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503 Document No. 76: Information Note regarding george H.W. Bush’s Visit to Poland (July 9–11) July 18, 1989 In this summary of Bush’s conversation with Jaruzelski, prepared by the Polish Foreign Ministry, one sees Bush’s caution and sensitivity about undermining Gorbachev ’s policy or destabilizing Eastern Europe in any way. He mentions several times his respect for Gorbachev and his resolve not to interfere in the processes in Poland. Jaruzelski makes it very clear to Bush that Western economic assistance is needed if the Polish reform is to succeed and that its success or failure would have wide implications throughout Eastern Europe. When discussing the idea of the common European home, Jaruzelski expresses a preference for a little more privacy—“that it should be a house with free corridors between respective rooms.” Bush, however, seems to agree with Gorbachev’s more radical vision—“a united Europe, without foreign troops (including American troops).” He sees this as “a vision of the future, but he is not waiting for a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.” Bush also asks Jaruzelski to make it clear to Gorbachev that his recent remarks were not a call for a Soviet pullout, which was a concern for the Soviet leader. […] Pres. Bush expressed great satisfaction with the fresh possibility of visiting Poland . He is impressed by the changes, which the world is watching with bated breath and admiration. He underscored that he did not come to Poland to complicate the very difficult work gen. Jaruzelski has to perform. He does not want to engage in “super rhetoric” that could be received well in the West but would hinder actions by the Polish authorities. It is not his goal to make gorbachev’s life more difficult and to trigger internal tensions in the socialist camp. He came to pay tribute to the reforms and changes and to encourage their intensification and expansion, to speak about how the United States could contribute to Poland’s economic renewal, but not to interfere in any way in our internal affairs. That is the general goal of President Bush’s visit to Poland, and [he was] pleased to hear the comments by his host, who is in a position to realize that goal. Also, he does not intend for the present visit to create a peculiar contest about who is more popular: gorbachev in the West, in the FRg and France, or Bush in the East, in Poland and Hungary. He is prepared to discuss every aspect of Polish–American relations. He also wants to emphasize that because of the course gen. Jaruzelski has declared and taken, his personal standing and popularity have never been as high in the United States as they are at present. Melyakova book.indb 503 2010.04.12. 16:20 504 Thanking [Bush] for expressing such relevant intentions for his visit, gen. W. Jaruzelski stressed that we are all aware of the superpower leaders’ tremendous responsibilities with regard to global problems, but also in reference to our country . He added that during his visit to France and the FRg M. gorbachev did not do and did not say anything that could damage U.S. interests. It is invigorating that people of such high prestige approach politics in such a responsible manner, in a spirit of mutual trust and respect for a partner’s interests. Only in this way is it possible to move forward. […] Reporting specifically on the results of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact nations in Bucharest, gen. W. Jaruzelski underlined that it was another step on the path toward progress in arms reductions and international cooperation, and toward achieving stability and security in Europe . The main emphasis in Bucharest was on political cooperation, and not military confrontation. The internal problems of the allies were also discussed, on which there is greater pluralism than in NATO. The PRL, Hungary and the USSR find themselves at the forefront of change and reform. But another viewpoint also exists. Some allies are concerned that the situation will slip out of control, that it will explode. Thus, the Polish situation might represent an incentive [for reform], or discourage [others] from reform if there are only empty shelves in Poland. Therefore if the West is interested in success for our reforms, they should see them not only in the Polish context but also in terms of spreading conditions. In Bucharest we spoke in favor of arms control, d...

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