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‘Papua, Aceh and Riau reject the 17th.’ Indonesia’s National Heroes weep. Fiftyfive years of Indonesian independence is a ruse. In three days time, on 17th August 2000, not all the people of the remaining 26 provinces are going to commemorate the proclamation. In Riau and Papua the people who want to celebrate are afraid, threatened by others who want independence. (Bangkit Online, 2000) In much of the discussion of the regional challenges Indonesia has confronted in the post-Soeharto era, there is the implied question of why, after over half a century of independence, Indonesia is still concerned with threats of territorial disintegration. Regional rebellions and separatist movements have been one of the reoccurring features of post-independence politics. John Legge has argued elsewhere in this volume that the struggle for national unity and the accommodation of diversity has been one of the defining themes of Indonesian history over the past century. Given the ethnic, cultural and religious complexity of Indonesian society, together with the very uneven distribution of human and natural resources across the archipelago, we should not be surprised that tensions between the provinces and the central government have had such a strong influence on Indonesia’s political dynamics. The persistence of strong regional identities and resistance to central authority in Papua, Aceh and Maluku suggest that historical experience and primordial loyalties remain important fixtures of the political landscape. Yet, it must also be remembered that there are many regions of the archipelago where there is little or no history of resistance. In this chapter I argue that while history, ethnicity and religion may be invoked by regional protagonists in how they articulate their cause, they are not immutable. The changing political, economic and cultural contexts also shape the forms and dynamics of resistance to Jakarta’s authority. Ambon was the location of one of the first attempts to secede from the republic. It has also been 12 THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL RESISTANCE IN INDONESIA Richard Chauvel 146 AA/Part2 23/3/01 6:25 PM Page 146 the centre of the most protracted ethnic and religious violence of the post-Soeharto era. The rhetoric from certain quarters notwithstanding, the contemporary battle for Ambon is not separatist in inspiration. However, the government’s inability to provide security might induce some Ambonese to see no other alternative but secession. Aceh provides the counter-example of where a region’s resistance in the 1950s was not separatist, but from the 1980s became so. This chapter will examine the transformation of regional revolts and separatist movements from the revolution to the present day. RELATIONS WITH JAKARTA Regional rebellions and separatist movements are also about Jakarta. The central government’s policies, its ability to impose its authority on the rest of the country, its ability to mobilise resources, the dynamics of political competition and dispersal of decision-making power, and the ideological constructions of the nation and state are all key ‘Jakarta’ factors that influence the changing dynamics of centre–periphery relations. The revival of regional resistance since the economic crisis and the fall of Soeharto suggests that a weak centre is the other side of the coin. Jakarta’s authority has become weaker relatively, but regional movements have not necessarily become stronger in absolute terms. Indonesia in the 1950s was a period when a newly independent government was establishing its authority and when political power was widely dispersed among competing groups and institutions. During the subsequent period – from the establishment of Guided Democracy through to the New Order – Indonesia became one of the most highly centralised large multi-ethnic states. Although the New Order state was not able to eliminate regional resistance, its control was never threatened by separatist movements in Papua (Irian Jaya), Aceh and East Timor. Authoritarian centralised governance went hand in hand with forthright assertions of national unity, perhaps disguising a nagging doubt that this might not be the case. If national unity was so strong and innate, why were such authoritarian methods required (Bourchier 1996b, p. 10)? The New Order style of governance of the regions, instead of promoting a sustainable model of national unity, formed the context for the contemporary revival of regional resistance. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Indonesia’s regional unrest and separatist movements have not simply been domestic affairs to be understood within the framework of centre–periphery THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL RESISTANCE IN INDONESIA 147 AA/Part2 23/3/01 6:25 PM Page 147 [3.22.249.158] Project MUSE...

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