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5. The Triumph of Political Logic
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
5 The Triumph of Political Logic I n 1998, demokrasi had brought about the long-awaited opportunity for Islamist parties to regain political power. The most fundamental challenge Islamists faced in the following months and years was to find a balance between promoting religious ideology and making the most of the chances provided by power politics. In this chapter, I will continue to stress that, ultimately, the achievement of political goals was of more immediate relevance than ideological ideals. This being constitutional Islamism, the practical imperative often came about as a consequence of political participation. This is thus different to a number of other Muslim-majority countries, perhaps nowhere more manifest than in Saudi Arabia, where the application of shari’ah has not been framed by constitutional confines. The pragmatic Islamist imperative was illustrated by their shifting support for presidential candidates from various ideological backgrounds. The Islamist parties’ recognition of ideologically opposed governments again underlined their strong constitutionalism. Their willingness to 264 The Triumph of Political Logic 265 support contenders for the presidency to whom they were ideologically opposed, was at the same time, coupled to the latter’s willingness to give Islamist MPs powerful positions in their cabinets. Short-term goals were thus of more urgent importance than long-term goals — a matter Islamists often explained with the predominance of constitutional rulings over ideological principles. As Islamist parties were strongly opposed to Megawati’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (“Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle”, PDIP), they wanted to diminish that party’s chances of winning the election and securing the presidency for Megawati Soekarnoputri. In the circumstances of 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties saw Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (“Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals”, ICMI) chairman and Soeharto’s last deputy, Habibie, as their best chance in the presidential race. When Habibie’s prospects dimmed, however, Islamist parties shifted their support behind Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (“National Awakening Party”, PKB) Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid to thwart Megawati’s bid for the presidency. Despite this, these parties later depictedAbdurrahman’s presidency as a failure and worked to bring about his downfall. In early 2001, parliament set up a commission to investigate Abdurrahman’s alleged mishandling of public funds.1 Though the cases were widely seen as insufficient basis for impeachment, Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi pressed ahead and eventually called on the MPR to initiate a Special Session to determine the president’s fate.2 The MPR removed Abdurrahman in July 2001 and Islamist parties voted to support Megawati as his replacement with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (“Unity Development Party”, PPP) Chairman Hamzah Haz as her deputy. The internal organization of Islamist parties has mirrored the practical imperative. Religious Councils (Majelis Syuro) are supposed to ensure that Islamic principles are paramount. But almost inevitably they give greater priority to political expediency. This disparity was starkest in PPP which contained several high-ranking ulama in a separate council. In official statements, PPP politicians described the opinion of ulama as decisive for political decisions. But when the circumstances demanded the adoption of more expedient positions, the same officials downplayed the importance of ulama in a political party. They argued this by pointing out that PPP ulama had never formed an autonomous religious body with an authority equal to that of Nahdlatul Ulama. PPP debated religious issues in the Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (“Party Advisory Council”, MPP), which comprised both ulama and other senior [54.159.186.146] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 02:01 GMT) 266 Islamism in Indonesia officials.3 Even though the MPP was officially on the same hierarchical level as the Central Board, its role remained largely symbolic.4 PPP ulama held that the “secular” name of the council was chosen in order to stress the difference from the Syuro Councils in non-political organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and thus to emphasize a political party’s need to adopt positions flexibly. Whether or not this is the case, ultimately PPP’s flexibility was based on the political considerations of party strategists. In the words of MPP Chairman K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin: The consideration…is that [in a political party] there is the possibility that political developments have to be taken into account. By contrast, in the socio-religious organizations, it is purely religion… If the fatwa [religious ruling] says red, then it is red. In politics, to say three times two is six can also be four plus two. As for the Syuro Council, two times three is six. As for the...