Ancient Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima

After Literalism and Spiritualism: The Plasticity of Aristotelian Perception

after literalism and spiritualism: the plasticity of aristotelian perception Nathanael Stein abstract A plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of perception runs as follows: perception is the actualization of a capacity to become like the object of perception in form, such that (i) the actualization involves but is not defined by physical changes to the sense organs, and (ii) the likeness between perceiver and object of perception is a kind of formal likeness rather than sameness of perceptible quality. That is, perception is defined as a kind of change in the sense of an actualization (ἐνέργεια) of a capacity, not alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), and the likeness between subject and object is non-literal likeness, even though the material cause of perception involves alterations of the sense organs. This position constitutes an attractive middle way between so-called ‘literalist’ and ‘spiritualist’ interpretations. If we take this kind of account seriously, a question arises: What is it to have this capacity for becoming like perceptibles? If the account Aristotle gives in De Anima is meant to be of the causal interactions yielding perceptual states (perception as a kind of change) as well as of the representational content of those states (likeness), then Aristotle needs to bridge the gap between the properties with which our perceptual faculty interacts causally and the properties which he claims our perceptual states represent things as having. The tension between the causes and contents of perception may be resolved if we consider the relationship between perception and universals, which suggests that the perceptual faculty and its states become more and more sophisticated depending on the other mental faculties and the experience of the perceiver. 1. introduction: aristotelian perception At the end of his initial treatment of perception in da ii 5, Aristotle sums up as follows: What is capable of perceiving is potentially such as the object of perception is actually, just as was said. When it is being affected, therefore, it is not similar, but when it has been affected it becomes like it and is such as it is.¹¹ da ii 5, 418a3-6: τὸ δ᾿ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ᾿ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.  nathanael stein What perceives is thus in some way acted upon by the object of perception, such as to be made like it. To give an account of Aristotle’s theory is to say how perception is a process of being affected, and how the perceiver is made similar to the object of perception. After investigating the objects of sense and each of the five senses in chapters ii 6 through ii 11, Aristotle returns to perception in general, and states that a sense (ἡ αἴσθησις) is ‘what is capable of receiving the perceptible forms without their matter’ (424a18). This suggests that the perceiver becomes like the object of perception in virtue of receiving its sensible forms ‘without the matter’. If so, it would seem that a key to an understanding of Aristotle’s theory of perception is an understanding of this activity of form reception: what its nature is, and what it involves.² Aristotle’s remarks in De Anima to the effect that perception is (i) a kind of change in which (ii) the perceiver is made like the object of perception, have been at the center of many recent attempts to understand his account of perception — including an especially heated debate regarding whether and how the sense organs change during perception — as well as his view of the soul in general. In the first part of this paper I examine the possibilities for interpreting those claims, and suggest an schematic understanding of them which I view to be the most textually and philosophically plausible. If that interpretation is correct, it is incumbent upon Aristotle and his interpreter to say what it is to have a capacity such as he describes , especially in light of what appears to be a wide gap between the properties with which the perceptual faculty interacts and the perceptual contents to which such interactions give rise. That this problem should arise for Aristotle, however, is welcome news: it indicates that his theory of perception is worth investigating as a theory of perception, rather than as a historical curiosity of either primitive physiology or of a conception of mind so foreign we cannot even begin to imagine what it would be like to believe it. 2. between literalism and spiritualism Aristotle’s analysis of perception in terms of likeness and change admits of a wide spectrum of interpretations. It extends from, at one end, perception as...