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Human Rights, after 60 years. A Philosophical Reflection
- Leuven University Press
- Chapter
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69 human riGhts, after 60 years. a PhiLosoPhicaL refLection Bart raymaekers human riGhts, moraL riGht Human rights have taken an important place within the moral discourse of our time: they are almost synonymous with our moral concerns, they are an indication of all kinds of oppression, they became a contemporary translation of what used to be called the good. This general consensus shows at the same time a large amount of them being too obvious: organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch attract spontaneous sympathy . However, such an overall recognition may be covering up a considerable risk: just as everybody favours peace, so everybody seems to be in favour of human rights. Aren’t they losing their specific meaning? They might function as a vague symbol of our good intentions and our moral convictions. If all of us are pro, what exactly is their meaning and significance? Are they more than an empty shell? Although human rights can be approached from many different perspectives (political, juridical, cultural, …) we will focus here on one of the most essential aspects of them: their primary moral dimension. Human rights are first and foremost moral rights; they belong to the human being as a human being, regardless of the institutional context. You don’t need to do anything to have them or to obtain them; you don’t need a degree or social standard ; the simple fact of being is enough to enable one to invoke them. While human rights are considered to be moral rights, they don’t coincide with morality as such, since morality usually contains more than just a mutual form of respect for anybody’s rights. In ethical theory today a common distinction is made between a thick and a thin morality. Within the realm of thick morality one refers to duties, virtues, attitudes, care, solidarity, ideals and all aspects of the good life; thick morality has to do with specific, culturally blended content. Thin morality on the other hand refers to respect for rights and procedures. Here no position is taken with respect to the content of the good life; what matters here is to 70 safeguard a space where everyone, individually or together with people sharing the same conviction, can bring his or her concept of the good life to reality. Classical examples illustrating the meaning of this distinction: campaigns against smoking or drugs can be motivated from both concepts. Starting from a thick morality one can be opposed to a life which is unhealthy or even detrimental; starting from a thin morality one can point to imminent nuisance or criminal facts, being a thread to the chance for anyone else to lead his personal life. human riGhts, a modern concePt Despite the idea that human rights are connected immediately to a human being as such, they aren’t eternal evidence, linked a priori to the concept of humanity. They are the product of a historical process of increasing consciousness, marked by very specific historical situations and events. This growing consciousness is related to what is often called a process of modernisation, when a closed society breaks up; individuals no longer identify themselves exclusively with their community. In experiencing and perceiving the difference between themselves as individuals and a society as a whole, they become able to be aware of abuses and all kinds of injustice. ‘Contrast experiences’ have played a decisive role in the development of the concept of human rights: the struggle against the arbitrariness of kings and the powerful; the struggle against social injustice, against totalitarianism … This is an important element in understanding why developing countries might look differently on human rights and take a different attitude. Since they did not live through the same historical processes, the human rights idea will not show the same dynamics or evidence. Understanding the concept of rights presupposes an understanding of historical processes where functional differentiation (Max Weber) is a leading element. middLe ages What are now called human rights were not yet present in medieval societies. Of course, in as far as we determine the recognition and use of the word right (Lat. Ius), it is always immediately connected to the notion of justice in an objective sense; it has to do with res iusta. One can make claims to an objectively just share [34.201.37.128] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 17:29 GMT) 71 of something which needs to be divided, e.g. a piece of land, a heritage. But this always connected...