Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades: Story, Text and Moralism

2. A Difficult Character (Alc. 2-9)

2 A Difficult Character (Alc. 2-9) 1. On Character Changes and Innate Passions (Alc. 2.1) In the proem, we learnt that Alcibiades remained beautiful throughout his life “because of the natural goodness and excellence of his body”1 . But what about his soul? Was he born with a good nature (φύσις) and did he develop a virtuous character (ἦθος)2 ? Plutarch brings up the subject immediately after the proem (2.1)3 : τὸ δ’ ἦθος αὐτοῦ πολλὰς μὲν ὕστερον, ὡς εἰκὸς ἐν πράγμασι μεγάλοις καὶ τύχαις πολυτρόποις, ἀνομοιότητας καὶ4 πρὸς αὑτὸ μεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο. φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον. In later life, his character displayed many inconsistencies and changes, as was to be expected in the course of great enterprises and numerous changes of fortune. He was by nature a man of many great passions, the strongest of which was his love of victory5 and being first. Some readers may be surprised at the statement that Alcibiades’ character underwent many changes, since modern scholars have often contended that the ancients regarded human character as something fixed 1 Alc. 1.5: δι’ εὐφυίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν σώματος. 2 On Plutarch’s conception of the human soul and his views on the formation of character, see Duff 1999a, 72-78 and 2008a; Gill 2004, 229-238. 3 It is not uncommon that the informal proem of a Plutarchan Life is followed (almost) immediately by a direct analysis of the protagonist’s nature and/or character ; cf. Them. 2.1; Art. 2.1; Lys. 2.2-5; Ages. 2.2. As usual (see Stadter 1988, 276), Plutarch uses the particle “δέ” to connect the informal proem and the first sentence of the rest of the Life. 4 Contrary to Ziegler & Gärtner 1994, who are followed by Raffaelli 1994 and F. Albini 1996, I see no reason to read “ἀνομοιότητας πρὸς αὑτό καὶ μεταβολάς” instead of “ἀνομοιότητας καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ μεταβολάς”, which we find in the manuscripts. 5 It is uncertain whether Plutarch and his contemporaries, who pronounced ει and ι in the same way (see Sturtevant 1940, 40), could associate “φιλονικία” with both “νίκη” (victory) and “νεῖκος” (strife), or made a distinction between “φιλονικία” and “φιλονεικία”; see esp. Duff 1999a, 83. At Alc. 2.1, the addition of “καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον” renders it unlikely that Plutarch wrote “τὸ φιλόνεικον”; cf. Pelling 1997a, 130-131 n. 78 and 2000b, 338 n. 15. 120 a difficult character (ALC. 2-9) and immutable6 . On further investigation, however, it becomes clear that Plutarch accepted the idea that one’s character can change from bad to good or vice versa. The former possibility is explicitly acknowledged in De sera num. 551c-552d, and constitutes a prerequisite for the working of Plutarch’s ethical treatises and the moral programme of the Parallel Lives7 . As to the reverse evolution, it is correct that Plutarch did not believe that true virtue could be converted into its opposite by any fortune8 . He admits, however, that real human beings, like those whom we see in action in the Parallel Lives, rarely if ever possess pure philosophical virtue9 . Therefore, they may suffer a negative character change when the circumstances alter10 . Plutarch mentions three possible ways to explain such a change of character. The first is to assume that it results from a change of nature (μεταβολὴ φύσεως). Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether Plutarch himself really believed that a man’s nature can change through fortune: he rejects the idea with regard to the Macedonian king Philip V at Arat. 51.4 and refuses to go into a full consideration of it in his Life of Sulla (30.6)11 . Secondly, some people conceal their baseness until they can safely vent it; their character changes but their nature does not12 . According to Plutarch, this is what happened in the case of Philip V, who from a gentle prince and self-controlled youth became a wanton man and a pernicious tyrant (Arat. 51.4). Finally, one may have a good nature but suffer a negative change of character as the result of great and undeserved misfortunes. Thus Sertorius, who at first showed himself merciful in punishing offences, became harsh towards his wrongdoers when his cause grew hopeless (Sert. 10.4-7). 6 See e.g. Goodyear 1972, 37; R. Martin 1981, 105. 7 Cf. Wardman 1974, 135-136; Gill 1983, 473-474; Swain 1989, 65; Frazier 1996, 90. 8 See Sert. 10.6. See also Wardman 1974, 134; Brenk 1977, 178; Gill 1983, 479-480. 9 See esp. Cim. 2.5. See also Babut 1969a, 301-303 and Lombardi 1997, 384-385. 10 Cf. Brenk 1977, 178-180; Gill 1983, 480-481 and 2004, 419-421; Swain 1989, 67-68. 11 For the view that Plutarch thought that a man’s character could change but his nature could not, see e.g. Bergen...