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20 Derek da Cunha© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2 Asia-Pacific Security: Strategic Trends and Military Developments Derek da Cunha INTRODUCTION An assessment of the economic prospects of the Asia-Pacific region in 1996 would have come up with a glowing picture of economically vibrant economies attracting enormous amounts of investment capital from around the world.1 From the standpoint of 1996, the short and medium term economic prospects for most of the economies of the Asia-Pacific looked good. A year later, however, that optimism became less apparent. Currency crises and attendant stock market declines that afflicted South Korea and Hong Kong and five of the most dynamic economies of Southeast Asia — namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — called into question the earlier upbeat assessment about the region’s economic prospects. The financial turmoil was also to have implications beyond merely the economic. Indeed, it was to have strategic implications, though these were not apparent throughout the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. Keeping the above backdrop in mind, this chapter analyses a number of broad regional strategic trends in recent years, speculating on their ultimate direction over the medium and long terms. The chapter first focuses on Northeast Asia. It will be noted that insofar as Northeast Asia is concerned, the Asian economic crisis, now over, had not really changed the course of strategic trends there. This was principally because apart from South Korea and Hong Kong, the economies of Northeast Asia were relatively insulated from the Asian financial contagion.2 The second part of this ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg Strategic Trends and Military Developments 21© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore chapter looks at Southeast Asia by examining some aspects of the weapons procurement programmes of, and apparent changes in military doctrine by, a number of Southeast Asian states during the 1990s. It will attempt to ascertain how economic difficulties, occasioned by the depreciation of regional currencies and falls in stock markets, had impacted on defence budgets, with consequences for weapons acquisition programmes and the overall effectiveness of regional armed forces. THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA North Korea The Korean peninsula remains the key focus of any assessment of security threats in the Asia-Pacific region simply because the peninsula remains one of the most militarized places in the world. Along its side of the 38th parallel, North Korea deploys the world’s largest commando force of more than 80,000 men at the van of a one-million-strong army and enormous concentrations of artillery well within range of many targets across the demilitarized zone,3 including Seoul (where about a quarter of South Korea’s population is located). The prospects for conflict on the peninsula have tended to ebb and flow in recent times as a result of a combination of factors. These have included North Korea’s severe and chronic famine; the North’s sharp economic decline and the attendant realization by the Pyongyang regime that as each year passes, and its weapons systems continue to degrade for lack of spare parts and maintenance, the conventional military balance on the peninsula continues to shift in favour of the South. As the conventional balance shifts, North Korea could well lean more heavily on its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons — the sort of weapons, the use of which would be abhorrent to the public conscience and a violation of the most fundamental norms and principles of humanitarian law. In its past conduct, however, the North Korean regime has shown itself oblivious to both the public conscience and humanitarian law. It is unclear how the onset of the financial crisis in South Korea in late 1997 and throughout 1998 would have affected North Korean calculations of the military balance on the peninsula. On the one hand, because of the crisis, the economic gap between the two Koreas had narrowed somewhat, albeit momentarily. As such, North Korea might well have felt less insecure. It could have considered less pressing any desire it might have had previously to initiate some kind of military action to forestall a widening of the already significant economic and military lead South Korea possessed [18.191.18.87] Project MUSE (2024-04-16 06:46 GMT) 22 Derek da Cunha© 2000...

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