Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand

25. The Political Economy of Thailand’s Middle-Income Peasants

The฀Political฀Economy฀of฀Thailand’s฀Middle-Income฀Peasants 323 25 THE฀POLITICAL฀ECONOMY฀OF฀ THAILAND’S฀MIDDLE-INCOME฀ PEASANTS Andrew Walker Military force, mass arrests and emergency rule succeeded in crushing the Red Shirt protests that paralysed parts of Bangkok in 2010, but the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was nevertheless destined to fail in its attempt to hold back the course of Thailand’s history. Over the past five decades, as Thailand has developed into a middle-income country, economic and social aspirations have outrun the nation’s elitefocused political institutions. The pressures from this seismic mismatch have been building for some time, erupting in murderous confrontations between protestors and security forces in 1973, 1976, 1992 and now 2010. When units of the Thai Army closed in on the Red Shirt protest site in the heart of Bangkok on 19 May 2010, the Thai government easily won another bloody battle, but it had already lost the war. In order to understand the social transformations that gave rise to the country’s crisis of April and May 2010 it is necessary to turn away from Bangkok and towards Thailand’s rural hinterland, where about two-thirds of the population live and where support for the Red Shirts is strongest. 25฀BangkokIT.indd฀฀฀323 12/6/11฀฀฀12:08:29฀PM Andrew฀Walker 324 Many of the changes that have occurred in rural Thailand during recent decades have been very positive indeed. Half a century ago, 96 per cent of Thailand’s farmers were living in poverty. This figure has now plummeted to only 13 per cent. Life expectancy has increased, infant mortality is close to First World standards, and primary schooling is near universal.1 Thailand has achieved most of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals well ahead of target. The rural population in Thailand can now be described as a “middle-income peasantry” in which subsistence rice farming, commercial agriculture and extensive offfarm employment are combined to produce levels of household income and consumption unthinkable a few decades ago. In the northern Thai village where I have been undertaking ethnographic research for the past eight years, 130 households own a total of 134 televisions, 129 refrigerators, 169 motor-bikes, 134 mobile phones, 75 fixed phone lines, 81 tape or compact disk players, 26 cars or pick-up trucks and 29 computers. For most people in rural Thailand, economic growth has meant that absolute poverty is no longer a predominant concern. This rural prosperity has been seized upon by some critics of the Red Shirt protestors to undermine their claims of disadvantage, as if only abject poverty is a legitimate basis for political mobilization. But the rise in rural living standards is only part of the story. Thailand’s rural transformation has two very important weaknesses. One of them is economic; the other is cultural. Both are political. The economic weakness is inequality. Thailand has been very successful in managing absolute poverty, but it has failed to deal with relative poverty. Many developing countries face the challenge of a widening gap between rich and poor, but Thailand’s performance is particularly bad and shows little sign of improving. Since the mid-1980s, Thailand has been significantly more unequal than its main regional neighbours. National statistics, which understate the affluence of the survey-avoiding rich, show that Thailand’s inequality has grown steadily worse, dipping only temporarily after the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. In the mid-1970s the richest 20 per cent of the population earned about eight times as much as the poorest 20 per cent, whereas in the 2000s this ratio has climbed to between twelve and fourteen.2 The recent Human Development Report for Thailand highlights the regional dimensions of inequality. According to a range of human development 25฀BangkokIT.indd฀฀฀324 12/6/11฀฀฀12:08:30฀PM The฀Political฀Economy฀of฀Thailand’s฀Middle-Income฀Peasants 325 indicators of income, health, education and housing, Bangkok and its hinterland perform very strongly whereas the worst performers are predominantly rural provinces in the Northeast, North and far South. Gross provincial product per capita in Bangkok is eight times higher than in the Northeast and five times higher than in the North. Average household income in Bangkok is about three times higher than in the rural North and Northeast. One very important reason for this persistent inequality is that workers...