By Design or Accident: Reflections on Asian Security

2. Asia-Pacific Security Comes under ASEAN’s Scrutiny

2 Asia-Pacific Security Comes under ASEAN’s Scrutiny For much of its 25-year existence, ASEAN was extremely reluctant to openly identify itself with security concerns because it did not want to be seen as taking sides in the Cold War. This has changed with the end of the Cold War. ASEAN has now shown active interest in not just Southeast Asian but also broader Asia-Pacific security issues. The Singapore Declaration issued last year at the Fourth ASEAN Summit states that “ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN PostMinisterial Conferences (PMC).” Last month, senior ASEAN officials met their counterparts from the seven dialogue partners — the US, Japan, the European Community, South Korea, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — in a conference devoted exclusively to security matters. These discussions can be expected to continue during the ASEAN PMC next month. Indeed the PMC seems to be emerging as an important Asia-Pacific forum for security discussions. Two inter-related questions arise. Why the need for an Asia-Pacific forum for discussions on security? What can it realistically achieve? Asia-Pacific Security under ASEAN  The simple answer to the first question is that there has so far been no forum where the countries of East Asia, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand can sit together to discuss security concerns. For reasons of history and heterogeneity, there has been no equivalent of either a collective defence alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) or a forum like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Western Pacific security has rather been based on an American military presence and America’s bilateral defence treaties and arrangements with various countries which were concluded in the earlier years of the Cold War to protect these countries from aggression by the Communist powers. Many feel that this structure cannot by itself deal satisfactorily with all the problems of post-Cold War East Asia where, except on the Korean peninsula, there are now no clearly defined adversarial relationships. Although the Asia Pacific region is today more peaceful that at any other time since the end of the Second World War, there is disquiet that these good times will not last through the next decade if the strategic changes already in motion take an undesirable turn and produce new enmities and tensions. On the big canvas, two matters are of particular concern in this respect. One is the reduction of US power. If the US draws down its military forces too drastically or loses its will to be the key player in the Western Pacific before a new balance can emerge peacefully, it is not difficult to foresee new China-Japan, Korea-Japan and India-China tensions and new pressures on Southeast Asia by rival powers. The other is the rise of China. China is already showing signs of wanting to acquire a capability to project its power  By Design or Accident beyond its shores. How will this emergent new superpower relate to its neighbours in Asia? The main purpose of a multilateral Asia-Pacific security forum would be to cushion the effects of potentially destabilizing changes that are now taking place. The hope is that, over a period of time, habits of consultation and co-operation will form and suspicions and tensions will be reduced.After all,ASEAN was able to mute differences and vastly improve relations among member countries through many informal contacts and quiet discussions. Can ASEAN’s experience be replicated for the entire Asia-Pacific region? The skeptics would say no, pointing to the differences in size, history and cultures, not to mention thatASEAN wasgalvanized to co-cooperate by the perception of a common enemy whereas an all-inclusive Asia-Pacific organisation would lack this singular “advantage”. The best argument for persisting on the course of multilateral Asia-Pacific security discussions is that there is no other alternative. We are all condemned to try to make it work, so high seem the stakes. The fact that the Clinton Administration, unlike its predecessor, is supportive of multilateral security discussions should facilitate ASEAN’s task. However, the present discussions are preliminary and exploratory. China and Russia are not ASEAN’s dialogue partners and hence are not members of the PMC. A way will have to be found to bring them into a comprehensive Asia-Pacific forum. But one thing is clear:Asia-Pacific...