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12. Indonesian Terrorism: From Jihad to Dakwah?
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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211 12 Indonesian Terrorism: From Jihad to Dakwah? Ken Ward In this chapter, I will try to predict the future evolution of the jihadi movement in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has been the best known of several jihadi organisations operating in Indonesia and neighbouring countries, and my focus will largely settle on it. The task is a hazardous one, not least because, in several respects, the conditions facing jihadism now differ vastly from when JI was set up as a successor to Darul Islam, which continued to exist, though shorn of some of its membership, after JI emerged in 1993. In the decade and a half between 1985 and 2000, the jihadi movement was free to expand with relative impunity, the more so as JI leaders were secure in their self-imposed exile in Malaysia. Now, however, confronting a vigilant police apparatus deployed by a government for which combating terrorism has high priority, Indonesian jihadis seem to be no nearer to achieving their goals of first an Islamic state and then a caliphate embracing several Southeast Asian lands. Many have paid heavily, through prison sentences or death, for the violence they or their comrades have wreaked over the last eight years. The likeliest outcome for the near future is that veteran jihadis will fall back on dakwah , or spreading peacefully their understanding of Islam, while some of their juniors, bound together in small cells or even acting individually, continue to carry out violence. But, as we will see, drawing a boundary between dakwah and jihad will be no easy task. 1 YUDHOYONO’S BALANCE SHEET Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government has won high praise in the West for its thoroughness in fighting terrorism. Several major terrorists 212 Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia have been arrested or killed since it took office, including Azhari, the late Malaysian bomb maker, Zuhroni, JI’s latest commander (amir), and Abu Dujana, a former JI military commander. There have been no terrorist attacks against foreigners in Indonesia for over two years. Sectarian conflict, which gave jihadis a stage for training and combat experience in Maluku and Central Sulawesi several years ago, has now largely been contained. The Indonesian police, the main counterterrorist agency, have toyed with various creative approaches to ‘deradicalising’ jihadis, and several former JI members, such as the one-time territorial division head, Nasir Abas, and the repentant Bali bomber, Ali Imron, have come to the fore as facilitators or role models for this program. Both have published books on their careers as jihadis, explaining their respective defections from the cause. In this context of disruption and setback for the Indonesian jihadi movement, what capacity might it nonetheless have for sustaining itself in the coming years? After all, Darul Islam survived military defeat and its leader’s execution at the hands of the Sukarno government to resurface after a decade or so, handing on its ideology and commitment to a younger generation. Darul Islam first emerged during Indonesia’s independence struggle against the Dutch and, aiming to establish an Islamic state, fought against both the colonial army and Indonesia’s new national armed forces. Its record inspired many men later to play prominent roles in JI. Several factors suggest that the jihadi cause will withstand counterterrorism efforts to some extent. Jones (2007) has outlined how extensive kinship ties are leading to the formation of future generations of potential jihadis. She points out that hundreds of terrorist detainees come from large families and have siblings or children already in the movement. Terrorists’ families have even received public sympathy on occasion. The wives and children of two suspects, one of whom (Abu Dujana) had been injured in the course of being arrested and the other (Munajib) killed, were favoured with understanding media coverage and a sympathetic hearing from a parliamentary committee when they complained of the ‘excess and trauma’ they had suffered on witnessing those events (Gatra, 23 June 2007). Zuhroni is an Afghanistan veteran who shone in his first year as a student, notably being strong at mathematics. Later, however, his grades suffered because he was weak at religious subjects, an unusual deficiency in somebody later to become JI’s amir (personal communication from Nasir Abas, July 2007). According to the Indonesian police, some 437 terrorist suspects had been arrested by the end of 2007, of whom 341 had already been put on trial and sentenced (Jawa Pos, 27 December 2007). [44.213.75.78] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 17...