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10 Relations between the Roman Catholic church and the state in Cameroon’s postcolony Introduction Two distinct views have emerged of the socio-political role of mainline Christian churches in the African postcolony in the past decades. The first seems quite pessimistic . Several Africanists look upon these churches as vestiges of imperialism and allies of authoritarian rule (cf. Mbembe 1988; Bayart 1993; Gifford 1993b, 1994; Haynes 1996, 2004). They allege that, in the wake of their widespread support for colonial rule, these churches have become increasingly appropriated by the postcolonial state, providing it legitimacy either tacitly or explicitly. They advance the following main arguments to uphold this view. It has been claimed that church and state leaders in Africa show common interests and sentiments, and form, with other well-positioned social groups such as businessmen, an informal coalition of elites who seek to exercise hegemonic control over society. Bayart (1993), in particular, maintains that Christian churches are governed in a similar way as African postcolonial states. Like the political elite, church leaders are driven in their search for power, wealth and status by what he calls ‘the governmentality of the belly’ – a predatory style of governance characterised by clientelist relationships and corruption. Due to similarities in governing style, it has been relatively easy for the state to co-opt churches and encourage them to support the status quo by way of favours and privileges. Others argue that church leaders have rapidly become convinced that they could protect institutional interests more expeditiously in a climate of good rather than poor relations with the authoritarian postcolonial state. In a situation where the THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE STATE 169 churches were eager to retain what they had, including a prominent role in the provision of education, medical facilities and, more generally, religious freedom, social influence and material prosperity, it appeared sensible not to challenge government policies in the open but instead choose the route of discreet lobbying to effect the desired changes of policies (Haynes 1996: 117). Church leaders were well aware that the increasingly authoritarian political elite had already restricted the operations of non-religious civil-society organisations that could endanger their position of power. The other view of the socio-political role of mainline Christian churches in the African postcolony tends to be more optimistic. It regards churches as the masthead of civil society, pointing to their proven capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes, urging reform, advocating socio-political change and even presiding over change itself. Various Africanists refer to the central leadership role of mainline Christian churches in the democratisation movements that emerged on the African continent in the era of global neo-liberal reforms (cf. Gifford 1995; Constantin & Coulon 1997; Phiri 2001; Sabar 2002). Like the pessimistic school of thought, they advance divergent arguments in support of their position. In his earlier work on state-church relations in Cameroon, Bayart (1972, 1973) concludes that when the state suppresses political opposition groups and thus creates a vacuum in the system, churches tend to assume the functions of these organisations, leading to confrontation between the state and the church. He argues that the churches are the only civil society organisations that enjoy relative autonomy from the postcolonial hegemony: they remain ‘zones of freedom’ in an otherwise oppressive political environment. According to him, the churches are virtually a ‘state within a state’ and authoritarian African regimes appear reluctant to strive for their subordination to the state. While this particular claim seems a little exaggerated , it makes the point that churches in many African states effectively rival the state in the delivery of social services. Phiri (2001) has attempted to show the relevance of Bayart’s model in his study of church-state relations in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The relatively autonomous churches in these countries did confront the state after it had pulverised civil-society groups that would have otherwise played this role. Once civil society was liberated, however, they tended to withdraw from the political arena to their less visible and more traditional pastoral functions . Other authors try to show the key role of the mainline Christian churches in civil society in a different way from Bayart and Phiri. They stress that these churches are the only civil-society organisations that enjoy a high level of legitimacy in society. Moreover, they have the institutional and organisational structures, communication resources, leadership capability and transnational contacts necessary to resist or even rival the state (Médard 1997; Buijtenhuijs & Reynierse 1993). [18...

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