The Soul-Body Problem at Paris ca 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries

2.3 The Problem of Memory

2.3 The Problem of memory 2.3.1 Two TradITIons, Two TyPes of memory At the beginning of the second part of the present book, I introduced a distinction between two types of literary sources employed in the psychological speculation at the beginning of the thirteenth century, i.e. the theological sources and the philosophical sources. This distinction, rather simplified and imperfect, nevertheless helps to explain why Hugh of St-Cher and most of his contemporaries deal with the rational powers and the lower powers in two distinct contexts, posing different questions and using arguments of different types. The same distinction might be useful also in examining the discussion developed by the same authors about the concept of memory. Indeed, we may divide memory into two different kinds of powers according to the sources we refer to. On the one hand, we may define memory as a rational faculty which is identical with the essence of the soul and – like the soul – immortal . But, on the other hand, we may consider it as a sensitive or animal faculty, which depends on sensible images and therefore perishes with the body. These two points of view meet in the psychological speculation flourishing in the first decades of the thirteenth century, and this confrontation gives rise to a debate engendering various solutions. Before approaching this debate, let us consider its main sources, i.e. Augustine’s and Avicenna’s thought.185 Augustine of Hippo dwells on the problem of memory several times in his writings : this is in fact one of the central elements of his psychology. Hence, his view of memory goes through a number of transformations and it would thus be difficult to outline an adequate and complete picture of his thought in this regard.186 We 185 Actually, the sources of the thirteenth-century debate on memory are much more abundant; in particular, in the first half of the thirteenth century, authors were frequently inspired by the division of the powers of the soul introduced by John Damascene; cf. Philipp., sum. de bon., ed. Wicki, pp. 158-164; Ioh. Rup., sum. de an. ii, 3, 68-81, ed. Bougerol, pp. 197-220; Lottin, “La psychologie de l’acte humain chez saint Jean Damascène et les théologiens du XIIIe siècle occidental”, in Psychologie et morale, i, pp. 400-409. 186 Among the several works about this problem, we should mention especially J. A. Mourant, Saint Augustine on Memory, Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1980; A. Solignac , “‘Memoria’ dans la tradition augustinienne”, in Dictionnaire de spiritualité. Ascé- 152 Part two know, however, that early thirteenth-century theologians draw inspiration mainly from De Trinitate, which situates memory in the mind as image of Trinity-God. The importance of this view held by Augustine is increased by the fact that Peter Lombard included it in his Sentences.187 It follows that the description of memory expounded in De Trinitate occupies a prominent position in the theological writings of the first half of the thirteenth century. Augustine’s De Trinitate sees in the highest part of the soul, i.e. in mens, the image of the triune God.188 First of all, the mysterious unity of the three divine Persons is represented by the essential unity of memory, intellect and will. It is through these three elements that the mind can know itself and, above all, can know God (“anima capax Dei”): for the soul is image of the Trinity principally when it directs its inner eye to the prime and eternal truth (“anima particeps Dei”).189 The analogy between mind and God goes through the immortality of the soul as well. Indeed, whereas God is eternal, the soul, as image of Him, is immortal. Hence, if the created trinity (memory, intellect, will) is immortal, then the human memory shares the blessed life as it is an essential part of the soul conceived of as image of God.190 However, the conception of memory as one of the sensitive faculties is not foreign to Augustine’s thought. In his earlier works, memory is described as a power which makes use of sensible images and is shared by man and animals.191 The theologians of the first half of the thirteenth century, however, mainly assimilate the Augustinian view presented in De Trinitate, where memory is identified with mens and thus constitutes an intellective principle. The proper object of this spiritual memory is not reduced to the sensible world, but is mainly identified with...