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446 Document No. 58: Session of the CC CPSU Politburo April 20, 1989 Gorbachev was out of the country on April 9 when Soviet forces cracked down on pro-independence demonstrators in Tbilisi, Georgia, killing at least 20 and drawing widespread condemnation. Eleven days later, this Politburo meeting is the first sustained high-level discussion of the still-murky affair. Gorbachev denounces the Georgian communist leadership who called in the troops for having “sat in a bunker and relied only on force.” He turns directly to the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, to criticize the slanted intelligence given to the leadership, while Prime Minister Ryzhkov chimes in that “we, the people in the government, the Politburo members, knew nothing” and had to read about the deaths in Pravda. The Tbilisi events become the center of debates when the new Congress of People ’s Deputies convenes in May; the Congress would appoint an investigating commission , and the acting head of the Politburo at the time of the massacre, Yegor Ligachev, would be pilloried on national television by the radical democrats and independence advocates. For his part, Ligachev would maintain he had been set up, and that Gorbachev had been aware of the order to use force, even though in the post-event debates Gorbachev would unequivocally side with the opponents of violence . On a broader level, Tbilisi later becomes a watershed event that undermines the prestige of the Soviet military, delegitimizes the use of force against political movements in the USSR, reinforces Gorbachev’s own commitment to nonviolent change, and leads to the erosion of state power based on fear of violence and repression. Yet, in April, the leadership’s views appear to be considerably more guarded. Left with the final word in this version of the Politburo meeting, Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov (later a coup plotter in August 1991) advises grimly: “Still, the troops should not be moved far from Tbilisi.” Shevardnadze: In 1921 there was no revolutionary situation in georgia. The 11th army just entered [the country]. From here stems the traditional attitude toward Kirov and Ordzhonikidze.55 Our version of the April 9 events was absolutely groundless. The crisis is in the manifestation of contradictions between the new situation and the old leadership methods. We should have prevented the use of the army. In general, the army should not be drawn into resolving internal political conflicts. 55 Sergey Kirov (1886–1934) and Sergo Ordzhonikidze (1886–1937) were Bolshevik revolutionaries who played integral roles in establishing Soviet control over the Transcaucasus region, including georgia, in 1921–1922. Melyakova book.indb 446 2010.04.12. 16:20 447 Gorbachev: The crisis in georgia was not a bolt out of the blue. The whole country suspected that something was brewing there. Eduard Amvrosievich [Shevardnadze ] drew our attention to this many times. The georgians and Ossetians have a fiery temper, they are not like the Armenians. [georgian First Party Secretary Jumber] Patiashvili, as far as we know him, is not deaf to national interests but he shares with other comrades elements of panic-mongering, suspicion and, even more, reliance on force. He lacks the guts to conduct political work. The georgian leadership did not establish ties with the intelligentsia. And this is the georgian (!) intelligentsia. It is historically deeply tied to the people. It is the carrier of georgian national symbolism. Everything there—theater, film, music —everything carries a very strong national element, an underlying connection between the intelligentsia and the people. Had the intelligentsia been involved in due time in the process of change it would have responded sincerely and actively. But this was not done. Patiashvili has a taste for “decisive action.” I have long been saying—let us learn how to work under conditions of democracy . And now events confirm that. Our cadres regard political methods as a manifestation of weakness. Force—that is the real thing! In georgia they could not transform themselves in the democratic way, to lead genuine advocates of perestroika, to listen to opponents, even to people with extreme views. Patiashvili is the man with whom I was most closely tied in the georgian leadership, so it is difficult for me to give a full political and accurate analysis of what happened. And right now this is important for our work with the entire country. The crisis in work methods is showing through in more than just relations with the intelligentsia. It is necessary to understand everything correctly in order to work not only...

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