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192 11 ‘As Long as It’s Halal’: Islamic Preman in Jakarta Ian Douglas Wilson 1 INTRODUCTION According to the United States Department of State, Indonesia is a very dangerous place teeming with terrorist activities. Personally, the terrorists I’m more worried about are the ones out and about on the streets, pretending to be parking attendants, buskers, etc. (Piting 2004). This quote from the Jakarta Post encapsulates a grim daily reality faced by the residents of Indonesia’s capital. Fear of extortion, harassment or violence at the hands of preman, a colloquial term for a street thug or gangster, is for many Indonesians a significant and recurrent threat to their personal security. While Western governments and media continue to focus upon an ‘Islamist threat’ in Indonesia, it is a more mundane but pervasive form of everyday terror that has a greater impact on the lives of ordinary Indonesians. Street-level thuggery at the hands of preman is a ubiquitous part of life in urban centres throughout the country. There has been a discernible increase in premanisme since 1998. However , preman are by no means a new phenomenon. Throughout the New Order, a symbiotic relationship existed between elements of the regime and preman, many of whom were ‘institutionalised’ within paramilitary  See ‘Orang Bebas Yang Kian Menganggu’ [Free People Who Disturb All the More], Tempo, 20 May 2000. Preman is a normative term with a complex history that is beyond the scope of this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, it will be used to refer specifically to individuals who employ violent and coercive strategies to achieve material reward, similar to what Blok (1988) and Volkov (2002) have referred to as ‘violent entrepreneurs’. For more on the meaning of preman, see Ryter (1998). ‘As Long as It’s Halal’: Islamic Preman in Jakarta   193 and youth organisations such as the regime loyalists Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). Preman were allowed to operate protection rackets with virtual legal impunity on the condition that a proportion of their profits made its way through the state bureaucracy, and that they were available to be mobilised when the state felt its hegemony to be under threat. Towards the end of the New Order, as the image of a unified regime began to fracture, the ideology and symbolism of many of these ‘entrepreneurs in violence’ began to shift away from reactionary nationalism and loyalty to Soeharto and Golkar, and was increasingly derived from militant Islam. This shift reflected the changing political dynamics. Many preman gambled on which political force would come out on top. Some flocked to the satgas paramilitary wings established by political parties to mobilise support and raise revenue in the wake of the 1999 elections. Others joined the ranks of the plethora of militant Islamic organisations that emerged after 1998. Many of these groups were mobilised in November 1998 as part of the civil militias deployed by General Wiranto. With Habibie as president, defence of the state was correlated with defence of Islam, and the groups acted as a state-sponsored bulwark against the demands of the student-based reform movement. However, with a new freedom to organise and political elites in disarray, many were able to make the transition from subsidiaries of state power to autonomous actors. It has been well documented globally that gangsters often emerge as major beneficiaries of democratic electoral politics—as candidates, as revenue raisers, and as powerbrokers who are able to mobilise support , intimidate rivals and perform other services on behalf of clients. In this regard Indonesia has not been an exception (Trocki 1998). As eternal opportunists and ideological chameleons, preman were quick to ‘shapeshift ’ into the uniforms that best suited the new socio-political environment . Organisations, regardless of their ostensible purpose, are useful only in so far as they provide a cover for gaining and maintaining territory . In some instances it was a matter of the military-style camouflage fatigues of nationalist youth groups being replaced with the white robes and turbans of Islamic radicals. As one preman convert to the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) candidly explained: Now, in the reformasi era, nationalism, defending the state (bela bangsa) and all that shit don’t cut it anymore. It’s the groups that are about jihad and fighting vice (maksiat) that are the way to go (interview, Jakarta, 2005).  See Gunawan and Patria (2000: 58–63) and ‘Pam Swakarsa: Actor atau Korban ?’ [Volunteer Security Force: Actors or Victims?], Tempo, 30 November 1998. [18.224.63.87] Project...

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