Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia

4. Autonomy and Armed Separatism in Papua: Why the Cendrawasih continues to fear the Garuda

59 4 autonomy anD armeD separatism in papua: wHy tHe cenDrawasiH continues to Fear tHe garuDa Bilveer Singh Indonesian leaders are fond of referring to Papua’s incorporation into their Republic as one of re-integration, colloquially known as kembali ke Ibu Pertiwi, or return to the Motherland. The term “reintegration” is designed to highlight that even though the territory was already “integrated” into Indonesia in the past, its hiving away by the Dutch colonialists from independent Indonesia from 1950 to 1962 qualifies the incorporation to be referred to as “reintegration”. This is premised on the fact that Papua, referred by Indonesians as Irian Barat (West Irian) since 1950 or Dutch New Guinea throughout the colonial period, was supposed to be part of independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI)/Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia (NKRI), the Unitary State of Indonesia, but due to Dutch manipulations and deceptions, supported by the West, this was denied. After continuing for another twelve years as a Dutch colony (January 1950 to August 1962), while the rest of Indonesia was independent, it was surrendered, by the Dutch, to the United Nations [United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, UNTEA], which in turn, transferred the territory to Indonesia in May 1963. Since then, Indonesia has ruled the territory with an iron fist, claiming many Papuan lives as well as causing damage to Indonesia’s international reputation. The Papuan nationalists have been struggling for 60 Bilveer Singh independent statehood since the early 1960s but despite the persistence of the aspiration, very little headway has been made. The various autonomy proposals made by Indonesia were partly aimed at defusing Papuan demands for independence as well as silencing the calls for separatism that have been ascendant since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Papua was incorporated or reincorporated into Indonesia, first de facto and later de jure, largely due to the prominent role played by the Indonesian military. When Sukarno utilized diplomasi or diplomacy (as opposed to military combat) between 1950 and 1961, to regain the territory, he failed abysmally. However, where diplomacy failed, military brinkmanship has from the end of 1961, succeeded. Ever since, the Indonesian military has been a dominant player in Papua (as a symbol, consider that the TRIKORA Regional Command is located on a high ground overlooking the city of Jayapura, the provincial capital of Papua). Since May 1963, the Indonesian military’s prominent role and the adoption of what has been described as the “security approach” have dominated Jakarta’s policy towards the territory. Even though there have been fundamental changes since the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998, and other approaches have supplemented, and, at times, even supplanted the military approach, the Indonesian military continues to have a major role in determining Jakarta’s approach towards Papua. papuan grievances Since 1963, Papuan grievances have been adequately documented and expressed.1 These, in one way or the other, stem from the territory’s 2.5 million, largely Christian, population feeling politically, economically and socio-culturally threatened with the status of being minorities, of being “second-class” citizens of an internal colony of Indonesia. There is also a palpable fear of being oppressed, repressed and subjected to human rights abuses by the security apparatus. The pro-autonomy and independence Papuan elites have identified a number of key issues.2 These have been expressed differently on different occasions, depending on what is being emphasized. For instance, following the Second Papua Congress in 2000, Origenes Reagen Ijie identified the following as root causes of the Papuan conflict: Papua’s historical past and the accompanying betrayals, the development of a Papuan national identity discordant with the Indonesian national identity, the wholesale injustices that Papuans have experienced at the hands of Indonesia, the violent exploitation of Papua’s natural resources without any major benefits for the indigenous Autonomy and Armed Separatism in Papua 61 Papuans, the increasing dominance of the transmigrants (referred locally as pendatang), the rising dominance of Indonesian culture that is undermining and threatening Papuan culture, the large-scale violation of human rights and repression by the security apparatus since 1963, and finally, the widening perception gaps between the Papuans and various key non-Papuan actors with a stake in the territory (be they Indonesians or foreign investors or other powers that have supported Indonesia’s occupation of the territory).3 A study by the Indonesian Institute of Social Sciences similarly...