Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India

I. Introduction: Soundings from History

Introduction: Soundings from History 1 C H A P T E R I INTRODUCTION Soundings from History An extraordinary display of discord erupted between China and Singapore in July 2004, when Lee Hsien Loong paid a private visit to Taiwan shortly before becoming the city-state’s Prime Minister. Beijing responded with almost visceral asperity to the visit, saying that it had violated Singapore’s commitment to the one-China policy and had hurt China’s core interests. China followed up its words with punitive action, cancelling bilateral visits and exchanges and threatening to delay talks on a bilateral free trade agreement. Beijing was mollified only after Singapore emphasized its support for the one-China policy and its opposition to Taiwanese independence.1 What was astonishing about the dispute was China’s vehement denunciation of a Taiwan visit by the leader-designate of a sovereign nation whose troops actually trained in Taiwan. The Chinese response prompted Eric Teo Chu 01 BRisingPowers Ch 1 8/1/07, 3:54 PM 1 2 Between Rising Powers Cheow to place the pique in historical perspective.2 According to him, Beijing’s ire went beyond the Taiwan visit and expressed its frustration over what it saw as Singapore’s increasing tilt towards the United States at a time when China was wary of America’s intentions. Among the signs of the apparent tilt were Singapore’s “eagerness” to sign a free trade agreement with Washington in the midst of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq, “for which Singapore pledged support for the US-led coalition in Iraq”; and Singapore’s support for an American proposal to send its troops to help patrol the Malacca Straits, which “shocked” the Chinese. Certain quarters in Beijing saw Singapore as participating in a pro-US and anti-Chinese coalition of countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea that were forming a de facto arc of containment against China. The “mentality behind China’s ancient tributary system seems to be bearing out on certain recent geo-political trends emanating from China”, Teo argues, mentioning Beijing’s desire to reduce America’s influence in the Asia-Pacific and advance its own vision of Asian regionalism by excluding the United States from the region, which “Beijing may once again consider its own ‘backyard’ ”. Teo views Beijing’s “charm offensive” towards Singapore’s neighbours as being among its moves to “pacify” China’s immediate region, “as in the old days of China’s imperial tributary system under the Ming and Qing Emperors”. Teo’s use of an historical analogy suggests that China’s imperial past remains a framework by which current events might be judged. He is not alone. Positing an intriguing historical analogy, another scholar argues that the evocative image of China’s desire for a free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) being a modern-day tributary system 01 BRisingPowers Ch 1 8/1/07, 3:54 PM 2 Introduction: Soundings from History 3 may be an exaggeration, but seeing in it the economic statecraft of China’s strategy of peaceful ascendancy is historically apt.3 Does history have a message? PAX SINICA? That history helps in the analysis of contemporary international behaviour hardly is a novel idea. As Adda B. Bozeman notes in Politics and Culture in International History, knowledge of the meanings which a nation traditionally has attached to keywords such as peace, war and freedom, or what other values and institutions it has prized, helps to assess “the authenticity and worth of presently existing international arrangements and assumptions”.4 In that spirit have appeared attempts to apply a study of China’s past to international relations. Notable among them is Alastair Iain Johnston’s theoretical work, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History.5 Focusing on the Ming dynasty’s grand strategy against the Mongols (1368–1644), Johnston reads ancient military texts as sources of Chinese strategic culture to ask whether they speak of a single strategic culture. He goes on to study the effect of the strategic culture on Ming decision-making, and shows what effect strategic preferences had on Ming policies towards the Mongols. One conclusion that can be drawn from his work is that the realist strand running through the classics helps to explain why the Chinese have been no less apt to use force than any other civilization. More recently, Martin Stuart...