Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security

8. Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia

134 Lam Peng Er© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 8 Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia Lam Peng Er Japan aspires to play a political role commensurate with its status as the world’s second largest economic power. That Southeast Asia is a major arena in which Japan seeks to fullfil this aspiration can be seen from its various commitments: the disbursement of about one-third of its foreign aid to the region; the political linkage between aid and democratization; the “purchase” of friendship to support Tokyo’s future bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council; the unprecedented despatch of Japanese troops abroad since the end of World War II for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia; Tokyo’s proposal in 1991 to establish a regional forum to discuss security issues; and its urging China to exercise restraint with regard to pursuing Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. In the April 1996 Joint Declaration by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, both partners agreed to a more expansive interpretation of Japan’s responsibilities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and committed Tokyo to assist the United States in the event of regional instability in the broader Asia-Pacific region instead of Japan’s immediate neighbourhood. The U.S.-Japan strategic intent to jointly address regional hotspots is further codified in the 1997 “new guidelines”. Over the next two decades, the major strategic actors in the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be the United States, China and Japan. India and Russia, bedeviled by serious domestic problems, are unlikely to become dominant players in the region. However, whether Japan is able or willing to adopt a higher political profile in East Asia than it hitherto has is dependent not only on the promptings of its U.S. ally, and Japanese domestic party politics and public opinion, but also on the perceptions of Japan by its neighbours in Northeast and Southeast Asia. If Japan is unable ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg Perceiving Japan 135© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore to secure the understanding and support of the Southeast Asian states towards its desire to play a larger role, the country will find it much more difficult to fulfil its aspirations for status and security. This chapter raises two central questions. First, what are the domestic sources of the Southeast Asian states’ foreign policies towards Japan?1 Second, to what extent have shifts in the structures of the regional and international systems made an impact on the Southeast Asian states’ outlook towards Tokyo? Following on these two questions are two further ones. What would be the likely outcome if new configurations of power in East Asia were to emerge? Would the Southeast Asian states’ attitudes and actions towards Japan shift dramatically? The central argument here is that although the Southeast Asian states vary in terms of their dimensions of political regimes, ethnicity, experience of Japanese military occupation during World War II, level of economic development and size (see Table 8.1), they seek to establish good economic and political ties with Japan, because most of them are post-colonial capitalist states that are concerned with economic development, domestic political legitimacy and nationbuilding . While history, ethnicity, geography and regime-type do not impinge uniformly on the perceptions of the Southeast Asian states towards Japan, the most important domestic factor that shapes regional attitudes is the economic imperative to maintain good relations with Tokyo in order to fulfil their national agenda for economic development. Even though the Southeast Asian states are not homogeneous in their domestic structures and external outlook, they share a common concern for economic development. Good relations between the region and Japan is primarily underpinned by pragmatic and mutual commercial benefits, and not by any commonality of cultural values or political ideology based on “PanAsianism ” or “liberal democracy”. Even though the international system has been transformed from a Cold War bipolarity to a nascent multipolarity, there is still a fundamental continuity in the regional strategic architecture — the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Despite speculation about the durability and post-Cold War utility of the Alliance, it has provided strategic stability and predictability to the region; it obviates the need for Japan to adopt an autonomous defence posture, and provides a...