Maintaining Control: Autonomy and Language Learning

4. Discursive dissonance in approaches to autonomy

Discursive dissonance in approaches to autonomy 45 Introduction This was a very timely conference, not just because it marked a 10th anniversary, but more importantly because that period has been one of intense research, practice and reflection in our field, a period of growing competence and confidence during which myriads of ideas have been generated and tested. One of those many ideas, just one but an important one, is the belief that we can only really understand what autonomy is about if we examine it in the widest possible context, theoretically, educationally, and, above all, socially. I say “above all, socially” because the overall thrust of the work conducted over the last decade or so has been to show that becoming autonomous is an essentially social business. This seeming paradox is due to our human nature: we are both separately incorporated individuals, selves with bodies, and members of society, social beings. As Mead (1934) and Vygotsky (1986) have demonstrated, the reflection which is essential to learning consists of an internal dialogue between the self and the ‘me’, between the individual and the member of society. The skills for creating that intrapersonal dialogue, for thinking and reflecting, are acquired in and through interpersonal dialogue, social interaction. Whether it is approached as a social activity or as a mental process, learning in fact involves both dimensions of personal identity. Participative interaction with the environment provides the experiences, resources and skills necessary for the functioning of an interiorised 4 Discursive dissonance in approaches to autonomy Philip Riley 46 Philip Riley discourse, and the construction and maintenance of a personal identity. To put it in a nutshell, we learn by talking to ourselves. Our selves: the primary mechanism for the construction of identities is discourse. Others — our family and friends, teachers, neighbours, colleagues and institutions — constantly ‘membership’ us, that is, tell us who they think we are, while we ourselves send out a stream of identity claims (Riley 2002, 2007). The effect of this double series of pressures is generally to manoeuvre the individual concerned into a specific discursive position or role. However, in certain conditions, there may be a lack of congruency between the two, or individuals may be subject to conflicting messages or ideologies. In this chapter, I will argue that such conditions of discursive dissonance arise in educational contexts when there is a conflict between (unacknowledged, out-of-consciousness) pedagogical traditions and ‘official’ or ‘academic’ approaches to learning and teaching. Learners and teachers alike are caught in a tug-of-war between one relatively explicit set of beliefs and instructions and values backed up by institutional authority, and another inexplicit set which is based on folklinguistic beliefs and models and backed up by the authority of tradition and common sense.1 The theoretical background In order even to begin to set autonomy in its overall intellectual, practical and social context, and to set our discussion of discursive dissonance in the context of autonomy, at least three requirements need to be met: • Firstly, we need some kind of general framework for discussing the relationships between discourse, society and the individual. I shall attempt to do so under the heading of ‘The social knowledge system’. I would justify this part of the discussion as relevant to autonomy on the grounds that autonomy is first and foremost an approach to learning about the way in which the individual is integrated into society. To understand autonomy, we need to see it as one possible form of knowledge transfer or management, a particular kind of epistemic economy. • Secondly, if we are to discuss different pedagogical traditions, we obviously need some ideas and information about just how approaches to teaching and learning vary from one culture to Discursive dissonance in approaches to autonomy 47 another. For this, I will call on the anthropology and ethnography of education. • Thirdly, if we want to understand how popular beliefs about language and language learning influence or even interfere with official, institutional methods and practices, we need to take a look at those beliefs. In other words, instead of relying on academic, scientific linguistics, we will be attending to folklinguistics and, ideally, examining the role played by folklinguistics in the social knowledge system and in determining different pedagogical traditions. I would justify this part of the discussion as being relevant to autonomy on the grounds that different pedagogical traditions are more or less receptive or favourable to autonomous approaches...