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1. Sino-Vietnamese Reconciliation: Cause for Celebration?
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
1 Sino-Vietnamese Reconciliation: Cause for Celebration? The chain reactions produced by the ending of the Cold War and the vast changes in the Soviet Union over the last few years are still working themselves through Asia. In Southeast Asia they are producing another turn of the geopolitical kaleidoscope. The changes in Soviet policy, including the drastic reduction of aid to Vietnam, are forcing Hanoi to come to terms with China, its giant neighbour to the north with which, until recently, relations had been one of bitter enmity. And with Vietnam thus in dire straits and the Soviet threat to China much diminished, Beijing, for its part, sees this as an opportune time to strike a deal with Hanoi on important issues. Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, too, are driving Vietnam and China closer. The elderly leaders of both states have watched the turmoil there with horror and seem determined to prevent at all costs its occurrence in their own countries. Both have agreed that while economic reform must continue, political pluralism cannot be permitted. Communist party rule must be preserved. What will be the implications for Southeast Asia of a thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations? By Design or Accident Firstly, there is likely to be a settlement of the Cambodian conflict where China and Vietnam have been the principal backers of the resistance and the Phnom Penh government, respectively. Both countries seem to have decided for their own reasons that it is time to settle the matter, though difficult negotiations may still lie ahead. Afinal settlement will obviously have to be a compromise which is acceptable to both the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Beijing is committed to ensuring that the Khmer Rouge is not excluded but seems prepared to put pressure on it to go along with compromises worked out between the Sihanouk faction and Hun Sen. In the end, the Khmer Rouge may be increasingly marginalised. Secondly, the chances of a conflict in the Spratlys will probably diminish because Vietnam and China were the two claimants most likely to have started one. The Spratlys issue will still pose dangers and it will be difficult to resolve in a manner acceptable to all parties because of the number of conflicting sovereignty claims, but the chances of it being contained will now improve. Thirdly, Vietnam will have to give up its ambition to control Indochina. It is already clear that it cannot sustain control of Laos and Cambodia in the face of China’s opposition without external big power backing, which until now was from the Soviet Union. We can, therefore, expect the emergence of three relatively independent Indochinese states. Fourthly, if all the above come to pass, China’s standing and influence in the countries of Indochina, and by extension in Southeast Asia, will be enhanced. Hanoi will be paying more heed to China’s vital interests and sensitivities, and Beijing will be enjoying significantly more political influence in Laos and Cambodia than it does today. [3.90.255.22] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 14:33 GMT) Sino-Vietnamese Reconciliation In spite of Vietnam and China’s newfound common interests, Hanoi will remain wary of too close an embrace of Beijing, and will seek room for manoeuvre through ties with other countries. Moreover, China cannot provide the economic aid and investments that Vietnam needs for its economic reform programme to succeed. They will have to come from other sources once the US embargo is lifted. So, increased Chinese influence in Indochina may have no significant impact at this stage on the balance of power in the Southeast Asian region as a whole, where, among the external powers, China’s presence and influence will be offset by those of the US and Japan. Nevertheless, any enhancement of China’s naval and air capabilities in the coming years will be closely watched by countries in the region in view of China’s proximity, and its extensive claims in the South China Sea. On the whole the improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations and the end of the Cambodian conflict will constitute positive developments for the Southeast Asian region. For the first time in nearly half a century there will be peace in Indochina, followed by normalisation of political and economic relations between the three countries and the rest of the international community, including the Asean states. If all goes well, Indochina will experience the rapid economic growth and progress which have eluded it so far. Note This article...