Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy

Conclusion

Conclusion I n this study into the nature of Indonesian Islamism, I argued in favour of a nuanced examination of the beliefs and behaviour of Islamist parties in the early democratic period after the end of the New Order. Many scholars of Indonesian Islam have characterized Islamist politics as somewhat monolithic and contrary to the “essence” of Islamic teachings. They, in effect, portrayed Islamism as an undesirable element in a transitional democracy such as Indonesia’s. I have critiqued this discourse as biased in its depiction and promotion of Islam as a pluralist-friendly religion and questioned the binary conceptions which it uses to analyze Islamist agendas. I argued that Indonesian Islamism’s faithfulness to the constitution and commitment to reformist goals have been far greater than this scholarship suggested. I also highlighted that rather than being clear-cut and unwavering, as many of their critics appear to claim, many other aspects of Islamist politics have rather been contradictory (such as the stance on religious pluralism) and shallow (such as the shari’ah agenda 321 322 Islamism in Indonesia of several parties). Pragmatism, however, has, in most cases, prevailed, due to the need to appear pluralist and pro-reform. A central theme of the book was the Islamist view that Islam should provide the major cultural and legal framework for Indonesian society. This conviction, to some extent, explains their aim to control the government in order to achieve Muslim supremacy. I further pointed out that Islamist motives originate in a sense of loss of Muslim identity. For Islamists, gaining control of government meant shifting political power away from secular and non-Muslim forces, both of which they see as having accumulated a disproportionately large share of power since colonial times. The objective in controlling government thus meant to counter the long-term effects of colonialism, which had estranged Muslims from Islam and prevented devout Muslims from having a prominent political role in independent Indonesia. Because of this belief, members of Islamist parties are able to explain the electoral success of nationalist and secular parties — such as in the June 1999 and 2004 elections — as being the consequence of a larger transformation of Muslims along Western-secular parameters, together with the West’s negative propaganda against shari’ah. This fixation on past injustices — both real and perceived — was greatest among the keluarga organizations Partai Bulan Bintang (“Crescent Star Party”, PBB) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (“Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council”, DDII) with their emotional and ideological ties to the legacy of Masyumi. Given their obsession with domestic schemes to marginalize Muslims, PBB and DDII have shown a distinctive commitment to the national idea and to defending the place of Muslims in it. The view that Western interference has prevented Indonesia from becoming a great Muslim nation is critical to understanding their assertion that a broadly defined Islam was the vital element in Indonesian cultures and society. At the same time, in the early twenty-first century many Indonesian Muslims have come to see themselves and Islam as victims of a global plot to subjugate Muslim-majority countries. They perceive U.S. policy as basically continuing Dutch interferences into domestic issues, with the overall goal to hinder Indonesian Muslims from gaining political and economic power. Islamists take this for granted and have responded by taking on an unreflective essentialism. This belief has formed a powerful alliance with the suspicion that other countries, especially the United States, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Australia, wished to keep Indonesia weak and disunited. This conviction goes through much of the country’s Conclusion 323 political spectrum, that is, it is shared by Islamist parties, pluralist Muslim organizations, and nationalist parties. I also showed that Islam’s perceived superiority over other religions has had a deep and pervasive impact on dealings with non-Muslim communities. Islamists usually declare a desire to return Muslims to a full Islamic identity, but their ideal has always been rather to make Islam the broader philosophical basis of legislation and public affairs. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (“Unity Development Party”, PPP) and PBB, however, have abandoned this aim due to the controversies over the state ideology and the Jakarta Charter since independence. Both parties have since taken on non-interference in minority religious affairs as their guiding rhetorical principle by adamantly asserting that non-Muslims would not be affected by the constitutional recognition of shari’ah. The Reformasi Faction in parliament (1999...