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CHAPTER 1 BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND ]ORDAN'S CAREER BEFORE 1906 FROM the Opium War until the early twentieth century Britain's policy in China aimed at maximum economic benefit with minimum political involvement. However, on many occasions either her economic activities were endangered, or Britain was unwilling to undertake greater political involvement in order to protect her interests. There were times when troubles were caused by China, but they often resulted from international rivalry to control and influence her. Whatever the situation, Britain always took the same cautious consideration . Thus, after much indecision, Britain actively intervened on the side of the Manchus towards the end of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, 1850-1864，的 the same time trying to minimize the scale ofintervention. This intervention is attributed by J. S. Gregory to 'a simple issue of commercial advantage'. By 1862 it had become obvious that only direct foreign involvement could ensure ‘a Manchu victory' which was important to Britain ‘in defence of the treaty rights she had exacted from the Manchu government since 1842 and of the trading interests which had developed and, it was believed, would develop under their sanction'.1 For the rest of the nineteenth century Britain's aim in China was thwarted many times by the so-called ‘missionary problem'. AntiChristian and anti-missionary violence incited by Chinese xenophobia threatened the British economic positiol1 on both immediate and longterm levels. Such disturbances disrupted trade. The Boxer Uprising would have done so on a large scale had it not been for the protective policy towards foreigners, adopted by high Chinese officials in the central and southern provinces where British interests were most deeply entrenched. There was, however, a more far-reaching repercussion of the missionary question. In pressing for compensation after antimissionary incidents generally instigated by anti-dynastic elements, Britain was undermining the prestige of the Manchus who had in the first place conceded her privileged claims in China. The British government's reaction to this dilemma was ambivalent: while it refused the Manchu request to curb missionary activities for fear of influential opposition from the churches, on the other hand it did 2 Anglo-Chinese Dìplomacy I906-I920 discourage further missionary work in China. Most British missionaries saw their government's ambiguous attitude as an important cause of the growth of Chinese anti-Christian hostility.2 The problems mentioned so far were essentially situations arising in China. One has also to consider international rivalrγ， which challenged Britain's privileges and threatened her chance of expansion in China. Foreign encroachment and competition increased towards the end of the nineteenth century with the growing weakness of Ch'ing China. The cIimax came in 1897-1898 with the so-cal1ed ‘scramble for concessions', when Germany control1ed Shantung province, with excIusive mining and railway rights; France dominated south and southwest China around Kwangchow Bay; Russia was in the northeast, centering on Dairen and Port Arthur; and Japan in Fukien. Britain's response to these territorial cIaims followed her traditional China policy. To safeguard her interests in central China, she demanded from the Chinese government the non-alienation of the Yangtze region. To avoid over-committment herself, however, Britain did not go so far as to seek conversion of 出e Yangtze area into her specific sphere of influence.3 、 Nith the dawning of the new ccntury, Britain's position in China was still plagued by the same problems-a feeble Manchu government, Chinese anti-foreignism, and international rivalry-but with greater intensity and new forms of expression. The previous century had witnessed many serious anti-Manchu uprisings, but on the whole they lacked continuity. This was no longer true in the twentieth century. The Tung-meng hui, founded in 1905, organized a series of rebellions, culminating with the 1911 Revolution which ended the Ch'ing dynasty. No less detrimental to Manchu interests, and occuring almost simultaneous旬， was the constitutional movement. Ironical旬， this movement was initiated by the Manchus, who had been forced by their dismal defeat in the Boxer Uprising to admit that reforms were necessary to save the dynasty and the country. The country, however, became dissatisfied with the government's meagre innovations and cIamoured for a more extended division ofpower which of course gradually diluted the absolute rule of the Manchus. The anti-foreign sentiment of ear1y twentieth century Chinese was no longer motivated by xenophobia which resulted in the blind killing of foreigne [18.218.184.214] Project MUSE (2024-04-16 04:55 GMT...

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