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IV. The Diplomatic Battles
- Hong Kong University Press, HKU
- Chapter
- Additional Information
IV The Diplomatic Battles While economic independence was vital to Hong Kong's day-to-day survival, local control over diplomatic policies was no less essential to Hong Kong's longterm future. Despite London's constitutional responsibility for Hong Kong's foreign relations, the colonial administration fought for room to expand its autonomy in handling its political relations with London and Beijing in much the same way as it had struggled to enlarge its freedom to manage its economic links with the outside world. The struggle with London for control over the relationship with the Chinese authorities was protracted. Well before World War II, there had been a running fight between British diplomats and the colonial administration over Hong Kong's right to have direct access to Mainland officials. During the 1950s, the Hong Kong Governor had considerable latitude in defining relations with the Chinese Communist Party which came to power in 1949. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Hong Kong government still made most of the running, but during the 1980s, and the protracted Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong's future, London was in the driving seat. In the 1990s, control of the relationship with Beijing reverted to Hong Kong once more. In parallel, the colonial administration had always to contend with the Chinese government, its abiding suspicions of British intentions, its ideological upheavals, and its sensitivity to issues of national sovereignty. The departure of the British did not remove the danger of disputes with Beijing. By 2004, Mainland officials and Hong Kong commentators were citing numerous parallels between current conflicts and the confrontations in the 1980s and 1990s over how much autonomy the community could expect to exercise, especially in deciding on the proper pace of political reform. This chapter reviews the highlights of Hong Kong's long and arduous contests with both London and Beijing. 72 Uneasy Partners Imperial Strategies The popular perception in Hong Kong was that when it came to political issues, the colonial administration was very willing to accommodate British wishes, regardless ofvigorous local opposition. The examples most commonly cited ranged from the colonial administration's sabotage in 1981 of efforts to defend Hong Kong residents' claims to full United Kingdom nationality (because of the ruling Conservative Party's anxieties over the British voter's anti-immigrant prejudices), to the postponement of the first direct elections to the legislature until 1991 (because of reluctance to dery China's hostility to political reforms under British rule).1Yet, this chapter will show that London had no grand imperial design dictating how Hong Kong would contribute to the United Kingdom's national interests, and no great incentive to formulate one. Assets and Liabilities The previous chapter analysed how successful Hong Kong's struggle was for economic autonomy. The ruthless expansion of Hong Kong's right to manage its own financial and commercial policies and be free from London's interference was essential for the colonial administration's credibility with the Chinese community. As a result, Hong Kong made a very marginal contribution to the United Kingdom's economy and was more of a liability than an asset for much of the post-war period. But this relentless disregard for imperial interests created other, more political risks. If Hong Kong was of minimal economic value to the United Kingdom, why should London make any great effort to retain this distant colony? The question became important during World War II when there were serious pressures from the United States for the United Kingdom to give up Hong Kong and the rest of its imperial legacy in China. Some officials in London began to express considerable doubts about the colony's economic value to Britain. Why keep Hong Kong when the United Kingdom had surrendered the treaty ports and the other concessions on the Mainland? At that period, imperialist sentiment was still so strong that the sceptics could be ignored. In any case, the comfortable assumption prevailed in London that, almost by definition, Hong Kong and its China trade must be valuable assets.2 The lack of substantial economic gains did not undermine London's commitment to the colony so long as the United Kingdom still controlled a substantial Far Eastern empire. But as the United Kingdom retreated from Asia in the post-war era, the case for remaining in Hong Kong could no longer be taken for granted. Public opinion in post-imperial Britain might decide that the commercial benefits of holding on to Hong Kong were not...