Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security

7. Denuclearization in Northeast and Southeast Asia

114 Mak Joon Num© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 7 Denuclearization in Northeast and Southeast Asia Mak Joon Num INTRODUCTION “Denuclearization” may be defined as political/normative attitudes towards nuclear disarmament, with a complete ban on nuclear weapons as the objective. The ultimate aim of denuclearization is to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.1 Denuclearization is, therefore, linked to attitudes towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and to the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this respect, “Realist” Northeast Asia shows a markedly different attitude as compared with a more multilateral Southeast Asia. This is reflected in the fact that the Asia-Pacific region includes within it five of the seven declared nuclear powers — the United States, Russia and China, in addition to India and Pakistan (if we include South Asia as part of the Asia-Pacific).2 Northeast Asia also contains a number of threshold nuclear powers — Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — while North Korea is suspected to be close to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.3 On the other hand, there are no nuclear powers nor threshold nuclear states in Southeast Asia. This is probably because no Southeast Asian country possesses the technology needed for establishing an effective nuclear weapons capability, including warheads, launchers, and targeting systems. However, it is more than just technological capability and potential which accounts for such diverse attitudes to nuclear weapons between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that denuclearization, or attitudes towards nuclear weapons, is conditioned by national approaches to the whole notion of military power, i.e., whether states are Realists, or whether they are inclined more towards institutionalist approaches to security. The more ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg Denuclearization in Northeast & Southeast Asia 115© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore utility and/or necessity a country sees in the possession of military power, the more likely it is to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Most Southeast Asian states have, so far, not found conventional military power to be especially useful. This is because the sub-regional security system has been based on external guarantors for its external defence, and on a multilateral framework of norms of socialization and acculturation for achieving intra-regional stability. Military power has been used primarily to address issues of state-building and national consolidation, including suppression of insurgencies. The ASEAN states, in particular, have relied on diplomacy and institution-building, rather than military power, to manage inter-state relations. Northeast Asia, on the other hand, has placed a premium on military power because of its recent history. These two contrasting approaches towards military power are important to an understanding of the prospects for denuclearization and nuclear arms control in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China, again, like for so many other security issues, will set the tone and pace for denuclearization and any arms control process in Asia-Pacific.4 How China will behave in the future has been the subject of much analysis. Some analysts argue that China has become more internationally responsible as a result of economic interdependence. Others, however, maintain that China is still an irredentist and unsatisfied power, and that it will continue with its balance-of-power approach to international relations. For the moment, Beijing, as a minor nuclear power, is likely to continue building up its nuclear arsenal, or at the very minimum not reduce it in size.5 One reason for this is that Russia and the United States are leaders in nuclear technology and have such an “overkill” margin that they can afford to reduce substantially the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal.6 A significant part of this chapter will therefore be devoted to China’s attitude towards nuclear arms control. The chapter examines China’s long- and short-term interests. In the near term, China sees great utility in the possession of nuclear weapons, partly to make up for the relative technological shortcomings of its conventional military power. In the long term, however, it is in China’s interests to ensure that nuclear proliferation does not take place in Asia. Nuclear proliferation will result in China being surrounded by a ring of potentially hostile nuclear states. This will be a drawback to China’s ambitions as a superpower when it becomes comprehensively strong, with powerful conventional...