Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941

6 - Phase IV: The Forcing of Wong Nai Chung Gap

One hundred and forty men have been killed on 18 December, in the first few hours following the invasion. A further 451 will be killed this day, the biggest single loss of the fighting. On top of this, some 200 more1 will be captured. To understand this phase of the battle, one first needs to understand the defence. The west side of the valley is held by Lawson’s headquarters. The bottom is held by the headquarters of D Company Winnipeg Grenadiers, and a medical section. The east side of the valley is held by 3 Company HKVDC, with 7 Platoon at the north end of Jardine’s Lookout, twenty members of 9 Platoon holding the two pillboxes covering the middle area, and 8 Platoon — with the remainder of 9 Platoon — holding a variety of positions on Blue Pool Road, Stubbs Road, Wong Nai Chung Gap, the southern end of Sir Cecil’s Ride, and Stanley Gap. Near the latter, co-located with 3 Company HQ, is an AA position of 5 AA Regiment.2 The battle for Wong Nai Chung Gap itself consists of three phases: Firstly, soon after the Japanese land, four platoons from the Winnipeg Grenadiers HQ Company are sent forward to reinforce 3 Company HKVDC. McCarthy’s platoon is on Sir Cecil’s Ride, due west of the 9 Platoon HKVDC pillboxes; Birkett’s platoon is told to try and gain the summit of Jardine’s Lookout; French’s platoon is in Phase IV: The Forcing of Wong Nai Chung Gap 6 未命名59> 116 NOT THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE: THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG the col north-east of Jardine’s Lookout at the foot of Mount Butler; Mitchell’s platoon is at Stanley Gap. The initial Japanese attack falls on these troops, plus Lawson’s HQ and the D Company Winnipeg Grenadier positions. Secondly, once it becomes clear that the Japanese are attacking the area in force, A Company Winnipeg Grenadiers is also deployed, attacking towards Mount Butler. In a series of largely isolated skirmishes, almost the entire Winnipeg Grenadier force is pushed back, captured or destroyed by the end of the day. Lastly, the remainder of the fighting here is simply a series of attempted counter-attacks (so disjointed as to amount to little more than reinforcement attempts) by a variety of units. These come from the Royal Engineers with a party of seventy, A Company Royal Scots, sailors from HMS Thracian, and later B, C, and D Company Royal Scots and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. ‘And the reason for this waste of effort and loss of life was that there had been no concerted plan to counter-attack’ (92: 118). How much of this problem is rooted in the loss of Lawson, and the lack of a replacement for 24 hours, is a matter for conjecture. Interestingly, the Japanese perceive their attacks on the position as equally piecemeal. Shoji: ‘I am certain that the areas around the 5-Junction Road3 were subjected to confused attacking by different units such as the Shoji Butai,4 the Doi Butai, the Iwabuchi Butai plus the Divisional artillery directly attacked artillery under the direct commands of GOC Div and OC Infantry Group respectively . . . That the Tanaka Butai had passed near 5-Junction Road on the same day in the afternoon is quite certain’ (148). Wallis decides, on hearing that the Gap is under attack, to withdraw his Tai Tam Battalion HQ and all his East Brigade forces to Stanley and the hills immediately north. This decision has often been criticized. It has been pointed out that allowing the Japanese to split East Brigade and West Brigade down the middle was an example of divide and conquer, and led to the defenders’ eventual defeat. In fact, however, it appears this is a clear case of Wallis understanding that victory is impossible, and that the best he can do is hold out as long as possible. He correctly identifies the Stanley Peninsula as offering the best hope for long-term defence. Lieutenant Browne at Fortress HQ states: 未命名59> PHASE IV: THE FORCING OF WONG NAI CHUNG GAP 117 So my own opinion is that anybody who thought after our hurried evacuation from the Mainland that we were then fighting the Japanese to win was a fool. We were clearly fighting on, to inflict as much damage to the Japanese forces as we could. So Wallis’ decision to move such...