than* affective value-coding²⁷: value-coding is no ontology but a social semiotizing process that makes things *be* what the authorities want them to *seem* to be, and in capitalist patriarchy the authority of the wealthy male is normatively value-coded as “rational” rather than “emotional,” which is to say as the mind’s dominion over the body. In this sense Spivak’s insistence that “pregnancy as the result of copulation with clients allows the working out of the inscription of the female body in gestation to be economically rather than affectively coded” supports capitalist patriarchy’s protective (re)ideosomatization of the authorities’ feelings as numbers, the Master’s body as thoroughly and calmly mastered by numeric mind. In this ideosomatic regime, only the lower orders are “value-coded” in terms of affect, the tears of powerless women and children, the fears of powerless men.

Indeed throughout her reading of the novella, Spivak repeatedly thematizes affect as Douloti’s sentimental conservatism:

Her relationship to her mother, who is still in the village, is filled with affect. In terms of the critical implications of our argument, it has to be admitted that this affective production, fully sympathetic, is yet represented *within* rather than prior to an accepted code. . . . Like the affection between mother and daughter, Douloti’s affect for her village, again gently and beautifully written, is *within* a recognizable coding of sentiment. And indeed, as we see in the following passage, this unresisting nostalgia, dismissing planned resistance as futile, seems to rely on a conservative pre-capitalist coding of the sexual division of labor. . . . Douloti’s affect for her home is thus staged carefully by Mahasweta as the “residual” bonding that works against social change and, ultimately, against the achievement of national social justice, a project in which the author is deeply involved as an activist. Mahasweta dismisses neither side, but presents Douloti’s affect and, ultimately, Douloti herself, as the site of a real aporia. You cannot give assent to both on the same register. (92–93, emphasis in original)

This is all true; Spivak's aporetic reading of the ending is powerful and persuasive. But by thematizing affect in the story as Douloti's affect, and by implicit extension as the sanctioned body state of subaltern women, she also misses the more pervasive and more complex operation of affect in the men as well, not merely the tribals who have broken free of bond-slavery and joined the party of decolonizing nationalists—"Prasad roared out, 'That's enough, get out of here'" (84), "It is only Uncle Bono's breast that's bursting with an equal pain" (87)—but the stubbornly exploitative bond-holders as well, who are trapped by traditionalizing (iterosomatic) affect in the moils of their own destructive economic power. That this authoritarian male affect is another form of "residual" [or, in the original article (126), 'regressive'] bonding that works against social change and, ultimately, against the achievement of national social justice" should be obvious but isn't, to Spivak, because she recuperates in her reading the patriarchal affective value-coding that assigns affect to women and reason to men.²⁸

Restricting her thematization of affect to Douloti's nostalgic sentimentalism also numbs Spivak to the affective impact on the reader of the ending's aporetic speech act: "You cannot give assent to both on the same register. I am also arguing that, in terms of the general rhetorical conduct of the story, you also cannot give assent, in the same register, to the evocation of a space prior to value-coding, on the one hand, and the sympathetic representation of Douloti as a character, recognizable within an earlier discursive formation, on the other" (93). I think this falls apart, in fact. You *can* give "assent" to these cognitive structures, evocations of spaces and sympathetic representations, even in the "same register," since registers are just more cognitive structures that can quite easily tolerate this kind of dissonance. What Mahasweta does to us in portraying Douloti is not just to "evoke a space prior to value-coding" or to "represent" her sympathetically: rather, she gets us to identify with her, to simulate her body-becoming-mind states somatomimetically, and thus to feel with her as her body is progressively ravaged by venereal disease and finally she dies—but dies not angrily, not bitterly, not rebelliously, but gently, kindly, naively, acceptingly, infecting us not just with her death but with her sentimental acceptance of her death and of the system that caused it. The affective aporia Mahasweta is inflicting on us is nothing so statically representational as the evocation of a space, a space of difference or displacement or decolonization or anything so abstract; it makes us feel the ponderous polynormativity of the decolonizing counterregulation, the slow inertial grinding of the nationalists' decolonizing rage at injustice against everyone else's conditioned acquiescence to that injustice. What Mahasweta infects us with, in fact, is not

just an aporia, an “undecidable in the face of which decisions must be risked” (Spivak 93), but radically opposed regulatory affects, social evaluative feelings that incline us to move in opposite directions, toward activism and toward quietism, toward the bringing about of a utopian world where Douloti would not have needed to die horribly at the age of thirty and toward a surrender to the status quo as not so bad after all. In this sense Spivak is quite right to say that for Mahasweta subalternity is “a representation of decolonization *as such*”: in Douloti she feels, and tries to get her reader to feel, the clash of decolonizing normativities.