ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects

24. China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development

356 Leo Suryadinata 24 China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development Leo Suryadinata INTRODUCTION During the Cold War, there were two schools of thought regarding the policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards Chinese residents in Southeast Asia, including those in Indonesia. The first school was represented by Harold Hinton,1 which argued that China would protect the “overseas Chinese” (ethnic Chinese) at all cost; the second school of thought, which was spearheaded by David Mozingo2 and developed by Leo Suryadinata3 and others was that China’s national interest differed from that of the “overseas Chinese”, and it would only protect the “overseas Chinese” if this initiative coincided with the highest priority of China’s national interest such as national security, territorial integrity and the survival of the regime. After the end of the Cold War, as ethnicity and ethno-nationalism was more intensively examined, the view of the first school, in a modified way, reemerged .This view was that since China wanted to modernize and it recognized the tremendous economic resources of the Chinese communities overseas, Beijing began to stress ethnic ties and encouraged the ethnic Chinese to 24 ASEAN-China Relations Ch 24 5/8/05, 9:08 AM 356 China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development 357 re-orient themselves toward China. China was also prepared to protect ethnic Chinese interest, as it became part of China’s national interests, especially in its pursuit of global dominance.This view was articulated by Western journalists rather than scholars; the examples are Sterling Seagrave, and Lewis M. Simons and Michael Zielenziger.4 This chapter examines China’s policy towards the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold War in order to determine whether there have been any significant changes from the earlier findings. What has been Beijing’s policy towards the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia? What are the responses of Southeast Asian countries to the Chinese overture? Do ethnic Chinese remain as an important factor in Sino-ASEAN relations? THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC CHINESE: FROM PROTECTION TO NEUTRALITY The PRC initially inherited the Kuomintang (KMT, the nationalist party) policy of treating ethnic Chinese as the nationals of China.5 However, as Beijing entered the international community, it realized that to claim all ethnic Chinese to be China’s nationals was not only unrealistic but also harmful to the conduct of foreign relations. Beijing began to offer dual nationality treaties to countries, which recognized Beijing or wanted to be friendly with the new communist giant. The point of departure was in 1955 during the Afro-Asian conference where China initiated a friendly gesture to the newly independent states. Indonesia was the first and only country which signed the treaty, but it was only ratified by the Indonesian parliament in the 1960s. The 1950s and 1960s were the height of the Cold War, and Beijing’s primary goals in its foreign policy were to safeguard its “national interests”, including the security of the regime. The United States was considered as the prime enemy of China and later, the Soviet Union was also seen as a threat.6 The policy of the PRC towards Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, should also be seen in this light. When Indonesia introduced an anti-“overseas Chinese” regulation in 1959 and implemented it in 1960, which banned foreigners (that is, ethnic Chinese) to engage in retail trade, many Chinese livelihoods were threatened. They were forced to move out of the rural areas, which created social upheaval. The PRC intervened by sending ships to repatriate its nationals. But when Beijing discovered that this was detrimental to the Beijing-led anti-colonialist and anti-Western coalition, giving rise to the pro-Soviet faction in Jakarta, it immediately stopped repatriating the Chinese and 24 ASEAN-China Relations Ch 24 5/8/05, 9:08 AM 357 358 Leo Suryadinata absorbed the humiliation,7 indicating that “national interest” reigned supreme in Beijing’s policy. When the abortive coup attributed to the communists took place in Jakarta on 30 September 1965 (G-30-S), Beijing was accused by the pro-U.S. army generals such as A.H. Nasution and Suharto to have supported the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in its attempt to seize power, and SinoIndonesian relations reached its all-time low. The coup was crushed and the new military regime...