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Terrorism in Southeast Asia 41 5 Terrorism in Southeast Asia Sidney Jones Ms Sidney Jones, Southeast Director of the International Crisis Group and a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS, discussed security threats in the region, notably Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). She noted that terrorism was not viewed as the biggest threat within the region. It was not regime-threatening, although terrorist organizations such as the JI had some capability for violence. The JI was based in Indonesia. Other groups also had broad connections. As the JI weakened, other groups would rise. In the Philippines, there were the MILF, Abu Sayaf and Balek Islam; such groups were mainly used as footsoldiers . There was no hard evidence of external connections/JI involvement in the terrorism in Southern Thailand. Local issues were usually the prime drivers behind terrorist attacks. But the persecution of Muslims in Chechnya, as well as in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere, were always cited as grievances in JI documents. In Afghanistan, the recruits from Southeast Asia had trained separately, by themselves. JI leaders had met Khatab in Afghanistan, and Chenchnya was viewed in “romantic terms” by Indonesian mujaheedin, who always had an article about Chechen resistance in their bulletins. There were also video cassettes circulating in Indonesia with titles such as “Hell in Russia”. It was known that three JI members had visited Chechnya. Afghanistan formed the bond between the mujaheedin, and Afghan alumni were the most important core members of “special operations” or suicide bombings. They had carried out the Marriott Hotel attack in Jakarta. From 1984 to 1995, most training had been done in camps in Saada (Pakistan) 05 ASEAN-RussiaRelations Ch 5 23/1/06, 4:52 PM 41 42 Sidney Jones and Khost and Torkham in Afghanistan, where Indonesians had trained, together with some Filipinos and Tajiks. An academy with a three-year training programme had been set up by the JI in Afghanistan. In 1994, the JI decided to move their training camp to Mindanao. It was in operation from 1996 to 2000. One hundred and seventy-five Indonesians and thirty Malaysians had attended courses there. Small groups went to assist the MILF after 2000. This training continued till this year. The leadership and base of the JI were to be found in Indonesia. Even though about 400 arrests had been made, the JI could fill the vacancies. These arrests had weakened the JI but it had generated the impetus for new kinds of terrorist collaboration. For instance, Southeast Asians had gone to Karachi for study, with the aim of keeping the JI alive outside the region. In 2003, one cell was uncovered in Pakistan. While it contained only about fifteen members, the concern was that others might be recruited from amongst the hundreds of Southeast Asians studying quite legitimately in Pakistan. The younger brother of Hambali was arrested in Karachi; Hambali had himself been sheltered in Thailand. Jones stressed that most governments had focused on law enforcement measures, but this was only part of the picture. The JI leaders had sent their children to study both in JI schools in Indonesia, and in the case of the Karachi group, abroad, so a new generation of terrorists was being trained. So governments need to study recruitment patterns, which could not be easily stopped. There was also a need to pay attention to fake documentation; corruption; leaky border controls; access to small arms and explosives, stolen or bought from certain armies or quarries. 05 ASEAN-RussiaRelations Ch 5 23/1/06, 4:52 PM 42 ...

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