In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

156 CHAPTER 10 A Return of Hostilities? TheComprehensivePeaceAgreementandtheFutureofaTwo-StateSudan Wilfred Iyekolo INTRODUCTION Post-independence South Sudan is perhaps lacking the enthusiasm of the referendum era, because the envisioned end of hostilities, eternal peace, transformational stability, political justice, economic prosperity and absolute control of resources has proven illusory. No doubt, this disappointment is a consequence of the seemingly unending conflict between the North and South Sudan states, which is just one version of the cacophony of frustration in the defunct country, where the perceived common aggressor has been the government in Khartoum against all ‘others’ with disparate leaning. Until now, the regime of domination in the Sudan has been by default , because the British-Egyptian colonial rule, on the eve of its exit, had created an asymmetric system of administration that bequeathed authority to the North.1 Consequently, to consolidate its strangle-hold on power and control of commonwealth, and through machinations of identity: ethnicism, ‘Arabizism’, religiosity and Islamism, the anointed sect victimised and marginalised other perceived exclusive groups in the Sudan.2 In addressing the inequity, a series of peace and power sharing agreements were brokered in 2002, and finalised in 2005 with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA], through coordinated efforts of concerned neighbouring states and the international community. This agreement became the article of faith for the restoration of order, promotion of unity, justice and equity, and democratic transformation in the Sudan. Predominantly, it provided an opportunity for the aggrieved South Sudan to pursue self-recognition via a referendum. According to schedule, the agreement was implemented, and the referendum was held with overwhelming result in favour of secession. Contrary to expectation of problem resolution, the CPA regime has brought new complexities and challenges to the contention in the NorthSouth dialogue, having implications that threaten the future stability of the 157 two Sudanese countries. To validate this fear in the post-CPA era, it appears difficult issues around oil revenues between the divides, the centrality of Abyei, as well as attendant complexities on water, border demarcation and citizenship have potential to provoke a new cycle of conflict, depending on how the negotiation of these complexities is managed. Should negotiations between the divides breakdown, there would be a return of disorder, and the common Sudanese would be hardest hit. In turn, Africa would have one more distraction from her pursuit of stability, end of poverty, human rights, and economic prosperity; and the euphoria of the international community of putting out another conflict hotspot would extinguish in a jiffy. However valid this anxiety appears, it is a strong indication that much attention has not been accorded to the nature, intricacies and deficits in the negotiation of the peace agreement in question, because contentious issues from the exercise continue to feed the persistent complexities today even after its termination. It is, therefore, compelling to ask why the CPA is fundamental to the looming return of hostilities, and also what the pertinent issues are in the CPA negotiations responsible for a return of hostilities. In addition, did the CPA deliver its objectives? Are there reasons to doubt the CPA was ever a successful peace agreement? While this study may not provide answers to all these critical issues, it makes a review of the CPA negotiations at Machakos, and the challenge of stability consolidation between the two Sudanese countries. I argue that the so-called fundamental problems of identity, marginalisation and victimisation in the Sudan were manifestations of the core problem of struggles for resource control, of rights and access. In essence, the underlining problem between the belligerent Sudanese states is a political economy of who gets what, when and how. Also, I argue that the nature of the agreement at Machakos, and not Naivasha, is responsible for the rise of complexities in the post-CPA era, and from such a standpoint, the quest for stability and democratic transformation is beyond the architecture and scope of the CPA. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The Marxist society presents a basis for class struggle or group antagonism between proletariats and bourgeoisie over power and control of means of production.3 In contrast, Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by Tajfel and Turner in 19794 , claims that negligible condition of social classification, group-self awareness or group ‘we-feeling’ is sufficient to lead members of a group (in-group) to discriminate against others (out-group) who do not belong to such exclusive social enclave. The perceived members of an ‘ingroup ’ probably might have nothing in...


Additional Information

Related ISBN
MARC Record
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.