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691 Document No. 122: Record of Conversation between Mikhail gorbachev and Wojciech Jaruzelski April 13, 1990 This warm conversation between Gorbachev and the East European leader he respects the most, Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski, provides an epilogue to the process of change that started with Gorbachev’s first meeting as general secretary with bloc leaders in March 1985. Here, Jaruzelski thanks Gorbachev for the way that Moscow has received Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, head of the first Solidarity government (see Document No. 107). The former Polish dictator comments that Mazowiecki is a “realist” who is “pro-West but not anti-Soviet” and that “[h]is positions have solidified as the result of his visit to Moscow. He felt the attention and respect for him from the highest Soviet leadership.” Such behavior, Jaruzelski says, is especially important for the leaders of Solidarity, many of whom “were repressed, interned, or just oppressed” so that “now when they see normal, respectful treatment many are quickly changing for the better.” The two leaders commiserate on the economic problems they face, on the “adventurism ” of the Baltic nationalists (especially the Lithuanians), on the domestic political pressure in the Soviet Union to solve “present-day conflicts … through the old forceful methods,” and even on the way that communists themselves brought on their crisis (in Jaruzelski’s words): “when we tried to treat everybody alike, to make 99.99 percent of the voters vote for us, and to the accompaniment of thunderous applause .” Jaruzelski mentions the 50th anniversary of the Katyń massacres, and Gorbachev disingenuously reports that the relevant documents were only recently found “in a place where almost no-one thought to search until now.”92 Perhaps the most poignant moment occurs near the end, when Gorbachev summons the specter of the “Romanian version” (the violent overthrow of Ceauşescu) to defend his program. “My innermost aim, the chief strategic goal, is to complete perestroika , the democratization of society, and for once to have a renewal take place in Russia without blood, without civil war.” In this conversation, it is clear that Poland has become a testing ground for what would come next in the Soviet Union, just a short while later. By December 1990, Jaruzelski had lost his position as president and been replaced by Solidarity activist Lech Wałęsa; only a year later, Gorbachev would in turn disappear from the Kremlin along with the red flag of the Soviet Union. But the red stars on the Kremlin towers would remain, likewise the hammer and sickle on the Russian airline, Aeroflot’s, insignia; and in Poland, the young— post-communist—politician Aleksander Kwaśniewski, whom Jaruzelski recommends to Gorbachev in this meeting, would replace Wałęsa for his own two terms as president of Poland. 92 When Boris Yeltsin publicly released the Katyń file it became clear that the documents actually resided in the Kremlin archives and had been seen by gorbachev himself, who had previously decided against their release. Melyakova book.indb 691 2010.04.12. 16:21 692 Gorbachev: A warm welcome to you in the Kremlin. I am glad to meet again. We will have an opportunity to synchronize our political clocks. We are united by many things. It has fallen to our lot to decide a multitude of common and immediate problems. I think this is a timely visit. We are watching the situation in Poland carefully. I would like to hear your view. We should exchange thoughts on the prospects for the Warsaw Treaty, and about the general situation in Europe. […] You could say that right now populism is raging [in the USSR]. And populism multiplied by nationalism produces an explosive mix akin to detonating gasoline . It does not easily lend itself to rational control. In this respect the attitudes in your country’s society to some degree resemble the situation [in the Soviet Union]. Jaruzelski: We are all children of one epoch. Mazowiecki, being a rationalist, understands the danger of such a situation. He holds to common sense and realizes [his] responsibility for the situation in the country. In this respect we—the representatives of leftist forces—and he are allies. Mazowiecki also realistically appreciates the need for normal relations with the Soviet Union. In general, there are two wings in the former opposition. One is pro-West and anti-Soviet, the other is pro-West but not anti-Soviet. By his background and philosophy, Mazowiecki keeps to the Western orientation. But at the same time he is a...

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