The Convolutions of Historical Politics

The Turns of Russian Historical Politics, from Perestroika to 2011 (Alexei Miller)

The Turns of Russian Historical Politics, from Perestroika to 2011 Alexei Miller The relationship between history and politics in Russia experienced many dramatic changes since the beginning of Perestroika over 25 years ago. One such dramatic U-turn began in 2009–2010. The purpose of this article is to analyze the causes of the surge of historical politics in Russia at the beginning of the 21st century, and its current revision. From the Fervor of Perestroika to the Indifference of the 1990s It is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future that public interest in history in Russia will be anywhere near the level that was typical of the perestroika era. At that time, new trends had a clear political relevance, such as the discovery of “blank spots” in history concerning the crimes of the Communist regime—above all, Stalinism—and the widespread usage of such terms as “empire” and “totalitarianism” in reference to the Soviet Union, which had been previously banned. Even perestroika ’s idiomatic language was largely borrowed from historians’ vocabulary , such as the use of phrases like “opting for a historical path,” “historic alternatives,” etc. 1 The public began to crave all things historical. The situation was generally very unhealthy and showed signs of fervor—it was a period when demand definitely outweighed quality supply. At the same time the impression that the whole country decided to adopt a critical attitude towards Stalin and Stalinism was false—those who kept their proStalin views simply were not active in public sphere. 1 See Atnashev. “Transformation of the Political Speech under Perestroika.” 254 The Convolutions of Historical Politics The first half of the 1990s was marked by shocks resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and dramatic deterioration of material conditions for the majority of Russians. This coincided with a noticeable drop in public interest in history. The so-called trial of the Communist Party in 1992 revealed a profound split in society over the perception of its own past.2 The Soviet Union’s victory in World War II was the sole element of collective memory that evoked an emotional response across various social groups. Russian politicians sensed this and did not make many references to history in their key speeches. 3 Boris Yeltsin, who remained a staunch proponent of anti-Communist rhetoric until the end of his presidency, no longer sought to make this position the only legitimate one. In the second half of the 1990s, the authorities stopped exploiting the subject of history for political goals and left history for the historians. In contrast, the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s were very productive years for historians. The “archive revolution” defined this period, when many documents were made accessible for the first time and a considerable number were published. Russian historians started to actively cooperate with their foreign counterparts—mostly Americans and Western Europeans—in studying the events of the 20th century . Dozens of scholarly books on the Soviet period were published, even though society paid far less attention to them than in the perestroika era. Overall, the Russian media did not cope with the job of focusing the public’s attention on new historical research. More precisely , it did not set this objective for itself. Hundreds of monuments to the victims of political repression were erected at the time, most often at sites of mass executions or at Gulag camps.4 Yet these monuments did not occupy a central place in public space and public consciousness, as they were located on the outskirts of urban areas, or even in hard-to-reach places.5 No national rituals 2 Materialy dela o proverke konstitucionnosti ukazov Prezidenta RF, kasaiuschihsia deyatelnosti KPSS I KP RSFSR, a takze o proverke konstitucionnosti KPSS I KP RSFSR. Moscow, Spark, 1996–1998, vol. 1–6. 3 Malinova. “Tema proshlogo v ritorike prezidentov Rossii,”106–122. 4 The most important role in organization of research of the history of the crimes of the Soviet regime and commemoration of its victims belongs to “Memorial” society, founded in 1991. 5 Roginskii. “Pamiat’ o stalinizme.” 255 The Turns of Russian Historical Politics, from Perestroika to 2011 for commemorating the victims of the Soviet regime ever materialized. The criminal nature of the Soviet state was fixed neither in juridical nor official political documents. The assessment of 20th century history, coined in this period, was reflected—with some distinct, but not principal differences—in the wide...