Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: Civil Society and Agro-Industry in Anglophone Cameroon�s Plantation Economy

6. Privatisation and labour militancy: The case of Cameroon’s tea estates

147 6 Privatisation and labour militancy: The case of Cameroon’s tea estates Introduction Privatisation is an essential part of an overall neo-liberal reform package aimed at creating transparency and accountability in the management of national affairs as well as a favourable environment for opening up African economies to market forces and privatesector development (World Bank 1989, 1992; Sandbrook 2000). Privatisation calls for a re-evaluation of relations between the public and private sectors in Africa. Under pressure from international donors, governments have been urged to reduce state ownership and enhance private-sector development. International donors tend to attribute the massive growth of state enterprises since independence and their generally poor performance to the bad governance of Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes. They claim that statist conceptions of development have resulted in a widespread politicisation of economic decision-making and rentseeking behaviour among the parasitic political elite (World Bank 1997; Olukoshi 1998; van de Walle 2001). Privatisation would help cut public-sector inefficiency and waste, solve the problem of rising budgetary deficits, stimulate private-sector development, attract more investment and new technology, and revive economic growth. There is a growing body of literature on privatisation that discusses the mixed results these practices have had in Africa and the serious problems and controversy they have encountered (cf. Mkandawire 1994; Bennell 1997; Campbell White & Bhatia 1998; Tangri 1999; van de Walle 2001; Pitcher 2002; Rakner 2003). Privatisation problems in Africa are attributed not only to technical and financial constraints but also to the fact that privatisation did not offer the break with the previous dynamics of the post-colonial state that the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors had 148 Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa expected. Cameroon is a clear example of the failure of privatisation to free the parastatal sector of government neo-patrimonial logic (van de Walle 1994b; Walker 1998; Konings 2003b, 2007a). There is considerable evidence that the Biya regime was initially extremely reluctant to sell state-owned enterprises, which it saw as a threat to its patronage politics and the maintenance and consolidation of its power. It was only later that it was prepared to speed up the programme of privatisation. In addition to persistent pressure from international donors, the regime realised that privatisation itself did not necessarily foreclose rent-seeking opportunities for the parasitic bureaucratic and political elite. Indeed, some members benefited from it. For politicians responsible for the privatisation process, privatisation measures have frequently been an opportunity for corrupt practices. Divestiture has not been a transparent process and, in return for the payment of substantial kickbacks, public enterprises have been sold at prices far below their true value amid reports of embezzlement of the proceeds. Moreover, privatisation has not excluded members of the bureaucratic and political elite from occupying top positions in former state-owned enterprises. Some have been re-appointed and others have been newly recruited (Konings 2007a). The problems of privatisation in Africa are seen by some as also being due to the fierce opposition of civil-society organisations (cf. Olukoshi 1998; Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2003a, 2003b, 2007a). Although World Bank studies have recommended the involvement of civil society in neo-liberal economic reforms, arguing that their participation in policy making would ensure ownership, credibility and sustainability of the reform process (World Bank 1992, 1995; Rakner 2001), there is ample evidence that civilsociety organisations tend to be excluded from the decision-making process because of their expected resistance to the allegedly harmful effects of externally imposed privatisation schemes on their members. Academics, students and ethno-regional movements have vehemently denounced the sale of national and regional patrimony to western multinationals and nationals closely connected with African regimes (Tangri 1999; Konings 2003b, 2007a). They and various indigenous business groups have criticised the prominent role of foreign companies in the privatisation process as a 149 Chapter 6: Privatisation and labour militancy ‘recolonisation of Africa’. Consumer groups have often protested against the poor and/or expensive services delivered by newly privatised enterprises. Undoubtedly, the most public, persistent and organised opposition to privatisation in Africa has come from the labour movement. Trade unions have, on occasion, succeeded in blocking or slowing down the privatisation of specific enterprises or influencing negotiations for a privatisation agreement. At other times and in response to external pressures, governments have simply brushed union opposition aside, leaving a legacy of anger and political tension (Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2006...