The Convolutions of Historical Politics

The “Politics of History” as a Case of Foreign-Policy Making

The “Politics of History” as a Case of Foreign-Policy Making AlexAnDer AStrov Changes in the configurations of political power are often accompanied by shifts in the priorities of specific policies, which in turn acquire catchy marketing labels. The Russian Perestroika or “sovereign democracy ,” the Estonian “tiger leap,” or the British “big society,” while never exhausting the whole of the state’s politics, sometimes succeed in fastening short-term public attention on one specific aspect. Something similar is happening in world politics, even though here there was no “transitions of power” through regular elections and successful changes of priorities are more difficult to achieve. At some point the “politics of history,” for example, clearly tends to dominate the agenda alongside “energy security” and “colored revolutions.” Still, there is something about the “politics of history” which seems to distinguish it from, say, “war on terror” or détente. To begin with, the fascination with the “politics of history” erupted almost simultaneously in a number of states in Central Europe who employed similar techniques in their pursuit of this kind of politics . And then it ebbed almost as simultaneously. Second, political fashion, if that is what it was, in this case, was dictated by small states, rather than “great powers.” For some, these two aspects alone serve as a justification for seeking the causes of the “politics of history” at the established centers of global political power: more likely than not, the “politics of history” was nothing but a tool through which Washington and Brussels used small states in their increasingly problematic relations with Russia. Yet, a closer look at the substance of the “politics of history” in different European states suggests that Russia was not the sole object of this politics, sometimes it was not even the most important one. 118 The Convolutions of Historical Politics Rather, the concrete shape was given to the “politics of history” by the process of international socialization of small post-Communist states that was taking place in the context of European and transatlantic integration . This socialization, in turn, was driven by the accelerated adoption of “best practices” for the sake of successful accession to the EU and NATO. It is quite possible to expect that specific procedural solutions learned in the social, economic and military spheres were then applied to the “politics of history.” Hence certain synchronicity and similarity across various national contexts. Still, even if joint socialization promises to explain procedural similarities , they leave open the question of substance: why history? More specifically: Why indisputable political interest in history took shape in the first decade of the new millennium? How exactly this interest was different from the routine references to history invariably made in any politics? My answer to these questions comes down to an attempt to discern a specific conceptual language in which history was discussed by Estonian politicians right after the state’s accession to the EU and NATO. Needless to say, this language has its specific Estonian dialect and its own vocabulary. For example, the “Bronze soldier” monument, once in the center of Tallinn, points directly to Russian-Estonian relations as well as interethnic relations within Estonia. However, this language also has a certain grammar, which, I believe, is shared across a number of Central European states and is shaped by even broader European and transatlantic contexts. Once reconstructed, this general grammar together with a more coherent vocabulary, allows for an understanding of the “politics of history” in its relation with foreign policy. Changes of Emphasis During the “singing revolution” at the end of the 1980s, Mart Laar, who was subsequently to head the government of Estonia more than once, came up with the slogan “Give the nation back its history!” Since then, the past has invariably been an important argument in Estonian politics; nor has there been a lack of reflection on this theme. At the start of the new century, an intensification of the politics of history may 119 The “Politics of History” as a Case of Foreign-Policy Making be clearly observed. By intensification I mean not only that the emotional level of discussions has risen or that they have become more frequent but also there has been an obvious shift in emphasis. Whereas in the past, events used for political purposes were mostly restricted to the interwar period or the Communist past of certain elite politicians, the concepts of “totalitarianism,” “genocide,” and “crimes against humanity...