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4. Vote Maximization: Islamist Electoral Strategies
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
4 Vote Maximization: Islamist Electoral Strategies I n this chapter, I deal with a number of dilemmas for Islamism in pluralist politics and their impact on electoral strategy. I discuss in particular the hesitation of Islamist parties to promote shari’ah issues until after the June 1999 elections. I argue that these parties were uncertain about voters’ preferences; during the early democratic period they, therefore, concentrated on issues of broader political reform. HIgHlIgHtIng PoPular ISSuES oVEr SHARI’AH ConCErnS It is crucial to note that the 1998 student-led reformasi movement did not put pressure on political parties to Islamize the state and constitution. This greatly influenced the policies and strategies of Islamist parties in 216 Vote Maximization: Islamist Electoral Strategies 217 the immediate reformasi era. At the outset, no Islamist party had an official shari’ah policy. The electoral strategy of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (“Unity Development Party”, PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang (“Crescent Star Party”, PBB) and Partai Keadilan (“Justice Party”, PK) was based on a staunchly reformist agenda. They did not want to appear sectarian, while at the same time they wanted to ensure a broad appeal to Muslims. Between 1998 and mid-2000, they only showed determination on those Islamist issues deemed uncontroversial and which did not seem to cost votes in the elections. The reason for downplaying shari’ah goals was the uncertainty over voters’ response. It appeared to be more helpful for political survival to focus on issues of broader political reform. Also, accentuating shari’ah issues was likely to leave Islamist parties open to charges of sectarianism and endanger their democratic credentials. With the elections scheduled for June 1999, only a little more than a year after the fall of the old regime, it was crucial to avoid any images of Islamist politics as divisive. Then, in mid-2000, PBB and PPP added shari’ah to their agenda. The policy outlook of PK, by contrast, was steadier as it temporarily put aside shari’ah goals. This cloaked the party’s underlying dogmatism and unbending worldview. All Islamist parties, therefore, pursued a strategy that differentiated between short-term and long-term concerns. After the end of the New Order, it was paramount for parties to struggle to foster democracy and combat corruption. Both the Islamist and the secularnational camp believed these issues to have great popular appeal. The shared claim to defend reformasi ideals meant that in the early democratic period, ideological differences between Islamists, pluralist Muslims, and secular-nationalists were somewhat hidden. A central reformasi goal was to amend the 1945 Constitution. The constitution was commonly seen as vague, and enabling authoritarian rule and the breach of democratic checks and balances. The public and press, therefore, pressured parties to direct political power to the legislature. Other popular demands were to initiate direct presidential elections, enhance political and economic self-rule of regional administrations, end military participation in parliament and, expand the legal protection of human rights. In taking up these issues, Islamist parties did not target an Islamist electorate for the 1999 elections. This rendered their assertions that shari’ah was closest to the culture of [44.200.191.146] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 13:30 GMT) 218 Islamism in Indonesia Indonesians (as discussed earlier) a rhetorical device illustrating the desire to represent national identity.1 The consequence of the hesitation to disclose ideological issues was that in the constitutional panels, discussions on shari’ah issues built up gradually. Serious debate did not take place before 14 June 2000.2 But from then onward, PBB and PPP MPs devoted a third of their speeches to the defence of the Jakarta Charter. At times, Islamist parties also modified their proposals. They changed the syntax of the clause or proposed to arrange the articles of the constitutional Paragraph 29 on “religion” in a different order.3 Highlighting non-Islamist reform goals, in November 1999 Islamist parties agreed to stay away from sensitive issues such as the preamble of the constitution, the unitary state, and the presidential system. They also did not address the question of whether the president had to be Muslim.4 This reconfirmed Pancasila as state ideology and excluded the possibility of reinstalling the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter into the preamble of the constitution.5 What this meant was that the reforms were to be achieved without abandoning the religiously neutral characteristics of the political system.6 This, in the words of PBB legislator Hamdan Zoelva, “gentleman’s agreement for the sake...