The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260-c. 1360

Contents

Contents Acknowledgements IX Abbreviations XI Chapter 1: IntroduCtIon 1 1.1 Subject matter 2 1.2 Status quaestionis 4 1.3 Periodisation and sources 9 1.3.1 A chronological list of consulted commentaries 10 1.4 Orthography, punctuation and translations 14 Chapter 2: overvIew 15 2.1 The introduction of the De anima into the Latin West 15 2.2 The soul as perfectio 18 2.2.1 Avicenna’s influence 23 2.3 The soul as forma 25 2.3.1 Immortal but not personal: radical Aristotelianism 26 2.3.2 Formality and subsistence combined: Thomas Aquinas 30 2.3.3 A substance, but also a form 33 2.4 Unicity versus plurality of substantial form 36 Chapter 3: MethodologICal dIsCussIons 45 3.1 The scientific status of the scientia de anima 48 3.1.1 Imperceptibility 49 3.1.2 Simplicity 53 3.1.3 Potentiality 55 3.1.4 The study of the soul within natural philosophy 57 3.1.5 Radulphus Brito against John of Jandun 58 3.1.6 An increasing focus on the intellect 65 3.2 The subject matter of the scientia de anima 71 3.2.1 The soul as subject matter 74 3.2.2 The ensouled body sub ratione animae as subject matter 86 VI Contents 3.2.3 Leaving the subject matter undecided 88 3.2.4 Summary 90 3.3 The epistemic status of the scientia de anima 92 3.3.1 Unproblematic beginnings: Thomas Aquinas 98 3.3.2 Certitude and nobility combined: Anonymus Van Steenberghen and Walter Burley 103 3.3.3 Increasing difficulties: Anonymus Bazán, Radulphus Brito and John of Jandun 106 3.3.4 The final stages: John Buridan and Nicole Oresme 114 3.4 Conclusions 119 Chapter 4: the arIstotelIan defInItIon of the soul 123 4.1 Aristotle’s definition of the soul 124 4.1.1 Thomas Aquinas’s views on the matter of the soul 130 4.1.2 The Anonymi 141 4.2 Fourteenth-century interpretations 155 4.2.1 The substantiality of the soul 157 4.2.2 The actuality of the body 166 4.3 Can we perceive the identity of accidents? 168 4.3.1 Thomas Aquinas 169 4.3.2 Radulphus Brito 173 4.3.3 John of Jandun 181 4.3.4 John Buridan 190 4.4 Excursus: condemnations and polemics 197 4.5 Conclusions 206 Chapter 5: substanCe, powers and aCts 209 5.1 A curious fourteenth-century thought experiment 211 5.2 One soul or multiple souls? 216 5.2.1 John Buridan’s arguments against a plurality of souls 221 5.2.2 Nicole Oresme’s hesitation 224 5.2.3 Summary 226 5.3 The relation between the soul and its powers 227 5.3.1 Arguments against a real distinction 230 5.3.2 Arguments in favor of a real distinction 235 Contents VII 5.3.3 Some preliminary conclusions 240 5.3.4 The identification of the soul with its powers 241 5.4 The soul’s presence in the body 252 5.4.1 From annulose to perfect animals 254 5.4.2 Is the soul extended or not? 265 5.4.3 The discussion of the soul’s presence after Ockham 271 5.4.4 Is the power of sight really present in the foot? 276 5.4.5 From annulose animals to perfect animals 279 5.5 From animal soul to human soul 286 5.5.1 The intellective soul: material or immaterial? 286 5.6 Epilogue and conclusions 295 5.6.1 The fragile unity of the science of the soul 297 Chapter 6: fInal ConClusIons 301 Bibliography 307 Manuscripts 307 Published sources 307 Secondary literature 313 Index Codicum Manuscriptorum 327 Index Nominum 329 ...