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18. Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness of Psychology for Educational Research: Illustrated by the Case of Nazi-Germany
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18 Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness of Psychology for Educational Research: Illustrated by the Case of Nazi-Germany* M. Depaepe ❙ ❙ Far too Easy Hypotheses? “La ciencia (...) consiste en un ‘prurito’ de plantear problemas”1 (José Ortega y Gasset, 1930/2001, 16) A few years ago, when we determined the themes for the upcoming meetings of the Leuven Research Community, I thought that there could be no easier task than that which lay before me at the moment: reporting on the history of the attractiveness of psychology for educational research. On the basis of my work in the history of educational science on the development of the empirical-analytical paradigm (Depaepe, 1993), it seemed that one could quite easily formulate a number of hypotheses with regard to the increasing role of psychology in educational research. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, efforts to develop an independently conceived “experimental pedagogy” (as a counterpart to the earlier existing experimental psychology) had, to a large extent, been merged with the further development of (an equally independently conceived) “educational psychology” – in, among others, the United States, England and Germany. This very same hypothesis of a growing interest in psychology within the field of pedagogy could also be derived, without much effort, from the general history of science (see, e.g., Porter & Ross, 2003; Depaepe, 2010). As we know, the emergence of pedagogy (Pädagogik) as a science was closely connected with the rise of the Enlightenment and more specifically, with * Originally published in: P. SMEYERS & M. DEPAEPE (ed.), Educational Research: The Attraction of Psychology (Dordrecht, Springer, 2012) 11-31. 1 Science consists of an ‘itch’ to pose problems. Part IV: Appropriation Processes in Theory and Praxis 408 the idea of the manipulability of mankind and society. As a result, pedagogy was considered to have a highly normative character. It was imbued with social values and standards which had to be realised with its help. As shown by, among others, Fritz Osterwalder (2006), it served as a kind of secularised theology from the 18th century onwards. This could be established not only on the basis of its content, but also based on its language. Its language remained, in a sense, “evangelical”: the educationalist brought, in keeping with the winged words of Immanuel Kant, the liberating message of (self-) education to maturity (and autonomy). Afterwards, pedagogy developed increasingly in the direction of positivism and experimental science and has been shaped further, from the end of the 19th century onwards, by child study, pedology (and pedotechnics) and to some extent, reform pedagogy (or “new” education) (see Depaepe, 1993 & 2010). However, this dominant and heterogeneous direction was not a solitary trend. Numerous “new” substantive research areas as well as methodological “paradigms” led to the “educational sciences” manifesting themselves increasingly “in the plural” from the end of the 1960s. Besides the empirical-analytical approaches, also critical-emancipatory ideas took root. These “pedagogies” were generally based on all kinds of “humanistic” psychologies (like those of Rogers, Maslow and the like, see, e.g., Beatty, Cahan & Grant, 2006; Stauffer, 2009). It was certainly notable that the “goal of education” – the normative excuse par excellence of traditional pedagogy – was determined less and less on the basis of one or other ideology, but rather from the standpoint of the optimal development of the “self”. With this, the normativity of the past does not completely disappear, but it has certainly been exchanged for a different perspective. Educational correctness is defined less and less on the basis of the ideological and/or moral frameworks within which a person has to be educated. Instead, it is based on one’s own opportunities for optimal development. Here, (developmental) psychology seems to have definitively displaced theology (philosophy and ideology) as a legitimising science (see, e.g., Ottavi, 2001). Educational interventions are primarily justified by the criterion that they should not damage the individual or cause him any frustrations. In addition to these more intra-scientific causes, there are, at first sight, several extra-scientific elements from the history of educational science that reinforce the hypothesis that during the 20th century educationalists seemed to be increasingly driven into the arms of psychology for their scientific work. One can first of all refer to the growing professionalisation of the field, where the hunger for status has undoubtedly been a decisive motive. Desire for social recognition and professional prestige were, by no means, [54.166.223.204] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 15:29 GMT) 409 Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness of Psychology...