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Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: How Stoic and How Platonic?
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Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: How Stoic and How Platonic?* Christopher Gill (University of Exeter) 1. Introduction I tackle here a longstanding scholarly question: how far Marcus’ Meditations reflect orthodox Stoic thinking or a more mixed or eclectic approach, influenced by Platonic and other theories. I approach this question especially through a close reading of a number of passages on psychology which seem to display Platonic-style dualism. I argue that the passages can reasonably be interpreted as expressing Stoic ideas, even though these are formulated in a rather unexpected way. Why does this issue of Marcus’ relationship to Plato arise? There are several prominent and recurrent features of the Meditations, which seem both non-standard in Stoic terms and also evocative of Platonic thought. The most important is the use of psychological vocabulary which separates mind from body (or from psyche) or which presents mind as what we really are. This evokes Platonic dualism and seems to run counter to Stoic psychebody and psychological monism or holism. Other relevant features are Marcus’ use of the image of the ‘view from above’ and expression of disgust at aspects of our physical existence, which also seem to imply quasi-Platonic (dualistic) detachment from the body or physical world. The presence of such features has led some scholars to see Marcus as a philosophical eclectic, combining Stoic and Platonic themes (as well as other intellectual approaches) or as someone who treats ideas with an attitude that is more like religious faith than philosophical conviction.1 However, an alternative view is that the Meditations are to be understood as a coherently Stoic text, even though the work belongs to the genre of practical ethics and its for1 See * I am grateful for helpful comments on the version of this paper given at the stimulating and congenial colloquium at Gargnano, and also for comments made when the paper was given at a seminar at the Institute of Classical Studies in London University. I would also like to acknowledge the support of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, which enabled the research on which this discussion is based. e.g. Rist (1983); Asmis (1989), 2228-2229 and 2237-2246 (with refs. to earlier scholarship in 2228-2230); Alesse (2001); Cooper (2004), 364-368. 190 CHRISTOPHER GILL mulations of Stoic ideas are sometimes exceptional or individual.2 A similar reading of Seneca’s letters and Epictetus’ discourses (as largely orthodox in thought but distinctive in formulation) has been offered recently by Brad Inwood and A. A. Long.3 In general, I am strongly inclined to adopt the latter type of reading of Marcus’ Meditations. But this still leaves open the question how we should understand the relationship between the ideas or methodology found in these works of practical ethics and Stoic theory proper (in so far as we can reconstruct this). Much of the most innovative current work on Stoicism is devoted to exploring this complex question. I contribute to this project here especially by a close reading of certain passages on psychology. These bear, suggestively, on a topic of much recent debate in Stoic theory, namely the relationship between ethics and physics (and logic) in the Stoic conception of knowledge.4 It is implausible to expect to find sustained analysis of this question in the Meditations, and unlikely that we should find innovative ideas or theories – this is not that kind of text. However, we do find ways of discussing psychology and other topics that imply a certain attitude to the question of the relationship between ethics and physics, as I bring out during this paper. Before turning to these passages on psychology, it is worth trying to offer an overall characterisation of the project of the Meditations. In broad terms, though not in all details, I accept Pierre Hadot’s thesis, that the Meditations represent a self-addressed version of the programme of practical ethics – which Hadot calls ‘spiritual exercises’ – embodied in Epictetus’ Discourses and presented there as a three-stage programme.5 This programme , in turn, is best understood as a means of promoting ethical development or οἰκείωσις (‘appropriation’, ‘familiarisation’) both in its personal and social aspects.6 Put in more general terms, the Meditations express the thought that ethical development makes everything seem different – that it has a transforming effect on one’s view of oneself, other people and the world or universe as a whole. Strictly speaking, in Stoic theory, it is only the outcome of such development, the emergence of perfect wisdom, which 2...