Insurgent Intellectual: Essays in Honour of Professor Desmond Ball

10. Constructive criticism and Track 2 diplomacy

10 CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM AND TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY Brian L. Job and Anthony Milner INTRODUCTION With the end of the Cold War — a period during which he had established himself as a preeminent and prolific scholar of international reputation on the primary security concerns of that era (strategic nuclear weapons, signals intelligence, missile defence) as well as on Australia’s military defence — Desmond Ball’s attention shifted towards the Asia-Pacific, where it has largely remained to the present. Ball was quick to realise the importance of establishing regional institutions that could promote security cooperation in the Asian region. Over the course of the last two-plus decades, Ball’s efforts as a scholar, policy analyst, advisor to governments and Track 2 diplomat, have had significant impact on the shaping of the institutional architecture of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, with his abilities to operate simultaneously across academic and policy, and official (Track 1) and unofficial (Track 2) dimensions, Ball has occupied, and continues to occupy, a near unique role in the Australian and broader regional contexts. This chapter focuses on one aspect of Ball’s efforts to advance towards a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific security environment: that is, his work Constructive Criticism and Track 2 Diplomacy 89 to initiate and sustain Track 2 regional, multilateral security dialogue mechanisms and institutions to facilitate security cooperation among the states of the region. Particular attention is focused on Ball’s central role in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), which since its establishment in 1994 has been the only inclusive, region-wide Track 2 security institution with a broad agenda, productive working groups, and a relationship with its official counterpart theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). We organise our reflections on Ball’s contributions and achievements regarding CSCAP and its association with regional institutions across three dimensions: institution-builder on national, Track 1, and Track 2 levels; chronicler of regional institutionalisation; and innovator and critic of institutional achievement. Before addressing these dimensions, it is important first to take note of the key premises from which Ball’s AsiaPacific agenda has proceeded, in effect revealing the continuity of thought and principles that have guided his institution building and security architecture agenda. PREMISES In retrospect, four foundational premises have underpinned Ball’s overarching efforts to enhance regional security cooperation in the postCold War era: a comprehensive knowledge of the security and defence policies, and deployments of Asian states; a perceptive realisation of the distinctive “security culture” of the Asia-Pacific; a conviction that multilateral mechanisms and processes were necessary to supplement existing bilateral arrangements, and that the establishment of formal institutions was required to ensure focus and continuity; and, finally, a conviction that unofficial (Track 2) institutions and processes have a critical role to play in supporting their official regional counterparts. Any reader of Ball’s work on defence and security matters, be it the United States’ nuclear strategy and missile deployments, Asian states’ defence build-ups, Australian defence policy, or Burmese ethnic insurgencies, is impressed with his exhaustive and complete attention to empirical detail. Given the quantity and range of his writing this in itself is a formidable achievement. Ball always has all the facts, and his facts are always correct. In this way he has established a reputation for knowledge and credibility among regional officials and militaries — an important asset 90 Brian L. Job and Anthony Milner when putting forward suggestions for policy change or for military-tomilitary cooperation across states. His empirical authoritativeness has also meant that analysts have had reason to follow closely Ball’s cautions about the implications of weapons proliferation and the destabilising effects of competitive arms acquisition.1 Turning to the second premise, Ball differed from many other analysts steeped in the realist mindsets of bipolar, East-West nuclear strategy. With the Cold War drawing to an end, he quickly realised that the security precepts and institutional forms and practices of that era did not translate to the evolving security environment. As he put it in 1993, “understanding of the constraints and opportunities provided by three conditions: the end of the Cold War, geopolitical considerations in the Asia-Pacific region, and cultural factors — is a precondition for determining the tasks for security cooperation in the region”.2 For Ball, by the beginning of the 1990s there were already important signals as to the drivers of regional development and security. He saw an environment of...